Pj      Reports  of  the  Belgian  Representatives  in  Berlin,  London  and 
^OS     ^^^^  *^  ^^^  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Brussels,  1905-1914 


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PRESIDENT'S    OFFICE 


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EUROPEAN    POLITICS 

DURING  THE  DECADE  BEFORE 
THE  WAR  AS   DESCRIBED   BY 

BELGIAN  DIPLOMATISTS 


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Documents  Issued  by  the  Imperial  German  Foreign  Office 

19  1  5 

PRICE  25  CENTS 


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Reports  of  the  Belgian  Representatives  in  Berlin,  London  and 
Paris  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Brussels,  1905-1914 


EUROPEAN    POLITICS 

DURING  THE  DECADE  BEFORE 
THE  WAR  AS   DESCRIBED   BY 

BELGIAN  DIPLOMATISTS 


Documents  Issued  by  the  Imperial  German  Foreign  Office 

19  15 


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AN  INTRODUCTION 

TO  THE  REPORTS  TO  THE  BELGIAN  MINISTERS  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 

OF  THE  BELGIAN  DIPLOMATIC  REPRESENTATIVES  AT 

LONDON,  PARIS  AND  BERLIN  1905-  1915 


THE  titanic  drama  to-day  being  enacted  in 
Europe  invests  with  tragic  interest  the  de- 
tails of  diplomatic  history  during  the  decade 
in  which  the  storm  was  gathering.  Each  of  the 
Powers  has  given  out  an  edition  of  official  docu- 
ments representing  its  version  of  the  events  imme- 
diately preceding  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  But 
the  genesis  and  explanation  of  the  war  lie  further 
back,  nor  are  they  to  be  sought  in  the  White  Books 
or  Blue  Books,  or  Red  or  Gray  Books,  with  what- 
ever honesty  and  sincerity,  or  the  lack  of  it,  pre- 
pared. To  attain  any  degree  of  understanding  of 
the  cause  of  the  tragedy  it  is  of  course  necessary  to 
go  back  at  least  to  the  beginning  of  the  century  and 
to  seek  contemporaneous  records,  spontaneously 
made  and  innocent  of  design.  The  historians  of  the 
war  will  scrutinize  innumerable  documents  and  re- 
construct the  political  and  social  life  of  Europe  from 
the  beginning  of  the  century,  studying  in  particular 
the  diplomacy  of  the  period,  and  listening  to  the 
gossip  of  the  courts  and  chancelleries  and  parlia- 
ments where,  for  a  dozen  years,  the  guardians  of 
Europe's  fate  sought,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
some  to  provoke,  and  some  to  prevent,  the  catas- 
trophe which  at  last  has  fallen. 

Among  the  sources  to  which .  the  historian  will 
resort,  the  documents  which  are  herewith  presented 
to  the  world  will  rank  high.  They  consist  of  re- 
ports made  to  the  Belgian  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Baron  de  Favereau  and  M.  Davignon,  by 
the  Belgian  Ministers  at  the  chief  European  Capitals 
— Count  de  Lalaing  at  London ;  M.  A.  Leghait  and 
later  Baron  Guillaume  at  Paris ;  Baron  Greindl  and 
then  Baron  Beyens  at  Berlin — from  the  year  1905 
to  1914. 

The  correspondence  was  found  in  the  archives  of 
the  Belgian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  occu- 
pation of  Brussels  by  German  forces.  It  is  printed 
in  this  volume  in  its  original  French  and  in  an  Eng- 
lish translation.  A  few  facsimile  reproductions  ex- 
hibit sample  pages  of  the  manuscripts. 

These  papers  provide  a  running  commentary  on 
European  history  during  the  past  decade,  throwing 
light  which,  once  shed,  could  by  no  means  ever  be 
spared,  on  the  causes  of  the  cataclysm  through 
which  Europe  is  now  passing.  All  is  here.  Early 
testimony  of  a  decade  ago  of  the  growth  of  anti- 
German   jealousy,   soon   amounting   to   hatred,    in 


into  certainty,  of  the  Anglo-Russian  rapprochement 
and  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance;  the  inclusion  of 
Italy  in  the  Anglo-French  plans;  the  return  to  power 
of  Delcasse,  the  election  of  the  chauvinist  Poincare, 
the  institution  in  France  of  the  three-years'  military 
service  law,  the  exchange  of  the  Barthou  for  the 
Ribot  Cabinet — all  is  here. 

But  it  is  the  peculiar  interest  of  these  reports, 
voluminous  as  they  are  and  coming  as  they  do  from 
a  half  dozen  distinct  sources,  that  they  coincide  pre- 
cisely in  the  account  they  give  of  the  causes  of 
Europe's  unhappiness. 

The  picture  which  these  Ministers  unite  in  draw- 
ing is  that  of  the  sinister  figure  of  England  moving 
with  ever  malevolent  purpose  among  the  courts  and 
chancelleries  of  Europe,  everywhere  fomenting  sus- 
picions and  inspiring  hatred  of  the  Power  which  it 
has  set  its  mind  to  destroy.  In  the  pursuit  of  this 
purpose  we  see  King  Edward  in  the  closing  days  of 
his  reign  devoting  himself  to  the  dissipation  of  the 
long-standing  Anglo-French  antipathy  and  the  crea- 
tion of  the  rapprochement  which  Lord  Lansdowne 
and  Sir  Edward  Grey  strengthened  into  an  alliance. 
We  see  the  British  Government  intervening  at  Paris 
again  and  again,  with  suggestion,  innuendoes,  de- 
mands, always  calculated  to  misrepresent  German 
policy  and  induce  the  French  Government  to  assume 
in  every  international  discussion  an  attitude  of  irrec- 
oncilability toward  the  most  ordinary  German  sug- 
gestions. The  calendar  of  the  years  1905-1914  is 
unrolled  by  these  diplomatic  diarists,  and  the  story 
of  the  British  influence  on  French  internal  affairs 
during  the  decade,  of  British  influence  on  French 
foreign  policy  at  the  Algeciras  Conference  and  in 
Morocco,  and  in  the  successive  Balkan  crises,  is 
recounted. 

Though  the  chronicle  does  not  include  any  narra- 
tive from  St.  Petersburg,  there  are  ample  glimpses 
of  the  contemporaneous  progress  of  English  machi- 
nations in  that  capital,  tending  to  make  impossible 
any  confidence  between  the  Government  of  the  Czar 
and  of  the  Kaiser,  and,  finally,  the  creation  of  a 
Triple  Entente  bound  together  by  the  single  motive 
of  hatred  of  Germany. 

That  British  foreign  policy  during  the  last  ten 
years  has  had  as  its  central  motive  the  isolation  of 
Germany  is  of  course  no  secret  either  to  diplomatists 
or  to  laymen ;  but  the  extreme  degree  to  which  this 
motive    ruled,    the    never-sleeping    assiduity    with 


England;  the  retirement  of  Delcasse;  the  Algeciras  ^hich  it  was  pursued,  the  Machiavelian  ingenuity 

Conference;  the  mcidents  of  Scutari  and  Nancy;  the  with  which  every  occasion  to  forward  it  was  taken 

early  and  the  later  Balkan  crisis ;  the  ripening  of  the  advantage  of,  will  hardly  have  been  recognized  by 

Anglo-French  Entente;  the  first  rumors,  gathering  any  who  have  not  perused  the  documents  in  which 


these  detached  and  disinterested  spectators  of  the 
game  recorded  it  as  it  went  forward. 

Every  report,  every  paragraph  of  every  report, 
reveals  the  fact  that  the  neutral  diplomatists  recog- 
nize that  it  was  the  never-forgotten  aim  of  Great 
Britain  to  raise  up  enemies  to  Germany  on  every 
hand,  to  frustrate  her  every  endeavor,  no  matter 
how  innocent  of  harm  to  others;  and  that  in  pur- 
suance of  this  aim  England  never  hesitated  to  jeop- 
ardize the  peace  of  Europe. 

Such  is  the  story  which  these  pages  spread  be- 
fore us. 

It  is  away  back  in  1905  (September  23)  that  we 
find  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Baron  Greindl, 
writing  in  this  wise: 

"The  unheard-of  efforts  made  by  the  English 
press  to  prevent  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
Moroccan  affair  and  the  probably  insincere 
credulity  with  which  it  receives  all  calumnies 
aimed  at  the  German  policy  show  how  ready  pub- 
lic opinion  in  Great  Britain  is  to  acclaim  any 
combination  hostile  to  Germany." 

As  to  the  attitude  of  Germany,  writing  on  the  last 
day  of  the  year  1905,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin 
tells  his  home  office  that  it  has  been  "the  highest 
ambition  of  his  Majesty  (the  German  Emperor)  to 
preserve  peace  during  his  entire  reign." 

The  peculiar  tactics  historically  characteristic  of 
English  foreign  poHcy  are  recognized  in  the  memo- 
randum of  October  27,  1905,  by  the  Minister  in 
Berlin  in  these  words : 

"An  insurmountable  mistrust  of  England  is  pre- 
valent here.  A  great  number  of  Germans  are 
convinced  that  England  is  either  seeking  allies  for 
an  attack  against  Germany — or  which  would  be 
more  in  conformity  with  the  British  traditions — 
is  endeavoring  to  stir  up  a  war  on  the  Continent 
in  which  she  would  not  take  part  and  of  which  she 
would  reap  the  benefit." 

In  the  sam.e  memorandum  the  Minister  goes  on: 

"Are  the  people  in  England  who  profess  fear 
of  a  German  attack,  which  would  be  impossible, 
quite  sincere  ?  Do  not  they  rather  feign  such  ap- 
prehensions in  order  to  bring  about  a  conflict 
which  would  exterminate  the  navy,  the  merchant 
marine,  and  the  foreign  trade,  of  Germany? 
While  England  is  safe  from  attacks,  Germany  on 
the  contrary  is  very  vulnerable.  In  attacking 
Germany  simply  to  annihilate  a  rival,  England 
would  only  follow  her  old  tracks.  She  destroyed 
successfully  the  Dutch  fleet  in  accord  with  Louis 
XIV,  subsequently,  the  French  fleet  and,  finally, 
even  the  Danish  fleet,  in  the  midst  of  peace  and 
without  any  provocation,  simply  because  it  repre- 
sented a  respectable  naval  force." 

What  is  the  reason  for  the  English  hatred  of  Ger- 
many? It  is  again  and  again  set  down  by  each  of 
the  Belgian  Ministers.  Thus  Baron  Greindl,  Bel- 
gian Minister  at  Berlin,  writing  to  his  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  from  Berlin,  February  18,  1905: 

"The  real  cause  of  the  hate  of  the  English  for 
the  Germans  is  the  jealousy  produced  by  the  ex- 
traordinary development  of  the  merchant  marine, 
the    commerce,    and    the    industry,    of    Germany. 


This  hate  will  continue  until  the  English  will  have 
come  to  realize  that  the  commerce  of  the  world  is 
not  a  monopoly  belonging  by  right  to  England.  It 
is,  moreover,  carefully  nursed  by  the  Times  and 
quite  a  number  of  newspapers  and  magazines 
which  do  not  shrink  from  calumny  in  order  to 
cater  to  the  tastes  of  their  readers." 

Count  de  Lalaing,  writing  from  London,  June  23, 
1906,  says: 

"The  English  press  has  so  consistently  indulged 
in  attacks  against  the  Emperor,  his  government, 
and  his  people  that  the  public  remains  suspicious. 
Germany  is  the  great  commercial,  military  and,  in 
future  perhaps,  naval,  rival ;  for  this  reason  every 
good  citizen  considers  himself  under  obligation  to 
detest  her,  because  he  tells  himself  that  for  the 
present  she  is  the  only  nation  of  which  he  has  any- 
thing to  fear  since  the  weakening  of  Russia  and 
the  entente  with  France." 

Writing  from  London  May  24,  1907,  Count  de 
Lalaing  gives  his  government  some  pertinent  infor- 
mation respecting  the  activities  of  the  British  press: 

"A  certain  category  of  the  press,  known  here  as 
the  'yellow  press,'  is  to  a  great  degree  responsible 
for  the  hostility  between  the  two  nations.  What, 
indeed,  can  one  expect  of  a  journalist  like  Mr. 
Harmsworth,  to-day  Lord  Northcliffe,  editor  of 
the  Daily  Mail,  the  Daily  Mirror,  the  Daily 
Graphic,  the  Daily  Express,  the  Evening  News, 
and  the  Weekly  Dispatch,  who  in  an  interview 
to  the  Matin  exclaims :  'Yes,  we  detest  the  Ger- 
mans, and  cordially,  too.  They  are  making  them- 
selves odious  all  over  Europe.  I  shall  not  permit 
the  slightest  thing  which  might  offend  France  to 
be  printed  in  my  paper,  but  I  would  not  have  any- 
thing whatsoever  inserted  in  it  that  might  be 
agreeable  to  Germany.' 

"In  1899  this  same  editor  attacked  the  French 
with  the  same  violence,  wanted  to  boycott  the 
Paris  Exposition,  and  wrote :  'The  French  have 
succeeded  in  convincing  John  Bull  that  they  are 
his  bitter  enemies.  England  hesitated  for  a  long 
time  between  France  and  Germany,  but  she  always 
respected  the  German  character  whereas  she  has 
come  to  regard  France  with  contempt.  An  En- 
tente Cordiale  cannot  exist  between  England  and 
her  nearest  neighbor.  Enough  of  France,  which 
has  neither  courage  nor  political  sense.' 

"It  is  these  journalists,  editors  of  cheap  and 
widely  read  papers,  who  pervert  at  will  the 
spirit  of  an  entire  nation. 

"It  is  evident  that  official  England  is  pursuing 
a  policy  of  stubborn  hostility  which  aims  at  the 
isolation  of  Germany,  and  that  King  Edward  did 
not  disdain  to  use  his  personal  influence  in  the 
service  of  this  idea,  but  it  is  clearly  dangerous  to 
poison  public  opinion  as  openly  as  the  irresponsible 
press  in  question  is  doing." 

This  estimate  of  the  source  of  English  hatred  of 
Germany  is  coincided  in  by  the  Minister  at  Berlin, 
for  instance,  in  that  of  May  30.  1907,  in  which  he 
says : 

"England  is  jealous  of  the  prodigious  prog- 
ress in  the  industry,  the  commerce,  and  the  mer- 
chant marine  of  Germany.  Accustomed  to  be 
without  a  rival,  she  considers  any  competition  as 
an  encroachment  on  her  domain. 

"She  affects  to  feel  alarm,  the  sincerity  of 
which  seems  more  than  doubtful  to  me,  in  regard 


to  the  development  of  the  German  navy.  She 
ought  to  know,  however,  that  even  in  a  very 
distant  future,  an  attack  by  Germany  would  be 
practically  impossible.  It  is  Germany,  on  the  con- 
trary, who  has  everything  to  fear.  For  centuries 
England  has  applied  herself  to  the  destruction  of 
the  foreign  naval  forces  as  soon  as  they  acquired 
a  certain  degree  of  importance.  France  experi- 
enced this  after  Holland  had  done  so.  Then  it 
was  the  turn  of  Denmark,  whose  vessels  were  de- 
stroyed without  the  shadow  of  a  pretext  by  Ad- 
miral Nelson,  who  had  entered  the  harbor  of 
Copenhagen  as  a  friend." 

A  week  later  (June  8,  1907)  the  same  Minister, 
expressing  his  skepticism  regarding  the  effect  of  the 
approaching  visit  of  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  to 
Berlin,  writes: 

"As  Count  de  Lalaing  rightly  says,  the  King 
of  England  is  personally  directing  a  policy  the 
ultimate  aim  of  which  is  the  isolation  of  Ger- 
many. His  action  corresponds  with  the  senti- 
ments of  the  nation,  misled  by  an  unscrupulous 
press,  the  sole  interest  of  which  consists  in  a  large 
circulation,  and  which  is  therefore  only  anxious 
to  flatter  the  passions  of  the  populace.  It  is  not 
only  the  cheap  papers  that  lower  themselves  to 
such  a  part.  For  years  the  Times  has  pursued  a 
campaign  of  vilification  and  slander.  Its  Berlin 
correspondent,  who  has  every  opportunity  to  be 
well  informed,  nourishes  the  hatred  of  the  Eng- 
lish against  the  Germans  by  imputing  to  the 
Imperial  Government  ambitious  schemes  the  ab- 
surdity of  which  is  self-evident  and  by  accusing 
it  of  shady  maneuvres  of  which  it  has  never  a 
thought." 

Of  affairs  in  Paris,  while  the  Entente  is  being 
strengthened  and  the  purpose  of  England  imposed 
upon  the  RepubHc,  the  reports  of  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister give  vivid  pictures.  M.  Leghait,  writing  home 
March  6,  1906,  of  the  visit  of  King  Edward  to  the 
French  capital,  declares  that  "France  is  being 
dragged  against  her  will  into  the  British  policy.  In 
short,  it  is  felt  that  a  symptom  has  manifested  itself 
here  of  a  desire  which  England  may  have  to  en- 
venom the  situation  to  a  point  of  rendering  war 
inevitable." 

April  5,  1906,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin, 
writing  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  declares  that : 

"There  is  no  indication  that  the  British  Am- 
bassador had  made  the  slightest  effort  at  Alge- 
ciras in  order  to  find  a  solution  conciliating  the 
views  of  Germany  and  France.  It  was  of  course 
expected  that  England  would  support  the  French 
policy;  but  the  obligations  which  she  had  con- 
tracted need  not  have  prevented  her  from  exer- 
cising a  moderating  influence." 

In  this  connection  Baron  Greindl  gives  the  fol- 
lowing interesting  exposition  of  British  policy : 

"It  can  no  longer  be  doubted  that  it  has  been 
the  King  of  England  who  independently  from  his 
government  drove  M.  Delcasse  into  a  bellicose 
policy  and  who  gave  him  the  promise,  which  he 
would  not  have  kept,  to  land  100,000  British  sol- 
diers in  Holstein. 

"The  invitation  extended  by  the  King  to  M. 
Delcasse  at  the  time  of  his  passage  through  Paris 
can  only  be  interpreted  as  a  provocation. 


"If  any  doubt  could  still  have  existed,  the  singu- 
lar step  taken  by  Colonel  Barnardiston  with  Gen- 
eral Ducarne  would  have  dispelled  it." 

The  singular  step  taken  by  Colonel  Barnardiston 
with  General  Ducarne  was  revealed  to  the  world  in 
the  publication  November,  1914,  of  secret  docu- 
ments found  in  the  Brussels  archives,  detailing  a 
series  of  conversations  early  in  1906  between  the 
Military  Attache  of  the  British  Legation  in  Brussels, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  and  the  Chief  of 
the  Belgian  General  Staff,  Major-General  Ducarne, 
over  a  certain  British  proposal.  A  plan  was  dis- 
cussed for  the  landing  of  two  British  army  corps  in 
France  to  be  transported  into  Belgium  for  use 
against  Germany  in  case  of  war.  The  English  fur- 
ther proposed  the  establishment  of  a  Belgian  espion- 
age system  in  Germany,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that 
that  part  of  the  English  suggestion  was  acted  on  by 
the  Belgian  Government.  The  British  offer  to  land 
troops  was  accepted,  and  a  plan  for  their  use  was 
elaborated.  The  acceptance  of  the  British  proposal 
would  appear  to  have  been  unknown  to  Baron 
Greindl. 

Baron  Greindl's  report  to  his  Government  repeat- 
edly referred  to  the  Barnardiston-Ducarne  episode ; 
for  instance,  writing  April  18,  1907,  he  says: 

"This  zeal  in  uniting  Powers  whom  no  one  is 
menacing  for  alleged  purposes  of  defense,  can  with 
good  reason  seem  suspicious.  The  offer  of  100,- 
000  men  made  by  the  King  of  England  to  M. 
Delcasse  cannot  be  forgotten  in  Berlin.  We  our- 
selves have  to  record  the  singular  overtures  made 
by  Colonel  Barnardiston  to  General  Ducarne,  and 
who  knows  if  there  have  not  been  other  similar 
intrigues  which  have  not  come  to  our  knowl- 
edge?" 

The  reports  of  the  Belgian  Minister  in  France 
sketch  the  unwillingness  of  a  timid  minority  of  pa- 
triotic Frenchmen  to  see  their  country  brought  into 
England's  orbit.  He  observes  the  invention  by  King 
Edward  and  his  Ministers  of  constant  irritations 
designed  to  reawaken  and  fan  the  French  spirit  of 
revenge.  To  create  enemies  for  Germany,  this  is 
the  deliberate  and  persistent  aim  of  all  British  states- 
manship and  diplomacy.  It  was  reluctantly  that 
France  allowed  herself  to  be  hitched  and  dragged  at 
the  cart-tail  of  British  purposes,  if  the  observations 
of  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris  were  well  founded. 
Reporting  to  his  Government  February  10,  1907, 
M.  Leghait  writes : 

"I  believe  that  the  French  Government  would 
rather  have  avoided  this  last  English  visit  and  that 
it  is  aware  that  it  is  taking  upon  its  shoulders  too 
much  of  the  responsibility  for  the  Anglo-German 
antipathy. .... 

"France,  who  sincerely  desires  to  maintain 
peace  and  to  improve  her  relations  with  Germany, 
will  have  to  make  great  efforts  of  diplomacy  if 
she  wishes  to  demonstrate  at  Berlin  that  the  En- 
tente Cordiale  need  not  be  obnoxious  to  Germany 
and  that  it  was  not  concluded  to  put  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  her  expansion. 

"It  is  realized  here  so  well  that  France  is  in  a 
delicate  situation  and  has  been  dragged  into  a 
dangerous  game,  that  all  the  semi-official  organs 
and  other  serious  papers  are  keeping  silent  on 
this  occasion  and  that  none  of  them  dares  to  show 


pleasure  in  this  new  demonstration  of   English 
friendship." 

In  view  of  the  unspeakable  calamities  which  have 
fallen  upon  the  French  Republic  and  the  Kingdom 
of  Belgium  in  consequence  of  her  implication  in  the 
British  plot  against  Germany,  it  is  sadly  interesting 
to  note  that  as  early  as  June  17,  1907,  the  Belgian 
Minister  to  France,  M.  Leghait,  was  writing  solemn 
warnings  to  his  Government  in  this  fashion : 

"England  is  preparing  her  ground  admirably, 
but  has  France,  who  is  joining  her  in  her  policy, 
all  the  necessary  guarantees  that  she  will  not  be 
the  victim  of  this  policy  one  day?  The  uncer- 
tainty which  prevails  in  regard  to  this  subject 
justifies  the  supposition  that  there  exists  between 
her  and  the  British  Government  a  more  complete 
agreement  than  that  of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  but 
which  will  remain  latent  until  that  day  when 
events  zmll  demand  that  its  stipulations  be  made 
public. 

"In  order  to  arm  herself  for  the  moment 
against  perils  which  are  perhaps  illusory,  or  in 
order  to  strengthen  the  position  of  the  directors 
of  her  internal  policy,  France  is  contracting  a  debt 
of  gratitude  zuhich  ztnll  seem  heavy  to  her  on  the 
day  when  England  zmll  rez'eal  the  purpose  for 
which  she  zvants  to  use  the  influences  which  she 
had  grouped  around  herself." 

These  words  were  written  seven  years  before 
the  day  which  they  prophesied  broke  in  sorrow  over 
France. 

Great  Britain's  rapprochement  with  Russia  was 
becoming  a  possibility  in  1905.  As  early  as  Octo- 
ber 14  of  that  year  Baron  Greindl,  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister at  Berlin,  writes  to  his  Minister  of  Foreign 
AiTairs : 

"England  at  the  present  time  shows  no  interest 
whatsoever  in  the  fate  of  Turkey,  whose  preserva- 
tion has  for  such  a  long  time  been  the  leading 
principle  of  her  policy.  She  may  leave  Russia 
a  free  hand  in  Asia  Minor.  Such  a  combination 
would,  moreover,  have  the  advantage  of  embroil- 
*ing  Russia  with  Germany,  whose  isolation  is  at 
present  the  principal  aim  of  the  English  policy." 

The  persistent  wooing  of  the  Hyperboreans  by 
England  seemed  to  puzzle  the  Belgian  observers. 
Baron  Greindl,  writing  July  16,  1906,  remarks: 

"One  can  see  very  well  what  Russia  can  gain 
by  the  friendship  of  England,  but  it  is  much  less 
clear  what  good  the  Russian  friendship  could  do 
England.  What  can  they  aim  at  in  London  ex- 
cept at  making  enemies  for  Germany  ?" 

It  is  clear  to  this  disinterested  observer  that  Eng- 
land can  gain  nothing  from  Russia  by  winning  Rus- 
sia's friendship ;  he  knows  well  enough  that  to  gain 
Russia's  friendship  England  must  make  substantial 
concessions,  though  probably  his  imagination  never 
reached  the  point  of  supposing  that  the  successors 
of  Beaconsfield  and  Gladstone  would  have  cam- 
paigned against  Constantinople  for  the  purpose  of 
turning  it  over  to  the  Muscovite. 

Encouraged  by  England  and  conscious  of  the 
growing  probability  that  the  Entente  Cordiale  would 
become  a  Triple  Entente,  France  early  in  1907  be- 
gan to  assume  the  aggressive  attitude  which  Eng- 
land had  long  sought  to  impose  upon  her.     In  his 


report  on  the  state  of  the  Morocco  affair  at  the 
period  of  March  28,  1907,  Baron  Greindl  writes: 

"French  arrogance  is  becoming  again  what  it 
was  during  the  worst  days  of  the  second  Empire 
and  the  cause  of  this  is  the  Entente  Cordiale.  It 
has  increased  still  more  since  it  appears  that  the 
negotiations  between  London  and  St.  Petersburg, 
to  which  without  doubt  France  has  not  been  a 
stranger,  are  going  to  lead  to  an  Entente. 

"If  the  points  in  question  only  concerned  mat- 
ters to  be  treated  officially  between  the  cabinets — 
as  in  the  case  of  Egypt,  Morocco,  the  New  Heb- 
rides, the  fisheries  of  Terra  Nova,  Persia,  Af- 
ghanistan, Thibet — we  could  only  congratulate 
ourselves  to  see  the  causes  of  conflict  disappear 
between  the  great  Powers ;  but  at  the  bottom  of 
the  arrangements  concluded,  or  which  are  going 
to  be  concluded,  we  always  find  the  hatred  of  Ger- 
many kept  alive — in  Paris  by  the  deep-rooted 
memory  of  the  humiliation  of  1870,  in  London 
by  the  jealousy  inspired  by  the  industrial,  commer- 
cial, and  maritime  development  of  Germany,  in 
St.  Petersburg  by  nothing  at  all  unless  it  be  preju- 
dice and  the  wound  inflicted  on  the  boundless 
Slavic  pride  by  the  comparison  between  German 
civilization  and  Muscovite  barbarism." 

By  the  middle  of  the  year  1907  a  network  of  in- 
ternational understandings  had  been  brought  about 
by  England  among  Powers  whose  interests  were 
supposed  to  be  at  one  point  or  another  in  conflict 
with  those  of  Germany.  England's  alliance  with 
Japan,  and  her  Entente  with  France  and  with  Rus- 
sia were  followed  by  the  understanding  of  Italy 
with  France  and  England  on  the  Mediterranean 
question,  by  the  agreement  over  Egypt  and  Morocco, 
by  negotiations  with  Russia  over  respective  spheres 
of  influence  in  Asia,  and  by  an  understanding  with 
Spain. 

Commenting  upon  the  last  two  enterprises,  the 
Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  writing  to  his  Govern- 
ment June  22,  1907,  remarks  that  they  do  not  re- 
spond to  any  demands  of  political  necessity.  What, 
then,  was  their  purpose,  he  inquires. 

"If  they  do  not  conceal  some  hidden  motive, 
they  might  be  described  as  of  purely  ornamental 
character." 

"Japan  is  strong  enough  to  guarantee  the  integ- 
rity of  China  alone  until  the  day  when  it  will  silit 
her  to  violate  it  herself.  It  would  be  hard  to  ad- 
mit that  England  needs  Spain's  assistance  in  order 
to  defend  her  position  in  Egypt,  Cyprus,  Malta, 
and  Gibraltar.  Who  is  thinking  of  attacking  it 
and  who,  moreover,  would  have  the  material  means 
to  do  so  ?  France  is  no  less  secure  in  Algiers  and 
Tunis.  The  danger  could  only  come  from  one 
of  the  signatory  Powers,  if  the  friendship  existing 
between  them  at  present  were  to  break.  In  such 
an  event  the  present  treaties  would  become  null 
and  void  ipso  facto. 

"If  they  do  not  contain  any  secret  clause,  they 
seem  to  have  been  concluded  only  for  the  pleasure 
of  leaving  Germany  outside  once  more  during  the 
regtdation  of  the  interests  of  the  world.  These 
precautions  taken  against  imaginary  perils  are 
bound  to  awaken  and  to  foster  among  the  nations 
the  idea  that  Germany  is  the  aggressive  Power 
against  the  enterprises  of  which  the  other  coun- 
tries must  unite.  Matters  would  not  be  so  bad 
if  the  treaties  were  merely  superfluous,  but  they 


positively  compromise  the  cause  of  peace  which 
they  pretend  to  serve,  because  they  nurse  a  be- 
lief in  anti-German  circles  that  the  moment  is  ap- 
proaching in  which  their  schemes  can  be  realized." 

Seven  months  later,  on  January  25,  1908,  we  see 
Baron  Greindl  writing : 

"The  policy  directed  by  King  Edward  VII  un- 
der the  pretext  of  guarding  Europe  from  the 
imaginary  German  peril,  has  created  a  French 
danger  which  is  only  too  real,  and  which  is  a 
menace  above  all  to  us." 

From  this  period  on,  the  communications  of  the 
Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin  not  infrequently  advert 
to  the  dangers  to  Belgium  involved  in  the  outbreak 
of  a  European  conflagration. 

In  the  report  last  quoted,  the  Minister,  defending 
German  policy  from  the  aspersions  cast  upon  it  by 
an  ex-French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  exclaims : 

"Where  did  M.  Delcasse  see  that  Germany  was 
endeavoring  to  impose  her  supremacy  on  other 
nations?  We  are  her  close  neighbors,  but  for 
twenty  years  I  have  never  observed  in  the  Im- 
perial Government  the  slightest  desire  to  abuse  its 
strength  and  our  weakness.  I  wish  that  all  the 
other  great  Powers  had  used  the  same  considera- 
tion toward  us." 

February  2,  1908,  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin 
thus  summarizes  his  view  of  the  rivalry  between 
England  and  Germany : 

"No  one  here  ever  cherished  the  absurd  and 
impracticable  idea  of  an  attack  against  England ; 
but  everybody  fears  an  English  attack."    . 

In  the  middle  of  the  year  1908,  the  veteran  who 
had  served  Great  Britain  as  its  Ambassador  near  the 
Kaiser's  Government  was  recalled.  The  Belgian 
Minister  at  the  same  capital  thus  reports  to  his  Gov- 
ernment concerning  the  reason  for  Sir  Frank  Las- 
celles'  removal: 

"I  must  still  speak  to  you.  Sir,  of  the  approach- 
ing retirement  of  the  British  Ambassador,  who 
left  Berlin  some  time  ago  and  who  will  only  re- 
turn here  in  autumn  in  order  to  present  his  letters 
of  recall.  His  retirement  is  voluntary  only  in 
form.  It  was  forced  by  the  British  Government 
on  Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  who  had  a  great  desire  to 
remain  at  Berlin  and  in  favor  of  whose  stay  an 
unsuccessful  request  was  also  made  at  London  by 
the  Imperial  Government. 

"Sir  Frank  Lascelles  is  a  diplomat  of  rare  intel- 
ligence, very  sound  judgment,  and  perfect  loyalty, 
who  has  neither  physically  nor  intellectually  felt  the 
signs  of  age  and  who  enjoys  the  highly  merited 
confidence  of  the  Emperor,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, and  all  his  colleagues.  If  the  British  Gov- 
ernment deprives  itself  of  the  services  of  a  diplo- 
mat of  such  merit,  who  has  not  yet  reached  the 
age  limit,  it  is  only  because  Sir  Frank  Lascelles 
worked  for  fifteen  years,  without  permitting  him- 
self to  be  discouraged  by  numerous  checks,  to 
bring  about  a  rapprochemeyit  between  Germany 
and  England.  The  zeal  which  he  displayed  in  or- 
der to  dissipate  the  misunderstandings  which  he 
considered  absurd  and  detrimental  in  a  high  de- 
gree to  the  two  countries  does  not  correspond 
rvith  the  political  liezvs  of  his  sovereign." 

We  come  now  to  the  period  of  the  Morocco  crisis. 


We  see  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  Baron  Guil- 
laume,  writing  home  July  28,  191 1,  in  the  darkest 
hours  of  that  affair : 

"France  does  not  and  cannot  desire  that  mat- 
ters should  be  irretrievably  spoilt.  ...  I  have 
on  the  whole  less  confidence  in  the  desire  for 
peace  of  Great  Britain,  who  rather  enjoys  seeing 
others  devour  one  another." 

August  10,  191 1,  Baron  Guillaume  informs  his 
Government  that : 

"At  first  England  proposed  to  France  that  the 
two  Governments  despatch  without  delay  two 
men-of-war  each  to  the  waters  of  Agadir.  The 
Cabinet,  in  Paris  strongly  objected  to  this,  and 
there  the  matter  stands.' 

Supporting  the  statement  of  his  colleague  at 
Paris  regarding  the  English  designs  against  Ger- 
many in  the  late  summer  of  1907,  Count  de  Lalaing, 
Belgian  Minister  at  London,  reported  that  he  had 
been  informed,  "through  reliable  sources,  that  the 
officers  of  the  active  army  had  suddenly  been  called 
back  from  their  furloughs,  that  horses  had  been 
bought  for  the  cavalry,  and  that  the  North  Sea 
squadron  had  swiftly  been  put  on  a  war  footing." 
The  Belgian  Minister  quotes  the  statement  made  by 
a  Member  of  the  House  of  Commons  that : 

"War  had  been  avoided,  thanks  only  to  the  per- 
sonal intervention  of  the  German  Emperor,  to 
whom  King  George  and  the  Czar  had  written." 

In  the  autumn  of  191 1,  the  Belgian  Minister  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James's  reports  to  his  Government 
a  number  of  circumstances  of  extreme  interest  in 
the  light  of  events  of  1914.  The  Morocco  crisis 
did  not  come  to  an  end  without  provoking  a  serious 
discussion  in  Parliament  regarding  the  secret  part 
which  his  British  Majesty's  Government  had  taken 
in  the  business;  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  one  of 
the  greatest  efforts  of  his  life  to  conceal  what  he 
could  not  defend  before  the  nation,  and  to  defend 
what  he  could  not  conceal. 

Count  de  Lalaing  reports  on  November  28,  191 1, 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  the  categorical  state- 
ment that:  "There  was  no  secret  treaty  with 
France." 

The  Count  quotes  significantly  in  a  dispatch  dated 
November  30,  1908,  the  declaration  made  by  Lord 
Lansdowne  in  the  House  of  Lords  to  the  effect  that : 

"In  his  opinion,  the  Entente  Cordiale  had 
emerged  from  the  crisis  strengthened,  and  was 
destined,  as  was  the  Anglo-Russian  Entente,  to 
be  permanent." 

Lord  Lansdowne  was  the  father  of  the  Entente 
Cordiale. 

Count  de  Lalaing  continues  in  this  report : 

"Lord  Courtney  of  Penrith,  a  Liberal  and 
friend  of  Germany,  attacked  the  policy  of  the 
Government,  because  it  had  been  aiming  at  the 
isolation  of  Germany  (it  is  rare  to  hear  that  truth 
expressed  in  the  British  Parliament)  and  because 
it  had  not  upheld  the  Act  of  Algeciras." 

The  Belgian  Minister  adds:  "These  disagreeable 
truths  were  not  to  the  liking  of  the  House  of 
Lords." 


X 


Count  de  Lalaing  noted  particular  significance  in 
one  passage  in  the  speech  of  Lord  Lansdowne : 

"It  is  the  one  in  which  he  spoke  of  the  secret 
clauses  of  1904,  recently  made  public.  He  admit- 
ted that  in  such  a  case  the  promise  simply  to  give 
diplomatic  support  to  another  Power  might  lead 
to  the  obligation  to  furnish  assistance  of  another 
kind  {videlicet  military  and  naval).  An  Entente 
Cordiale  established  close  relations  between  two 
countries,  and  they  could  not  remain  indifferent. 
If  the  one  found  itself  in  a  different  position -with- 
out any  fault  of  its  own,  it  would  expect  to  re- 
ceive assistance  from  its  friend. 

"You  only  have  to  read  between  the  lines,"  ob- 
served the  Belgian  diplomatist,  "to  see  that,  ac- 
cording to  Lord  Lansdowne,  one  of  the  authors 
of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  such  an  arrangement  can, 
without  being  an  alliance,  produce  under  certain 
circumstances  all  the  effects  of  a  defensive  treaty 
between  the  two  nations." 

The  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  reporting  home 
about  this  time  (December  6,  191 1),  sees  matters 
precisely  as  does  his  colleague  in  London : 

"Everybody  in  England  and  France  considers 
the  Entente  Cordiale  as  a  defensive  and  offen- 
sive alliance  against  Germany.  That  is  the  char- 
acter which  the  late  King  of  England  wanted  to 
impart  to  it.  The  Entente  Cordiale  was  founded 
not  on  the  positive  basis  of  defense  of  common 
interests,  but  on  the  negative  basis  of  hatred 
against  the  German  Empire.  ...  It  is  the 
Entente  Cordiale  that  revived  in  France  the  idea 
of  revenge,  which  had  already  abated  consider- 
ably. It  is  the  Entente  Cordiale  that  causes  the 
state  of  unrest  and  uneasiness  in  which  Europe 
has  been  writhing  for  seven  years." 

Baron  Greindl  takes  up  particularly  the  suspicion 
that  England  had  had  in  preparation  a  military  ex- 
pedition on  the  Continent.  He  refers  to  the  fact 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  refrained  from  denying  the 
truth  of  the  charges  to  this  effect,  and  he  says : 

"In  default  of  other  information  it  must  be 
considered  as  an  established  fact  that  the  plan  had 
been  discussed  in  London  of  aiding  France  in  a 
war  with  Germany  by  landing  an  English  corps  of 
150,000  men.  There  is  nothing  in  this  which 
ought  to  surprise  us.  It  is  the  continuation  of  the 
singular  proposals  which  were  made  a  few  years 
ago  to  General  Ducarne  by  Colonel  Barnardiston 
as  well  as  of  the  Flushing  intrigue." 

Baron  Greindl  comments  sarcastically  .on  the  fact 
that: 

"A  hue  and  cry  was  raised  because  a  German 
cruiser  had  cast  anchor  on  the  roadstead  of 
Agadir,  whereas  England  had  not  moved  a  muscle 
when  watching  the  progressing  conquest  of  Mo- 
roccan territory  by  France  and  Spain  and  the  over- 
throw of  the  Sultan's  independence. 

"England  could  not  do  otherwise.  She  was 
bound  by  her  secret  treaty  with  France." 

In  short,  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Belgian 
Ministers  in  Europe's  chief  capitals  is  to  the  effect 
that  the  Moroccan  question  had  been  used  through- 
out by  England  deliberately  to  the  end  of  commit- 
ting the  Triple  Entente  to  a  settled  policy  of  hos- 
tility to  Germany. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  191 1  this  is  the  report 


which  the  Belgian  Government  received   from  its 

representative  in  Berlin : 

"There  is  no  more  harmony  between  the  people 
than  there  is  between  the  Governments.  The  Eng- 
lish continue  to  be  jealous  of  Germany's  expan- 
sion. The  Germans  who  six  months  ago  were  by 
no  means  hostile  to  England  have  become  so  now." 

The  disinterested,  but  complete  and  absolutely 
unanimous,  as  well  as  continuous,  testimony  which 
the  successive  occupants  of  the  three  chief  Belgian 
legations  in  Europe  bear  to  the  innocence  of  Ger- 
many's policy  and  the  persistent  and  malicious  hos- 
tility of  England's  policy  is  astounding.  Writing 
February  13,  191 2,  Count  de  Lalaing  notes  the  oppo- 
sition to  Sir  Edward  Grey  rampant  in  the  English 
press.  The  Daily  News  was  in  the  lead  of  those 
who 

"deplored  the  results  of  the  action  of  the  Minis- 
ter who  had  set  up  a  Triple  Entente  in  opposition 
to  the  Triple  Alliance,  hampered  the  expansion 
of  Germany,  and  brought  the  country  within  'an 
ace  of  war  during  the  past  year.  The  policy  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey  was  logically  bound  to  lead 
Great  Britain  to  adopt  compulsory  conscription  for 
the  army." 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1912  a  new  Belgian  Min- 
ister appeared  at  Berlin,  in  the  person  of  Baron 
Beyens.  His  first  published  communication  to  his 
Government  is  concerned  with  asking  whether  the 
new  German  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James's,  Baron  von  Marschall,  will  succeed  in  what 
is  understood  to  be  his  aim  at  London,  namely,  to 
efifect  better  feelings  between  the  German  Imperial 
Government  and  the  British  Government.  Baron 
Beyens  observes : 

"Without  doubt,  nobody  desires  it  more  than 
the  Emperor;  and  in  justice  to  His  Majesty  it 
should  be  said  that  he  hardly  neglects  a  single 
occasion  in  order. to  say  in  public  some  amiable 
or  laudatory  words  about  the  English.  The  re- 
cent races  at  Kiel  twice  offered  him  a  pretext  for 
praising  the  British  navy.  The  Emperor  never 
allows  himself  to  be  discouraged  by  the  disap- 
pointments which  the  British  friends  cause  him.  I 
have  been  told  here  that  -after  the  death  of  Ed- 
ward VII  the  Emperor  as  well  as  the  Crown 
Prince  were  convinced,  when  returning  from 
England,  where  they  were  very  courteously  re- 
ceived, that  the  coldness  existing  in  the  relations 
between  the  two  Courts  during  the  preceding 
years  would  give  way  to  an  intimate  cordiality 
and  that  the  causes  of  misunderstanding  between 
the  two  peoples  would  vanish  with  the  past.  The 
Emperor's  surprise  must  have  been  cruel  when  he 
saw  the  Cabinet  of  London  last  year  range  itself 
with  so  much  resolution  by  the  side  of  France. 
But  the  Emperor  is  tenacious,  and  he  has  not 
given  up  reconquering  the  sympathy  of  the  Eng- 
lish, just  as  he  has  succeeded  in  winning  the  con- 
fidence of  the  Czar,  by  the  charm  of  his  seductive 
personality.  As  he  cannot  act  himself  at  London, 
he  has  charged  with  this  thankless  task  the  most 
distinguished  of  the  German  diplomats." 

Baron  Beyens  makes  an  acute  analysis  of  the 
causes  of  ill-feeling  between  Germany  and  England, 
the  result  of  conversations  with  his  friend,  the  Brit- 
ish Ambassador,  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  and  German 
diplomatists.     He  notes : 


"Sir  Edward  Goschen  passed  over  in  silence  an- 
other, perhaps  deeper,  cause  of  the  aversion  of  the 
English  for  the  German  nation ;  their  industrial 
and  commercial  rivalry.  England  observes  with 
a  very  natural  jealousy  how  an  European  people 
is  gaining  ground  every  year  in  the  economic 
struggle  of  the  world  and  how,  in  this  respect 
also,  it  is  threatening  the  supremacy  which  Eng- 
land had  secured  for  herself.  The  German  prod- 
ucts, though  still  inferior  in  quality,  are  tending 
to  become  equal  to  similar  English  goods,  the  price 
of  which  has  remained  higher.  The  mark  of 
origin  'Made  in  Germany'  imposed  by  the  British 
Cabinet,  seems  to  have  had  the  result  that  the 
German  products,  because  of  their  cheaper  price, 
are  to-day  being  preferred  in  the  British  Colonies 
to  those  of  the  mother  country." 

On  October  31,  1912,  the  Belgian  Minister  at 
London  recounts  to  his  Government  the  continuing 
progress  of  the  anti-German  propaganda  in  Eng- 
land, dwelling  particularly  on  the  part  played  by 
Lord  Roberts,  whom  he  describes  as  the  enfant  ter- 
rible. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Berlin  every  influence  was 
being  exerted  for  tranquillity.  Baron  Beyens,  writ- 
ing home  from  Berlin  November  30,  191 2,  regard- 
ing the  visit  to  the  German  Capital  of  the  Austrian 
Heir  Apparent,  records : 

"The  Archduke  said  at  Berlin  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  had  reached  the  limit  of 
the  concessions  which  it  was  in  a  position  to  make 
to  its  neighbor.  The  Emperor  and  his  advisers 
have  nevertheless  not  been  sparing  with  counsels 
of  moderation,  which  William  II  when  speeding 
his  guest  at  the  station  summed  up,  with  a  famil- 
iarity of  speech  which  is  his  custom  in  the  words : 
'Above  all,  no  follies.'  I  can  on  the  authority  of 
Ambassadors  who  repeated  it  to  me  vouch  for  the 
authenticity  of  this  advice,  which  escaped  the  in- 
discretion of  the  newspapers." 

The  Belgian  Minister  remarks: 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor,  the  Chan- 
cellor, and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs are  passionately  pacific." 

In  the  spring  of  191 3  events  in  Paris  again  be- 
come interesting.  Baron  Guillaume  writes  of  the 
beginnings  of  the  presidency  of  M'.  Poincare,  whose 
popularity  he  ascribes  above  all  to  a  rebirth  of  that 
"old  French  chauvinism"  which  had  disappeared 
for  years,  but  had  gained  fresh  life  since  the  inci- 
dents of  Agadir.  "M.  Poincare,"  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister notes,  "is  from  Lorraine,  and  misses  no  occa- 
sion to  mention  it.  He  was  the  collaborator  and 
the  originator  of  M.  Millerand's  militarist  policy." 

The  events  which  Baron  Guillaume  now  describes 
include  the  swift  increase,  under  the  influence  of 
England,  of  French  chauvinism.  It  soon  becomes 
the  general  belief  that  an  early  war  with  Germany 
is  inevitable.  A  fever  of  agitation  takes  possession 
of  the  country,  and  the  demand  for  an  overwhelm- 
ing increase  of  the  army  is  raised  on  all  sides.  The 
entire  press,  with  the  solitary  exception  of  the  social- 
ist and  extreme  radical  papers,  demand  a  law  calling 
upon  every  Frenchman  for  three  years'  army  serv- 
ice. At  first  reluctant,  the  Cabinet,  then  the  Dep- 
uties, are  carried  away. 


On  June  12,  191 3,  Baron  Guillaume  writes  to 
Brussels : 

"Thus  it  is  certain  to-day  that  provisions  are 
going  to  be  introduced  in  the  French  legislature 
which  the  country  will  probably  not  be  able  to  bear 
for  a  great  length  of  time.  The  burdens  of  the 
new  law  will  be  so  heavy  for  the  population,  the 
expenditure  which  it  involves  so  exorbitant,  that 
the  country  will  soon  protest,  and  France  will  be 
confronted  with  this  alternative;  renunciation 
(which  is  insuflferable  to  her)  or  war  within  a 
short  time. 

"The  responsibility  of  those  who  have  brought 
the  country  to  this  pass  will  be  heavy.  The  peo- 
ple are  following  them  in  a  sort  of  madness,  in  a 
frenzy,  which  is  interesting  but  lamentable.  It  is 
forbidden  to-day  on  pain  of  being  considered  a 
traitor,  to  utter  the  slightest  doubt  of  the  neces- 
sity for  the  adoption  of  the  three  years'  service. 
Everybody  realizes  that  the  nation  as  such  is  far 
from  being  in  favor  of  the  reform  which  is  in 
preparation ;  everybody  comprehends  the  danger 
which  threatens  the  future ;  but  one  closes  one's 
eyes  and  goes  on." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  fatal  year  1914,  the  Bel- 
gian Minister  at  Paris,  writing  January  16,  says: 

"I  have  already  had  the  honor  to  tell  you  that 
it  was  MM.  Poincare,  Delcasse,  Millerand  and 
their  friends,  who  invented  and  followed  the  na- 
tionalistic, militaristic  and  chauvinistic  policy,  the 
revival  of  which  we  are  witnessing.  It  is  a  dan- 
ger for  Europe — and  for  Belgium.  I  see  in  it  the 
greatest  peril  which  is  menacing  the  peace  of 
Europe  to-day :  not  that  I  have  the  right  to  sup- 
pose that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  intends 
to  disturb  it  deliberately — I  am  rather  inclined  to 
believe  the  contrary — but  because  the  attitude 
which  the  Barthou  Cabinet  has  assumed  is  in  my 
opinion  the  principal  cause  of  the  growth  of  mili- 
taristic tendencies  in  Germany." 

In  the  latter  part  of  April,  1914,  the  King  and 
Queen  of  England  visited  Paris,  met  with  a  brilliant 
reception,  every  incident  of  which  was  seized  upon 
to  promote  the  popularity  of  the  three  years'  service 
law,  with  all  its  consequences.  Baron  Guillaume 
notes  that  there  was  no  mention  of  a  likelihood  of 
giving  the  relations  between  France  and  England  a 
more  formal  character  by  treaty.  He  remarks,  writ- 
ing on  April  25,  1914: 

"Great  Britain  dislikes  formal  conventions,  and 
the  agreements  already  concluded  between  the  two 
Governments  as  they  are  to-day  established  suf- 
fice for  the  realization  of  the  aims  aspired  to." 

So  late  as  May  8,  19 14,  Baron  Guillaume  reports 
that  the  three  years'  military  service  law,  imposed 
upon  the  country  by  the  military  party,  "will  have 
to  be  given  up,  or  war  will  have  to  be  waged  before 
two  years  from  to-day  have  elapsed."  It  was  less 
than-  two  years,  it  was  less  than  three  months,  before 
Baron  Guillaume's  apprehensions  were  realized. 

On  June  9th,  the  Belgian  Minister,  reporting  it  to 
his  home  Government,  asks : 

"Is  it  true  that  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg 
imposed  on  France  the  adoption  of  the  three  year^ 
law,  and  that  it  is  to-day  using  all  its  weight  in 
order  to  secure  its  maintenance  ? 

"I  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  any  light  on  this 
delicate  point,  but  it  would  be  all  the  graver  be- 


cause  the  men  who  guide  the  destinies  of  the  Em- 
pire of  the  Czar  must  know  that  the  effort  which 
is  thus  being  demanded  of  the  French  nation  is 
excessive  and  cannot  be  sustained  for  a  long  time. 
Is  the  attitude  of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg 
based  on  the  convic  tion  that  events  are  sufficiently 
near  at  hand  to  use  the  tool  which  it  intends  to  put 
into  the  hand  of  its  ally?" 

Thus  closes  the  unhappy  narrative  of  Belgium's 
representative  in  the  French  Capital.  However,  at 
the  same  time,  or  to  be  accurate,  two  days  later,  his 
London  colleague  is  writing  the  Brussels  Govern- 
ment regarding  the  relief  felt  in  England  at  the  in- 
stallation in  France  of  the  Ribot  Cabinet  committed 
to  the  enforcement  of  the  three  years'  service  law, 
which  alone,  observes  Count  de  Lalaing,  "can  put 
the  Republic  in  a  position  to  fulfill  the  agreements 
which  tie  her  to  her  ally,  Russia,  and  her  friend, 
England." 

One  of  the  most  interesting  communications  in 
the  dossier  is  that  from  Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Min- 
ister at  Berlin,  dated  April  24,  1914,  in  which  he 
comments  on  the  official  visit  of  the  King  and  Queen 
of  England  to  Paris  and  the  political  relations  be- 
tween France  and  Great  Britain  at  that  particular 
time. 

As  the  world  now  knows  from  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
speech  of  August  3,  1914,  in  Parliament,  Great 
Britain  had  been  for  several  years  secretly  allied  to 
France  by  a  "gentlemen's  agreement"  the  existence 
of  which  was  unknown  even  to  the  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  British  Cabinet.  The  world  knows 
further  from  the  famous  minutes  of  a  conversation 
on  April  23,  1912,  between  General  Jungbluth, 
Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Stafif,  and  Colonel 
Bridges,  British  Military  Attache  at  Brussels,  that 
"at  the  time  of  the  recent  events"  (viz.,  the  Morocco 
crisis)  "the  British  Government  would  have  imme- 
diately efifected  a  disembarkment  in  Belgium  even  if 
we  (Belgians)  had  not  asked  for  assistance." 


Baron  Beyens  was,  evidently,  familiar  with  those 
conversations,  though  he  ignored  Great  Britain's 
secret  "gentlemen's  agreements"  existing  then  with 
Belgium  as  well  as  with  France.  He  writes  to  his 
Government : 

"For  us,  the  most  interesting  point  in  connection 
with  the  visit  of  the  Sovereigns  of  Great  Britain 
is  to  know  whether  the  British  Government  would 
be  as  inclined  to-day  as  three  years  ago  to  range 
itself  by  the  side  of  France  in  the  case  of  a  con- 
flict of  the  latter  with  Germany. 

"We  have  had  the  proof  that  a  co-operation  of 
the  British  army  and  the  despatching  of  an  ex- 
peditionary corps  to  the  Continent  have  been  con- 
sidered by  the  military  authorities  of  the  two  Gov- 
ernments (England  and  France). 

"Would  it  be  the  same  to-day,  and  should  we 
still  have  to  fear  THE  ENTRY  OF  BRITISH 
SOLDIERS  INTO  BELGIUM  IN  ORDER  TO 
HELP  US  DEFEND  OUR  NEUTRALITY 
BY  FIRST  COMPROMISING  IT?" 

It  can  surely  not  be  necessary  to  dilate  upon  the 
meaning  of  the  narrative  set  forth  in  these  luminous, 
but  disheartening,  pages.  These  are  not  the  words 
of  German  apologists.  They  are  the  words  of  dis- 
interested expert  observers — the  considered  words, 
though  set  down  in  the  very  midst  of  events  as  they 
pass.  They  register  the  convictions  of  five  profes- 
sional students  of  contemporary  international  his- 
tory, living  in  the  three  chief  capitals  of  Europe, 
and  possessing  unparalleled  access  to  the  facts,  with 
the  advantage  of  being  detached  and  unprejudiced 
with  regard  to  them.  And  their  convictions  are 
identical.  A  more  complete  indictment  of  English 
statesmanship  as  the  enemy  of  the  peace  of  the 
world,  a  deliberate  and  persistent  conspirator 
against  an  unoffending  neighbour,  could  not  possi- 
bly be  framed.  The  indictment  stretches  through- 
out the  nine  years.  There  are  no  palliations,  no 
extenuations.     It  is  a  record  of  a  monstrous  crime. 


DIRECTION   POLITIQUE 

N° /^.i  _.-.'- ^V/.^..... 

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/  Page  6  of  Report  of 

'  ^  6   ^'  9o^u^  -i^ty^iy^  April  5,  1906 

^''2^^  H/^^  e/^  ^VL  l^  {Jc  ^  vl^ 

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^M^^il  Page  8  of  Report  of 

April  5,  1906 


DIRECTION  POLITIQUE 

N' ...__^  D"'  dr^ 

ENTRE  LE /  A^a'^jl 


i 


f/UovMlW     „AWtAA^' 


^  V. 


Page  4  of  Report  of  May  24,  1907 

Page  5  of  Report  of  May  24,  1907 

'j'^CA^^VKveW   '^W  ^^A/NTv^k  ol^  (oMe.  La)^,  ^*^^^^  d  ^  c^  ^  iV^^ 


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DIRECTION  POLITIQUE 


ctv<^ 


6Ln'yn^C^(- 


I  GUI.  dc^  djt^^^^   aJcc^    ^Ucu  ^^^    (la^Oc£j^_^ 


ifTt.'iZUX-c^^ 


-(>juty 


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V  . 


—    XIX    — 

Page  8  of  Report  of  June  17,  1907 
Page  9  of  Report  of  June  17,  1907 


# 


198^795. 


Paris  le  ZO  mars  I9I4- 

0         i;i 


V 


2£DnSi«vir  le  Ulnlftre, 


C^  le  retour  de  la  Donno  saison  ,M.le  Pr^slAont  de  la  R^pUbliqiua 
va  reprandre  le  ohemln  des  divers  depart ements  de  la  Tranoe  oil  l*on 
r^elaioe  sa  vislte  .Sans  toutes  les  regions  du  pays   ,on  I'lixrlte  et  11 
se  rend  prnsque  toujours  k  ces  appeis  qui  le  flattent  et  serrent  la 
politique  .11  eonnalt  le  oUarme  qu* 11  r^pand  autour  de  lul  ;11  a  aons- 
oleiiee  du  sueo^s  oontlnu  de  ses  diseours  .8a  parole  est  toujours  &sk. 
bile  et  t>rlllante   :11  prepare  oonsoeneleuaement  ses  alloeutlons  qui 


Page  3  of  Report  of  March  10,  1914 

pas  m^prls  sur  sa  slgnlfloation,  ayant  par f alterae nt   comprls  que  o'^talt 
sa  propre  personnalite  qui  6talt  en  Jeu.  L'obllgatlon  o\x  11  a'est  trou- 
v^, grace  k  la  d^feotlon  de  quelquee  perfionnalites  polltlquea  eur  lea  - 
queues  11  oroyalt  pouvolr  oompter   .4e  oonTler  le  pouvoir  k  U.   Calliaux 
tout  en  I'attrlDuant  nomlnalement  a  U.  Dovimergue,l»a  profonl^meni   InAls- 
pos^.La  personnailt^  du  Ulnlstre  des  Finances  dont  11  oonnalt  le  m^rltei 
mala  axiasl  toutes  les  falDleases   ,l\il  est  profondentent  antlpathique  . 
11  y  a  vu  un  ^oneo  pour  la  politique  mllltaire  et  natlooallste  qu*ll 
poursult  syst^matlquement  depuis  le  Jour  d^Jk  oli  11  avalt  ^t^  place  k 
la  tete  du  Gouvernemsnt  oonime^Pr^BidAnt  du  Conaell  , 

Avec  M.M.  Deloass^.Mlllerand  et  quelquea  autrea^ll  pr^eoniaa  inlaa- 
saMement  I'oeuvre  du  rel^ement  politique  et  mllltaire  de  la  Prance   , 
ooiKbln^e  arec  des  relatlona  plus  ^troltes  et  plus  conflantes  aveo  la 
Hxissle   .11  est  all6  k  Pdters'bovu'g  oomme  President  du  Conselljll  y  retour 
nera   .dans  quelques  molS/Oomme  President  de  la  R^pUblique 

II  y  a  envoys  r^cemment  M.  D^lcass^  auquel  11  ayalt  confl^  la  mla- 
Blon  de  cheroner  par  tous  lea  moyens.  k  exalter  lea  tolenfalta  de  I'alllan 
oe  franoo-russe  et  k  amener  le  grand  Empire  k  accentvier  ses  preparatlfa 
mllltalres  . 

On  pretend  aujourd'hui  que  M.  DftlcasLse  auralt  quelque  peu  foroe  la 
note, que  sa  mission  n»a  guire  riusal.qu'll  a  Indispose  par  cea  inataneea 
lea  hautes  spheres  mosooYltea.et  que  son  retour  ,un  peu  premature, quo l- 
qu?  I'on  en  dlse   .seralt  en  partle  motlv^  par  le  peu  de  sucoea  de  aa 


Page  5  of  Report  of  March  10,  1914 

Des  son  arrlvee  a  1 'Ely see, le  President  a  ciierche  un  rapprochement 
avec  son  plus  dangereux  adversaire   ,M.   Clemenceau   -.mais  cnacun  salt 
que  oette  tentative  n'a  point  reussi  .Le  redacteur  en  cHef  de  1»"  Horn 
me  Litore"  ne  manque  pas  un  Jour  de  pourauivre  sa  campagne  Vlolenteet 
perflde  centre  M.  Polncare   .11  a  deja  demoli  durant  sa  longue  carri©- 
re  un  grand  nomtore  de  minlsteres   -.aujourd'iiul  11  vise  plus  haut  . 
Je  suls, Monsieur  le  Ministre,avftc  un  prorond  respect, 


votre  tr^  oDelssant  servlteur  . 


P  r/I7 
,^^13/447 


A  propos  de  la  vi»ite  des 
Souverains  Anglais  k  Paris. 


4  24 .  Ayr.il... 


/P  14 


Uonsieur  le  Ministre, 


\     La  presse,coiifflie  le  monde  politique  de  Berlin, s 'est  oc- 
cupee  necessairemem;  de  la  visite  des  Souverains  Anglais  h. 
Paris  et  il  n'a  faliu  rien  moins  que  les  derniers  evenements 
du  Mexique  pour  distraire  leur  attention  de  ce  spectacle.  6n 
s'est  accorde  ici  a  trouver  tres  maladroits  les  efforts  de 
certains  publicistes  francais  en  vue  d'amener  le  Gouverne- 
ment  britannique  a  transformer  1' entente  cordiale  en  allian- 
ce effective;  les  joumalistes  berlinois,  tant  liberaux  que 


—    XXIV    — 

Page  3  of  Report  of  April  24,  1914 

de  conseiller  des  ^crivains  framjais  avec  une  insistance 
intempe stive?  N'est-ce  pas  aussi  un  reste  du  vieil  esprit 
presDv'terien  qui  survit  dans  les  classes  inf^rieures  de  la 
soci^t6  anglaise, composees  surtout  de  non-conformistes? 
Get  esprit  a  ^t^  de  tout  temps  hostile  auz  id^ea  et  k   la 
civilisation  frangaises.  L'antipathie  des  radicaux  anglais 
pour  la  R6publique  voisine  est  sans  doute  un  effet  de  ces 
diverses  causes  et  un  produit  de  ces  differents  elements. 

Pour  nous, la  question  la  plus  int^ressante  qui  se 
pose  a  1' occasion  de  la  visite  des  Souverains  de  la  Grande 
Bretagne  e*t  celle  de  savoir  si  le  Gouvernement  britannique 
serait  eujourd'hui  aussi  enclin  qu'il  y  a  trois  ans  k   se 
ranger  du  cot^  de  la  France,  dans  le  cas  d'un  conflit  de 
cettfc  derniere  avec  I'Allemagne.  Nous  avonseu  la  preuve 
qu'une  cooperation  de  I'arm^e  anglaise  et  I'envoi  d'un 
corps  exp^ditionnaire  sur  le  continent  avaient  6t6envisag6s 
par  les  autorit^s  militaires  des  deux  pays.  En  serai t-il 
encore  de  meme  aujourd'hui  et  aurions  nous  toujours  a  re- 
douter  1' entree  en  Belgique  de  soldats  anglais  pour  nous 
aider  a  defendre  notre  neutralit^^  en  commengant  par  la 
compromettre?  Si  la  question  n'est  examinee  que  du  point  de 
vue  allemand,  le  seul  ou  je  puisse  me  placer,  une  r§ponse 
negative  n'est  pas  douteuse.  II  semble  a  un  observateur 
vivant  k  Berlin  que  les  liens  de  1 'Entente  Cordiale  se 
sont  quelque  peu  d<§tendus.  que  la  pointe  de  cette  arme  de- 
fensive n'est  plus  tournee  exclusivement  centre  I'Allemagne, 
comme  elle"  le  fut  du  temps  du  Roi  Edouard,  et  que  la  Triple 
Entente  est  devenue  plutot  un  concert  qu'une  Union  de  Puis- 
sances,agissant  ensemble  dans  certeines  questions  d^termi- 
nees  pour  la  poursuite  d'interets  communs.  Mais  cette 
fa5on  de  voir  pent  etre  fausse  ou  influenc^e  par  la  lecture 


Page  4  of  Report  of  April  24,  1914 

d^  Merits  politiques  dus  k  des  plumes  allemandes.  II  serait 
fort  int^ressant  pour  moi  d©  savoir  ce  que  pensent  du  ca- 
ractere  qu'a  pris  1 'Entente  Cordiale  mes  Collegues  de 
Londres(  et  de  Paris. 

Veuillez  agr^er.  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  les  respectueu- 
ses  assurances,  de  ma  plus  haute  consideration, 

/3^  /3cy< 


INDEX 


No. 


Name  of  Writer 


Place  and  Date 
of  Writing 

1905 

London,  February  7 . 

Berlin,  February  18. . 

London,  April  1 

Paris,  May  7 

London,  June  8 

Berlin,  August  5 

Berlin,  August  22 

Berlin,  September  23 

Berlin,  Sept.  30 

Berlin,  October  14. . . 

Paris,  October  24. . . . 
Berlin,  October  27. . . 


Berlin,  November  18. 


Berlin,  December  31 . 


1906 

London,  January  14 

Paris,  March  6 

Berlin,  April  5 

London,  June  23 

Berlin,  July  16 

London,  July  28. . . . 

1907 
Paris,  February  4. . . 


Contents 


Count  de  Lalaing. . . 
Baron  Greindl 

Count  de  Lalaing. . . 

M.  A.  Leghait 

Coimt  de  Lalaing. . . 

Count  d'Ursel 

Count  d'Ursel 

Baron  Greindl 

Baron  Greindl 

Baron  Greindl 

M.  A.  Leghait 

Baron  Greindl 

Baron  Greindl 

Baron  Greindl 

M.  E.  van  Grootven 
M.  A.  Leghait 

Baron  Greindl 

Count  de  Lalaing. . . 
Baron  Greindl 

Count  de  Lalaing. . . 
M.  A.  Leghait 


Anti-German  sentiment  in  England 

State  of  Anglo-German  relations.  Speech  of 
Mr.  Lee 

Visit  of  German  Kaiser  to  Tangiers 

Visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  Paris.  Morocco. 

Retirement  of  M.  Delcasse 

Anglo-German  relations 

Visit  to  German  ports  by  English  fleet 

Rumors  of  impending  negotiations  concerning 
a  rapprochement  between  England  and 
Russia.  The  possibility  of  a  new  grouping  of 
the  Powers 

The  impression  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  al- 
liance in  Berlin 

The  impression  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty 
of  alliance  in  Russia.  British  attempts  at  a 
rapprochement  with  Russia 

Franco-German  relations 

Toast  of  the  Kaiser,  in  which  His  Majesty 
gives  utterance  to  his  belief  that  efforts  are 
being  made  to  form  a  coalition  against 
Germany 

Project  of  naval  increase;  the  navy  has  be- 
come popular  in  Germany  because  of  the 
fear  of  an  English  attack 

Baron  von  Richthofen  on  the  relations  of  Ger- 
many with  England  and  France.  The  Kaiser 
told  the  Marquis  de  Laguiche  that  he  wished 
to  preserve  peace '. 

Conference  of  Algeciras 

Visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  Paris.  Invita- 
tion to  M.  Delcasse  for  luncheon 

State  of  the  Anglo-German  relations 

Anglo-German  relations 

The  meeting  of  the  German  Kaiser  and  the 
King  of  England  will  probably  not  take  place. 
The  Bagdad  railway  affair 

Limitation  of  the  navy 

Journey  of  King  and  Queen  of  England  to 
Paris 


No. 

Name  of  Writer 

Place  and  Date 
of  Writing 

Contents 

Page 

22 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  February  8 .  .  . 

The  Anglo-German  relations 

26 

23 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  February  9 

In  Berlin  no  one  gave  a  bellicose  interpretation 
to  the  Kaiser's  address  of  February  5 

27 

24 

M.  A.  Leghait 

Paris,  February  10 

Visit  of  the  British  Sovereigns  in  Paris.    Re- 
lations between  Germany,  France  and  Eng- 
land  

27 

25 

M.  E.  de  Cartier 

London,  March  28 

Anglo-Russian  rapprochement 

28 

26 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  March  28 

Morocco.     The  new  grouping  of  Powers  im- 
pairs the  security  of  Europe 

29 

27 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin    \pril  8 

France's  Moroccan  policy 

31 

28 

M.  E.  de  Cartier 

London,  April  12 

Visit  of  King  Edward  VII  to  Carthagena 

33 

29 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  April  18 

Meeting   of  the   King  of   England   with   the 
Kings  of  Spain  and  Italy 

34 

30 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  May  24 

Anglo-German  relations 

35 

31 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  May  30 

Visit    of    the    English    journalists.      Political 
speeches  of  Mr.  von  Miihlberg  and  of  the 
British  Ambassador 

36 

32 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  June  8 

Visit  of  the  English  journalists.     It  is  to  be 
feared  that  it  will  not  produce  any  lasting 
result 

40 

33 

M.  A.  Leghait 

Paris  June  17 

French  and  English  agreement  with  Spain 

Agreement  between  England  and  Spain 

41 

34 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  June  19 

42 

35 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  June  22 

The  Franco-Japanese  and  the  Anglo-Franco- 

43 

36 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  July  1 

The  reception  which  M.  Etienne  received  from 
the  Kaiser  is  a  noteworthy  symptom 

45 

37 

M.  E.  de  Cartier 

London,  August  10. .  .  . 

The  events  in  Morocco 

46 

38 

Count  de  Lalaing 

Baron  Greindl 

47 

39 

1908 

Berlin,  January  27 

Paris,  January  27-30. . . 
Berlin,  January  29 

Delcasse's  chauvinistic  speech 

48 

40 

49 

41 

Morocco.     Semi-official  telegram   on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  speeches  of  Delcasse  and  Pichon 

51 

42 

Berlin,  February  2 

Reduction  of  term  of  service  of  the  war-ships 
— a  symptom  of  the  relations  with  England. . 

52 

43 

Berlin,  March  28 

The  voting  of  the  credits  for  the  navy  shows  the 
real  state  of  the  Anglo-German  relations 

52 

44 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  May  6 

Germany  is  losing  patience  in  face  of  French 
procedure  in  Morocco 

53 

45 
46 

Berlin,  May  10 

Berlin,  May  13 

The  envoys  of  Mulai  Hafid  in  Berlin;  bitter- 
ness between  France  and  Germany.     The 

54 
56 

Baron  Greindl 

Statements  of  the  envoys  of  Mulai  Hafid ..... 

47 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  May  30 

Berlin,  June  12 

Visit  of  President  Fallieres  to  London 

57 

48 

Baron  Greindl 

Impression  in  Germany  of  the  meeting  at  Reval 

59 

No. 

Name  of  Writer 

•    Place  and  Date 
of  Writing 

Contents 

Page 

49 

Berlin  July  4 

It  is  hoped  in  Berlin  that  the  Macedonian 
question  will  not  lead  to  a  conflict  between 
the  Powers 

60 

50 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  July  18 

England  has  attempted  to  tighten  the  bonds 
of  the  entente  against   Germany.     France 
did  not  agree  to  it 

61 

51 

M  A  Leghait 

Paris  July  20 

Visit  of  M.  Fallieres  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
and  to  the  Kings  of  Sweden,  Denmark,  and 
Norway 

63 

52 

M  A  Leghait 

Paris,  October  8 

1909 

Russian  proposal  of  a  conference 

64 

53 

M.  A.  Leghait 

Paris,  January  19 

Berlin,  February  13. . .  . 

64 

54 

Visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  Berlin.    WiU 
it  produce  a  relaxation  of  the  tension? 

66 

55 

Berlin,  February  17...  . 

Impression  produced  in  leading  circles  by  the 
King  of  England's  visit 

67 

56 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  March  22 

The  distrust  between  Germany  and  England 
shown  at  the  debate  concerning  the  navy. .  . 

68 

57 

Berlin,  March  31 

The  question  of  the  limitation  of  armament 
discussed  in  the  Reichstag  and  in  the  House 
of  Commons 

69 

58 

The  ill-feeling  evoked  in  Paris  and  London  by 
the  manner  of  solving  the  Balkan  crisis 

70 

59 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  April  17 

Prince  von  Billow  and  M.  Tittoni.     Despite 
the  alliance  one  scarcely  counts  on  Italy  any 
longer  in  Berlin  and  Vienna 

71 

60 
61 

Baron  Greindl 

Count  d'Arschot 

Schoonhoven 

Berlin,  June  21 

Paris,  August  3 

Politicial  significance  of  the  meeting  of    the 
German  Kaiser  with  the  Czar  of  Russia 

The  Emperor  of  Russia  in  Cherbourg 

72 
73 

62 
63 

1910 

Berlin,  November  7. . .  . 

1911 

Berlin,  March  3 

The  political  significance  of  the  visit  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  in  Potsdam 

Delcasse's   appointment   as   Minister— a  bad 
symptom,  the  significance  of  which  should, 
however,  not  be  exaggerated 

74 
76 

Baron  Greindl  . 

64 

Baron  Gui.laume 

Paris,  March  4 

Franco-German  relations 

78 

65 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  March  20 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  on  the  relations  with 
Germany 

79 

66 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  April  21...:.... 

Pourparlers  between  Berlin  and  Paris  on  ac- 
count of  the  Morocco  crisis 

81 

67 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  April  29 

Morocco 

,     80 

68 
69 

Baron  Greindl 

,  Count  de  Lalaing 

Berlin   Mav  1 

The  attitude  of  the  German  Government  in  the 

83 

1 
I    85 

London,  May  9 

Morocco 

70 

Baron  Greindl 

Berlin,  May  10 

The  Moroccan  question  takes  a  less  favorable 
turn 

i 

1    86 

71 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  May  22 

The  Kaiser's  visit  to  London 

87 

No. 

Name  of  Writer 

Place  and  Date 
of  Writing 

7? 

Berlin,  June  17 

7S 

74 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  July  5 

75 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  July  8 

76 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  July  8 

77 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  July  24 

78 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  July  24 

7«t 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  July  28 

80 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  August  10 

81 

Baron  Greindl  . .    . 

Berlin  October  12 

82 

Count  de  Lalaing. . 

London,  November  18  . 

83 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  November  28  . 

84 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  November  30  . 

85 

Baron  Greindl 

Sfi 

1912 

87 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  January  15.... 

88 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  February  9 .  .  . 

89 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  February  13  .  . 

90 

Count  de  Lalaing 

London,  February  16.  . 

ttl 

Berlin,  April  26 

Berlin,  June  28 

Berlin  October  18 

Oo 

Baron  Beyens 

0? 

Baron  Beyens 

CH 

Berlin,  October  24 

London,  October  31 ... . 

95 

Coimt  de  Lalaing 

Ofi 

Baron  Beyens 

Berlin  November  30 

97 

Baron  Guillaunie 

1913 

Paris,  February  14 

98 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  February  19 

Contents 


The  attitude  of  Germany  in  the  Morocco  Af- 
fair remains  an  expectant  one 

Despatch  of  a  German  man-of-war  to  Agadir. . 

Morocco -  • 

Attitude  of  the  French  Government  in  face  of 
the  German  procedure  in  Morocco 

Morocco 

Franco-German  pourparlers  on  account  of 
Morocco.    The  attitude  of  England 

Morocco 

The  international  situation.  England's  at- 
titude  

England's  attitude  in  the  Morocco  question. . 

Conclusion  of  the  Franco-German  agreement, 
in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  Morocco.  Diffi- 
culties to  be  foreseen  in  the  question  of 
territorial  compensation 

Morocco 

Sir  E.  Grey's  speech 

Lord  Lansdowne's  speech 

Charges  of  the  German  people  against  Eng- 
land. The  Chancellor's  answer  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey 

Despite  the  settlement  of  the  Morocco  crisis, 
the  relations  with  England  have  grown  worse. 

Satisfaction  felt  in  England  at  Caillaux's  re- 
tirement  : 

Lord  Haldane's  journey  to  Berlin 

Sir  E.  Grey  and  the  Daily  News 

Lord  Haldane's  journey  to  Berlin 

First  reading  of  the  bills  proposed  for  the  in- 
crease of  the  army  and  navy  and  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  brandy  contingent 

The  mission  of  Baron  von  Marschall  at  London. 
Anglo-German  relations 

Franco-German  relations 

Russia  and  the  Balkan  crisis 

Anglo-German  relations 

The  Balkan  War  and  European  politics 

M.  Poincare 

The  Bulgaro-Roumanian  conflict.  Franco- 
German  relations 


No. 

Name  of  Writer 

Place  and  Date 
of  Writing 

Contents 

Page 

99 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  February  21 

The  imminent  nomination  of  M.  Delcasse  to 
the  post  of  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg... 

119 

100 

Count  de  Lalaing 

Baron  Guillaume 

London,  February  24.. . 
Paris,  March  3 

119 

101 

Franco-German  relations.    Statements  of  the 
German  Ambassador  and  of  M.  Pichon. . . . 

120 

i02 

Berlin,  March  18 

The  Balkan  War  and  the  Great  Powers.    Rus- 
sia's attitude.    The  Scutari  question 

121 

103 
104 

The   war  between   Turkey  and   the   Balkan 
States.    The  incident  of  Scutari 

123 
124 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris  April  16 

The  incident  of  Nancy 

105 

Paris  April  17 

The  incident  of  Nancy.    Chauvinism  in  France 

Marriage  of  Princess  Victoria  Louise.     Rap- 
prochement between  Germany  and  England. 
The  Belgian  Congo 

125 

106 

Baron  Beyens 

Berlin,  May  26 

125 

107 

Paris,  June  12 

The  law  of  three  years'  service 

127 

108 

Count  de  Lalaing 

Count  de  Lalaing 

128 

109 

The  new  French  Cabinet 

129 

1914 

110 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  January  16 

The  policy  of  MM.  Poincare,  Delcasse  and 
Millerand.     Morocco.      M.    Caillaux's    in- 
fluence   

130 

111 

Baron  Beyens 

Berlin,  February  20 

Franco-German  agreement    concerning    Asia 
Minor 

131 

112 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  March  10 

M.  Poincare,  his  friends  and  his  opponents 

133 

113 

Baron  Beyens. 

Berlin,  April  24 

Wish  of  certain  French  publicists  to  see  the 
entente  cordiale  transformed  into  an  alliance. 
Attitude  of  the  English  Radicals.    Question 
of  the  co-operation  of  the  British  Army  on 
the  Continent 

135 

114 
115 

Baron  Guillaume 

Paris,  April  25 

Paris,  May  8 

The  visit  of  the  British  Sovereigns  to  Paris. 
The  Franco-British  relations . . 

137 
138 

116 
117 

Baron  Guillaume 

Count  de  Lalaing 

Paris  June  9 

The  Ministerial  crisis 

139 
140 

London,  June  11 

Berlin,  June  12. 

Berlin,  July  2 

The  French  crisis. . 

118 

The  Ribot  Ministry 

The  demarche  ol  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment in  Belgrade 

119 

L 

143 

BELGIAN    DOCUMENTS 
1905-1914 


No.  1. 


No.  1. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  7  Fevrier  1905. 

Monsieur  le  Baron! 

L'inimitie  du  public  anglais  pour  la  nation  alle- 
mande  n'est  pas  de  date  recente.  Elle  est  fondee, 
semble-t-il,  sur  la  jalousie  et  la  crainte.  Sur  la  ja- 
lousie, en  presence  des  pro  jets  economiques  et  com- 
merciaux  de  TAllemagne ;  sur  la  crainte,  en  voyant 
que  la  suprematie  navale,  la  seule  que  I'Angleterre 
puisse  revendiquer,  pourrait  peu-etre  un  jour  lui 
etre  disputee  par  la  flotte  allemande.  Cet  etat  d'ame 
est  fomente  par  la  presse  anglaise,  sans  souci  des 
complications  Internationales;  et  un  coup  de  patte 
centre  I'ambitieux  Empereur  et  les  sourdes  menees 
de  son  chancelier  ne  manque  jamais  d'obtenir  les 
applaudissements  de  la  foule. 

L'attaque  produit  la  riposte  et  on  constate  une 
aigreur  correspondante  chez  les  ecrivains  et  les  jour- 
nalistes  germaniques.  L'autre  jour,  le  Dr.  Paasche 
jetait  un  cri  d'alarme  en  apprenant  que  I'amiraute 
anglaise  voulait  concentrer  dans  la  mer  du  Nord 
I'escadre  qui  jusqu'ici  avait  son  point  d'attache  dans 
la  Mediterranee  et  y  trouvait  la  preuve  que  pour  le 
Cabinet  de  Londres  il  n'y  avait  d'autre  ennemi  a 
redouter  en  Europe  que  I'Allemagne.  La  semaine 
derniere,  dans  un  banquet,  Mr.  A.  Lee,  Civil  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  a  loue  les  recentes  reformes  intro- 
duites  par  le  Gouvernement,  qui  permettent  de  don- 
ner  le  premier  coup  avant  que  I'adversaire  ne  soit 
pret,  avant  meme  que  la  guerre  ne  soit  declaree.  II 
a  ajoute  que  c'est  du  cote  de  la  mer  du  Nord  que  la 
vigilance  de  I'amiraute  doit  s'exercer  surtout. 

Ce  langage  a  eu  un  grand  retentissement  en  AUe- 
magne.  Aussi  essaie-t-on  de  replatrer  les  choses,  et 
on  dit  ici  que  le  langage  de  Mr.  Lee  a  ete  mal  inter- 
prete,  car  les  deux  Gouvernements  sont  et  veulent 
rester  en  bons  termes ;  mais  I'esprit  chauvin  se  donne 
libre  cours  dans  le  public  anglais  et  les  journaux  peu 
a  peu  faussent  I'opinion  qui  en  est  arrivee  a  trouver 
que  I'Allemagne  n'a  pas  le  droit  d'augmenter  ses 
forces  navales  et  que  son  budget  de  la  marine  con- 
stitue  une  provocation  a  I'egard  de  I'Angleterre. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


London,  February  7,  1905. 

Sir:— 

The  enmity  of  the  English  public  towards  the 
German  nation  is  long  standing.  It  seems  to  be 
based  on  jealousy  and  fear ;  on  jealousy,  because  of 
the  economic  and  commercial  plans  of  Germany ;  on 
fear,  in  the  thought  that  British  supremacy  at  sea, 
the  only  supremacy  to  which  England  can  lay 
claim,  may  one  day  be  disputed  by  the  German  fleet. 
This  state  of  mind  is  being  fostered  by  the  British 
press,  regardless  of  international  complications,  and 
a  slap  at  the  ambitious  German  Emperor  and  the 
secret  intrigues  of  his  chancellor  never  fails  to  gain 
the  applause  of  the  masses. 

Attack  produces  a  counter-thrust,  and  thus  a  cor- 
responding bitterness  may  be  observed  among  Ger- 
man writers  and  journalists.  Dr.  Paasche  (*) 
sounded  a  warning  the  other  day  when  it  was  re- 
ported that  the  British  Admiralty  was  going  to  con- 
centrate in  the  North  Sea  the  squadron  hitherto  sta- 
tioned in  the  Mediterranean.  He  sees  in  this  a  proof 
that  the  cabinet  in  London  fears  no  other  enemy  in 
Europe  but  Germany.  Last  week,  at  a  banquet,  the 
Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  Mr.  A.  Lee,  praised 
the  reforms  recently  introduced  by  the  Government 
which  would  permit  the  British  to  deal  the  first 
blow  before  the  adversary  was  ready,  even  before 
war  could  be  declared.  He  added  that  the  vigilance 
of  the  Admiralty  would  have  to  be  directed  chiefly 
towards  the  North  Sea. 

This  speech  has  caused  a  great  stir  in  Germany, 
and  efforts  are  being  made  here  to  gloss  things  over 
by  saying  that  the  language  of  Mr.  Lee  had  been 
falsely  interpreted,  for  the  two  governments  are  on 
good  terms  and  determined  to  remain  so.  But  the 
chauvinistic  spirit  is  spreading  among  the  English 
people,  and  the  papers  are  slowly  misleading  public 
opinion,  which  has  already  been  influenced  so  far 
as  to  think  that  Germany  has  no  right  to  increase 
her  naval  forces  and  that  her  naval  budget  consti- 
tutes a  provocation  for  England. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


(*)  Vice-President  of  the  Reichstag. 


■W^;2. 


Le  Barori'  (^'rernil,' '  Miriistre  -de'  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs : 


Berlin,  le  18  Fevrier  1905. 

Monsieur  le  Baron! 

Les  sept  voyages  que  j'ai  eu  a  faire  depuis  le  15 
Novembre  et  les  nombreuses  affaires  urgentes  dont 
j'ai  eu  a  m'occuper  pendant  le  peu  de  temps  que  j'ai 
pu  passer  a  Berlin  dans  les  intervalles,  m'ont  force 
a  reduire  ma  correspondance  au  strict  necessaire. 
C'est  pour  cette  raison  que  je  ne  vous  ai  pas  parle, 
malgre  le  retentissement  qu'elle  a  eu,  de  I'entrevue 
du  chancelier  avec  le  journaliste  anglais  M.  Bashford 
publiee  il  y  a  trois  mois.  En  faisant  savoir  au  pu- 
blic anglais  que  I'Allemagne  n'a  aucune  idee  d'agres- 
sion  centre  I'Angleterre,  le  Comte  de  Bulow  n'a  rien 
dit  qui  ne  soit  connu  de  quiconque  est  de  sang  froid. 
L'Allemagne  n'aurait  rien  a  gagner  a  un  conflit.  De 
plus  elle  n'est  pas  preparee  pour  la  lutte.  Malgre 
les  progres  maritimes  de  I'Allemagne  ses  forces  na- 
vales  sent  encore  tellement  inferieures  a  celles  de 
I'Angleterre  que  ce  serait  folie  que  de  provoquer  une 
guerre.  La  flotte  allemande  a  ete  creee  dans  un  but 
purement  defensif.  La  petite  dimension  des  soutes  a 
charbon  de  ses  vaisseaux  de  haut  bord  et  le  petit 
nombre  des  croiseurs  prouvent  d'ailleurs  que  la  flotte 
n'est  pas  destinee  a  s'eloigner  des  cotes. 

J'ai  cru  pouvoir  d'autant  mieux  me  dispenser  de 
vous  parler  de  cette  entrevue  que  tous  les  journaux 
I'ont  publiee  et  que  je  n'en  attendais  pas  un  meilleur 
succes  que  des  nombreuses  tentatives  de  rapproche- 
ment qui  I'ont  precedee.  La  vraie  cause  de  la  haine 
des  Angleiis  contre  rAUemagne  est  la  jalousie  in- 
spiree  par  le  developpement  extraordinaire  de  la 
marine  marchande,  du  commerce  et  de  I'industrie  de 
I'Allemagne.  Cette  haine  persistera  jusqu'a  ce  que  les 
Anglais  se  soient  penetres  de  I'idee  que  le  commerce 
du  monde  n'est  pas  un  monopole  qui  appartient  de 
droit  a  I'Angleterre.  Elle  est  d'ailleurs  soigneuse- 
ment  entretenue  par  le  "Times"  et  toute  une  serie 
de  journaux  et  de  revues  qui  ne  reculent  pas  devant 
la  calomnie  pour  flatter  les  gouts  de  leurs  lecteurs. 

On  dit  le  RoiEdouard  Vllprofondement  pacifique ; 
mais  un  Roi  d'Angleterre  n'a  qu'une  influence  tres 
limitee  sur  la  direction  politique  de  son  pays.  Le 
gouvernement  anglais  partage  jusqu'a  un  certain 
point  le  sentiment  public  ou  du  moins  il  est  incapable 
de  resister  au  courant,  puisqu'il  depend  exclusive- 
ment  de  la  chambre  des  communes  a  laquelle  le  pou- 
voir executif  est  de  plus  en  plus  subordonne. 

Une  des  raisons  principales  du  recent  arrangement 
entre  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  insuffisamment  ex- 
plique  d'apres  moi,  a  ete  sans  doute  le  desir  d'avoir 
a  main  libre  du  cote  de  I'Allemagne. 

Mais  quelque  fiit  leur  pensee  intime,  les  ministres 
anglais  avaient  toujours  ete  corrects  dans  la  forme. 
II  etait  evident  que  la  nouvelle  organisation  de  la 
flotte  anglaise  visait  I'Allemagne.  Si  le  centre  en  est 
maintenant  dans  la  mer  du  Nord,  ce  n'est  certaine- 
ment  pas  contre  la  Russie  dont  le  materiel  est  en 
grande  partie  detruit  et  dont  la  marine  vient  de  don- 
ner  des  preuves  eclatantes  d'incapacite ;  mais  il  etait 
inutile  de  le  proclamer.  Le  discours  de  M.  Lee  a  fait 
une  impression  d'autant  plus  penible  en  Allemagne 


Berlin,  February  18,  1905. 

Sir:— 

The  seven  journeys  which  I  have  made  since 
November  15th,  and  the  numerous  urgent  affairs 
with  which  I  was  occupied  during  the  short  inter- 
vals I  could  spend  in  Berlin,  compelled  me  to  con- 
fine my  correspondence  to  what  was  strictly  neces- 
sary. It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have  not  reported 
to  you,  despite  the  sensation  it  created,  concerning 
the  interview,  published  three  months  ago,  which 
the  Chancellor  gave  to  the  English  journalist,  Mr. 
Bashford.  In  informing  the  English  public  that 
Germany  harbored  no  aggressive  intentions  against 
England,  Count  von  Biilow  said  nothing  that  is  not 
known  to  people  who  keep  their  heads  cool.  Ger- 
many would  have  nothing  to  gain  by  such  a  con- 
flict. Moreover,  she  is  not  prepared  for  the  strug- 
gle. Notwithstanding  her  maritime  progress,  her 
naval  forces  are  so  inferior  to  those  of  England 
that  it  would  be  folly  for  her  to  provoke  a  war. 
The  German  fleet  has  been  created  purely  for  de- 
fensive purposes.  Furthermore,  the  small  bunkers 
of  the  ships  of  her  high  seas'  fleet  and  the  small 
number  of  cruisers  prove  that  the  fleet  is  not  in- 
tended to  leave  coastal  waters. 

I  thought  that  I  might  dispense  with  speaking  to 
you  of  this  interview,  all  the  more  because  all  pa- 
pers published  it  and  because  I  did  not  expect  any 
better  success  for  it  than  for  the  many  attempts  at 
at  rapprochement  which  have  preceded  it.  The  real 
cause  of  the  hate  of  the  English  for  the  Germans  is 
the  jealousy  produced  by  the  extraordinary  devel- 
opment of  the  merchant  marine,  the  commerce,  and 
the  industries  of  Germany.  This  hate  will  continue 
until  the  English  realize  that  the  commerce  of  the 
world  is  not  a  monopoly  belonging  by  right  to  Eng- 
land. It  is,  moreover,  carefully  nursed  by  the 
"Times"  and  a  great  number  of  newspapers  and 
magazines  which  do  not  shrink  from  calumny  in 
order  to  cater  to  the  tastes  of  their  readers. 

It  is  said  that  King  Edward  VII  is  profound- 
ly pacific;  but  a  King  of  England  has  only 
a  very  limited  influence  on  the  policy  of  his  country. 
The  British  Government  shares  to  a  certain  degree 
the  opinion  of  the  public,  or  is  at  least  not  in  a 
position  to  swim  against  the  current,  since  it  is  de- 
pendent exclusively  on  the  House  of  Commons  to 
which  the  executive  power  is  becoming  more  and 
more  subordinate. 

One  of  the  principal  reasons  for  the  recent  agree- 
ment between  France  and  England,  which  to  my 
mind  has  been  but  insufficiently  explained,  is  un- 
doubtedly the  desire  to  have  a  free  hand  against 
Germany. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  their  ulterior  mo- 
tives, the  British  Ministers  have  always  been  for- 
mally correct.  It  is  evident  that  the  new  organiza- 
tion of  the  British  fl^et  is  aimed  at  Germany.  If 
its  centre  is  now  in  the  North  Sea  it  certainly  has 
not  been  transferred  there  with  any  intentions 
against  Russia,  whose  material  has  in  great  measure 
been  destroyed  and  whose  navy  has  only  recently 
g-iven  complete  proof  of  its  inefficiency.  But  it  is 
superfluous  to  mention   this.     The  speech  of  Mr. 


que  le  lord  civil  de  Tamiraute  a  dit  que  I'ennemi  en- 
tendrait  les  canons  de  la  flotte  ^glaise  avant  d'avoir 
eu  le  temps  de  recevoir  par  les  journaux  la  nouvelle 
de  la  declaration  de  guerre.  Dans  sa  pensee  il  s'agit 
done  d'une  agression  de  la  part  de  I'Angleterre. 

M.  de  Miihlberg  m'a  dit  que  I'Empereur  a  parle  en 
termes  tres  severes  a  I'ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a 
Berlin  de  I'incartade  de  M.  Lee.  Celui-ci  a  public 
depuis  une  rectification  du  compte  rendu  de  son  dis- 
cours  corrigeant  ce  quil  y  avait  de  blessant  pour 
TAllemagne.  On  ne  parait  attacher  ici  qu'une  foi 
mediocre  a  ce  dementi. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


Lee  made  an  all  the  more  painful  impression  in  Ger- 
many because  the  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  de- 
clared that  the  enemy  would  hear  the  guns  of  the 
British  fleet  before  he  received,  from  the  news- 
papers, the  news  of  the  declaration  of  war.  To  his 
mind,  then,  it  is  England  that  will  be  the  aggressor. 

Mr.  von  Miihlberg  told  me  that  the  Emperor  had 
spoken  in  very  severe  terms  to  the  British  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  in  regard  to  the  invectives  of  Mr. 
Lee.  The  latter  has  since  published  a  correction  of 
the  report  of  his  speech,  rectifying  the  points  which 
had  offended  Germany.  It  does  not  seem  that  much 
faith  is  being  placed  here  in  this  denial. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  3. 


No.  3. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  k  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  1  Avril  1905. 


London,  April  1,  1905. 


Monsieur  le  Baron ! 


Sir:- 


Vous  n'ignorez  pas  que  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne 
est  impopulaire  en  Angleterre  surtout  depuis  son 
telegramme  historique  ,et  vous  savez  le  pen  de  sym- 
pathie  que  la  nation  eprouve  pour  I'Allemagne.  La 
visite  de  I'Empereur  a  Tangef  n'a  pas  manque  de 
susciter  des  articles  desobligeants  dans  la  presse, 
heureuse  d'une  occasion  de  deverser  sa  mauvaise  hu- 
meur  contre  le  Souverain  d'un  pays  qui  est  une 
rivale  commerciale  de  I'Angleterre,  qui  veut  se  creer 
une  marine  de  guerre  de  premier  ordre,  et  qui  a 
present  encourage  les  Marocains  dans  leur  sourde 
resistance  aux  entreprises  de  la  France. 

On  apprehende  de  voir  I'Allemagne  insister  sur  le 
maintien  de  la  porte  ouverte  a  Tanger,  et  soutenir 
I'independance  du  Sultanat  contrariant  ainsi  la  po- 
litique de  "penetretion  pacifique"  entreprise  par  la 
France,  avec  I'assentiment  de  I'Angleterre. 

On  parait  persuade 'qu'en  se  rendant  a  Tanger, 
I'Empereur  a  voulu  non  seulement  donner  une  legon 
a  la  France,  mais  aussi  a  son  amie. 

Cette  susceptibilite  britannique  vis  a  vis  de  Berlin 
existe  depuis  longtemps,  mais  il  n'est  pas  rassurant 
de  constater  qu'elle  augmente  au  lieu  de  diminuer. 

Jusqu'ici  le  Cabinet  anglais  n'a  pas  eu  a  exprimer 
ses  vues,  et  la  question  n'a  pas  ete  soulevee  a  la 
Chambre ;  mais  d'apres  une  rumeur  qui  a  cours  dans 
le  public  on  repondrait  a  I'attitude  de  I'Empereur 
Guillaume  par  une  demonstration  Ahglo-Frangaise, 
sous  forme  de  visites  reciproques  des  escadres  des 
deux  nations  dans  le  courant  de  cet  ete,  a  I'instar 
de  ce  qui  s'est  passe  en  1893,  lorsque  la  flotte  russe 
est  venue  a  Toulon  pour  affirmer  I'amitie  franco- 
russe. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


You  are  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  the  Ger- 
man Ernperor  is  unpopular  in  England,  especially 
since  his  historic  telegram,  and  you  know  what  little 
sympathy  the  English  nation  entertains  for  Ger- 
many. The  visit  of  the  Emperor  to  Tangiers  has 
not  failed  to  evoke  unfriendly  articles  in  the  press, 
which  is  happy  to  have  occasion  to  give  vent  to  its 
ill-feeling  towards  the  sovereign  of  a  country  that 
is  a  commercial  rival  of  England,  that  wants  to  cre- 
ate for  itself  a  navy  of  the  first  order,  and  that  at 
present  is  encouraging  the  Moroccans  in  their  mute 
resistance  to  the  activities  of  France. 

It  is  feared  that  Germany  will  insist  on  the  main- 
tenance of  the  open  door  in  Tangiers  and  uphold  the 
independence  of  the  Sultanate,  thus  going  counter 
to  the  policy  of  "peaceful  penetration"  inaugurated 
by  France  with  the  consent  of  England. 

The  conviction  prevails  here  that  in  proceeding 
to  Tangiers  the  Emperor  wished  to  give  a  lesson 
not  only  to  France  but  also  to  her  friend. 

This  British  susceptibility  in  regard  to  Berlin 
has  existed  for  a  long  time,  but  it  is  not  reassuring 
to  have  to  state  that  it  is  increasing  instead  of  di- 
minishing. 

Up  to  the  present,  the  British  Cabinet  has  not  had" 
to  express  its  opinion  and  the  question  has  not  been 
brought  up  in  Parliament ;  but  according  to  a  rumor 
current  among  the  public  the  answer  to  the  attitude 
of  Emperor  William  will  be  an  Anglo-French  dem- 
onstration in  the  shape  of  reciprocal  visits  of  the 
squadrons  of  the  two  nations  during  this  summer, 
just  as  in  1893  the  Russian  fleet  appeared  at  Toulon 
in  order  to  emphasize  the  Franco-Russian  friend- 
ship. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  4. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgiue  k  Paris,  a  M. 
leBaron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  7  Mai  1905. 

Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

La  presence  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  Paris,  dans  un 
moment  ou  I'atmosphere  est  toute  vibrante  encore 
des  evenements  de  Tanger,  a  une  signification  qu'il 
y  a  lieu  de  constater  avec  une  serieuse  attention  mais 
a  laquelle  il  ne  faudrait  pourtant  pas  accorder  une 
importance  exageree.  Le  Roi  n'avait  nul  engage- 
ment qui  I'obligeait  a  faire  maintenant  un  sejour  a 
Paris  et,  s'il  I'a  fait,  c'est  evidemment  pour  donner 
en  ce  moment  a  la  France  un  nouveau  temoignage 
d'amitie  et  accentuer,  en  presence  de  circonstances 
speciales,  la  solidarite  qui  existe  entre  les  signa- 
taires  de  I'accord  du  8  Avril  1904.  Cette  solidarite 
a  en  efifet  ete  nettement  et  fortement  affirmee,  mais 
sans  ostentation,  sans  toasts  et  sans  demonstrations 
publiques.  Le  Roi  ne  s'est  pas  borne  pourtant  a 
exprimer  ses  sentiments  et  ses  vues  a  M.  Delcasse 
et  aux  hommes  politiques  frangais,  il  a  tenu  a  ce  que 
la  cour  de  Berlin  en  fut  informee  et  il  a  eu  a  cet  eflfet, 
apres  le  diner  a  I'Elysee,  un  long  entretien  avec 
I'ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  auquel  il  aurait  parle, 
parait-il,  en  termes  fort  precis.  La  teneur  de  cet  im- 
portant entretien  a  ete  communiquee  a  M.  Delcasse, 
mais  les  termes  en  sont  tenus  secrets. 


Le  silence  que  continue  a  observer  I'Allemagne, 
malgre  I'oflfre  de  M.  Delcasse  de  causer  pour  dissiper 
tout  malentendu,  maintient  ici  I'etat  de  nervosite 
qui  regne  et  on  se  demande  quand  et  comment  on 
sortira  de  la  situation  fausse  dans  laquelle  on  se 
trouve.  Hier  encore  le  Prince  de  Radolin  a  ete  regu 
par  M.  Delcasse,  il  a  fait  beaucoup  de  frais  d'ama- 
bilite  mais  il  n'a  pas  aborde  la  question  marocaine. 
On  se  plait  a  supposer  que  la  visite  de  I'Empereur 
Guillaume  a  Tanger  ayant  ete  une  demonstration 
d'initiative  personnelle  on  attend  a  Berlin  le  retour 
de  Sa  Majeste  pour  en  regler  les  consequences. 


On  me  dit  que  I'idee  de  reunir  une  conference  pour 
poursuivre  et  completer  I'oeuvre  de  celle  de  Madrid 
en  1880  serait  abandonnee  parce  qu'aucune  puissance 
ne  s'y  est  montree  favorable  et  qu'il  n'est  pas  a  sup- 
poser  que  le  Sultan  du  Maroc  veuille  prendre  I'initia- 
tive  d'une  telle  proposition. 

Dans  les  spheres  gouvernementales  on  pretend  que 
par  les  conventions  franco-anglaise  et  franco-espac;- 
nole  on  ne  s'est  pas  ecarte  de  I'esprit  de  la  convention 
deMadrid,  qu'on  a  fourni  a  ce  sujet  d'amples  explica- 
tions et  que  Taction  de  la  France  au  Maroc,  d'accord 
avec  I'Angleterre,  I'Espagne  et  I'ltalie,  est  sur  des 
bases  parfaitement  correctes  tandis  que  I'attitude  de 
I'Allemagne  ne  pent  etre  basee  que  sur  des  craintes 
et  des  suspicions,  qu'aucun  fait  ne  justifie  et  qui  sont 
blessantes  pour  la  France. 

Quoique  tons  les  chefs  de  parti  se  croient  actuelle- 
ment  obliges  par  les  circonstances  de  soutenir  la  po- 
litique marocaine  de  M.  Delcasse,  il  n'est  pas  a  dire 
pour  cela  qu'ils  I'approuvent  et  bon  nombre  d'entre 
eux  I'avaient  prevenu  qu'il  ne  fallait  pas  toucher  a 
cette  question  que  de  longue  date  on  avait  etudtee  et 


Paris,  May  7,  1905. 

Sir:— 

The  presence  of  the  King  of  England  in  Paris  at 
a  time  when  the  atmosphere  is  still  vibrating  with 
the  events  of  Tangiers  has  a  significance  which  de- 
serves serious  attention  but  which,  on  the  other 
hand,  should  not  be  considered  as  of  exaggerated 
importance.  The  King  had  no  engagement  oblig- 
ing him  to  visit  to  Paris  at  the  present  time  and,  as 
he  has  done  so,  it  is  evidently  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  to  France  at  this  moment  a  new  proof  of 
friendship  and  of  emphasizing  under  special  circum- 
stances the  solidarity  existing  between  the  signa- 
tories to  the  understanding  of  April  8,  1904.  This 
solidarity  has,  indeed,  been  clearly  and  forcibly  af- 
firmed but  without  any  ostentation,  without  toasts 
and  without  public  demonstrations.  The  King  has, 
however,  not  confined  himself  to  expressing  his  sen- 
timents and  views  to  M.  Delcasse  and  to  the  French 
politicians,  but  has  taken  care  that  the  court  at 
Berlin  should  be  informed  thereof  and  to  this  end, 
a  long  conversation  took  place  with  the  German 
Ambassador,  after  the  banquet  at  the  Elysee,  dur- 
ing which  the  King  seems  to  have  spoken  in  very 
precise  terms.  The  tenor  of  this  important  con- 
versation has  been  communicated  to  M.  Delcasse, 
but  the  terms  of  it  have  been  kept  secret. 

The  silence  which  Germany  continues  to  observe 
despite  the  offer  of  M.  Delcasse  to  hold  conversa- 
tions in  order  to  dissfpate  the  misunderstanding,  is 
sustaining  the  state  of  nervousness  prevailing  here, 
and  the  question  is  being  asked  when  and  how 
France  will  emerge  from  the  wrong  situation  in 
which  she  finds  herself.  When  M.  Delcasse  re- 
ceived Prince  Radolin  yesterday,  he  said  many 
pleasant  things,  but  he  did  not  touch,  however, 
upon  the  Moroccan  question.  The  attitude  taken 
here  is  that,  since  Emperor  William  went  on  his 
journey  to  Tangiers  on  his  own  initiative,  Berlin 
is  awaiting  the  return  of  His  Majesty  in  order  to 
determine  the  consequences  of  that  visit. 

I  am  told  that  the  idea  of  calling  a  conference  in 
order  to  continue  and  complete  the  work  of  the  Con- 
ference of  Madrid  in  1880  will  be  abandoned  because 
no  Power  has  shown  itself  in  favor  of  it  and  be- 
cause it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco  is  willing  to  take  the  initiative  in  such  a 
proposition. 

In  governmental  circles  it  is  maintained  that  in 
the  matter  of  the  Franco-English  and  the  Franco- 
Spanish  conventions,  no  departure  has  been  made 
from  the  spirit  of  the  convention  of  Madrid,  that 
ample  explanations  on  this  subject  have  been  fur- 
nished and  that  the  action  of  the  French  in  Morocco 
in  agreement  with  England,  Spain,  and  Italy  is  on 
a  perfectly  correct  basis,  while  the  attitude  of  Ger- 
many can  only  be  based  on  fears  and  suspicions  that 
are  in  no  way  justified  by  facts  and  are  resented 
in  France. 

Although  all  the  party  leaders  believe  that  the 
present  situation  demands  that  they  sustain  the  Mo- 
roccan policy  of  M.  Delcasse,  this  does  not  mean 
that  they  approve  of  it  and  a  considerable  number 
of  them  warned  him  not  to  touch  this  question 
which  had  been  studied    for    a    long    time    and    the 


dont  on  avait  toujours  constate  les  dangers.  M. 
Delcasse  a  cru  que  I'accord  avec  I'Angleterre  avait 
ecarte  ces  perils  et  que  le  moment  etait  opportun 
pour  developper  I'influence  frangaise  dans  cette  par- 
tie  de  I'Afrique.  On  lui  dit  aujourd'hui  que  I'atti- 
tude  de  I'Angleterre  a  ete  fallacieuse  et  que  I'accord 
impose  avec  I'Espagne  en  a  ete  la  premiere  preuve. 
On  sait  en  effet  que  les  clauses  secretes  de  cet  ac- 
cord laissent  a  I'Espagne  des  avantages  pour  I'orga- 
nisation  financiere  et  monetaire  et  que  dans  la  repar- 
tition eventuellement  prevue  des  zones  d'influence 
la  France  a  ete  ecartee  de  Tanger  et  de  la  partie 
la  plus  importante  des  cotes. 

L'accord  franco-espagnol  a  ete  communique  par  les 
deux  pays  interesses  aux  puissances  comme  corol- 
laire  de  I'accord  franco-anglais.  L'Allemagne  ne 
pouvait  done  pas  ignorer  ces  arrangements  et  I'atti- 
tude  qu'elle  a  prise  dans  la  suite  ne  peut  etre  basee 
que  sur  des  considerations  politiques  d'un  ordre  ge- 
neral ou  sur  la  crainte  que  les  negociations  entamees 
a  Fez  n'aboutissent  avec  le  consentement  tacite  de 
I'Angleterre  a  un  resultat  depassant  les  proportions 
avouees  jusqu'ici. 

II  resulte  de  renseighements  puises  a  des  sources 
autorisees  que  Ton  ne  croit  pas  qu'il  y  ait  des  clauses 
secretes  annexees  a  I'accord  du  8  avril  1904  mais  on 
suppose  qu'il  y  a  une  certaine  entente  tacite  par  la- 
quelle  I'Angleterre  laisserait  une  asssz  grande 
liberte  d'action  a  la  France  au  Maroc,  sous  la  reserve 
des  clauses  secretes  de  I'arrangement  franco-espa- 
gnol, clauses  sinon  imposees  du  moins  fortement  sou- 
tenues  par  le  cabinet  de  Londres. 

Si  Ton  est  tente  d'attribuer  des  intentions  quelque 
peu  machiaveliques  a  la  politique  bienveillante  de 
I'Angleterre  envers  la  France  dans  la  question  maro- 
caine,  on  ne  va  pas  pourtant  jusqu'a  croire  que  les 
vues  et  les  aspirations  anglaises  aient  ete  formulees 
dans  un  ecrit  en  precision  de  complications  gene- 
rales.  On  est  plutot  tente  de  croire  que  les  diffi- 
cultes  actuelles  ont  surpris  les  cabinets  de  Paris  et 
de  Londres  et  ont  cree  une  situation  que  Ton  n'avait 
pas  prevue  et  en  prevision  des  consequences  ge- 
nerales  de  laquelle  on  n'aurait  par  consequentpas  pris 
d'engagements.  C'est  surtout  cette  imprevoyance 
que  Ton  reproche  a  M.  Delcasse  et  ses  adversaires 
politiques  qui  ne  lui  avaient  pas  menage  leurs  aver- 
tissements  ne  manqueront  pas,  quelque  soit  Tissue 
de  la  crise  actuelle,  d'en  profiter  pour  exiger  sa 
retraite. 

La  prolongation  anormale  de  la  situation  troublee 
et  inquietante  dans  laquelle  on  se  trouve  ne  fait 
qu'accroitre  I'instabilite  de  la  position  du  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres  et  c'est  peut-etre  la  ce  que 
Ton  veut  a  Berlin. 

On  est  tres  anxieux  de  connaitre  les  paroles  que 
I'Empereur  Guillaume  prononcera  a  Gravelotte  le 
11  de  ce  mois  et  le  caractere  purement  civil  qu'il 
a  voulu  donner  a  cette  ceremonie  laisse  esperer  qu'il 
profitera  de  cette  occasion  pour  attenuer  I'eflfet  de  sa 
descente  a  Tanger.  Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  la  confiance 
qui  s'etait  retablie  dans  les  relations  franco-alle- 
mandes  s'est  evanouie  et  on  en  est  revenu  au  point 
oti  Ton  en  etait  il  y  a  environ  vingt  ans. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


A.  Leghait. 


dangers  of  which  had  always  been  pointed  out. 
M.  Delcasse  believed  that  the  understanding  with 
England  had  removed  these  dangers  and  that  the 
moment  was  favorable  for  a  development  of  French 
influence  in  this  part  of  Africa.  Today  he  is  told 
that  England's  attitude  was  double-faced  and  that 
the  agreement  with  Spain,  forced  on  France,  was 
the  first  proof  of  this.  It  is  actually  known  that 
the  secret  clauses  of  this  agreement  give  Spain  ad- 
vantages in  regard  to  the  organization  of  finances 
and  currency  and  that  in  the  proviso  made  for  an 
eventual  re-distribution  of  the  zones  of  influence, 
France  has  been  eliminated  from  Tangiers  and  the 
most  important  part  of  the  coast. 

The  Franco-Spanish  agreement  was  communi- 
cated to  the  Powers  by  the  two  interested  countries 
as  a  corollary  to  the  Franco-English  agreement. 
Germany,  therefore,  was  cognizant  of  these  arrange- 
ments, and  the  attitude  which  she  subsequently 
adopted  can  be  based  only  on  political  considera- 
tions of  a  general  nature,  or  spring  from  a  fear 
that  the  negotiations,  begun  at  Fez,  might  with 
the  agreement  of  England  lead  to  a  result  of  con- 
siderable greater  bearing  than  has  hitherto  been 
admitted. 

According  to  inquiries  made  at  authoritative  quar- 
ters, it  is  not  believed  that  the  understanding  of 
April  8,  1904,  contains  any  secret  clauses,  but  it  is 
supposed  that  a  certain  tacit  understanding  exists 
according  to  which  England  would  allow  France 
sufficient  liberty  of  action  in  Morocco  within  the 
limits  of  the  secret  clauses  of  the  Franco-Spanish 
arrangement  which,  if  not  dictated  by  the  Cabinet 
at  London,  were  at  least  strongly  supported  by  it. 

Though  one  may  be  inclined  to  suspect  somewhat 
Machiavellian  intentions  behind  England's  pro- 
French  policy  in  the  Moroccan  question,  one  would 
hardly  go  so  far  as  to  assume  that  the  English 
thoughts  and  plans  were  formulated  in  writing  with 
a  view  to  general  complications.  One  would  rather 
be  inclined  to  believe  that  the  present  difficulties 
have  surprised  the  Cabinets  of  Paris  and  London 
and  created  a  situation  which  had  not  been  foreseen 
and  for  the  possible  general  consequences  of  which 
no  arrangements  had  been  made.  It  is  chiefly  this 
lack  of  foresight  for  which  M.  Delcasse  is  being  re- 
proached ;  and  his  political  opponents,  who  were  un- 
sparing in  their  warnings  to  him,  will  not  fail,  what- 
ever may  be  the  outcome  of  the  present  crisis,  to 
utilize  it  in  order  to  demand  his  retirement. 

Should  the  present  perplexing  and  disquieting 
situation  last  unreasonably  long,  the  uncertainty  of 
the  position  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  can 
only  be  aggravated  and  that  is  perhaps  what  is  de- 
sired at  Berlin. 

The  words  which  Emperor  William  is  to  utter 
at  Gravelotte  on  the  11th  of  the  present  month  are 
anxiously  awaited,  and  the  purely  civil  character 
which  he  intends  to  give  to  this  ceremony  admits 
of  the  hope  that  he  will  take  advantage  of  the  occa- 
sion to  attenuate  the  impression  of  his  landing  at 
Tangiers.  However  that  may  be,  the  confidence 
which  had  been  reestablished  in  the  Franco-German 
relations  has  disappeared,  and  matters  are  back  at 
the  point  where  they  were  about  twenty  years  ago. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  5. 


No.  5. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  si 
Londres,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres, 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  8  Juin  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

La  nouvelle  de  la  retraite  de  M.  Delcasse  a  etc 
recue  avec  regret  par  les  organes  du  Gouvernement 
Britannique  La  politique  anglophile  de  I'ancien  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  si  energiquement  se- 
conde  par  I'ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres,  avait 
about!  a  une  entente  dont  les  evenements  recents  ont 
prouve  toute  I'utilite  et  I'incertitude  qui  regne  quant 
a  I'orientation  que  donnera  son  successeur  a  la  po- 
litique frangaise,  n'est  pas  sans  preoccuper  I'opinion. 

Tout  en  felicitant  M.  Delcasse  de  la  grande  oeuvre 
accomplie,  le  "Times"  reconnait,  qu'en  ce  qui  con- 
cerne  le  Maroc,  il  a  neglige  de  considerer  les  circon- 
stances  qui  pourraient  resulter  d'une  defaite  de  la 
Russie  en  Extreme  Orient  et  par  consequent  donner 
a  I'Allemagne  une  opportunite  d'intervenir  en  en- 
courageant  le  Sultan  dans  sa  resistance  aux  projets 
de  la  France. 

II  est  vrai  que  I'Allemagne  avait  semble  d'abord 
ne  se  preoccuper  nullement  de  I'arrangement  anglo- 
frangais  et  avait  eu  soin  de  ne  pas  laisser  deviner 
le  parti  qu'elle  devait  tirer  de  la  passivite  forcee  de 
la  Russie  dans  les  affaires  Europeennes.  La  faute 
n'en  reste  pas  moins  a  M.  Delcasse  d'avoir  cru  pou- 
voir  se  passer  de  I'assentiment  de  I'Allemagne  dans  le 
reglement  d'un  question  d'un  interet  commercial  tres 
important  pour  elle. 

Le  Journal  de  la  Cite  exprime  I'espoir  que  M. 
Rouvier,  le  successeur  designe  de  M.  Delcasse,  con- 
tinuera  I'Entente  cordiale  devenue,  plus  qu'une  po- 
litique de  Gouvernements,  une  veritable  union  entre 
deux  peuples,  et  il  assure  le  Gouvernement  frangais, 
en  ce  cas,  de  la  continuation  de  I'attitude  de  loyale 
cooperation  adoptee  par  I'Angleterre. 

Sans  vouloir  prejuger  ce  que  fera  la  France, 
I'organe  conservateur  declare  que,  si  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  la  Republique  refuse  de  prendre  part  a  la 
Conference  proposee  par  le  Sultan  du  Maroc,  I'An- 
gleterre en  fera  autant  et  que,  sur  ce  point  comme 
en  tout  le  reste,  le  Gouvernement  britannique  suivra 
fidelement  la  politique  sur  laquelle  est  base  I'ar- 
rangement qu'il  a  conclu  avec  la  France  et 
I'Espagne. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


London,  June  8,  1905. 
Sir: — 

The  news  of  the  retirement  of  M.  Delcasse  has 
been  received  with  regret  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment organs.  The  Anglophile  policy  of  the  former 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  which  received  such 
active  support  from  the  French  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don had  led  to  an  entente,  the  usefulness  of  which 
has  been  clearly  proven  by  recent  events ;  and  the 
uncertainty  prevailing  here  concerning  the  direc- 
tion which  his  successor  may  give  to  French  policy 
is  filling  the  public  mind  with  anxiety. 

Although  the  Times  congratulates  M.  Delcass6 
on  the  great  work  which  he  has  accomplished,  it 
confesses  that  in  regard  to  Morocco  he  neglected 
to  consider  the  circumstances  which  might  result 
from  a  defeat  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East  and  which 
consequently  might  give  Germany  an  opportunity 
to  interfere  by  encouraging  the  Sultan  in  his  op- 
position to  the  French  projects. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  beginning  Germany  seemed 
not  to  feel  any  concern  about  the  Anglo-French 
agreement,  and  that  she  took  care  not  to  betray 
how  she  would  utilize  the  enforced  inactivity  of 
Russia  in  European  affairs.  It  is  none  the  less  the 
fault  of  M.  Delcasse  to  have  believed  that  he  could 
dispense  with  the  assent  of  Germany  in  settling 
a  question  which  was  of  very  important  commercial 
interest  to  her. 

The  City  Journal,  expressing  the  hope  that  M. 
Rouvier,  the  prospective  successor  to  M.  Delcasse, 
will  continue  the  Entente  Cordiale,  which  from  a 
mere  policy  of  the  governments  had  devoleped  into 
a  veritable  union  of  the  two  peoples,  assures  the 
French  Government  of  the  continuation  of  the  atti- 
tude of  loyal  co-operation  hitherto  observed  by 
England. 

Without  wishing  to  anticipate  what  France  is  go- 
ing to  do  the  conservative  organ  states  that,  in  case 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  should  refuse  to 
participate  in  the  conference  proposed  by  the  Sultan 
of  Morocco,  England  would  do  the  same  and  that 
on  this  point,  as  on  all  others,  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  faithfully  adhere  to  the  basic  policy  of 
the  agreement  which  it  had  concluded  with  France 
and  Spain. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  6. 


No.  6. 


Le  Comte  d'Ursel,  Charge  d' Affaires  de  Belgique  k 
Berlin,  k  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  d'Ursel,  Belgian  Charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin, 
to  Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  5  Aout  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Deux  journaux  allemands,  !e  "Reichsbote"  et  le 
"Staatsbiirger,"  d'ailleurs  depourvus  d'autorite,  avai- 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  August  5,  1905. 


Two  German  newspapers,  not  as  a  rule  speaking 
rith    authority,    the    Reichsbote    and    the    Staats- 


ent  cru  devoir  attirer  I'attention  de  leurs  lecteurs  sur 
le  peril  qui  pourrait  resulter  pour  TAllemagne  des 
manoeuvres  projetees  de  I'escadre  anglaise  dans  la 
Baltique  et  suggeraient  I'idee  que  les  puissances 
riveraines  en  interdisent  I'acces  aux  flottes 
etrangeres.  La  Gazette  de  Cologne,  dans  un  article 
officieux  paru  le  30  Juillet,  avait  pris  la  peine  de 
faire  remarquer  que  I'alarme  manifestee  par  les  jour- 
naux  dont  il  s'agit  etait  depourvue  de  toute  raison 
d'etre:  que  si  I'escadre  britannique  jugeait  a  propos 
de  s'approcher  des  cotes  allemandes,  elle  y  recevrait 
I'accueil  courtois  qui  lui  est  dii  d'apres  les  usages  in- 
ternationaux.  L'emotion  de  la  presse  anglaise  ne 
s'explique  guere  et  si  celle-ci  persistait  a  s'alarmer 
des  suggestions  de  quelques  journaux  allemands,  on 
pourrait  lui  faire  remarquer  que  jadis  la  visite  d'une 
escadre  allemande  a  Plymouth  avait  donne  lieu  dans 
la  presse  anglaise  aux  commentaires  les  plus  pessi- 
mistes.  Recemment  encore,  les  declarations  d'un 
lord  civil  de  I'amiraute  temperees  il  est  vrai,  par  des 
explications  donnees  en  haut  lieu,  constituaient  une 
nouvelle  preuve  des  sentiments  peu  bienveillants  de 
I'opinion  anglaise  vis-a-vis  de  TAllemagne. 

La  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung"  reprodui- 
sait  dans  son  No.  d'hier  un  article  du  "Fremden- 
blatt"  congu  dans  le  meme  esprit.  Le  journal  vicn- 
nois  ajoutait  que  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre  pou- 
vaient  se  faire  concurrence  au  point  de  vue  econo- 
mique  sans  que  cette  rivalite  ait  necessairement  son 
contre-coup  sur  le  terrain  politique.  La  "Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine  Zeitung"  faisait  suivre  la  repro- 
duction de  I'article  du  "Fremdenblatt"  de  cette 
phrase:  "Nous  esperons  que  ces  idees  seront  ac- 
cueillies  de  I'autre  cote  du  canal  comme  elles  meri- 
tent  de  I'etre." 

II  est  a  craindre  que  le  voeu  reste  platonique.  La 
rivalite  entre  I'Angleterre  et  I'Allemagne  a  des 
causes  trop  profondes  pour  qu'il  suffise  des  declara- 
tions de  gens  bien  intentionnes  pour  les  ameliorer. 
Les  Anglais  n'admettent  pas  que  leur  commerce  et 
leur  puissance  maritime  puissent  etre  mis  en  peril. 
Or  les  progres  gigantesques  de  I'Allemagne  consti- 
tuent pour  I'Angleterre  une  menace  permanente  et 
tous  les  moyens  lui  sont  bons  pour  faire  echec  a  cette 
expansion.  L'entrevue  recente  de  I'Empereur  d'Alle- 
magne  et  du  Czar,  la  visite  de  I'Empereur  Guillaume. 
a  Copenhague,  la  presence  d'une  escadre  allemande 
dans  les  eaux  danoises  tout  est  pretexte  a  la  presse 
anglaise  pour  se  repandre  en  recriminations  et  en  in- 
vectives contre  I'Allemagne.  Partout  oil  I'Angle- 
terre pent  lui  susciter  quelqu'embarras,  elle  s'em- 
presse  de  profiter  de  I'occasion.  L'assistance  ouverte 
donnee  par  les  Anglais  aux  insurges  de  la  colonie 
allemande  du  sud-ouest  africain  en  leur  reconnais- 
sant  la  qualite  de  belligerants  et  en  interdisant  le 
transit  par  la  colonie  du  Cap  des  vivres  et  des  muni- 
tions destines  aux  troupes  allemandes  est  significa- 
tive a  cet  egard. 

II  est  question  depuis  deux  jours  d'une  entrevue 
entre  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  et  le  Roi  d'Angleterre 
sur  territoire  allemand.  II  est  permis  de  se  montrer 
sceptique  quant  aux  eflfets  qui  pourront  en  resulter 
au  point  de  vue  de  I'amelioration  des  rapports  entre 
les  deux  pays. 


burger,  have  thought  it  necessary  to  draw  the  at- 
tention of  their  readers  to  the  dangers  which  might 
result  for  Germany  from  the  intended  manoeuvres 
of  the  British  squadron  in  the  Baltic,  and  have  sug- 
gested that  the  littoral  Powers  forbid  foreign  fleets 
entering  that  sea.  The  Cologne  Gazette,  in  a  semi- 
official article  published  in  the  issue  of  July  30th, 
has  taken  the  trouble  to  declare  that  the  fears  ut- 
tered by  the  above  mentioned  papers  are  without 
any  foundation  whatever,  and  that  if  the  British 
squadron  should  decide  to  visit  the  German  coast, 
it  would  be  accorded  the  courteous  reception  to 
which  it  is  entitled  according  to  international  cus- 
tom. The  excitement  of  the  English  press  can 
hardly  be  understood.  If  it  should  continue  to  get 
alarmed  at  articles  in  some  few  German  papers, 
one  might  point  out  to  it  that  on  a  former  occasion 
the  visit  of  a  German  squadron  at  Plymouth  gave 
rise  in  the  English  press  to  most  pessimistic  com- 
ments. Only  recently  the  remarks  of  the  Civil  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty,  although  subsequently  tempered 
by  explanations  from  higher  quarters,  gave  fresh 
proof  of  the  unfriendliness  of  British  public  opin- 
ion towards  Germany. 

The  North  German  Gazette  in  its  issue  of  yester- 
day reproduces  an  article  from  the  Fremdenblatt 
conceived  in  the  same  spirit.  The  Viennese  paper 
added  that  Germany  and  England  could  compete 
commercially  without  necessarily  allowing  this 
rivalry  to  evoke  a  counter  effect  in  political  mat- 
ters. The  North  German  Gazette,  which  reprinted 
the  article  from  the  Fremdenblatt,  commented  on 
it  by  saying :  "We  hope  that  these  ideas  will  meet 
with  the  reception  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel 
which  they  deserve." 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  this  wish  wrill  remain  a 
platonic  one.  The  causes  of  the  rivalry  between 
England  and  Germany  are  too  profound  to  be  ameli- 
orated by  declarations  of  well-meaning  people.  The 
English  are  not  willing  that  their  commerce  and 
power  at  sea  should  be  placed  in  jeopardy.  The 
gigantic  progress  of  Germany  is  a  perpetual  men- 
ace to  England,  and  she  will  not  refrain  from  using 
any  means  in  order  to  put  a  stop  to  this  expansion. 
The  recent  meeting  of  the  German  Emperor  and 
the  Czar,  the  visit  of  Emperor  William  at  Copen- 
hagen, the  presence  of  a  German  squadron  in  Danish 
waters,  all  this  gave  the  English  press  a  pretext  for 
indulging  in  recriminations  and  invectives  against 
Germany.  Wherever  England  can  cause  Germany 
embarrassment  she  at  once  seizes  on  that  occasion. 
Significant  in  this  connection  is  the  unconcealed 
assistance  which  the  English  lent  to  the  rebels  in 
German  Southwest  Africa  by  acknowledging  them 
as  belligerents,  and  by  prohibiting  the  transit  of 
foodstuffs  and  munitions  for  the  German  troops 
through  Cape  Colony. 

For  two  days  a  rumor  has  been  abroad  concerning 
a  meeting  between  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
King  of  England  on  German  territory.  It  is  well 
to  be  sceptical  as  to  the  effect  which  such  a  meet- 
ing might  produce  in  regard  to  an  improvement  in 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


L.  d'Ursel. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


L.  d'Ursel. 


No.  7. 


No.  7. 


Le  Comte  d'Ursel,  Charg6  d' Affaires  de  Belgique 
a  Berlin,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre 
dcs  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  d'Ursel,  Belgian  Chcirge  d'affaires  at  Berlin, 
to  Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  22  Aoiit  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron! 

J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  entretenir  par  mon  rap- 
port du  5  de  ce  mois  du  cri  d'alarme  jete  par  quel- 
ques  journaux  allemands  a  la  nouvelle  que  I'escadre 
anglaise  se  preparait  a  venir  manoeuvrer  dans  les 
eaux  de  la  mar  Baltique.  Ces  journaux  ne  proposai- 
ent  rien  moins  que  de  fermer  aux  flottes  etrangeres 
I'acces  de  la  mer  Baltique.  Des  declarations  officieu- 
ses  sent  venues  mettre  les  choses  au  point.  On 
faisait  remarquer  qu'une  escadre  allemande  avait 
relache  sur  les  cotes  d'Angleterre  sans  que  celle-ci 
en  prit  ombrage  et  que  la  courtoisie  internationale 
reclamait  qu'on  fit  le  meme  accueil  aux  vaisseaux 
anglais. 

Cette  meme  note  se  fait  entendre  dans  I'article 
officieux  ci-joint  que  public  la  Norddeutsche  Allge- 
meine  Zeitung  dans  sa  revue  hebdomadaire  d'avant- 
hier.  II  y  est  dit  que  la  flotte  anglaise  touchera  au 
cours  de  ses  manoeuvres  dans  plusieurs  ports 
etrangers  et  notamment  dans  des  ports  allemands ; 
qu'il  est  du  devoir  de  la  population  dc  ces  villes  de 
reserver  aux  officiers  et  aux  marins  anglais  le  meme 
bon  accueil  que  les  Allemands  ont  regu  en  Angle- 
terre  ou  les  autorites  se  sont  efforcees  de  rendre 
agreable  aux  etrangers  le  sejour  dans  le  pays. 
L'article  exprime  en  terminant  le  souhait  que  la 
visite  de  I'escadre  anglaise  contribue  a  renforcer  la 
consideration  reciproque  que  se  doivent  deux  grands 
pays  civilises. 

II  est  a  craindre  que  ce  voeu  officiel  reste  pla- 
tonique;  les  excitations  de  la  presse  anglaise  dans 
I'affaire  marocaine,  I'accueil  exagerement  enthou- 
siaste  fait  aux  marins  fran^ais  en  Angleterre,  I'at- 
titude  a  peine  polie  du  Roi  Edouard  VII  venant  faire 
une  cure  a  quelques  kilometres  de  la  frontiere  alle- 
mande sans  manifester  le  desir  de  se  rencontrer  avec 
son  neveu  sont  autant  de  symptomes  de  mauvais 
vouloir  de  I'Angleterre  vis-a-vis  de  I'Allemagne.  Aus- 
si  serait-il  extraordinaire  qu'on  se  montrat  plus  que 
strictement  poli  vis-a-vis  de  marins  anglais.  La 
municipalite  de  Swinemiinde  a  donne  I'exemple  de 
la  reserve  en  refusant  de  voter  des  fonds  pour  la 
reception  de  I'escadre. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  L.  d'Ursel. 


Berlin,  August  22,  1905. 
Sir:— 

On  the  5th  inst.  I  had  the  honor  to  report  concern- 
ing the  alarm  which  was  sounded  by  some  German 
papers  when  the  news  was  received  that  an  English 
squadron  was  about  to  hold  manoeuvres  in  the  Baltic 
Sea.  These  papers  proposed  nothing  less  than  to 
forbid  foreign  fleets  to  enter  the  Baltic.  In  the 
meantime  semi-official  statements  have  made  the 
situation  clear.  They  point  out  that  when  a  Ger- 
man squadron  anchored  off  the  English  coast,  Eng- 
land did  not  take  umbrage  thereat  and  that  interna- 
tional courtesy  demanded  that  a  similar  reception 
be  accorded  to  the  British  vessels. 

The  same  note  is  struck  in  the  enclosed  semi- 
official article  published  the  day  before  yesterday 
by  the  North  German  Gazette  in  its  weekly  review. 
There  it  is  said  that  in  the  course  of  its  manoeuvres 
the  British  fleet  was  going  to  touch  at  several  for- 
eign and  especially  at  German  ports;  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  population  of  these  towns  to  prepare 
for  the  English  officers  and  men  as  cordial  a  recep- 
tion as  the  Germans  had  enjoyed  in  England,  where 
the  authorities  made  every  effort  to  make  their  stay 
in  the  country  pleasant  for  the  strangers.  In  con- 
clusion the  article  expresses  the  wish  that  the  visit 
of  the  British  squadron  will  contribute  to  strengthen 
the  reciprocal  esteem  which  two  great  civilized 
countries  owe  to  one  another. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  this  official  wish  will  re- 
main platonic ;  the  excitement  in  the  English  press 
on  the  occasion  of  the  Moroccan  affair,  the  unduly 
enthusiastic  reception  of  the  French  marines  in 
England,  the  scarcely  polite  attitude  of  King  Ed- 
ward VII  in  taking  a  cure  only  a  few  kilometers 
from  the  German  frontier  without  showing  a  desire 
to  meet  his  nephew,  all  these  things  are  so  many 
symptoms  of  England's  ill-will  towards  Germany. 
It  would  be  out  of  the  ordinary  as  well  ,to  show 
more  than  strict  politeness  to  the  English  marines. 
The  municipality  of  Swinemiinde  has  set  an  exam- 
ple of  such  reserve  by  refusing  to  vote  the  funds 
for  the  reception  of  the  squadron. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  L.  d'Ursel. 


No.  8. 

Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin, 
a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 


No.  8. 

Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  23  Septembre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Depuis  des  annees  on  mene  dans  des  journaux  an- 
glais a  la  tete  desquels  se  trouve  la  "National  Re- 
view," une  campagne  pour  preconiser  un  rapproche- 
ment entre  I'Angleterre  et  la  Russie.  Apres  la  con- 
clusion de  I'accord  anglo-frangais,  la  diplomatie 
frauQaise  s'est  activement  employee  dans  ce  sens. 
D'apres  des  bruits  persistants  les  negociations  con- 
tinuent.     Certains  symptomes  me  portent  a  croire 


Berlin,  September  23,  1905. 
Sir:— 

For  years  a  campaign  has  been  conducted  in  the 
English  newspapers,  headed  by  the  National  Re- 
view, in  favor  of  a  rapprochement  between  England 
and  Russia.  Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco- 
English  agreement,  French  diplomacy  has  been 
making  active  endeavors  in  this  direction.  Accord- 
ing to  persistent  rumors  the  negotiations  are  still 
progressing.     Certain  symptoms  cause  me  to  be- 


Ju'il  faut  leur  accorder  une  attention  particuliere. 
'ai  appris  que  dans  la  haute  finance  de  Londres  on 
ne  repousse  plus  I'idee  d'emettre  en  Angleterre  un 
emprunt  russe.  II  y  a  peu  de  temps  encore,  les 
banquiers  anglais  n'auraient  pas  meme  consenti  a  en 
discuter  la  possibilite. 

J'ai  demande  hier  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Richthofen  ce 
qu'il  fallait  penser  des  rumeurs  qui  circulent.  II  m'a 
repondu  qu'il  y  a  certainement  en  Angleterre  un 
courant  favorable  a  un  rapprochement  avec  la  Riis- 
sie,  surtout  dans  les  spheres  elevees  et  en  tres  haut 
lieu.  J'ai  interrompu  le  Baron  de  Richthofen  pour 
dire  qu'on  prete  en  eflfet  au  Roi  d'Angleterre  un  pro- 
jet  semblable  dont  il  aurait  meme  fait  part  a  I'Em- 
pereur  lors  de  leur  derniere  entrcvue.  Le  secretaire 
d'etat  ne  m'a  pas  contredit. 

Continuant  M.  le  Baron  de  Richthofen  m'a  dit  que 
meme  depuis  la  chute  de  M.  Delcasse,  il  y  a  encore 
en  France  un  fort  parti  qui  veut  continuer  la  po- 
litique de  I'ancien  ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres. 
Enfin  dans  toutes  ces  combinaisons  I'hostilite  centre 
I'Allemagne  joue  son  role.  Toutefois  le  secretaire 
d'etat  ne  croit  pas  que  le  danger  soit  bien  grand. 
La  base  manque  pour  une  entente  entre  I'Angleterre 
et  la  Russia.  Elle  serait  en  contradiction  avec  I'alli- 
ance  conclue  le  12  aout  dernier  entre  I'Angleterre  et 
le  Japon.  Contra  qui  cette  alliance  serait-elle  dirigee, 
sinon  contre  I'Empire  du  Czar?  Un  pareil  projet  ne 
cadre  pas  non  plus  avec  le  langage  tres  sympathique 
pour  I'Allemagne  que  vient  de  tenir  M.  Witte  a 
Paris.  Le  president  du  conseil  des  ministres  de  Rus- 
sie  va  rentrer  a  Saint  Petersbourg  et  y  aura  sans 
doute  son  mot  a  dire.  Si  un  accord  entre  I'Angle- 
terre et  la  Russie  etait  proche  M.  Witte  aurait  cer- 
tainement ete  a  Londres.  II  se  borne  a  visiter  Paris 
et  Berlin  et  ne  verra  pas  d'autre  chef  d'etat  que  M. 
Loubet  et  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne. 


J'ai  replique  que  malgre  I'immense  service  que 
vient  de  rendre  M.  Witte  a  la  Russie  il  passe  pour 
etre  toujours  assez  mal  vu  a  la  cour.  M.  le  Baron 
de  Richthofen  m'a  repondu  que  M.  Witte  est  plu- 
tot  mal  eleve  et  dit  sans  menagement  tout  ce  qu'il 
pense.  C'est  pourquoi  il  n'est  pas  aime  des  grands- 
ducs ;  mais  c'est  un  homme  dont  I'autorite  s'impose 
et  de  I'opinion  duquel  il  faut  tenir  compte. 

A  notre  point  de  vue  il  est  a  souhaiter  que  le  se- 
cretaire d'etat  ait  raison.  La  triple  alliance  dirigee 
par  I'Allemagne  nous  a  donne  trente  ans  de  paix 
europeenne.  Elle  est  maintenant  afFaiblie  par  I'etat 
de  decomposition  ou  se  trouve  I'Empire  austro-hon- 
grois.  La  nouvelle  triple  entente  de  la  France,  de 
I'Angleterre  et  de  la  Russie  ne  la  remplacerait  pas. 
Elle  serait  au  contraire  une  cause  d'inquietude  per- 
petuelle.  On  en  a  si  bien  le  sentiment  ici  qu'au  com- 
mencement de  I'annee  derniere,  lorsqu'on  savait  que 
d'actives  negociations  se  poursuivaient  entre  Paris 
et  Londres  sans  etre  exactement  informe  de  I'objet 
sur  lequel  elles  portaient,  I'Empereur  croyait  a  une 
agression  imminente  de  la  France  alliee  a  I'Angle- 
terre. 

Malgre  les  tres  grosses  difficultes  d'un  rap- 
prochement entre  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg  la 
possibilite  n'en  est  plus  exclue.  Vous  remarquerez 
que  le  secretaire  d'etat  la  considere  seulement  comme 
improbable.  L'entente  entre  la  France  et  I'Angle- 
terre etait  plus  improbable  encore  et  pourtant  elle 
s'est  realisee.  Elle  a  ete  ratifiee  par  les  deux  peuples 
parce  qu'elle  est  I'expression  de  la  haine  commune 
contre  I'Allemagne.  De  meme  le  Russe  bait  I'Alle- 
mand  parce  que  I'Allemagne  est  le  pays  voisin  qui 


lieve  that  they  demand  the  closest  attention.  I 
have  learned  that  the  idea  of  putting  a  Russian  loan 
on  the  market  in  England  is  no  longer  rejected  by 
the  great  financiers  at  London.  Only  a  short  time 
ago  the  English  bankers  would  not  have  consented 
even  to  discuss  such  a  possibility. 

Yesterday  I  asked  Baron  von  Richthofen  what 
was  to  be  thought  of  the  rumors  that  were  abroad. 
He  replied  that  there  certainly  existed  in  England 
a  current  favorable  to  a  rapprochement  with  Rus- 
sia, above  all  in  the  upper  circles  and  in  high  places. 
I  interrupted  Baron  von  Richthofen  to  say  that  the 
King  of  England  was  actually  credited  with  having 
such  a  plan  and  that  he  was  even  said  to  have 
spoken  about  it  to  the  Emperor  at  their  last  meet- 
ing.    The  Secretary  of  State  did  not  contradict  this. 

Continuing,  Baron  von  Richthofen  told  me  that 
even  after  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse  there  was  still  a 
strong  party  in  France  which  wished  to  continue 
the  policy  of  the  former  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
At  the  bottom  of  all  these  combinations  was  hos- 
tility against  Germany.  Nevertheless  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  does  not  believe  that  the  danger  is 
very  great.  He  considers  that  the  basis  was  lack- 
ing for  an  Entente  between  England  and  Russia, 
which  would  be  in  contravention  of  the  Alliance 
concluded  between  England  and  Japan  on  the  12th 
of  August  last  year.  Against  whom  could  such  an 
alliance  be  directed  if  not  against  the  Empire  of  the 
Czar?  Neither  would  such  a  project  fit  in  with  the 
Germanophile  language  which  only  recently  M. 
Witte  had  used  in  Paris.  The  President  of  the 
Russian  Council  of  Ministers  would  go  back  to  St. 
Petersburg  where,  no  doubt,  he  would  have  a  word 
to  say.  If  an  agreement  between  England  and 
Russia  were  pending,  M.  Witte  would  certainly 
have  gone  to  London,  whereas  he  had  confined  his 
visits  to  Paris  and  Berlin  and  was  not  going  to  see 
any  other  heads  of  states  but  M.  Loubet  and  the 
German  Emperor. 

I  answered  that  in  spite  of  the  immense  service 
which  M.  Witte  had  just  rendered  Russia  he  was 
reported  as  being  somewhat  badly  received  at  court. 
Baron  von  Richthofen  answered  that  M.  Witte  had 
rather  bad  manners  and  was  in  the  habit  of  saying, 
without  reserve,  what  he  thought.  It  was  for  this 
reason  that  he  was  not  liked  by  the  Grand  Dukes ; 
but  he  was  a  man  whose  authority  carried  weight 
and  with  whose  opinion  one  had  to  count. 

From  our  point  of  view  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
Secretary  of  State  is  right.  The  Triple-Alliance 
under  the  leadership  of  Germany  has  given  us  thirty 
years  of  European  peace.  It  is  now  weakened  by 
the  state  of  disintegration  in  which  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  finds  itself.  The  new  Triple  En- 
tente between  France,  England,  and  Russia  could 
not  supplant  it.  It  would,  on  the  contrary,  be  a 
case  of  perpetual  unrest.  This  feeling  is  so  pro- 
nounced here  that  when,  at  the  beginning  of  last 
year,  it  was  known  that  active  negotiations  were 
going  on  between  Paris  and  London  without  being 
exactly  informed  of  their  object,  the  Emperor  be- 
lieved an  attack  by  France  in  alliance  with  England 
to  be  imminent. 

In  spite  of  the  great  difficulties  that  are  in  the 
way  of  a  rapprochement  between  London  and  St. 
Petersburg,  the  possibility  thereof  is  no  longer  ex- 
cluded. You  will  remark  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  considers  it  only  as  improbable.  The  entente 
between  France  and  England  was  still  more 
improbable,  and  yet  it  came  into  being.  It  was 
sanctioned  by  the  two  peoples  as  the  expression  of 
their  common  hate  against  Germany.  In  the  same 
way  the  Russian  hates  the  German  because  Ger- 


sert  de  point  de  comparaison  et  dont  la  civilisation 
superieure  humilie  son  orgueil  de  barbare. 

_  Ce  n'est  un  mystere  pour  personne  que  les  rela- 
tions personnelles  de  I'Empereur  et  du  Roi  d'Angle- 
terre  sont  franchement  mauvaises. 

La  nouvelle  repartition  des  forces  navales  de 
I'Angleterre  est  evidemment  dirigee  centre  I'Alle- 
magne.  Si  Ton  en  avait  doute,  le  discours  impru- 
dent du  lord  civil  de  I'amiraute  M.  Lee  aurait  ouvert 
les  yeux.  En  choisissant  la  Baltique  pour  le  theatre 
des  manoeuvres  de  la  flotte  anglaise,  le  gouverne- 
ment  britannique  n'a  fait  evidemment  qu'user  de  son 
droit.  L'Allemagne  aurait  ete  mal  venue  a  s'en  of- 
fenser  et  elle  a  fait  aux  marins  anglais  I'accueil  le 
plus  courtois;  mais  ce  n'en  etait  pas  moins  une 
demonstration  dont  le  but  etait  de  faire  toucher  du 
doigt  au  peuple  allemand  I'ecrasante  superiorite  nu- 
merique  des  forces  navales  anglaises.  Le  tele- 
gramme  oblige  de  I'amiral  anglais  a  I'Empereur 
etait  glacial  et  Sa  Majeste  a  repondu  sur  le  meme 
ton. 

Les  efforts  inouis  qu'a  faits  la  presse  anglaise  pour 
empecher  le  reglement  pacifique  de  I'affaire  du  Ma- 
roc  et  la  credulite  probablement  pas  tres  sincere  avec 
laquelle  elle  accueille  toutes  les  calomnies  dirigees 
contre  la  politique  allemande,  montrent  combien 
I'opinion  publique  dans  la  Grande-Bretagne  est  pre- 
paree  a  accueillir  favorablement  toute  combinaison 
hostile  a  I'Allemagne. 

Enfin  la  principale  cause  de  dissentiment  entre 
I'Angleterre  et  la  Russie  est  provisoirement  ecartee. 
C'etait  I'ambition  malsaine  de  la  Russie  d'etendre  in- 
cessamment  les  limites  d'un  empire  deja  beaucoup 
trop  grand.  Les  desastres  militaires  de  la  Russie  et 
ses  embarras  interieurs  la  forceront  a  renoncer  pour 
longtemps  a  la  politique  de  conquetes. 

II  est  vrai  que  d'un  autre  cote  I'Allemagne  a  pro- 
fite  du  conflit  entre  la  Russie  et  le  Japon  pour  ame- 
liorer  notablement  ses  relations  avec  I'Empire  voisin. 
On  lui  a  su  gre  a  Saint-Petersbourg  de  la  neutralite 
bienveillante  qui  a  permis  a  la  Russie  de  concentrer 
toutes  les  forces  disponibles  vers  I'extreme  Orient; 
mais  ni  les  peuples  ni  les  gouvernements  ne  se 
piquent  de  gratitude.  Combien  de  temps  la  recon- 
naissance durera-t-elle  apres  que  le  danger  est  passe? 
La  Russie  toujours  aux  abois  et  qui  a  sature  la 
France  et  I'Allemagne  d'emprunts  russes  restera-t- 
elle  longtemps  insensible  a  la  tentation  d'ouvrir  a 
son  profit  un  nouveau  marche  financier? 

_Je  n'ai,  bien  entendu,  aucune  raison  de  croire  qu'un 
resultat  positif  quelconque  ait  deja  ete  obtenu ;  mais 
il  y  a  une  possibilite  dont  il  faut  tenir  compte.  Les 
constellations  politiques  ne  sont  pas  eternelles.  II 
se  prepare  peut-etre  un  nouveau  groupement  des 
grandes  puissances  qui  diminuerait  la  securite  euro- 
peenne  et  qui  s'accomplirait  par  consequent  a  notre 
detriment. 
Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


many  is  the  neighboring  country  which  serves  as  a 
comparison  and  whose  superior  civilization  is  humil- 
iating to  the  Russian's  barbaric  pride. 

It  is  a  secret  to  none  that  the  personal  relations 
between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  England  are 
exceedingly  bad. 

The  new  distribution  of  England's  naval  forces  is 
evidently  directed  against  Germany.  If  anyone  had 
any  doubts  on  this  head,  the  imprudent  speech  of 
the  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  Mr.  Lee,  will  have 
opened  his  eyes.  In  choosing  the  Baltic  as  the 
theatre  for  the  manoeuvres  of  the  British  fleet  the 
British  Government  evidently  does  not  go  beyond 
its  rights.  It  would  have  been  unwise  on  the  part 
of  Germany  to  take  offense  thereat  and  she  has 
given  the  English  marines  the  most  courteous  re- 
ception; but  it  was,  nevertheless,  a  demonstration 
the  purpose  of  which  was  clearly  to  show  the  Ger- 
man people  the  crushing  numerical  superiority  of 
the  British  naval  forces.  The  customary  telegram 
of  the  British  Admiral  to  the  Emperor  was  icy  and 
His  Majesty  answered  in  the  same  tone. 

The  unheard-of  efforts  made  by  the  English  press 
to  prevent  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Moroccan 
affair  and  the  probably  insincere  credulity  with 
which  it  receives  all  calumnies  aimed  at  the  German 
policy  show  how  ready  public  opinion  in  Great 
Britain  is  to  acclaim  any  combination  hostile  to 
Germany. 

Another  point  is  that  the  principal  cause  of  the 
differences  between  England  and  Russia  has  been 
removed  for  the  time  being.  I  mean  the  unhealthy 
Russian  ambition  incessantly  to  extend  the  bound- 
aries of  an  Empire  which  is  already  too  big.  The 
military  disasters  of  Russia  and  her  internal  embar- 
rassments will  force  her  to  give  up  for  a  long  time 
her  policy  of  conquest. 

It  is  true  that,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  has 
profited  by  the  conflict  between  Russia  and  Japan 
in  improving  her  relations  with  her  neighbor  con- 
siderably. They  have  been  grateful  to  Germany  at 
St.  Petersburg  for  her  benevolent  neutrality  which 
permitted  Russia  to  concentrate  all  the  forces  at  her 
disposal  in  the  Far  East;  but  neither  peoples  nor 
governments  can  pride  themselves  on  their  grati- 
tude. How  long  will  Russia's  gratitude  last  when 
the  danger  is  over?  Russia  is  always  in  straits; 
she  has  flooded  France  and  Germany  with  her 
loans;  will  she  be  able  much  longer  to  resist  the 
temptation  to  open  a  new  financial  market  for  her 
benefit? 

I  have,  be  it  well  understood,  no  reason  to  believe 
that  any  positive  result  has  thus  far  been  obtained ; 
but  there  is,  a  possibility  which  one  must  take  into 
account.  Political  constellations  are  not  eternal. 
Perhaps  a  new  grouping  of  the  Great  Powers  is 
being  evolved  which  would  diminish  the  European 
security  and  the  realization  of  which  would  con- 
sequently be  to  our  detriment. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  9. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangdres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  30  Septembre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

_  Depuis  que  je  n'ai  plus  a  ma  disposition  le  cour- 
rier  anglais,  je  me  trouve  tres  souvent  gene  dans  ma 


Berlin,  September  30,  1905. 
Sir:— 

Since  the  English  courier  is  no  longer  at  my  dis- 
posal I  very  often  find  myself  hampered  in  my  cor- 


correspondance.  J'ai  du  plus  d'une  fois  supprimer 
des  informations  ou  des  reflexions  qu'il  cut  ete  im- 
prudent d'expedier  par  la  poste. 

Je  profite  du  depart  de  M.  de  Benin  qui  a  la  com- 
plaisance de  se  charger  d'un  pli  a  votre  adresse,  pour 
parler  du  traite  d'alliance  conclu  le  12  aoiit  der- 
nier entre  I'Angleterre  et  le  Japon  et  qui  vient  d'etre 
public?  Commentant  cet  acte  diplomatique  la  Ga- 
zette de  Cologne  dit  que  les  deux  puissances  se  ga- 
rantissent  mutuellement  leurs  possessions  en  Asie,en 
tenant  compte  de  leur  position  speciale  en  Coree  et 
au  Thibet ;  qu'elles  assurent  le  status  quo*  dans  I'ex- 
treme  Orient  et  reconnaissent  le  principe  de  la  porte 
ouverte.  Ces  deux  derniers  points  tiennent  compte 
des  interets  des  tiers  et  repondent  aux  aspirations 
de  I'Allemagne.  La  Gazette  se  montre  done  satis- 
faite. 

C'est  sans  doute  la  note  officielle  qui  sera  donnee 
au  departement  Imperial  des  Affaires  etrangeres; 
mais  je  sais  que  I'accord  intervenu  y  a  cause  une  im- 
pression desagreable. 

II  est  tres  peu  probable  que  la  Russie  soit  capable 
d'essayer  une  revanche  pendant  les  dix  premieres  an- 
nees  qui  suivront  sa  defaite,  c'est-a-dire  pendant  la 
duree  du  traite  meme,  si  elle  se  releve  plus  vite  qu'on 
ne  le  pense,  I'alliance  est  superfine  en  ce  qui  la  con- 
cerne,  au  moins  pour  le  Japon.  II  peut  etre  fort 
agreable  et  fort  utile  a  I'Angleterre  d'obtenir  le  con- 
cours  de  I'armee  japonaise  pour  defendre  I'Hindous- 
tan,  mais  on  ne  voit  pas  bien  comment  elle  pourrait 
venir  en  aide  a  son  alliee  si  ce  n'est  sous  le  rapport 
financier.  Elle  n'a  pas  un  seul  soldat  a  mettre  a  la 
disposition  du  Japon  et  celui-ci  n'a  pas  besoin  des 
vaisseaux  anglais.  La  flotte  russe  est  aneantie.  La 
Russie  peut  a  la  verite  se  procurer  assez  rapidement 
un  materiel  nouveau.  C'est  une  question  d'argent 
mais  on  ne  forme  pas  en  un  tour  de  main  des  amiraux 
et  des  matelots.  Le  personnel  de  la  marine  russe  a 
fait  preuve  d'une  effroyable  incapacite.  Le  Japon  est 
maitre  de  la  mer  de  Chine  pour  de  longues  annees. 

Si  le  traite  n'a  pas  pour  but  de  prevenir  une  ag- 
gression russe,  contre  qui  serait-il  dirige  sinon  contre 
I'Allemagne? 

Ce  n'est  certes  pas  pour  Kiautschau  lui-meme  que 
I'Empire  en  a  pris  possession.  II  voulait  avoir  une 
base  d'operation  pour  s'assurer  une  part  du  butin 
a  une  epoque  ou  le  partage  de  la  Chine  paraissait  im- 
minent. L'alliance  anglo-japonaise  signifie  que  I'Al- 
lemagne doit  renoncer  a  toute  velleite  semblable.  La 
precaution  est  d'autant  plus  blessante  qu'elle  est  inu- 
tile. Depuis  les  victoires  du  Japon  chacun  doit 
savoir  que  toute  idee  de  demembrement  de  la  Chine 
est  desormais  exclue. 

J'ajouterai  comme  reflexion  personnelle  que  le 
traite  n'a  pas  meme  I'avantage  d'empecher  un  rap- 
prochement entre  la  Russie  et  I'Angleterre.  L'alli- 
ance de  ce  pays  et  du  Japon  est  purement  defensive. 
Lord  Lansdowne  a  done  pu  dire  sans  s'ecarter  de  la 
verite  qu'elle  n'est  pas  dirigee  contre  la  Russie.  Cette 
derniere  puissance  doit  panser  ses  plaies  avant  de 
recommencer  sa  politique  de  conquetes.  Le  moment 
est  done  plus  favorable  que  jamais  pour  une  limita- 
tion provisoire  des  spheres  d'influence.  L'alliance  ne 
serait  anti-russe  que  si  la  Russie  nourrissait  des  pen- 
sees  d'agression  et  pour  longtemps  encore  elle  en 
est  incapable. 

Le  ton  general  de  la  campagne  de  presse  menee  en 
Angleterre  montre  que  le  rapprochement  avec  la 
Russie  y  est  desire  non  dans  un  but  d'apaisement, 
mais  dans  une  pensee  hostile  a  I'Allemagne.  II  est 
k  craindre  que  le  Roi  d' Angleterre  ne  partage  ce  sen- 
timent.   J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  voi's  ecrire  recemment 


respondence.  More  than  once  I  have  had  to  sup- 
press information  or  reflections  because  it  would 
have  been  unwise  to  send  them  by  mail. 

I  make  use  of  the  departure  of  M.  de  Bonin,  who 
is  good  enough  to  take  charge  of  a  despatch  ad- 
dressed to  you,  in  order  to  tell  you  of  the  treaty  of 
alliance  between  England  and  Japan  which  was 
concluded  on  August  12th  and  has  just  been  pub- 
lished. In  commenting  on  this  diplomatic  docu- 
ment the  Cologne  Gazette  says  that  the  two  Powers 
mutually  guarantee  to  one  another  their  possessions 
in  Asia,  taking  into  account  their  special  position  in 
Korea  and  Thibet,  that  they  affirm  the  status  quo 
in  the  Far  East,  and  recognize  the  principle  of  the 
open  door.  These  two  last  points  take  into  consid- 
eration the  interest  of  third  parties  and  meet  Ger- 
many's aspirations.  The  Gazette  is  therefore  sat- 
isfied. 

This  is  certain  to  be  also  the  official  version  which 
will  be  given  out  at  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office; 
I  know,  however,  that  the  treaty  has  caused  a  dis- 
agreeable impression  there. 

It  is  very  unlikely  that  Russia  will  be  able  to 
attempt  a  war  of  revenge  for  the  first  ten  years 
following  her  defeat,  that  is  to  say  for  the  period 
during  which  the  treaty  will  be  in  force ;  if  she  re- 
covers more  quickly  than  is  expected  the  alliance, 
as  far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  is  useless,  at  least  for 
Japan.  It  may  be  very  welcome  and  useful  for  Eng- 
land to  obtain  the  help  of  the  Japanese  army  in 
order  to  defend  Hindustan,  but  it  is  not  easy  to 
conceive  how  England  could  come  to  the  aid  of  her 
Ally  unless  it  be  in  the  financial  sphere.  She  has 
not  a  single  soldier  whom  she  could  place  at  Japan's 
disposal,  nor  has  the  latter  any  need  for  English 
ships.  The  Russian  fleet  has  been  annihilated.  It 
is  true  that  Russia  can  speedily  replace  the  material. 
That  is  only  a  question  of  money,  but  you  cannot 
at  a  moment's  call  produce  admirals  and  marines. 
The  personnel  of  the  Russian  fleet  has  proven  ter- 
ribly incapable.  Japan  will  be  the  mistress  of  the 
Chinese  sea  for  many  years  to  come. 

If  the  treaty  does  not  aim  at  preventing  a  Rus- 
sian aggression,  against  whom  could  it  be  directed, 
if  not  against  Germany? 

Germany  certainly  did  not  take  possession  of 
Kiaochow  for  its  own  sake.  She  wanted  to  have 
a  basis  of  operation  in  order  to  secure  for  herself  a 
part  of  the  booty  at  a  time  when  the  partition  of 
China  seemed  to  be  imminent.  The  Anglo-Japa- 
nese Alliance  signifies  that  Germany  is  to  renounce 
all  such  ideas.  The  precaution  hurts  the  more  be- 
cause it  is  superfluous.  Since  Japan's  victories 
everybody  ought  to  know  that  all  ideas  of  a  dis- 
memberment of  China  are  henceforth  excluded. 

I  would  like  to  add  as  a  personal  reflection  that 
the  treaty  has  not  even  the  advantage  of  preventing 
a  rapprochement  between  Russia  and  England. 
The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  is  purely  defensive. 
Lord  Lansdowne  was,  therefore,  in  a  position  to 
say,  without  deviating  from  the  truth,  that  it  is  not 
directed  against  Russia.  This  Power  has  first  to 
heal  its  wounds  before  it  can  begin  again  a  policy 
of  conquest.  Thus  the  moment  is  more  favorable 
than  ever  for  a  provisional  limitation  of  the  spheres 
of  influence.  The  Alliance  would  be  anti-Russian 
only  if  Russia  entertained  ideas  of  aggression  and 
of  such  she  will  still  be  incapable  for  a  long  time. 

The  general  tone  of  the  press  campaign  which 
is  being  conducted  in  England  shows  that  the  rap- 
prochement with  Russia  is  not  desired  from  any 
pacific  motives  but  with  hostile  intentions  against 
Germany.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  King  of  Eng- 
land shares   this   sentiment     I   had   the   honor   to 


12    — 


que  ses  relations  avec  I'Empereur  sont  tout  a  fait 
mauvaises.  On  m'a  rapporte  de  source  sure  que  Sa. 
Majeste  a  eu  recemment  une  conversation  privee 
contrastant  tout  a  fait  avec  les  sentiments  pacifiques 
qu'on  lui  pretait  jusqui'ici. 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


report  to  you  some  time  ago  that  his  relations  with 
the  Emperor  are  positively  bad.  From  a  reliable 
source  I  learn  that  in  a  recent  conversation  His 
Majesty  made  remarks  which  were  entirely  in  con- 
trast with  the  pacific  sentiments  which  were  hith- 
erto attributed  to  him. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  10. 


No.  10. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Monsieur  le  Baron ! 


Berlin,  le  14  Octobre  1905. 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  October  14,  1905. 


En  communiquant  au  gouvernement  russe  le  traite 
d'alliance  anglo-japonais  Sir  Charles  Hardinge  a, 
comrne  vous  le  savez,  exprime  I'espoir  que  la  Russie 
verrait  dans  le  fait  de  la  communication  comme  dans 
la  teneur  du  traite  la  preuve  des  intentions  pacifiques 
et  amicales  de  I'Angleterre. 

Quelques  jours  apres,  I'ambassadeur  a  demande  au 
Comte  Lamsdorflf  quelle  impression  la  lecture  du 
traite  avait  faite  sur  lui.  J'apprends  de  source  cer- 
taine  que  le  Comte  Lamsdorflf  a  repondu  que  toutes 
les  personnes  avec  lesquelles  il  a  eu  I'occasion  de  dis- 
cuter  le  traite  a  commencer  par  I'Empereur  Nicolas 
II  n'ont  pas  le  moindre  doute  que  I'arrangement  ne 
soit  dirige  contre  la  Russie. 

Sir  Charles  Hardinge  a  vivement  combattu  cette 
maniere  de  voir  et  a  exprime  I'opinion  qu'on  pourrait 
aussi  bien  considerer  le  traite  comme  dirige  contre 
rAllemagne.  Un  seul  mot,  la  mention  de  I'lnde  dans 
le  traite,  pourrait  justifier  I'opinion  que  Ton  a  eu  la 
Russie  en  vue ;  mais  a  dit  I'ambassadeur,  il  faut  tenir 
compte  de  ce  que  le  traite  est  purement  defensif.  Si 
la  Russie  est  animee  des  memes  vues  pacifiques  que 
I'Angleterre,  elle  pourrait  tres  bien  y  souscrire. 

Les  eflforts  de  I'Angleterre  pour  representer  a 
Saint-Petersbourg  le  traite  d'alliance  avec  le  Japon 
comme  ne  visant  pas  la  Russie  confirment  ce  que 
nous  savions  deja  du  desir  du  cabinet  de  Londres  de 
se  rapprocher  de  cette  derniere  puissance. 

Vous  vous  rappellerez,  Monsieur  le  Baron,  que 
dans  la  conversation  avec  M.  le  Baron  de  Richthofen 
dont  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  rendre  compte  par 
mon  rapport  du  23  Septembre  le  secretaire  d'etat  m'a 
dit  qu'il  ne  croyait  pas  a  une  entente  entre  la  Rus- 
sie et  I'Angleterre,  parce  que  la  base  manque.  II  y 
en  a  pourtant  une  possible.  L'Angleterre  se  desiii- 
teresse  maintenant  completement  du  sort  de  la  Tur- 
quie  dont  la  conservation  a  ete  si  longtemps  le  prin- 
cipe  dirigeant  de  sa  politique.  Elle  pourrait  laisser 
a  la  Russie  la  main  libre  en  Asie  mineure.  Une 
pareille  combinaison  aurait  de  plus  a  ses  yeux  I'avan- 
tage  de  brouiller  la  Russie  avec  I'Allemagne  et  I'iso- 
lement  de  I'Allemagne  est  actuellement  le  but  prin- 
cipal de  la  politique  anglaise. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.l  Greindl. 


When  communicating  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty 
of  Alliance  to  the  Russian  Government,  Sir  Charles 
Hardinge,  as  you  know,  expressed  the  hope  that 
Russia  would  see  in  this  communication  as  well  as 
in  the  tenor  of  the  treaty  a  proof  of  England's  pacific 
and  friendly  intentions. 

Some  days  later  the  Ambassador  asked  Count 
Lamsdorflf  what  impression  the  reading  of  the  treaty 
had  made  on  him.  I  hear  from  a  reliable  source  that 
Count  Lamsdorflf  replied  that,  from  Emperor  Nich- 
olas n  down,  everybody  with  whom  he  had  had  oc- 
casion to  discuss  the  treaty,  had  not  the  slightest 
doubt  that  the  agreement  was  directed  against 
Russia. 

Sir  Charles  Hardinge  strongly  contested  this  idea 
and  maintained  that  one  might  just  as  well  consider 
the  treaty  as  being  directed  against  Germany.  One 
single  word,  viz.,  the  mention  made  in  the  treaty 
of  India,  might  justify  the  opinion  that  Russia  had 
been  in  view;  but,  said  the  Ambassador,  it  should 
be  taken  into  account  that  the  treaty  was  purely 
defensive.  If  Russia  was  guided  by  the  same  pacific 
intentions  as  England,  she  might  very  well  en- 
dorse it. 

The  eflforts  made  by  England  in  St.  Petersburg 
in  order  to  represent  the  treaty  with  Japan  as  not 
aiming  at  Russia  confirm  what  we  already  know  of 
the  desire  of  the  Cabinet  at  London  to  come  into 
closer  touch  with  the  latter  Power. 

You  will  remember,  Sir,  that  during  my  conver- 
sation with  Baron  von  Richthofen  of  which  I  had 
the  honor  to  tell  you  in  my  report  of  September 
23rd,  the  Secretary  said  to  me  that  he  did  not  be- 
lieve in  an  entente  between  Russia  and  England, 
because  there  was  no  basis  for  it.  However,  such 
a  basis  is  possible.  England  at  the  present  time 
shows  no  interest  whatsoever  in  the  fate  of  Turkey 
whose  preservation  has  for  such  a  long  time  been 
the  leading  principle  of  her  policy.  She  may  leave 
Russia  a  free  hand  in  Asia  Minor.  Such  a  com- 
bination would,  moreover,  have  the  advantage  of 
embroiling  Russia  with  Germany,  whose  isolation 
is  at  present  the  principal  aim  of  the  English  policy. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Greindl. 


No.  11. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Paris,  a  M. 
le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  24  Octobre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

L'accalmie  s'est  faite  autour  des  incidents  orageux 
des  dernieres  semaines,  mais  le  calme  qui  regne  est 
plutot  produit  par  le  desir  d'etouflfer  des  polemiques 
dangereuses  et  des  questions  qu'on  n'est  pas  pret 
a  resoudre  que  par  un  sentiment  de  reelle  securite. 
Les  evenements  qui  se  sont  produits  depuis  le  prin- 
temps  passe  ont  ebranle  I'equilibre  europeen,  ouvert 
des  horizons  nouveaux  et  jete  la  perturbation  dans  la 
politique  exterieure  de  la  France.  II  est  done  naturel 
qu'apres  une  semblable  secousse  on  passe  par  une 
periode  de  recueillement. 

L'Allemagne  nie  avoir  fait  au  Cabinet  de  Rome  des 
confidences  ou  insinuations  destinees  a  servir  d'aver- 
tissement  a  la  France  et  n'admet  pas  qu'elle  doit  se 
servir  d'un  intermediaire  dans  ses  rapports  avec  le 
Gouvernement  de  la  Republique.  On  declare  aussi 
que  les  revelations  sensationnelles  de  la  presse  fran- 
caise  n'ont  nullement  emu  le  Gouvernement  alle- 
mand  prepare  depuis  longtemps  aux  eventualites 
ainsi  exposees  au  public  et  que  les  dementis  officieux 
qui  ont  paru  a  Paris  et  a  Londres  ont  ete  faits  spon- 
tanement  et  nullement  a  la  suite  de  demandes  d'ex- 
plications  de  la  part  du  Prince  de  Biilow. 

Si  Ton  se  remet  ici  des  emotions  causees  par  la 
politique  inconsideree  de  M.  Delcasse  et  s'il  y  a 
assez  de  patriotisme  et  de  dignite  meme  dans  la 
presse  pour  dissimuler  le  ressentiment  qu'a  engendre 
I'attitude  de  I'Allemagne,  celui-ci  subsiste  pourtant 
avec  de  profondes  racines  dans  les  coeurs  franqais. 
Une  immense  desillusion  a  envahi  ceux  qui  sommeil- 
laient  dans  des  reves  pacifiques,  le  chauvinisme  na- 
tional s'est  reveille,  on  discute  I'efficacite  de  la 
defense  comparee  a  I'organisation  formidable  des 
voisins  de  I'Est,  et  on  se  montre  dispose  a  faire  de 
nouveaux  sacrifices  pour  que  la  flotte  et  I'armee 
soient  pretes  a  toute  eventualite.  On  semble  ne  pas 
se  dissimu'er  que  dans  I'etat  actuel  des  -choses  on 
se  trouverait  a  la  frontiere  dans  les  conditions  tout 
aussi  defavorables  qu'en  1870.  On  deplore  surtout  le 
manque  d'organisation,  d'autorite  des  chefs  et 
d'esprit  de  discipline  dans  I'armee.  Si  la  France, 
apres  de  longues  annees  de  somnolente  accalmie, 
songe  a  nouveau  a  fourbir  ses  armes,  on  ne  saurait 
admettre  qu'elle  soit  guidee  en  cela  par  des  idees 
agressives  mais  elle  se  rend  compte  que  de  I'orienta- 
tion  qu'el'e  va  donner  a  sa  politique  exterieure  ou  de 
celle  meme  qu'on  lui  attribuerait  peuvent  naitre  de 
graves  complications.  Si  I'Allemagne  voyait  se  des- 
siner  nettement  un  rapprochement  anglo-franco- 
russe,  attendrait-elle,  malgre  tout  son  desir  de  main- 
tenir  la  paix,  la  consolidation  d'une  telle  alliance  et 
ne  voudrait-elle  pas  rompre  violemment  le  cercle  de 
fer  dans  lequel  on  chercherait  a  I'etreindre?  On  se 
rend  bien  compte  ici  que  personne  ne  veut  la  guerre 
mais  on  ne  saurait  se  dissimu'er  que  les  rivalites 
economiques  et  commerciales,  questions  desormais 
vitales  pour  les  Puissances,  peuvent  la  dechainer 
d'un  moment  a  I'autre.  L'.Angleterre  dans  ses  ef- 
forts pour  maintenir  sa  suprematie  et  enrayer  le  de- 
veloppement  de  sa  grande  rivale  germanique  est 
evidemment  animee  du  desir  d'eviter  un  conflit,  mais 
ses  aspirations  egoistes  ne  nous  y  menent-elles  pas? 


Sir: 


Paris,  October  24,  1905. 


A  calm  has  set  in  after  the  stormy  events  of  the 
last  weeks,  but  it  is  produced  rather  by  a  desire  to 
stifle  dangerous  polemics  and  questions  for  which 
no  solution  is  prepared  than  by  an  actual  feeling 
of  security.  The  happenings  since  last  Spring 
have  shaken  the  European  equilibrium,  opened  up 
new  horizons  and  caused  disturbance  in  the  French 
foreign  policy.  It  is,  therefore,  only  natural'that 
such  a  shake-up  should  be  followed  by  a  period  of 
reconsideration  and  study. 

Germany  denies  having  made  confidential  com- 
munications or  insinuations  to  the  Cabinet  at  Rome 
intended  to  serve  as  a  warning  to  France,  and  she 
claims  that  she  has  no  need  of  an  intermediary  in 
her  relations  with  the  Government  of  the  Republic. 
It  is  also  said  that  the  sensational  revelations  of  the 
French  press  have  in  no  way  excited  the  German 
Government  which  for  a  long  time  has  been  pre- 
pared for  such  contingencies  as  have  now  been  made 
pubHc.  It  is  further  said  that  the  semi-official  de- 
nials which  appeared  in  Paris  and  London  were 
spontaneous  and  in  no  manner  the  result  of  demands 
for  explanations  made  by  Prince  von  Bulow. 

Although  people  here  are  recovering  from  the  ex- 
citement caused  by  the  inconsiderate  policy  of  M. 
Delcasse,  and  although  even  the  press  possesses 
enough  patriotism  and  dignity  to  conceal  the  resent- 
ment which  Germany's  attitude  has  engendered,  that 
resentment  has,  nevertheless,  firmly  taken  root  in 
the  hearts  of  the  French.  A  great  disillusion  has 
befallen  those  who  had  been  dozing  in  pacific 
dreams ;  national  chauvinism  has  been  awakened ; 
the  eflFectiveness  of  the  country's  defense  is  being 
discussed  in  comparison  with  the  formidable  organ- 
ization of  the  neighbors  in  the  East,  and  a  disposi- 
tion is  manifesting  itself  to  make  fresh  sacrifices  so 
that  the  navy  and  the  army  may  be  ready  for  any 
event.  It  seems  to  be  realized  that  in  the  present 
state  of  afl^airs  France  would  find  herself  on  the 
frontier  in  a  condition  as  unfavorable  as  in  1870. 
Complaints  are  made  particularly  of  the  lack  of 
organization,  authority  on  the  part  of  the  leaders, 
and  a  sense  of  discipline  in  the  army.  If  France 
after  long  years  of  somnolent  rest  thinks  again  of 
furbishing  her  armor,  it  should  not  be  imagined  that 
she  is  being  guided  in  this  by  ideas  of  aggression ; 
she  is,  on  the  contrary,  awake  to  the  fact  that  grave 
complications  may  arise  from  the  course  which  she 
is  going  to  take  in  her  foreign  policy  or  which  may 
only  be  attributed  to  her.  If  Germany  were  clearly 
to  see  an  Anglo-Franco-Russian  rapprochement 
taking  shape  would  she,  despite  all  her  desire  to 
maintain  peace,  wait  for  the  consolidation  of  such 
an  alliance,  or  would  she  not  rather  forcibly  break 
the  iron  ring  which  her  adversaries  were  attempting 
to  forge  around  her?  It  is  fully  realized  here  that 
nobody  wants  war,  but  on  the  other  hand,  no  one 
seeks  to  deny  the  fact  that  it  may  be  unchained  at 
any  moment  by  economic  and  commercial  rivalry, 
involving  questions  which  will  hereafter  be  of  vital 
importance  to  the  Powers.  England,  despite  her 
efforts  to  maintain  her  supremacy  and  tn  c^ock  the 


Elle  a  cru,  en  concluant  I'alliance  japonaise  et  en 
attirant  peu  a  peu  la  France  dans  de  semblables 
liens,  avoir  trouve  le  moyen  d'arriver  a  son  but  en  pa- 
ralysant  assez  les  forces  de  rAUemagne  pour  rendre 
la  guerre  impossible,  car,  certes,  dans  ce  cas,  I'Al- 
lemagne  n'eut  pas  ete  attaquee  et  si  elle  prenait 
Tcffensive,  ses  allies  de  la  triplice  n'eussent,  sans 
doute,  pas  considere  comme  une  obligation  contrac- 
tuelle  de  participer  a  une  attaque  contre  la  France. 
Si  TAllemagne,  forte  de  ses  victoires  et  de  son  im- 
mense developpement,  a  voulu,  des  le  debut,  rompre 
les  intrigues  de  ceux  qui  cherchaient  a  porter  at- 
teinte  au  prestige  du  role  predominant  qu'elle  occupe 
en  la  reduisant  a  un  pacifique  isolement,  il  est  a  sup- 
poser  qu'elle  est  disposee  a  aller  jusqu'au  bout  dans 
cette  voie.  Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
contre  lequel  se  sont  eleves  les  griefs  germaniques, 
qui  visaient  au  fond  la  Grande-Bretagne,  doit  se 
rendre  compte  que  s'il  poursuivait  la  politique  de  M. 
Delcasse  ce  serait  la  France  qui  deviendrait  I'otage 
de  la  lutte  dont  I'Angleterre  beneficierait. 


Si  M.  Rouvier  avait  I'intention  de  s'engager  dans 
cette  politique  plus  fiere  et  plus  digne,  pent  etre  plus 
hasardeuse,  il  n'aurait  pas  cede  aux  injonctions  de 
I'Allemagne  en  sacrifiant  M.  Delcasse.  Apres  un  tel 
acte  la  reprise  da  la  politique,  generalement  blamee 
de  son  predecesseur  semble  impossible  et  pourtant 
on  souffre  de  rester  sous  I'impression  de  ce  penible 
incident  et  on  voudrait  rehausser  le  moral  de  la 
France  en  donnant  un  temoignage  de  son  indepen- 
dance  politique,  mais  on  se  trouve  fort  embarrasse  et 
par  suite  fort  hesitant  pour  le  moment. 

II  parait  que  I'Allemagne  envisage  de  plus  en  plus 
comme  possible  un  conflit  avec  I'Angleterre  et  qu'elle 
n'est  pas  sans  nourrir  de  serieuses  inquietudes  a  ce 
sujet.  De  la  les  insinuations  de  la  presse  officieuse 
qui  semble  vouloir  mettre  la  France  en  demeure  de 
declarer  de  quel  cote  elle  se  rangerait.  Ces  articles 
produisent  ici  une  impression  irritante.  On  semble 
comprendre  que  loin  de  se  prononcer  dans  une  telle 
eventualite  il  est  de  I'interet  de  la  France  de  main- 
tenir  la  neutralite  autant  que  possible  car  il  est  evi- 
dent qu'elle  ne  pourrait  pas  prendre  parti  pour  I'Alle- 
magne et  que  si  elle  s'alliait  a  I'Angleterre  elle  ris- 
querait  fort  de  donner  a  I'Allemagne  des  compensa- 
tions pour  les  desastres  que  la  flotte  britannique 
pourrait  lui  infliger.  II  est  done  a  supposer  que  M. 
Rouvier  a  pour  objectif,  primo  d'eviter  toute  cause 
de  conflit  en  Europe  et  secundo  d'en  tenir  la  France 
a  I'ecart  s'il  devait  eclater. 

Pour  le  moment,  le  President  du  Conseil  est  en 
Espagne  et  il  s'efforce  de  resserrer  les  liens  d'amitie 
de  ce  cote.  Des  son  retour,  il  aura  probablement  a 
soutenir  de  vives  attaques  a  la  Chambre.  On  ne  sait 
pas  encore  exactement  comment  et  avec  quelle  vio- 
lence le  debat  s'engagra  sur  la  politique  exterieure, 
mais  la  partie  sera  sans  doute  dure  et  fort  delicate 
pour  Mr.  Rouvier  et  des  craintes  sont  meme  mani- 
festees  sur  son  maintien  au  pouvoir. 

Ce  n'est  pas  sans  anxiete  aussi  que  Ton  envisage 
la  Conference  d'Algesiras.  Le  Sultan  hesite  a  ac- 
cepter le  programme  qui  lui  est  soumis  et  I'Angle- 
terre se  dispose  a  le  faire  echouer.  On  s'accorde  a 
reconnaitre  que  cette  reunion  aura,  dans  les  circons- 
tances  de  tension  generale  actuelle,  une  importance 
toute  speciale  et  qu'elle  pent  avoir  des  resultats  tout 
autres  que  ceux  prevus  par  son  programme.  La 
s'accentuera  le  role  de  I'Angleterre  et  s'effectuera 
forcement  sous  son  impulsion  le  groupement  des 
Puissances.       L'Allemagne    redoute,    parait-il,     ce 


development  of  her  big  German  rival,  is  evidently 
animated  by  the  desire  to  avoid  a  conflict,  but  are 
not  her  egotistic  aspirations  leading  us  into  it?  In 
concluding  the  Japanese  Alliance  and  in  gradually 
drawing  France  into  similar  ties,  she  believed  she 
had  found  the  means  by  which  to  arrive  at  her  goal 
of  paralyzing  the  forces  of  Germany  in  a  degree  suf- 
ficient to  make  war  impossible ;  for  in  that  case  Ger- 
many would  not  be  attacked  and  if  she  should  take 
the  offensive,  her  Allies  of  the  Triplice  would  doubt- 
less not  consider  themselves  under  a  treaty  obliga- 
tion to  take  part  in  an  attack  against  France.  If 
Germany,  strong  through  her  victories  and  her  im- 
mense development,  was  willing  from  the  beginning 
to  break  the  intrigues  of  those  who  sought  to  impair 
the  prestige  of  the  predominant  part  which  she  is 
playing,  by  forcing  her  to  peace  by  isolation,  it  must 
be  assumed  that  she  is  ready  to  pursue  this  road  to 
the  end.  The  Government  of  the  Republic,  against 
whom  the  German  complaints  are  raised,  which  in 
reality  are  intended  for  Great  Britain,  must  realize 
that  if  they  follow  the  policy  of  M.  Delcasse  France 
would  become  the  hostage  in  the  struggle  from 
which  England  would  draw  the  benefit. 

If  M.  Rouvier  had  purposed  embarking  on  this 
prouder  and  more  dignified,  but  perhaps  also  more 
dangerous,  policy  he  would  not  have  given  way  to 
Germany's  injunctions  by  sacrificing  M.  Delcasse. 
After  such  action  it  seems  impossible  that  the  policy 
of  his  predecessor,  which  met  with  general  con- 
demnation, should  be  taken  up  again,  and  yet  people 
are  suffering  under  the  impression  of  this  painful 
incident  and  would  like  to  improve  the  morale  of 
France  by  giving  proof  of  her  political  independ- 
ence, but  they  find  themselves  embarrassed  and  are 
at  present  very  undecided. 

It  seems  that  Germany  regards  a  conflict  with 
England  as  increasingly  possible  and  that  she  har- 
bors serious  anxiety  on  this  subject.  Hence  the  in- 
sinuations of  the  semi-official  press,  which  seems  to 
want  to  compel  France  to  declare  which  side  she 
will  take.  These  articles  are  producing  an  irritat- 
ing impression  here.  It  seems  to  be  perfectly  un- 
derstood here  that  far  from  pronouncing  herself 
on  such  a  contingency  it  is  to  France's  interest  to 
remain  neutral  as  long  as  possible,  for  it  is  evident 
that  she  could  not  take  the  part  of  Germany  and 
that,  if  she  allied  herself  with  England,  she  would 
run  the  risk  of  having  to  pay  compensation  for  the 
disasters  which  the  British  fleet  might  inflict  on  Ger- 
rnany.  It  must  therefore  be  assumed  that  M.  Rou- 
vier's  intention  is  in  the  first  place  to  avoid  all  cause 
of  conflict  in  Europe  and  furthermore  to  keep 
France  out  of  it  if  it  should  break  out. 

At  the  present  moment  the  Prime  Minister  is  in 
Spain  trying  to  tighten  the  bonds  of  friendship  on 
that  side.  On  his  return  he  will  probably  meet 
with  lively  attacks  in  the  Chamber.  It  is  not  yet 
known  exactly  how  and  with  what  force  the  debate 
concerning  the  foreign  policy  will  be  conducted,  but 
it  will  doubtless  be  a  hard  and  difficult  fight  for 
M.  Rouvier  and  fears  are  even  expressed  about  his 
remaining  in  power. 

The  Algeciras  conference  also  is  looked  forward 
to  with  anxiety.  The  Sultan  is  hesitating  about 
accepting  the  programme  submitted  to  him  and 
England  is  endeavoring  to  bring  about  its  failure. 
It  is  universally  recognized  that  in  view  of  the  pres- 
ent general  tension  the  conference  will  be  of  es- 
pecial importance  and  that  it  may  lead  to  very  dif- 
ferent results  than  those  forecast  in  the  programme. 
At  this  conference  England's  role  will  become  more 
pronounced,  and  the  grouping  of  the  Powers  will 
necessarily   take   place   under   her   pressure.     This 


—    16    — 


groupement  qui  aurait  pour  premier  effet  I'avorte- 
tnent  de  la  Conference  et  elle  serait,  dit-on,  plus  dis- 
posee  maintenant  a  accepter  le  sacrifice  d'amour- 
propre  d'un  ajournement  indefini  que  les  consequen- 
ces possibles  d'une  reunion  immediate. 

Le  Prince  de  Radolin  n'a  pas  quitte  Paris  de  tout 
I'ete  et  il  est  encore  en  relations  presque  journalieres 
avec  le  departement  des  Affaires  fitrangeres. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  A.  Leghait. 


Germany  seems  to  fear  because  its  first  result  would 
be  the  miscarriage  of  the  conference,  and  it  is  said 
that  she  would  now  be  more  disposed  to  sacrifice 
her  amour-propre  by  consenting  to  an  indefinite  ad- 
journment than  to  accept  the  possible  consequences 
of  an  immediate  meeting. 

Prince  von  Radolin  did  not  leave  Paris  all  summer 
and  he  is  still  in  almost  daily  touch  with  the  De- 
partment of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  12. 


No.  12. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangdres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  27  Octobre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

La  statue  du  Feldmarechal  Comte  de  Moltke  a 
ete  inauguree  hier  a  Berlin. 

Le  soir  au  diner  de  gala  qui  a  suivi  la  ceremonie, 
I'Empereur  a  dit  que  la  journee  comportait  deux 
toasts ;  le  premier  consacre  au  passe  et  a  la  memoire. 
Profondement  reconnaissant  envers  la  providence 
qui  a  une  grande  epoque  a  donne  ses  paladins  au 
Grand  Empereur,  Sa  Majeste  boit  son  premier  verre 
en  silence  en  souvenir  du  plus  grand  general  de 
I'Empereur  Guillaume. 

Sa  Majeste  a  continue  en  disant:  "Le  second 
verre  est  pour  I'avenir  et  le  present !  Ces  messieurs 
ont  vu  quelle  est  notre  situation  dans  le  monde. 
Done  la  poudre  seche,  les  epees  aiguisees,  le  but  re- 
connu,  les  forces  ramassees  et  les  pessimistes  bannis. 
Je  leve  mon  verre  a  notre  peuple  en  armes.  A 
I'armee  allemande  et  a  son  etat-major  general ! 
Hurra,  Hurra,  Hurra  1" 

II  est  impossible  de  faire  entendre  plus  clairement 
qu'en  depit  de  tous  les  dementis  officieux  I'Empereur 
continue  a  croire  que  la  politique  de  I'Angleterre  a 
Paris,  a  Tokio,  a  Saint  Petersbourg,  a  Washington  a 
pour  but  non  seulement  d'ameliorer  les  relations  avec 
les  grandes  puissances  europeennes  et  extra  euro- 
peennes;  ce  qui  n'aurait  rien  que  de  legitime;  mais 
aussi  et  principalement  d'isoler  I'AUemagne. 

II  regne  ici  une  mefiance  insurmontable  centre 
I'Angleterre.  Un  tres  grand  nombre  d'AUemands 
sont  persuades  que  I'Angleterre  ou  cherche  des  al- 
lies pour  une  agression  contre  TAllemagne,  ou  ce 
qui  serait  plus  conforme  aux  traditions  britanniques, 
travaille  a  provoquer  sur  le  continent  une  guerre  a 
laquelle  elle  ne  prendrait  pas  part  et  dont  elle  re- 
cueillerait  les  profits. 

On  me  dit  que  beaucoup  d'Anglais  nourrissent 
des  inquietudes  analogues  et  craignent  une  agression 
allemande. 

Je  me  demande  sur  quoi  pent  se  fonder  a  Londres 
une  pareille  impression.  L'Allemagne  est  absolu- 
ment  incapable  d'attaquer  I'Angleterre.  Pour  debar- 
quer  une  armee  sur  le  .sol  anglais,  il  faudrait  etre 
maitre  de  la  mer  au  moins  pendant  quelques  jours, 
et  I'AUemagne  n'a  aucune  chance  de  le  devenir.  Sa 
flotte  embusquee  aux  deux  extremites  du  canal  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  et  pouvant  passer  en  une  nuit  d'une  mer  a 
I'autre  pourrait  peut-etre  etre  efficace  pour  empecher 
le  blocus  des  ports  allemands.    Elle  aurait  le  choix 


Berlin,  October  27,  1905. 
Sir:— 

Yesterday  the  statue  of  Field-Marshal  Count  von 
Moltke  was  unveiled  in  Berlin. 

In  the  evening,  at  the  gala-dinner  following  the 
ceremony,  the  Emperor  said  that  the  day  called  for 
two  toasts,  the  first  of  which  must  be  a  tribute  to 
the  memory  of  the  past.  Deeply  grateful  to  Provi- 
dence, which  in  a  great  time  gave  able  paladins  to 
the  Great  Emperor,  His  Majesty  drank  the  first 
glass  in  memory  of  Emperor  William's  greatest 
general. 

His  Majesty  then  continued :  "The  second  glass 
is  to  the  future  and  the  present!  You,  gentlemen, 
have  seen  what  our  position  is  in  the  world.  There- 
fore, let  us  keep  our  powder  dry,  our  swords  sharp, 
our  aim  clearly  defined,  our  strength  collected,  and 
the  pessimists  banished.  I  lift  my  glass  to  drink 
to  our  nation  in  arms.  To  the  German  army  and 
its    General    Staff!     Hurrah!     Hurrah!     Hurrah!" 

It  cannot  possibly  be  more  clearly  expressed  that, 
all  semi-official  disavowals  notwithstanding,  the 
Emperor  continues  to  believe  that  England's  policy 
in  Paris,  Tokio,  St.  Petersburg  and  Washington  is 
not  only  aiming  at  improving  the  relations  with  the 
Great  Powers  in  and  out  of  Europe,  in  which  she 
would  be  perfectly  justified,  but  also  and  chiefly  at 
isolating  Germany. 

An  insurmountable  mistrust  of  England  is  preva- 
lent here.  A  great  number  of  Germans  are  con- 
vinced that  England  is  either  seeking  allies  for  an 
attack  on  Germany  or — which  would  be  more  in 
conformity  with  British  traditions — is  endeavoring 
to  stir  up  a  war  on  the  continent  in  which  she 
would  not  take  part  and  of  which  she  would  reap 
the  benefit. 

I  am  told  that  many  Englishmen  harbor  similar 
apprehensions,  and  fear  a  German  attack. 

I  ask  myself  on  what  such  an  impression  can  be 
based  at  London.  Germany  is  absolutely  in  no  po- 
sition to  attack  England.  In  order  to  land  an  army 
on  British  soil  Germany  would  have  to  have  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  at  least  for  some  days,  of  which 
she  has  no  chance.  With  her  fleet  in  ambush  at 
both  ends  of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  and  able  to 
pass  from  one  sea  to  the  other  in  a  night,  she  might 
perhaps  be  able  to  prevent  a  blockade  of  the  Ger- 
man ports.     She  would  be  in  a  position  to  choose 


16 


du  moment  ou  il  lui  conviendrait  d'attaquer  une 
escadre  ennemie  aux  equipages  et  aux  machines  fa- 
tigues. La  flotte  allemande  n'a  ete  construite  que 
pour  cela ;  mais  elk  serait  hors  d'etat  d'affronter  une 
bataille  navale  sur  les  cotes  de  I'Angleterre.  La 
disproportion  numerique  des  forces  est  trop  grande. 

Quant  a  une  attaque  de  I'Allemagne  contre  les 
colonies  anglaises,  il  est  inutile  d'en  parler.  II  est 
evident  qu'on  n'y  pent  pas  songer. 

Les  gens  qui  en  Angleterre  affichent  la  crainte 
d'une  agression  allemande  irrealisable,  sont-ils  bien 
sinceres?  Ne  feignent-ils  pas  ces  alarmes  pour  pous- 
ser  a  un  conflit  qui  aneantirait  la  flotte  de  guerre,  la 
marine  marchande  et  le  commerce  exterieur  de  I'Al- 
lemagne. Si  I'Angleterre  est  a  I'abri  des  coups,  I'Alle- 
magne au  contraire  est  tres  vulnerable.  En  atta- 
quant  TAllemagne  simplement  pour  aneantir  un 
rival,  I'Angleterre  ne  ferait  que  suivre  ses  anciens 
errements.  Elle  a  successivemnt  detruit  la  flotte 
hollandaise  d'accord  avec  Louis  XIV ;  puis  la  flotte 
frangaise  et  meme  la  flotte  danoise  en  pleine  paix  et 
sans  aucune  provocation,  simplement  parce  que 
celle-ci  constituait  une  force  navale  respectable. 

II  n'y  a  aucune  raison  avouable  de  conflit  entre 
I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre.  La  haine  des  Anglais 
contre  I'Allemagne  provient  uniquement  de  I'envie 
que  leur  inspirent  les  progres  de  la  marine,  du  com- 
merce et  de  I'industrie  allemande. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s]  Greindl. 


the  moment  for  an  attack  on  a  hostile  squadron  at 
a  time  when  its  men  and  its  machinery  were  ex- 
hausted. The  German  fleet  was  built  only  for  this 
end ;  but  it  would  be  out  of  the  question  for  it  to 
face  the  enemy  off  the  English  coast.  The  numer- 
ical disproportion  of  the  forces  would  be  too  great. 

An  attack  by  Germany  on  the  British  colonies 
need  not  be  discussed.  It  is  evident  that  it  cannot 
be  thought  of. 

Are  the  people  in  England  who  profess  fear  of  a 
German  attack,  which  would  be  impossible,  quite 
sincere?  Don't  they  rather  feign  such  apprehen- 
sions in  order  to  bring  about  a  conflict  which  would 
exterminate  the  navy,  the  merchant  marine,  and  the 
foreign  trade  of  Germany?  While  England  is  safe 
from  attacks,  Germany  on  the  contrary  is  very  vul- 
nerable. In  attacking  Germany  simply  to  annihi- 
late a  rival  England  would  only  follow  her  old 
tracks.  She  destroyed  successfully  the  Dutch  fleet 
in  accord  with  Louis  XIV,  subsequently  the  French 
fleet  and,  finally  even  the  Danish  fleet  in  the  midst 
of  peace  and  without  any  provocation,  simply  be- 
cause it  represented  a  respectable  naval  force. 

There  is  no  reasonable  ground  for  a  conflict  be- 
tween Germany  and  England.  The  Englisman's 
hate  of  Germany  springs  solely  from  jealousy  caused 
by  the  progress  of  Germany's  marine,  commerce, 
and  industry. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  18  Novembre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Le  "Reichsanzeiger"  a  public  hier  I'extrait  suivant 
du  budget  pour  I'annee  prochaine  contenant  les 
depenses  pour  la  marine  de  guerre. 

Le  gouvernement  propose  d'augmenter  le  mate- 
riel de  la  flotte  de  6  grands  croiseurs  et  de  10  petits ; 
I'augmentation  du  nombre  des  torpilleurs,  I'augmen- 
tation  du  tonnage  des  vaisseaux  de  ligne  et  des 
grands  croiseurs  dont  la  necessite  a  ete  prouvee  par 
I'experience  de  la  guerre  entre  la  Russie  et  le  Japon, 
Taugmentation  du  nombre  des  ofificiers  et  des  mate- 
lots  evaluee  a  environ  6000  hommes.  Le  plan  doit 
etre  realise  en  9  ans.  II  etait  deja  connu  en  sub' 
stance  avant  la  publication  des  details  et  il  est  bien 
accueilli  par  I'opinion  publique.  La  chose  est 
d'autant  plus  a  remarquer  que  la  situation  des  finan- 
ces de  I'Empire  est  loin  d'etre  satisfaisante. 

La  marine  de  guerre  etait  autrefois  tres  impopu- 
laire  en  Allemagne.  Le  revirement  en  sa  faveur  a 
commence  apres  la  guerre  du  Transvaal  et  de  Cuba 
que  I'opinion  publique  allemande  a  considerees  com- 
me  des  actcs  de  piraterie,  elle  a  voulu  mettre  I'Em- 
pire a  I'abri  d'agressions  semblables.  La  nouvelle 
organisation  des  forces  navales  britanniques  incon- 
testablement  dirigee  contre  I'Allemagne,  a  fait  en- 
core mieux  sentir  la  necessite  de  posseder  une  flotte 
non  dans  le  but  d'attaquer  I'Angleterre,  ce  a  quoi 
personne  ne  songe  et  ce  qui  est  d'ailleurs  irrealisable. 
mais  uniquement  pour  se  defendre  contre  elle. 

L'Allemagne  n'est  exposee  a  etre  attaquee  sur  le 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  November  18,  1905. 


The  Official  Gazette  published  yesterday  the  fol- 
lowring  abstract  from  the  budget  for  next  year  con- 
taining the  expenditure  for  the  navy. 

The  Government  proposes  an  increase  in  the  ef- 
fective strength  of  the  fleet  by  6  large  and  10  small 
cruisers,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  torpedo- 
boats,  and  in  the  tonnage  of  the  battle  ships  and  the 
big  cruisers,  the  necessity  for  which  was  shown  by 
the  experiences  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war;  and  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  officers  afid  men  estimated 
at  about  6,000.  The  plan  is  to  be  executed  in  9 
years.  The  general  outlines  of  the  plan  were  known 
before  the  publication  of  the  details  and  meet  with 
a  favorable  reception  by  public  opinion.  The  mat- 
ter is  the  more  remarkable  because  the  financial 
situation  of  the  Empire  is  far  from  satisfactory. 

The  navy  was  formerly  very  unpopular  in  Ger- 
many. The  reversal  in  its  favor  began  after  the 
Boer  war  and  the  war  in  Cuba,  which  German  pub- 
lic opinion  considered  as  acts  of  piracy ;  it  was  then 
desired  to  shield  the  Empire  from  similar  aggres- 
sions. The  new  organization  of  the  British  naval 
forces,  which  is  indisputably  directed  against  Ger- 
many, has  caused  the  need  of  a  fleet  to  be  felt  more 
keenly.  This  fleet  is,  however,  not  to  be  created  in 
order  to  attack  England,  of  which  nobody  thinks 
and  which,  moreover,  would  be  impossible,  but  ex- 
clusively for  defense  against  that  country. 

On  the  Continent,  Germany  is  exposed  to  attack 


continent  que  par  la  France  ou  la  Russie.  Dans 
I'eventualite  d'un  conflit  avec  elles,  le  sort  de  la 
guerre  se  decidera  par  les  armees  de  terre  et  une 
bataille  navale  de  quelque  cote  que  reste  la  victoire, 
n'aura  aucune  influence  sur  les  conditions  de  la  paix. 
C'est  done  I'Angleterre  seule  qu'elle  a  a  redouter  et 
qui  I'oblige  a  entretenir  une  marine  hors  de  propor- 
tion avec  les  necessites  de  la  protection  de  ses  in- 
terets  commerciaux  dans  les  pays  exotiques. 

Malheureusement  non  seulement  I'attitude  de  la 
presse  anglaise,  mais  aussi  celle  des  ministres  anglais 
est  de  nature  a  nourrir  ces  defiances.  Personne  ne 
doute  ici,  malgre  les  dementis  officieux,  que  la  po- 
litique agressive  de  M.  Delcasse  n'ait  ete  encouragee 
par  I'Angleterre.  On  a  beaucoup  remarque  dans  les 
discours  de  Lord  Lansdowne  au  club  constitutionnel 
et  de  M.  Balfour  au  banquet  du  Lord  maire,  pacifi- 
ques  dans  leur  ensemble,  les  allusions  malveillantes 
qui,  sans  nommer  I'Allemagne,  ne  pouvaient  s'adres- 
ser  qu'  a  elle.  Lord  Lansdowne  a  dit  que  I'Angle- 
terre avait  ete  de  temps  en  temps  entravee  par  le 
fait  que  dans  plusieurs  parties  du  monde  elle  s'etait 
trouvee  en  presence  de  rivalites  qui  ne  pouvaient 
etre  avantageuses  a  personne,  sauf  peut-etre  a  quel- 
que potentat  astucieux  qui  savait  comment  en  tirer 
profit. 

M.  Balfour  a  dit  qu'il  pensait  qu'il  n'y  aurait  pas 
de  guerre  a  I'avenir,  a  moins  qu'il  ne  surgisse  des 
nations  ou  des  chefs  d'Etat  qui  sentent  qu'ils  ne  peu- 
vent  realiser  leurs  plans  d'agrandissement  national 
qu'en  foulant  aux  pieds  les  droits  de  leurs  voisins. 
Le  Premier  Ministre  anglais  a  toutefois  ajoute  qu'il 
ne  voyait  pas  de  perspective  d'une  pareille  calamite 
pour  I'Europe. 

Je  me  demande  oii  et  quand  I'Allemagne  a  contre- 
carre  la  politique  anglaise.  Sont-ce  des  reminis- 
cences du  telegramme  adresse  par  I'Empereur  au 
president  Kruger  apres  la  capture  de  Jameson  et  de 
ses  compagnons?  C'est  deja  bien  vieux.  De  plus 
on  ne  devrait  pas  oublier  a  Londres  qu'il  s'agissait 
d'une  bande  de  flibustiers  sans  doute  organisee  sous 
main  par  le  gouvernement  anglais,  mais  que  I'Angle- 
terre officielle  a  desavouee. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.l  Greindl. 


17    - 

only  from  France  and  Russia.  In  the  case  of  a  con- 
flict with  these  Powers  the  fate  of  war  will  be  de- 
cided by  the  armies  on  land,  and  a  naval  fight — no 
matter  to  whom  victory  may  fall — will  have  no  in- 
fluence on  the  terms  of  peace.  It  is,  therefore, 
England  alone  whom  Germany  has  to  fear  and  who 
compels  her  to  maintain  a  navy  which  is  out  of 
proportion  to  the  requirements  for  the  protection 
of  her  commercial  interests  in  countries  across  the 
sea. 

Unfortunately,  the  attitude  not  only  of  the  En- 
glish press  but  of  the  British  Ministers  as  well  is 
apt  to  feed  this  mistrust.  Nobody  doubts  here  that 
in  spite  of  the  semi-official  denials  the  aggressive 
policy  of  M.  Delcasse  has  been  encouraged  by  Eng- 
land. Much  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  remarks 
in  the  speeches  of  Lord  Lansdowne  at  the  Consti- 
tutional Club  and  of  Mr.  Balfour  at  the  Lord 
Mayor's  banquet,  remarks  which,  though  on  the 
whole  pacific,  still  contained  malevolent  allusions 
that,  without  mentioning  Germany,  could  refer 
only  to  her.  Lord  Lansdowne  said  that  England 
had  from  time  to  time  been  hampered  by  finding 
herself  in  various  parts  of  the  world  face  to  face 
with  rivalries  which  could  not  be  of  value  to  any- 
body except  perhaps  some  astute  potentate  who 
knew  how  to  derive  profit  from  them. 

Mr.  Balfour  said  he  did  not  beheve  there  would 
be  a  war  in  the  future  unless  it  were  caused  by  na- 
tions or  heads  of  state  who  feel  that  they  cannot 
realize  their  plans  of  national  aggrandizement  ex- 
cept by  trampling  on  the  rights  of  their  neighbors. 
The  British  Prime  Minister  added,  however,  that 
he  did  not  foresee  such  a  calamity  for  Europe. 

I  ask  myself  when  and  where  Germany  has 
thwarted  British  policy.  Are  these  reminiscences 
of  the  telegram  addressed  by  the  Emperor  to  Presi- 
dent Kriiger  after  the  capture  of  Jameson  and  his 
associates?  That  is  a  very  old  story.  Nor  should 
it  be  forgotten  in  London  that  the  matter  concerned 
a  band  of  filibusters  that,  while  doubtless  secretly 
organized  by  the  British  Government,  was  officially 
disavowed  by  England. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Greindl. 


No.  14. 


No.  14. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin,  k 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greidl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  31  Decembre  1905. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

M.  le  Baron  de  Richthofen  m'a  parle  hier  de  la 
satisfaction  que  lui  a  causee  le  changement  de  Mi- 
nistere  en  Angleterre.  Le  Cabinet  unioniste  ne  lais- 
sera  pas  de  regret  a  Berlin.  Le  secretaire  d'Etat  ne 
suppose  pas  qu'il  y  ait  eu  a  Londres  un  plan  pre- 
conQu  de  rupture  avec  I'Allemagne.  II  attribue  plu- 
tot  I'attitude  du  ministere  Balfour  a  une  trop  grande 
docilite  a  obeir  aux  indications  d'une  certaine  presse 
qu'on  etait  incapable  de  diriger,  mais  cette  faiblesse 
pouvait  mener  aux  plus  graves  dangers.  On  remar- 
que deja  une  detente  depuis  que  le  nouveau  cabinet 
est  aux  affaires.  M.  Campbell  Bannerman  a  une 
reputation  de  droiture  et  de  loyaute  qui  inspire  con- 
fiance. 


Berlin,  December  31,  1905. 

Sir: — 

Baron  von  Richthofen  spoke  to  me  yesterday  of 
the  satisfaction  which  the  Cabinet  change  in  Eng- 
land had  caused  him.  The  Unionist  Cabinet  is  not 
mourned  in  Berlin.  The  Secretary  of  State  does 
not  suppose  that  there  has  been  a  preconcerted  plan 
at  London  to  bring  about  a  rupture  with  Germany. 
Attributing  the  attitude  of  the  Balfour  Ministry 
more  to  an  excessive  obedience  to  the  demands  of 
a  certain  press  which  it  could  not  guide,  he  thinks 
that  such  weakness  might  have  led  to  the  gravest 
dangers.  Since  the  new  Cabinet  had  been  at  the 
helm  a  relaxation  was  already  perceptible.  Mr. 
Campbell  Bannermann  enjoyed  a  reputation  for  in- 
tegrity and  loyalty  which  inspired  confidence. 


Le  Baron  de  Richthofen  dit  que  les  Frangais  ont 
manifeste  dans  ces  derniers  temps  una  nervosite  que 
rien  ne  justifie.  On  s'est  imagine  a  Paris  que  I'Alle- 
magne  n'attendait  qu'une  occasion  de  tomber  sur  la 
France.  L'Empire  accepterait  une  guerre  si  on  I'y 
oblige;  mais  il  n'a  jamais  eu  la  moindre  velleite  de 
la  provoquer.  Qu'y  gagnerait-il  ?  Toute  la  politique 
de  I'Allemagne  temoigne  de  ses  intentions  pacifiques. 
Elle  n'a  pas  fait  la  moindre  tentative  pour  profiter 
des  desordres  de  la  Russie.  Tout  prouve  au  con- 
traire  qu'elle  ne  desire  que  le  maintien  du  statu  quo. 
M.  Bihourd  a  parle  d'un  parti  de  la  guerre.  II  y  a 
peut-etre  quelques  jeunes  officiers  qui  desirent  de 
I'avancement ;  mais  un  parti  de  la  guerre  n'existe  pas. 
L'Allemagne  a  I'unanimite  veut  la  paix. 


J'ai  demande  au  secretaire  d'etat  si  je  pouvais  con- 
siderer  comme  authentique  une  conversation  de 
I'Empereur  avec  un  personnage  franqais  rapportee,  il 
y  a  trois  jours,  par  le  journal  "Le  Temps."  Sa 
Majeste  aurait  dit  en  resume  qu'on  a  eu  tort  de 
croire  qu'il  existe  autour  d'Elle  un  parti  de  la  guerre. 
Quand  meme  il  existerait,  cela  n'aurait  aucune  im- 
portance; car  c'est  a  Elle  qu'appartient  la  decision. 
L'Empereur  ne  veut  pas  la  guerre,  parce  qu'il  la  con- 
sidere  comme  contraire  a  son  devoir  envers  Dieu  et 
envers  son  peuple. 

Le  Baron  de  Richthofen  m'a  repondu  que  la  com- 
munication du  journal  "Le  Temps"  est  exacte  sinon 
quant  a  la  forme,  au  moins  quant  au  fond.  II  a 
ajoute  que  c'est,  parait-il,  au  Marquis  de  Laguiche, 
attache  militaire  de  France  a  Berlin,  que  I'Empereur 
I'a  adressee.  Ce  sont  du  reste  les  idees  bien  connues 
de  Sa  Majeste. 

J'ai  replique  qu'il  me  semble  qu'on  peut  caracte- 
riser  la  politique  de  I'Empereur  en  disant  que  la  plus 
haute  ambition  de  Sa  Majeste  est  de  conserver  la 
paix  pendant  toute  la  duree  de  son  regne. 

Le  secretaire  d'etat  m'a  repondu  que  c'est  en  effet 
I'idee  dominante  qui  inspire  la  politique  Imperiale. 

II  ne  peut  pas  prevoir  ce  qui  se  produira  a  la  con- 
ference d'Algesiras,  mais  il  a  bon  espoir  qu'on  ar- 
rivera  a  un  resultat  satisfaisant. 

Le  secretaire  d'etat  ne  m'a  pas  dit  un  mot  du  livre 
blanc  allemand  a  la  preparation  duquel  on  a  active- 
ment  travaille  depuis  la  publication  du  livre  jaune 
franqais  et  qui  doit  etre  acheve.  Aurait-on  renonce  a 
le  faire  paraitre  pour  ne  pas  .lourrir  une  polemique 
de  journaux  dont  la  continuation  ne  pourrait  etre  que 
nuisible  a  une  entente? 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


Baron  von  Richthofen  said  that  the  French  were 
of  late  displaying  a  nervousness  which  nothing  jus- 
tified. People  in  Paris  had  been  imagining  that 
Germany  was  only  waiting  for  an  occasion  in  order 
to  fall  upon  France.  Germany  would  accept  a  war 
when  forced  to  do  so,  but  she  never  had  enter- 
tained the  slightest  desire  to  provoke  it.  What 
could  she  gain  by  it?  The  entire  policy  of  Ger- 
many was  proof  of  her  pacific  intentions.  She  had 
not  made  the  slightest  attempt  to  profit  by  Rus- 
sia's troubles.  Everything  served,  on  the  contrary, 
to  show  that  all  she  desired  was  the  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo.  M.  Bihourd  had  spoken  of  a  war 
party.  There  might  perhaps  be  a  few  young  offi- 
cers desirous  of  advancement ;  but  there  was  no  such 
a  thing  as  a  war  party.  Germany  unanimously 
wished  for  peace. 

I  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  whether  I  could 
consider  as  authentic  the  report  of  the  Temps  of 
three  days  ago  according  to  which  a  conversation 
took  place  between  the  Emperor  and  a  Frenchman. 
His  Majesty  was  reported  to  have  said  in  so  many 
words  that  it  was  wrong  to  believe  that  a  war  party 
existed  around  him.  Even  if  it  existed,  it  would 
have  no  importance,  as  the  decision  rested  with  him 
and  he  did  not  want  war,  which  he  considered  as 
contrary  to  his  duties  towards  God  and  his  people. 

Baron  von  Richthofen  answered  that  the  report 
of  the  Temps  was  correct,  if  not  in  its  form  at  least 
in  its  substance.  He  added  that  it  appeared  that 
it  was  Marquis  de  Laguiche,  the  Military  Attache 
of  France  in  Berlin,  to  whom  the  Emperor  had 
spoken.  Besides,  these  were  the  well  known  ideas 
of  His  Majesty. 

I  answered  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  policy 
of  the  Emperor  might  be  characterized  by  saying 
that  it  was  the  highest  ambition  of  His  Majesty  to 
preserve  peace  during  his  entire  reign. 

The  Secretary  of  State  replied  that  that  was  in- 
deed the  dominating  idea  which  inspired  the  Im- 
perial policy.  He  could  not  foresee  what  would 
happen  at  the  Algeciras  Conference,  but  he  was 
hopeful  that  a  satisfactory  result  would  be  reached. 

The  Secretary  of  State  did  not  say  a  word  con- 
cerning the  White  Book,  which  has  been  industri- 
ously prepared  since  the  publication  of  the  French 
Yellow  Book  and  which  must  be  finished  by  now. 
It  may  be  that  it  has  been  decided  not  to  publish 
the  book  in  order  not  to  give  food  for  a  newspaper 
polemic,  the  continuation  of  which  would  only  be 
injurious  to  an  understanding. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


M.  E.  van  Grootven,  Charge  d' Affaires  a  Londres,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


E.  van  Grootven,  Charge  d'affaires  at  London, 
to  Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Londres,  le  14  Janvier  1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Malgre  les  preoccupations  causees  par  les  elections 
on  suit  avec  le  plus  grand  interet  en  Angleterre  tout 
ce  qui  a  trait  a  la  prochaine  conference  d'Algesiras, 
et  Ton  cherche  a  s'y  rendre  compte  des  dispositions 
avec  lesquelles  les  principales  interessees,  la  France 
et  I'Allemagne,  s'y  rendront. 


London,  January  14,  1906. 
Sir: — 

In  spite  of  the  preoccupation  caused  by  the  elec- 
tions, people  in  England  are  following  with  the 
greatest  interest  everything  that  has  reference  to 
the  impending  conference  of  Algeciras  and  are  try- 
ing to  imagine  with  what  intentions  the  principal 
parties,  France  and  Germany,  are  going  there. 


Quant  a  I'Angleterre  elle  reste  entierement  favo- 
rable a  la  France.  Ainsi  que  Sir  E.  Grey  I'a  declare 
dans  un  discours,  "I'Angleterre  fera  son  possible  pour 
ameliorer  ses  relations  avec  TAllemagne,  mais  ce 
rapprochement  reste  toujours  subordonne  a  une 
bonne  entente  de  rAllemagne  avec  la  France." 

Dans  ces  derniers  temps  le  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres  a  repete  a  plusieurs  reprises  aux  diffe- 
rents  ambassadeurs  accredites  a  Londres  que  la 
Grande-Bretagne  etait  engagee  vis-a-vis  de  la  France 
en  ce  qui  concerne  le  Maroc,  et  qu'elle  remplirait  ses 
engagements  jusqu'  au  bout  meme  en  cas  d'une 
guerre  franco-allemande,  et  quoi  qu'il  put  lui  en 
couter. 

La  presse  et  I'opinion  publique  font  preuve  des 
memes  sentiments.  L'on  y  rappelle  les  differents 
froissements  qui  se  sont  produits  entre  ce  pays  et 
I'Allemagne,  notamment  lors  de  la  guerre  sud-afri- 
caine,  et  Ton  ajoute  que  si  la  Conference  d'Algesiras, 
qui  est  reunie  a  la  demande  de  I'Allemagne,  venait  a 
echouer  par  la  faute  de  cette  derniere,  non  seulement 
tout  espoir  de  rapprochement  anglo-allemand  serait 
perdu,  mais  il  en  resulterait  une  reelle  hostilite  entre 
les  deux  pays. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

fs.!  van  Grootven. 


As  regards  England  she  is  whole-heartedly  favor- 
ing France ;  as  Sir  E.  Grey  said  in  a  speech :  "Eng- 
land will  do  all  in  her  power  to  improve  her  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  but  this  rapprochement  is 
always  dependent  on  good  terms  between  Germany 
and  France." 

Of  late  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  re- 
peated at  various  occasions  to  the  different  Am- 
bassadors accredited  in  London  that  Great  Britain 
had  engaged  herself  towards  France  in  the  Moroc- 
can question  and  that  she  would  meet  her  obliga- 
tions fully  even  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  war 
and  at  all  costs. 

The  press  and  public  opinion  give  proof  of  the 
same  sentiments.  The  various  frictions  between 
England  and  Germany  are  being  recalled,  particu- 
larly since  the  South  African  war,  and  it  is  added 
that  if  the  Conference  of  Algeciras,  called  at  the  in- 
stance of  Germany,  should  fail  through  the  latter's 
fault,  not  only  would  all  hope  be  lost  of  an  Anglo- 
German  rapprochement,  but  a  real  hostility  would 
arise  between  the  two  countries. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Van  Grootven. 


No.  16. 


No.  16. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M.  le 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  6  Mars  1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Le  Roi  Edouard  VII  est  arrive  Samedi  soir  a  Paris 
et  II  est  descendu  a  I'Ambassade  d'Angleterre. 

Quoique  Sa  Majeste  ait  voulu  conserver  I'inco- 
gnito,les  circonstances  donnent  a  Sa  presence  a  Paris 
et  aux  entrevues  qu'Elle  a  cues  ici  une  importance 
toute  speciale.  Le  Roi  a  echange  des  visites  avec  le 
President  de  la  Republique  et  il  I'a  convie  a  diner 
Dimanche  a  I'Ambassade  ainsi  que  Mr.  Rouvier  et 
le  Baron  de  Courcel  qui  vient  de  revenir  de  Berlin. 
De  plus,  et  c'est  la  le  point  interessant,  il  a  regu 
hier  a  dejeuner  Mr.  Loubet  et  Mr.  Delcasse. 

Cette  marque  de  courtoisie  envers  Mr.  Delcasse, 
en  ce  moment,  est  tres  commentee.  Elle  est  gene- 
ralement  consideree  comme  une  demonstration  tres 
significative  qui  deconcerte  par  I'etendue  et  la 
gravite  des  consequences  qu'elle  peut  avoir. 

II  est  naturel  que  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  ait  desire 
donner  un  temoignage  special  de  sympathie  au  Mi- 
nistre qui  s'etait  montre  si  empresse  a  entrer  dans  les 
vues  de  I'Angleterre,  mais  en  appelant  a  lui  celui 
dont  I'Allemagne  a  exige  la  retraite  il  a  donne  une 
consecration  nouvelle  a  I'accord  du  8  avril  1904  et 
sanctionne  une  politique  contre  laquelle  I'Allemagne 
proteste  et  que  la  France  elle-meme  a  repudiee. 

Si  quelques  doutes  pouvaient  subsister  encore  sur 
les  intentions  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  ils  sont  dis- 
sipes ;  mais  on  se  demande  quelle  est  la  portee  reelle 
de  cette  demonstration  et  Ton  hesite  a  en  comprendre 
I'utilite  et  meme  la  prudence  dans  les  circonstances 
actuelles  ou  les  difficultes  s'accumulent  pour  I'Alle- 
magne et  oil  son  amour  propre  semble  deja  suffisam- 


Paris,  March  6,  1906. 

Sir:— 

King  Edward  VII  arrived  in  Paris  on  Saturday 
evening  and  went  to  stay  at  the  British  Embassy. 

Although  His  Majesty  wanted  to  preserve  his  in- 
cognito, circumstances  lend  a  special  importance  to 
his  presence  in  Paris  and  to  the  interviews  which 
he  has  had  here.  The  King  exchanged  visits  with 
the  President  of  the  RepubHc  and  invited  him  to 
dinner  on  Sunday  at  the  Embassy  together  with  M. 
Rouvier  and  Baron  de  Courcel,  who  has  just  come 
back  from  Berlin.  Besides  that,  and  this  is  the 
interesting  point,  he  received  M.  Loubet  and  M. 
Delcasse  yesterday  at  luncheon. 

This  mark  of  courtesy  towards  M.  Delcasse  at 
this  moment  is  very  much  discussed.  It  is  gener- 
ally considered  as  a  very  significant  demonstration 
which  is  disconcerting  on  account  of  the  extent  and 
the  gravity  of  the  consequences  which  it  may  have. 

It  is  natural  that  the  King  of  England  should 
have  desired  to  give  a  special  proof  of  sympathy  to 
the  Minister  who  has  shown  himself  so  eager  to 
adopt  English  views,  but  by  calling  into  his  pres- 
ence the  man  whose  retirement  was  exacted  by  Ger- 
many he  has  imparted  fresh  importance  to  the  agree- 
ment of  April  8,  1904,  and  has  sanctioned  a  policy 
against  which  Germany  protests  and  which  France 
herself  has  repudiated. 

If  any  doubts  could  still  exist  as  to  the  intentions 
of  Great  Britain  they  have  been  dispelled ;  but  the 
real  import  of  this  demonstration  is  a  subject  for 
speculation  and  there  is  difficulty  in  understanding 
its  expediency  and  even  its  prudence  under  the 
present  circumstances,  when  difficulties  are  accu- 
mulating for  Germany  and  when  her  self-respect 


20 


ment  atteint  par  la  marche  des  negociations  d'Al- 
gesiras. 

On  n'est  pas  sans  craindre  que  la  coincidence  de 
ces  evenements  ne  produise  une  certaine  irritation 
capable  d'influencer  d'une  fagon  facheuse  les  deci- 
sions du  Cabinet  de  Berlin  et  ne  I'empeche  d'accepter 
avec  tout  le  calme  desirable  I'echec  bien  prevu  de  la 
Conference. 

On  envisage  presquel'acte  pose  par  le  Roi  Edouard 
comme  une  riposte  de  la  descente  de  I'Empereur 
Guillaume  a  Tanger  et  on  attache  d'autant  plus 
d'importance  a  cet  acte  qu'on  ne  congoit  pas  qu'un 
Souverain  dont  on  connait  I'esprit  pondere  ait  pu  s'y 
resQudre  sans  en  mesurer  toutes  les  consequences  et 
en  assumer  toutes  les  responsabilites. 

Le  Roi  a  voulu  parait-il  montrer  que  la  politique 
qui  a  provoque  I'energique  intervention  de  I'AUe- 
magne  est  restee  malgre  cela  la  meme  parce  que 
I'Angleterre  a  maintenu  fermes  et  immuables  les 
principes  qui  lui  ont  dicte  I'accord  du  8  avril  1904. 

Dans  les  cercles  diplomatiques  cette  manifestation 
est  consideree  comme  inutile  et  fort  dangereuse  en 
ce  moment.  Dans  le  monde  frangais  elle  est  medio- 
crement  appreciee  vu  qu'on  se  sent  par  la  entraine 
malgre  soi  dans  la  politique  anglaise  dont  on  redoute 
les  effets  et  que  Ton  a  generalement  desapprouvee  en 
conspuant  Mr.  Delcasse. 

On  craint  en  somme  d'avoir  vu  se  manifester  ici  un 
symptome  du  desir  que  pourrait  avoir  I'Angleterre 
d'envenimer  la  situation  au  point  de  rendre  la  guerre 
inevitable. 

Dans  les  spheres  officielles  pourtant  et  notamment 
au  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  on  affecte  de 
prendre  la  chose  avec  beaucoup  de  calme.  On  con- 
sidere  la  demonstration  du  Roi  envers  Mr.  Delcasse 
comme  une  consequence  toute  naturelle  des  rapports 
.amicaux  qu'ils  ont  eus  pendant  tant  d'annees  et  on  ne 
veut  y  voir  que  le  desir  du  Souverain  de  la  Grande- 
Bretagne  de  donner  dans  un  moment  difficile  un 
nouvel  appui  a  la  cause  de  la  France. 

II  est  a  constater  que  la  presse  frangaise  est  jus- 
qu'ici  muette  sur  I'entrevue  du  Roi  avec  Mr.  Del- 
casse. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  A.  Leghait. 


seems  already  sufficiently  hurt  by  the  course  which 
the  negotiations  at  Algeciras  are  taking. 

It  is  feared  that  the  coincidence  of  these  events 
may  produce  a  sense  of  irritation  apt  to  influence 
in  a  regrettable  manner  the  decisions  of  the  Cabinet 
at  Berlin  and  that  it  may  prevent  the  latter  from 
accepting  with  desirable  calmness  the  defeat  which 
is  expected  as  a  result  of  the  conference. 

This  act  of  King  Edward  is  regarded  almost  as 
a  return  thrust  for  the  landing  of  Emperor  William 
at  Tangiers,  and  all  the  more  importance  is  attached 
to  this  step  because  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  a 
Sovereign,  the  poise  of  whose  mind  is  known,  could 
have  decided  in  favor  of  it  without  weighing  all  its 
consequences  and  without  assuming  all  responsi- 
bility for  it. 

The  King,  so  it  seems,  wanted  to  show  that  the 
policy  which  caused  the  energetic  intervention  of 
Germany  has,  nevertheless,  remained  the  same  be- 
cause England  kept  firm  and  immutable  the  prin- 
ciples which  the  agreement  of  April  8,  1904,  has 
imposed  on  her. 

In  diplomatic  circles  this  manifestation  is  con- 
sidered as  superfluous  and  at  the  present  moment 
highly  dangerous.  In  French  circles  it  received 
only  lukewarm  appreciation  because  it  is  felt  that 
France  is  thereby  being  dragged  against  her  will 
into  the  British  policy,  the  consequences  of  which 
are  feared  and  which  has  been  universally  dis- 
avowed by  the  flouting  of  M.  Delcasse. 

In  short,  it  is  feared  that  in  this  incident  is  made 
manifest  a  sign  of  the  desire  that  England  may 
have,  to  embitter  the  situation  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  render  war  inevitable. 

Nevertheless,  official  circles — particularly  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs — affect  to  take  the  mat- 
ter very  calmly.  The  demonstration  of  the  King 
towards  M.  Delcasse  is  represented  as  a  very  nat- 
ural consequence  of  the  amicable  relations  which 
have  existed  between  them  for  so  many  years,  and 
it  is  said  to  amount  to  no  more  than  a  desire  of  the 
Sovereign  of  Great  Britain  to  give  fresh  support 
to  the  cause  of  France  in  a  difficult  moment. 

It  is  deserving  of  mention  that  the  French  press 
so  far  has  been  silent  on  the  interview  of  the  King 
with  M.  Delcasse. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  17. 


No.  17. 


X.e  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  5  Avril  1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron! 

N'ayant  pas  eu  dans  ces  derniers  temps  I'occasion 
de  vous  ecrire  autrement  que  par  la  poste,  je  n'ai  pas 
pu  repondre  avant  aujourd'hui  a  la  depeche  du  12 
Mars  par  laquelle  vous  avez  bien  voulu  me  communi- 
quer  le  tres  interessant  rapport  de  mon  coHegue  a 
Paris  sur  I'impression  causee  par  les  attentions  par- 
ticulieres  dont  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  honore  M.  Del- 
casse a  son  passage  en  France. 

Ainsi  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  par 
mon  rapport  du  24  Decembre  dernier  I'avenement  du 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  April  5,  1906. 


Having  had  no  occasion  of  late  to  write  to  you 
otherwise  than  by  mail,  I  have  not  been  able  to 
reply  before  today  to  the  despatch  of  March  12  by 
which  you  were  good  enough  to  send  me  the  very 
interesting  report  of  my  colleague  at  Paris  on  the 
impression  caused  by  the  remarkable  distinction 
with  which  the  King  of  England  honored  M.  Del-  ■ 
casse  when  passing  through  France. 

As  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  in  my  report 
of  December  24,  the  accession  to  power  of  the  Lib- 


ministere  liberal  en  Angleterre  avait  cause  une  vive 
satisfaction  a  Berlin.  On  croyait  ici  dans  les  spheres 
officielles  que  le  nouveau  cabinet  suivrait  une  politi- 
que tres  amicale  pour  la  France,  chercherait  a  se  rap- 
procher  de  la  Russie;  mais  sans  que  ces  deux  ten- 
dances impliquent  de  I'hostilite  contre  I'Allemagne. 

II  faut  bien  reconnaitre  que  cette  esperance  ne 
s'est  pas  realisee. 

Le  mouvement  en  faveur  d'un  rapprochement  avec 
I'Allemagne  provoque  par  Lord  Avebury  n'a  pas  eu 
de  suite.  Lorsque  de  tres  notables  commergants  al- 
lemands  se  sont  rendus  a  Londres  pour  repondre  a 
cette  initiative  amicale,  ils  y  ont  passe  presque  ina- 
percus.  Les  journaux  ont  parle  le  moins  possible 
d'eux.  La  presse  anglaise  a  fait  tout  ce  qu'elle  a  pu 
pour  empecher  la  conference  d'Algesiras  d'aboutir. 
Elle  s'est  montree  plus  intransigeante  que  les  jour- 
naux francais  et  n'a  jamais  cesse  de  propager  de  pre- 
tendus  plans  d'agression  allemande  qui  n'ont  jamais 
existe. 

On  ne  voit  pas  qu'a  Algesiras  I'ambassadeur  d' An- 
gleterre ait  fait  le  moindre  effort  pour  trouver  une 
solution  conciliant  les  vues  de  I'Allemagne  et  de  la 
France.  On  s'attendait  certainement  a  ce  qu'elle 
soutint  la  politique  francaise ;  mais  les  engagements 
contractes  ne  I'empechaient  nullement  de  jouer  un 
role  moderateur. 

Tout  cela  n'est  guere  d'accord  avec  le  discours 
programme  prononce  le  21  Decembre  dernier  a  Al- 
bert Hall  par  M.  Campbell  Bannerman  et  dont  je 
vous  ai  parle  par  mon  rapport  precite. 

On  est  oblige  d'en  conclure  que  la  politique  ex- 
terieure  de  I'Angleterre  est  dirigee  par  le  Roi  lui- 
meme  et  qu'elle  n'a  pas  change  depuis  que  Sa 
Majeste  a  pris  de  nouveaux  conseillers. 

II  n'y  a  plus  de  doute  que  c'est  le  Roi  d' Angleterre 
qui  en  dehors  du  gouvernement  avait  pousse  M.  Del- 
casse  a  une  politique  belliqueuse  et  lui  avait  fait  la 
promesse  d'ailleurs  irrealisable  de  debarquer  100  000 
soldats  anglais  en  Holstein. 

L'invitation  adressee  par  le  Roi  a  M.  Delcasse  lors 
de  son  passage  a  Paris  ne  pent  etre  interpretee  que 
comme  une  provocation. 

SI  QUELQUE  DOUTE  POUVANT  REGNER 
ENCORE  LA  SINGULIERE  DEMARCHE  FAI- 
TE  PAR  LE  COLONEL  BARNARDISTON  AU- 
PRES  DE  M.  LE  GENERAL  DUCARNE  L'AU- 
RAIT  DISSIPE. 

II  y  a  bien  en  Angleterre  une  politique  de  cour  qui 
se  poursuit  a  cote  et  en  dehors  de  celle  du  ministere 
responsable. 

Heureusement  toutes  ces  intrigues  ont  ete  im- 
puissantes  a  troubler  la  paix.  L'Allemagne  est  iso- 
lee.  L'attitude  de  I'ltalie  est  equivoque.  L'Au- 
triche-Hongrie  paralysee  par  ses  embarras  interieurs 
est  incapable  de  venir  en  aide  a  son  alliee.  La  legon 
qui  se  degage  des  derniers  evenements  est  que  I'Al- 
lemagne seule  est  capable  de  tenir  ses  adversaires  en 
respect.  C'est  peut-etre  le  benefice  le  plus  clair 
qu'elle  a  retire  de  I'aflFaire  marocaine. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


eral  Ministry  in  England  caused  lively  satisfaction 
in  Berlin.  It  was  believed  here  in  official  circles 
that  the  new  Cabinet  would  pursue  a  policy  friendly 
to  France  and  would  seek  to  draw  closer  to  Rus- 
sia, but  it  was  not  expected  that  these  two  ten- 
dencies would  imply  any  hostility  against  Germany. 

That  this  hope  has  not  been  realized  must  be 
fully  recognized. 

The  movement  in  favor  of  a  rapprochement  with 
Germany  started  by  Lord  Avebury  has  led  to  no 
results.  When  very  prominent  German  merchants 
went  to  London  in  response  to  this  friendly  initia- 
tive they  were  hardly  noticed.  The  newspapers  said 
as  little  as  possible  about  them.  The  English  press 
has  done  all  in  its  power  to  prevent  the  Conference 
of  Algeciras  from  succeeding.  It  showed  itself  more 
unyielding  than  the  French  journals  and  never 
ceased  to  spread  reports  of  alleged  German  plans 
of  aggression  which  have  never  existed. 

There  is  no  indication  that  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor made  the  slightest  effort  at  Algeciras  in  order 
to  find  a  solution  conciliating  the  views  of  Germany 
and  France.  It  was,  of  course,  expected  that  Eng- 
land would  support  the  French  policy ;  but  the  obli- 
gations which  she  had  contracted  need  not  have 
prevented  her  from  exercising  a  moderating  in- 
fluence. 

All  this  is  hardly  in  keeping  with  the  program- 
matic speech  delivered  by  Mr.  Campbell  Banner- 
rnann  on  December  21  at  Albert  Hall,  which  I  men- 
tioned to  you  in  the  report  referred  to  above. 

The  conclusion  is  inevitable  that  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  England  is  directed  by  the  King  himself  and 
that  it  has  not  changed  since  His  Majesty  took  new 
counsellors. 

It  can  no  longer  be  doubted  that  it  was  the  King 
of  England  who,  without  sanction  of  the  govern- 
ment, drove  M.  Delcasse  into  a  bellicose  policy  and 
who  gave  him  the  promise,  which  he  could  not  have 
kept,  to  land  100,000  British  soldiers  in  Holstein. 

The  invitation  extended  by  the  King  to  M.  Del- 
casse at  the  time  of  his  passage  through  Paris  can 
only  be  interpreted  as  a  provocation. 

IF  ANY  DOUBT  COULD  STILL  HAVE  EX- 
ISTED THE  SINGULAR  STEP  TAKEN  BY 
COLONEL  BARNARDISTON  WITH  GEN- 
ERAL DUCARNE  WOULD  HAVE  DIS- 
PELLED IT. 

There  really  is  in  England  a  court  policy  beside 
and  independent  of  that  of  the  responsible  Ministry. 

Fortunately,  all  these  intrigues  have  been  incapa- 
ble of  disturbing  peace.  Germany  is  isolated.  The 
attitude  of  Italy  is  equivocal.  Austria-Hungary, 
paralyzed  by  her  internal  troubles,  is  unable  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  her  ally.  The  lesson  derived  from 
recent  events  is  that  Germany  alone  is  capable 
of  holding  her  adversaries  in  check.  That  is  per- 
haps the  clearest  benefit  which  she  has  drawn  from 
the  Moroccan  aflfair. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  18. 

Le  Comte  de  Laldng,  Ministre  de  Belgique  ^  Lon- 
dres, a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


No.  18. 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  23  Juin   1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Un  noyau  de  personnalites,  appartenant  en  ge- 


London,  Tune  23,  1906. 

Sir:— 

A  small  circle  of  men,  chiefly  belonging  to  the 


22 


neral  au  parti  liberal  et  a  la  tete  duquel  se  trouve 
Lord  Avebury  (jadis  Sir  John  Lubbock)  essaie  de 
militer  depuis  longtemps  contre  le  sentiment  anti- 
allemand  si  dominant  encore  dans  le  public  anglais. 
II  y  a  deux  ans  ce  milieu  a  favorise  I'expedition  en 
AUemagne  du  comite  d'etudes  municipales,  orga- 
nisee  par  Lord  Lyveden,  qui  vous  vous  en  souvien- 
drez,  a  egalement  visite  notre  pays. 

Cette  annee  les  memes  personnages,  d'accord  avec 
I'Ambassade  d'AIlemagne,  ont  arrange  la  reception 
en  Angleterre  d'une  grande  deputation  de  bourg- 
mestres  allemands.  En  ce  moment  ce  sont  les  jour- 
nalistes  allemands,  de  passage  a  Londres,  que  Ton 
fete.  Banquets,  discours  de  Lord  Avebury  et  du 
Comte  Metternich,  et  visite  obligatoire  des  monu- 
ments de  la  ville,  rien  ne  leur  est  epargne. 

L'effet  reel  produit  est  a  peu  pres  nul.  Le  siege 
de  I'opinion  est  fait :  la  presse  anglaise  a  tellement 
abuse  des  attaques  contre  I'Empereur,  son  gouverne- 
ment  et  son  peuple,  que  le  public  reste  mefiant. 
L' AUemagne  est  la  grande  rivale,  commerciale,  mili- 
taire  et  peut-etre,  dans  I'avenir,  navale;  a  ce  titre 
tout  bon  citoyen  se  croit  oblige  de  la  detester,  parce 
qu'il  se  dit  que  pour  le  moment  c'est  la  seule  nation 
dent  il  ait  a  craindre  quelque  chose,  depuis  I'aff  aiblis- 
sement  de  la  Russie  et  I'entente  avec  la  France. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Comte  de  Lalaing. 


Liberal  party  and  at  the  head  of  whom  stands  Lord 
Avebury  (formerly  Sir  John  Lubbock)  have  been 
trying  for  a  long  time  to  militate  against  the  anti- 
German  sentiment  still  so  prevalent  among  the 
English  public.  Two  years  ago  this  group  pro- 
moted the  expedition  to  Germany  of  the  committee 
for  municipal  investigation  organized  by  Lord  I^yve- 
den  which,  as  you  will  remember,  also  visited  our 
country. 

This  year  the  same  people,  in  accord  with  the 
German  Embassy,  arranged  the  reception  of  a  large 
deputation  of  German  Mayors  in  England.  At  pre- 
sent the  German  journalists  passing  through  Lon- 
don are  being,  feted.  Banquets,  speeches  by  Lord 
Avebury  and  Count  Metternich,  and  the  usual  visits 
to  the  monuments  of  the  city — they  are  spared  noth- 
ing. 

The  real  effect  produced  is  practically  nil.  Pub- 
lic opinion  is  being  worked  upon :  the  English  press 
has  so  consistently  indulged  in  attacks  against  the 
Emperor,  his  Government,  and  his  people,  that  the 
public  remains  suspicious.  Germany  is  the  great 
commercial,  military,  and  in  future  perhaps,  naval 
rival;  for  this  reason  every  good  citizen  considers 
himself  under  the  obligation  to  detest  her  because 
he  tells  himself  that  for  the  present  she  is  the  only 
nation  from  which  he  has  anything  to  fear,  since 
the  weakening  of  Russia  and  the  entente  wdth 
France. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Count  de  Lalaing. 


No.  19. 


No.   19. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Beriin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  16  Juillet  1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Apres  son  retablissement  et  avant  de  partir  pour 
Norderney,  le  chancelier  a  prie  successivement  tous 
les  ambassadeurs  accredites  a  Berlin  de  passer  chez 
lui.  Dans  son  entretien  avec  I'ambassadeur  d'Angle- 
terre  tous  deux  ont  emis  I'opinion  qu'une  entrevue 
des  Souverains  serait  desirable  pour  ameliorer  les 
relations ;  mais  le  Prince  de  Biilow  a  dit  qu'apres  ce 
qui  s'etait  passe  il  etait  necessaire  que  le  premier  pas 
fut  fait  par  le  Roi  Edouard  VIL  L'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre  a  fait  observer  que  cette  premiere  de- 
marche avait  deja  ete  effectuee.  II  a  ete  charge  de 
demander  quel  serait  I'itineraire  de  la  croisiere  que 
I'Empereur  d'AIlemagne  comptait  faire  dans  la  Medi- 
terranee  et  dont  la  date  coincidait  avec  ceile  du  voya- 
ge que  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  fait  au  printemps  dans 
la  meme  region.  Non  seulement  I'information  de- 
mandee  ne  lui  a  pas  ete  fournie ;  mais  le  gouverne- 
ment  Imperial  ne  lui  a  jamais  fait  savoir  que  le  projet 
de  voyage  dans  la  Mediterranee  etait  abandonne. 

Depuis  les  pourparlers  confidentiels  ont  continue. 
II  parait  meme  que  des  lettres  ont  ete  echangees  en- 
tre  les  Souverains. 

Je  ne  vous  en  ai  pas  parle  jusqu'ici,  parce  que 
j'attendais  pour  avoir  quelque  resultat  positif  a  vous 
communiquer.  Je  romps  le  silence  aujourd'hui  parce 
que  des  journaux  ont  annonce  que  les  negociations 
avaient  abouti  et  ont  meme  public  le  lieu  et  la  date 


Sir: 


Berlin,  July  16,  1906. 


After  his  recovery  and  before  he  went  to  Norder- 
ney, the  Chancelleor  asked  all  the  Ambassadors 
accredited  in  Berlin  to  call  on  him.  In  his  conver- 
sation with  the  British  Ambassador  both  expressed 
the  opinion  that  a  meeting  of  the  Sovereigns  was 
desirable  in  order  to  improve  the  relations,  but 
Prince  von  Biilow  said  that,  after  what  had  passed, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  King  Edward  VII  to  take 
the  first  step.  The  British  Ambassador  pointed  out 
that  the  first  step  had  already  been  taken.  He  had 
been  instructed  to  inquire  what  was  to  be  the 
itinerary  of  the  cruise  which  the  Emperor  was 
contemplating  making  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
the  date  of  which  coincided  with  that  of  the  voyage 
which  the  King  of  England  made  in  the  Spring  in 
the  same  region.  Not  only  was  the  information 
asked  for  never  given  him,  but  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment had  never  inf-T^rmed  him,  either,  that  the 
project  of  the  voyage  to  the  Mediterranean  had  been 
abandoned. 

Since  then  the  confidential  pourparlers  have  con- 
tinued. It  even  seems  that  letters  have  been  ex- 
changed between  the  Monarchs. 

I  have  not  written  to  you  until  now  about  this 
because  I  waited  to  have  some  positive  result  to  re- 
port. I  break  my  silence  to-day  because  newspa- 
pers announce  that  the  negotiations  have  been  con- 
cluded, and  even  publish  the  place  and  approximate 


approximative  de  I'entrevue.  Ces  nouvelles  sont  de 
pure  invention.  Je  puis  vous  affirmer  d'apres  des  in- 
formations puisees  a  de  tres  bonnes  sources  que  la 
grande  probabilite  est  que  I'Empereur  et  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre  ne  se  rencontreront  pas. 

Une  autre  raison  que  j'avais  de  ne  pas  me  presser 
est  que  j'attache  une  tres  minime  importance  aux 
demonstrations  de  ce  genre.  A  combien  d'entrevues 
n'a-t-on  pas  assiste  dans  ces  dernieres  annees  dont  on 
proclamait  le  brillant  succes  et  qui  n'ont  produit  au- 
cun  resultat  durable?  La  cause  de  la  tension  des  re- 
lations entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre  n'est  pas  a 
chercher  dans  les  dispositions  personnelles  des  Sou- 
verains.  Celles-ci  sont  au  contraire  dictees  par  I'etat 
de  I'opinion  publique  dans  les  deux  pays,  comme  le 
constate  si  clairement  le  rapport  de  mon  collegue  a 
Londres  sur  le  resultat  nul  de  la  visite  des  journa- 
listes  allemands  en  Angleterre,  que  vous  avez  bien 
voulu  me  communiquer  par  votre  depeche  du  10 
Juillet.  C'est  aussi  le  sentiment  populaire  qui  dirige 
la  politique  du  gouvernement  britannique  restee  aus- 
si hostile  a  I'Allemagne  sous  le  ministere  liberal  que 
sous  I'administration  unioniste.  Que  peuvent  crain- 
dre  les  Anglais  de  la  Russie  dans  I'etat  de  decompo- 
sition ou  elle  est  et  pourtant  les  pourparlers  en  vue 
d'un  rapprochement  ont  continue  aussi  longtemps 
qu'on  a  trouve  a  Saint-Petersbourg  un  interlocuteur. 
On  y  a  mis  a  Londres  un  tel  exces  de  zele  que  le  gou- 
vernement russe  a  ete  oblige  de  decliner  piteusement 
la  visite  annoncee  de  la  flotte  anglaise  a  Cronstadt. 

On  volt  bien  ce  que  la  Russie  peut  gagner  a  I'ami- 
tie  de  I'Angleterre,  mais  beaucoup  moins  clairement 
a  quoi  I'amitie  russe  servirait  a  I'Angleterre.  Que 
peut-on  vouloir  a  Londres  sinon  susciter  des  ennemis 
a  I'Allemagne? 

Ce  qui  a  transpire  des  pourparlers  recents  est  de 
nature  a  confirmer  ce  soupqon.  D'apres  le  "Morning- 
post,"  la  Russie  et  I'Angleterre  auraient  le  projet  de 
s'entendre  pour  donner  leur  consentement  a  la  cons- 
truction du  chemin  de  fer  de  la  Mesopotamie,  a  la 
condition  que  la  Russie  fut  autorisee  a  y  relier  son 
chemin  de  fer  du  Caucase  et  que  I'Angleterre  eiit  le 
controle  de  la  nouvelle  voie  depuis  Bagdad  jusqu'au 
Golfe  Persique.  Un  pareil  accord  s'il  venait  a  etre 
conclu  serait  le  comble  de  I'impertinence.  Le  Sultan 
est  un  souverain  independant ;  il  a  donne  la  conces- 
sion du  chemin  de  fer  de  la  Mesopotamie  a  une  ban- 
que  allemande.  Nulle  puissance  etrangere  n'a  le 
droit  ni  meme  le  moindre  pretexte  de  s'immiscer  dans 
cette  affaire  exclusivement  interieure  de  la  Turquie. 
Pourtant  le  plan  existe.  Lord  Lansdowne  a  declare 
recemment  a  la  chambre  haute  qu'en  1903  il  a  essaye 
sans  succes  d'internationaliser  le  chemin  de  fer  de 
Bagdad  et  depuis  I'origine  I'Angleterre  a  cherche  a 
entraver  cette  entreprise. 

Elle  a  voulu  mettre  la  main  sur  Koweit,  seul  port 
naturel  ou  puisse  aboutir  le  chemin  de  fer,  a  moins 
qu'on  ne  cree  a  grands  frais  un  port  artificiel  et  pro- 
bablement  mauvais  dans  les  marecages  du  Chatt  el 
Arab. 

Elle  a  au  moins  favorise  I'insurrection  arabe  en 
livrant  des  armes  et  des  munitions  aux  revokes. 

On  a  presque  avoue  a  Londres  que  seule  de  toutes 
les  grandes  puissances  I'Angleterre  a  fait  opposition 
a  I'augmentation  des  droits  de  douane  turcs,  de  peur 
que  la  Turquie  ne  soit  en  mesure  de  donner  un  gage 
pour  la  garantie  du  revenu  kilometrique  du  chemin 
de  fer. 

Lorsqu'il  y  a  sept  ans  la  Deutsche  Bank  a  obtenu 
la  concession  de  la  ligne,  elle  a  offert  une  participa- 
tion a  la  France  et  a  I'Angleterre  non  pas  qu'elle  eiit 
besoin  de  capitaux  etrangers  pour  cette  entreprise 
qu'elle  est  parfaitement  en  etat  de  faire  toute  seule ; 
mais  pour  eviter  les  jalousies  Internationales.     La 


date  of  the  meeting.  All  this  news  is  pure  invention. 
SI  am  in  a  position  to  affirm  on  information  drawn 
ifrom  very  good  sources  that  the  great  probability  is 
'that  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  England  will  not 
meet. 

Another  reason  why  I  have  not  been  in  a  hurry  is 
that  I  attach  only  very  little  importance  to  demon- 
strations of  this  kind.  How  many  meetings  have 
we  not  seen  in  these  last  years,  the  brilliant  success 
of  which  was  proclaimed  and  which  produced  no 
lasting  result?  The  cause  of  the  tension  in  the  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  England  must  not  be 
sought  in  the  personal  feelings  of  the  Sovereigns. 
These  are,  on  the  contrary,  determined  by  the  state 
of  public  opinion  in  the  two  countries,  as  is  so 
clearly  shown  in  the  report  of  my  colleague  in  Lon- 
don on  the  negative  result  of  the  visit  of  German 
journalists  in  England,  which  you  were  good  enough 
to  send  me  in  your  despatch  of  July  10.  Likewise 
it  is  popular  sentiment  that  guides  the  policy  of  the 
.British  Government  which  has  remained  as  hostile 
towards  Germany  under  the  Liberal  Cabinet  as  it 
was  under  the  Unionist  administration.  What  have 
the  English  to  fear  from  Russia  in  her  present  state 
of  decomposition?  And  yet  the  pourparlers  with  a 
view  to  a  rapprochement  continued  as  long  as  a 
listener  could  be  found  at  St.  Petersburg.  London 
displayed  such  excessive  zeal  that  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment was  constrained  to  decline  woefully  the 
announced  visit  of  the  British  fleet  to  Cronstadt. 

It  can  be  readily  seen  what  Russia  can  gain  by 
the  friendship  of  England,  but  it  is  much  less  clear 
what  good  the  Russian  friendship  could  do  England. 
What  else  can  they  aim  at  in  London  if  not  at  mak-  * 
ing  enemies  for  Germany? 

What  has  transpired  of  the  recent  pourparlers  is 
such  as  to  confirm  this  suspicion.  According  to  the 
Morning  Post,  England  and  Russia  propose  an  un- 
derstanding in  order  to  give  their  consent  to  the 
construction  of  the  Mesopotamian  railway,  on  the 
condition  that  Russia  be  authorized  to  link  her  Cau- 
casian railway  to  it  and  that  England  gain  control 
of  the  new  line  from  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Such  an  agreement,  if  it  really  should  be  concluded, 
would  be  the  acme  of  impudence.  The  Sultan  is  an 
independent  Sovereign ;  he  gave  the  concession  for 
the  railway  in  Mesopotamia  to  a  German  bank.  No 
foreign  Power  has  the  right  nor  even  the  feeblest 
pretext  to  interfere  in  this  entirely  internal  affair 
of  Turkey.  Yet  the  plan  exists.  Lord  Lansdowne 
recently  declared  in  the  House  of  Lords  that  in  1903 
he  tried  without  success  to  internationalize  the  Bag- 
dad railway,  and  ever  since  its  beginning  England 
has  sought  to  thwart  that  enterprise. 

She  endeavored  to  put  her  hand  on  Koweit,  the 
only  natural  terminal  port  for  the  line  unless  an 
artificial  and  probably  poor  harbor  be  created  at 
great  expense  in  the  swamps  of  the  Shatt-el-Arab. 

She  at  least  favored  the  insurrection  of  the  Arabs 
by  supplying  arms  and  munitions  to  the  insurgents. 

It  has  been  more  or  less  admitted  in  London  that 
England  alone  of  all  the  Great  Powers  raised  op- 
position to  the  increase  of  the  Turkish  import  duties 
for  fear  that  Turkey  might  then  be  in  a  position  to 
give  a  security  for  the  guaranteed  revenue  of  the 
railroad. 

When  the  Deutsche  Bank  obtained  the  concession 
for  the  line  seven  years  ago,  it  offered  France  and 
England  a  share  in  it ;  not  that  it  was  in  any  need 
of  foreign  capital  for  this  undertaking,  which  it  was 
quite  capable  of  carrying  out  alone,  but  simply  in 
order  to  avoid  international  jealousy.     France  ac- 


France  a  accepte.  L'Angleterre  a  refuse.  On  serait 
vraisemblablement  dispose  a  lui  accorder  encore  la 
part  qu'elle  a  dedaignee  autrefois  et  de  lui  donner 
aussi  un  moyen  legitime  d'exercer  son  influence; 
mais  la  pretention  d'avoir  la  haute  main  sur  le 
chemin  de  fer,  sans  participation  financiere  serait 
sans  doute  repoussee  comme  absolument  inadmis- 
sible. 

En  depit  du  bon  accueil  qui  a  ete  reserve  en  An- 
gleterre  aux  journalistes  allemands,  la  polemique  sur 
la  question  du  chemin  de  fer  de  Mesopotamie  a  re- 
commence dans  la  presse  allemande  et  dans  certains 
journaux  non  sans  une  certaine  pointe  d'aigreur. 

II  est  fort  a  redouter  qu'avec  ou  sans  les  reconci- 
liations periodiques  sur  lesquelles  nous  sommes 
biases,  la  jalousie  et  la  defiance  ne  continuent  a  etre 
I'etat  normal  des  relations  entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'An- 
gleterre. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


cepted;  England  refused.  Probably  there  would 
be  a  disposition  even  now  to  accord  to  her  the  share 
which  she  once  refused  and  also  to  allow  her  a  legi- 
timate means  of  exercising  her  influence;  but  the 
pretension  to  have  a  hold  over  the  railway  without 
any  financial  participation  would  doubtless  be 
brushed  aside  as  entirely  unacceptable. 

In  spite  of  the  good  reception  extended  to  the 
German  journalists  in  England,  discussion  of  the 
question  of  the  Mesopotamian  railway  has  begun 
again  in  the  German  press,  and  in  some  papers  not 
without  a  certain  bitterness. 

It  is  very  much  to  be  feared  that  vdth  or  without 
the  periodical  reconciliations  which  have  ceased  to 
interest  us,  jealousy  and  mistrust  will  continue  to  be 
the  normal  state  in  the  relations  between  Germany 
and  England. 

Accept,  etc.  ,    •    - 

[Signed]  .  Greindl. 


No.  20. 


No.  20. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  28  Juillet  1906. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Apres  les  reductions  dans  I'armee  proposees  a  la 
Chambre  voici  le  tour  de  la  marine,  dans  laquelle 
aussi  on  cherche  a  efifectuer  des  economies.  Modifi- 
ant  les  plans  arretes  par  le  Gouvernement  de  M.  Bal- 
four, le  Cabinet  actuel  est  d'avis  de  construire  trois 
cuirasses  du  type  Dreadnought  au  lieu  de  quatre, 
deux  contretorpilleurs  au  lieu  de  cinq,  et  huit  sous- 
marins  au  lieu  de  douze,  soit  d'encourir  une  depense 
de  £6  800  000  au  lieu  de  £9  300  000,  et  d'arriver  a  al- 
leger  le  budget  des  annees  prochaines  de  £2  500  000. 
On  annoncerait  cette  decision  a  La  Haye,  pour  prou- 
ver  que  I'Angleterre  est  favorable  au  desarmement 
naval  et  a  la  limitation  des  depenses ;  elle  continue- 
rait  dans  la  voie  des  economies  si  son  exemple  trou- 
vait  de  I'echo  et  des  imitateurs  a  la  Conference  de  la 
Paix  en  1907.  Dans  le  cas  contraire,  on  construirait 
plus  de  vaisseaux. 

Mais  pour  faire  adopter  ce  plan,  le  Ministre  de  la 
Marine  s'est  trouve  oblige  de  declarer  que  si  son  pro- 
gramme etait  approuve  par  la  Chambre,  les  forces  na- 
vales  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  seraient  encore  sup6- 
rieures  a  celles  des  deux  autres  plus  grandes  marines 
du  monde,  et  que  I'Angleterre  resterait  sans  rivale 
sur  mer.  Sa  genereuse  initiative  dans  la  voie  des 
reformes  est  singulierement  diminuee  par  le  fait 
qu'elle  ne  court  aucun  risque  et  qu'elle  compte  bien 
rester,  apres  comme  avant,  maitresse  de  rOc6an. 

Que  les  Etats-Unis  ou  I'Allemagne  surtout  re- 
fusent  a  La  Haye  d'adopter  les  vues  preconisees  par 
les  delegues  anglais,  on  ne  manquera  pas  de  jeter 
sur  ces  nations  la  responsabilite  de  I'echec  inflige  aux 
idees  humanitaires  de  I'Angleterre,  et  du  nouvel 
apotre  de  la  paix.  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman. 


Sir:- 


London,  July  28,  1906. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Comte  de  Lalaing. 


After  the  debate  on  the  army  reduction  the  House 
has  now  in  turn  taken  up  the  naval  budget  in  which 
economies  are  likewise  proposed.  Modifying  the 
plans  decided  upon  by  the  Government  of  Mr.  Bal- 
four, the  present  Cabinet  intends  to  build  three 
cruisers  of  the  dreadnought  type  instead  of  four, 
two  torpedo  destroyers  instead  of  five,  and  eight 
submarines  instead  of  twelve,  incurring  an  expen- 
diture of  £6,800,000  instead  of  £9,300,000  and  re- 
lieving the  budget  of  the  next  years  by  £2,500,000. 
This  decision  would  then  be  announced  at  the 
Hague  as  proof  of  the  fact  that  England  is  in  favor 
of  naval  disarmament  and  restriction  of  expenditure, 
and  England  would  continue  on  the  road  of  econ- 
omy if  her  example  should  meet  with  approval  and 
imitation  at  the  Peace  Conference  in  1907.  In  the 
reverse  case  more  ships  would  be  built. 

But  to  secure  acceptance  of  this  plan  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  had  to  declare  that  if  his  pro- 
gramme were  passed  by  the  House  the  naval  forces 
of  Great  Britain  would  still  be  superior  to  those  of 
the  other  two  greatest  navies  of  the  world  and  that 
England  would  remain  without  rival  on  the  sea. 
Her  generous  initiative  in  the  way  of  reforms  loses 
considerably  in  value  by  the  fact  that  she  runs  no 
risks  and  that  she  is  quite  confident  that  she  will 
remain,  as  heretofore,  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 

Should  the  United  States,  or  above  all  Germany, 
refuse  at  the  Hague  to  accept  the  views  proffered 
by  the  British  delegates,  one  may  be  sure  that  the 
responsibility  for  the  blow  dealt  to  the  humanitarian 
ideas  of  England  and  of  the  new  peace  apostle,  Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannermann,  would  be  thrown  on 
those  nations. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Count  de  Lalaing. 


25 


No.  21. 


No.  21. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M.  le 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  4  Fevrier  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron! 

Le  Roi  et  la  Reine  d'Angleterre  sont  arrives  in- 
cognito a  Paris  samedi  soir;  ils  sont  descendus  a 
I'ambassade  et  y  sejourneront  jusqu'au  9  Fevrier.  Ce 
voyage  inattendu  n'a  ete  decide  que  dans  ces  derniers 
jours  et  il  a  cause  une  certaine  surprise  meme  au 
gouvernement  de  la  Republique.  M.  Pichon  en 
avouant  hier  soir  a  ses  intimes  son  etonnement  con- 
fessait  qu'il  n'en  soupgonnait  pas  le  but.  On  n'at- 
tribue  jusqu'ici  aucun  motif  special  a  cette  visite, 
mais  il  semble  qu'elle  doive  avoir  un  caractere  po- 
litique d'autant  plus  important  qu'il  est  moins  spe- 
cific. II  est  certes  trop  tot  pour  apprecier  la  portee 
de  ce  voyage  et  en  prevoir  les  resultats.  On  ne  pent 
faire  que  des  conjectures  basees  sur  la  situation  po- 
litique generale  et  sur  celle  qui  existeactuellement  en 
France.  Depuis  quelques  annees  le  Gouvernement  de 
la  Republique  a  accueilli  avec  faveur  et  presque  avec 
enthousiasme  les  avances  de  I'Angleterre  qui,  tres 
discretement  a  laisse  a  M.  Delcasse  et  a  ses  suc- 
cesseurs  tout  le  merite  de  I'entente  cordiale  et  cet 
accord  etait  considere  par  la  grande  majorite  des 
Frangais  comme  un  appui  moral  et  materiel  fort  pre- 
cieux  pour  le  maintien  du  prestige  de  la  France  et  la 
sauvegarde  de  ses  interets. 


L'arrivee  au  pouvoir  de  M.  Clemenceau  a  ete  le 
couronnement  de  I'influence  anglaise.  Le  cabinet  de 
Londres  croyait  trouver  en  lui  un  homme  absolu- 
ment  devoue  a  sa  politique  et  ayant  un  caractere 
assez  aiitoritaire  et  energique  pour  I'imposer.  II 
semble  qu'on  a  ete  assez  degu  dans  les  esperances 
qu'on  avait  congues  et  qu'on  s'inquiete  de  I'inco- 
herence  de  son  administration  et  de  I'impuissance 
qu'il  montre  chaque  jour  davantage  a  arreter  la  de- 
sorganisation  de  la  France.  D'autre  part  a  cote  de 
la  desillusion  sur  le  role  joue  par  M.  Clemenceau 
bien  des  symptomes  ont  laisse  entrevoir  que  I'opi- 
nion  publique  franqaise  devenait  soupgonneuse  a 
regard  des  avantages  de  I'entente  cordiale  et  qu'elle 
commengait  a  manifester  le  desir  d'aiTranchir  la 
France  de  I'ingerence  britannique.  II  existe  depuis 
peu  une  opposition  encore  sourde  et  timide,  mais  bien 
significative  contre  I'aveuglement  avec  lequel  on  se 
laisse  entrainer  dans  I'orbite  de  I'Angleterre.  Les 
conseils  et  les  desseins  de  cette  puissance  n'apparais- 
sent  plus  aussi  desinteresses  qu'au  debut  et  il  en  re- 
sulte  qu'il  se  forme  un  parti  dispose  a  secouer  le  joug 
de  cette  influence  etrangere  pour  donner  a  la  France 
une  plus  grande  et  plus  honorable  liberte  d'action, 
tout  en  maintenant  pourtant  d'excellents  rapports 
d'amitie  avec  sa  voisine  d'outre-Manche.  J'ai  lieu 
de  croire  que  les  tendances  anglaises  en  Afrique  et 
specialement  I'attitude  envers  I'Etat  du  Congo  n'ont 
pas  ete  etrangeres  au  sentiment  de  defiance  qui  se 
manifeste  ici. 


II  n'est  done  pas  etonnant  qu'en  presence  de  cette 
situation  le  Roi  Edouard  ait  voulu  venir  causer  avec 
les  membres  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  et 
raflFermir  I'influence  qu'il  craint  de  lui  voir  echapper. 
On  se  demande  quel  sera  le  resultat  de  ce  nouvel  ef- 
fort et  s'il  ne  sera  pas  considere  comme  une  pression 


A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


Paris,  February  4,  1907. 


The  King  and  Queen  of  England  arrived  incog- 
nito at  Paris  on  Saturday  evening ;  they  are  staying 
at  the  Embassy  and  will  remain  here  until  the  9th 
of  February.  This  unexpected  journey  was  decided 
on  only  during  the  last  days  and  caused  some  sur- 
prise even  to  the  Government  of  the  Republic.  Last 
night  M.  Pichon  did  not  conceal  from  his  friends 
his  astonishment  and  confessed  that  he  had  no  idea 
as  to  the  purpose  of  the  trip.  While  so  far  no 
special  motive  is  being  attributed  to  the  visit,  it 
seems  that  it  must  have  a  political  character,  the 
importance  of  which  is  all  the  greater  because  it  is 
not  clearly  defined.  It  is  certainly  too  early  to  ap- 
preciate the  import  of  this  journey  and  to  foresee 
its  results.  One  can  only  make  conjectures  based 
on  the  general  political  situation  and  on  the  one 
at  present  existing  in  France.  For  some  years  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  has  received  favorably 
and  almost  with  enthusiasm  the  advances  made  by 
England.  The  latter  very  discreetly  gave  all  the 
credit  for  the  entente  cordiale  to  M.  Delcasse  and 
his  successors,  and  that  agreement  was  considered 
by  the  great  majority  of  the  French  as  a  moral  and 
material  support  of  great  value  for  the  maintenance 
of  France's  prestige  and  for  the  security  of  her 
interests. 

M.  Clemenceau's  accession  to  power  was  the 
crowning  point  of  the  English  influence.  The  Cab- 
inet of  London  believed  that  it  had  in  him  a  man 
absolutely  in  accord  with  its  policy  and  of  a  suffi- 
ciently autocratic  and  energetic  character  to  put  it 
through.  It  seems  that  there  is  disappointment  as 
to  the  hopes  conceived  and  that  there  is  uneasiness 
on  account  of  the  inconsistency  of  his  administra- 
tion and  the  inabiHty  which  he  is  displaying  more 
and  more  every  day  to  check  the  disorganization  of 
France.  On  the  other  hand,  besides  the  disappoint- 
ment caused  by  the  part  played  by  M._  Clemenceau, 
there  are  many  symptoms  which  indicate  that 
French  public  opinion  has  become  suspicious  as  re- 
gards the  advantages  of  the  entente  cordiale  and 
that  it  is  beginning  to  show  a  desire  to  free  France 
from  British  interference.  There  has  come  into 
existence  recently  an  opposition,  as  yet  silent  and 
timid  but  very  significant,  to  the  blindness  with 
which  France  is  allowed  to  be  drawn  into  England's 
orbit.  The  counsels  and  plans  of  that  Power  no 
longer  appear  as  disinterested  as  at  the  beginning, 
and  the  result  is  that  a  party  is  growing  up,  which 
is  inclined  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of  this  foreign  in- 
fluence and  to  give  France  a  greater  and  more  hon- 
orable freedom  of  action  while  at  the  same  time 
maintaining  good  and  friendly  relations  with  the 
neighbor  across  the  Channel.  I  have  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  Africa,  and 
more  particularly  her  attitude  towards  the  Congo 
State,  have  been  contributory  to  the  sentiment  of 
mistrust  which  is  manifesting  itself  here. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  astonishing  that  in  face  of  this 
situation  King  Edward  should  have  wished  to  come 
and  talk  with  the  members  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment and  to  strengthen  the  influence  which  he  is 
afraid  is  slipping  from  him.  The  question  is  what 
the  result  of  this  new  effort  will  be  and  whether  it 


—    26 

exageree  fortifiant  les  tendances  de  reaction  centre 
cette  ingerence  etrangere  et  suspecte. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


will  not  be  looked  upon  as  undue  pressure  and  will 
only  tend  to  strengthen  the  reactionary  tendency 
against  this  suspicious  foreign  influence. 
Accept,  etc. 
A.  Leghait.  [Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  22. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian.  Minister  at  London,  to 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  8  Fevrier  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Uni  par  un  sentiment  de  malveillance  envers  I'Em- 
pereur  Guillaume,  a  la  veille  des  recentes  elections  en 
Allemagne,  on  escomptait  ici  la  victoire  des  partis 
anti-gouvernementaux  et  le  triomphe  des  elements 
socialistes  on  pourrait  dire  que  le  public,sans  distinc- 
tion de  parti  esperait  ce  resultat.  Meme  la  presse 
conservatrice,  antisocialiste  par  excellence,  annon- 
cait  avec  satisfaction  mal  dissimulee  que  les  socia- 
listes democrates  allaient  infliger  un  echec  a  la  po- 
litique imperiale,  tant  interieure  que  coloniale.  Les 
journaux  liberaux  et  radicaux  prevoyaient  que  les 
tentatives  de  gouvernement  personnel,  dangereuses 
pour  la  paix  de  TEurope,  seraient  fletries  par  la  na- 
tion Allemande,  reunie  dans  ses  comices  et  que  les 
evenements  allaient  enfin  donner  a  reflechir  a  I'Em- 
pereur  et  a  son  Chancelier  trop  complaisant.  Quant 
aux  Socialistes  anglais,  leur  confiance  dans  le  succes 
de  leurs  confreres  allemands  etait  complete. 

C'est  avec  un  depit  a  peine  voile  qu'on  a  accueilli 
le  verdict  des  electeurs  germaniques.  La  popularite 
dont  iouit  encore  le  Kaiser,  a  ete  une  revelation 
pour  les  Anglais  qui  se  berqaient  de  I'illusion,  soi- 
gneusement  entretenue  par  la  presse,  que  I'Empereur 
etait  peu  aime,  discredit^  et  par  consequent  moins  a 
craindre.  Hier  le  "Morning  Post"  dans  un  article  de 
fond  ci-joint  disait:  "Caveant  Consules" ;  les  jour- 
naux de  I'opposition  conjurent  le  Gouvernement  Bri- 
tannique,  antimilitariste  du  moment,  de  se  tenir  pret 
a  tout  evenement  et  de  ne  pas  donner  suite  au  pro- 
gramme d'affaiblissement  de  la  marine  dans  un  but 
economique  a  un  moment  oti  I'Empereur  Allemand 
peut  etre  tente  de  mettre  a  profit  son  regain  de  popu- 
larite et  de  se  lancer  dans  une  politique  exterieure 
agressive.  Le  discours  recent  de  Sa  Majeste  Im- 
periale est  qualifie  de  menagant.  II  faut  faire,  il  est 
vrai,  la  part  des  necessites  de  la  politique  courante 
parlementaire.  L'opposition,  prolaablement,  trouve 
que  les  paroles  imperiales,  apres  le  succes  electoral 
dont  il  s'agit,  peuvent  etre  mises  a  profit  dans  la 
lutte  centre  le  Gouvernement  de  M.  Campbell  Ban- 
nerman,  qui  veut  proposer  a  La  Haye  la  limitation 
des  armements  et  qui  ne  cesse  de  diminuer  les  ef- 
fectifs  de  I'armee  et  de  ralentir  la  construction  des 
vaisseaux  de  guerre.  D'autre  part,  les  liberaux  n'ont 
jamais  de  sympathie  pour  le  Gouvernement  person- 
nel et  le  parti  ouvrier  est  toujours  enclin  a  deplorer 
un  echec  du  socialisme  continental.  Quoiqu'il  en 
soit,  le  public  parait  desappointe  du  resultat  des 
elections,  et  le  sentiment  anti-allemand  inspire  par 
la  crainte  et  la  jalousie  et  que  j'ai  souvent  eu  I'hon- 
neur  de  vous  signaler  n'a  pas  encore  perdu  de  son 
intensite. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Comte  de  Lalaing. 


Sir: 


London,  February  8,  1907. 


United  in  their  sentiment  of  ill-will  towards  Em- 
peror William,  on  the  eve  of  the  recent  elections  in 
Germany  the  British  public  counted  on  a  victory 
of  the  opposition  and  on  the  triumph  of  the  social- 
istic elements — one  might  even  say  that  the  public, 
without  distinction  of  parties,  was  hoping  for  such 
a  result.  Even  the  Conservative  press,  in  spite  of 
its  pronounced  antagonism  to  socialism,  announced 
with  ill-disguised  satisfaction  that  the  Social  Demo- 
crats were  going  to  put  a  check  on  the  Imperial 
policy,  interior  as  well  as  colonial.  The  Liberal 
and  the  Radical  papers  prophesied  that  the  attempts 
at  a  personal  regime,  which  were  a  danger  to  Euro- 
pean peace,  would  be  branded  by  the  German  na- 
tion at  the  polls,  and  that  at  last  events  would 
cause  the  Emperor  and  his  too  complaisant  Chan- 
cellor to  think.  As  regards  the  English  socialists, 
their  confidence  in  the  success  of  their  German  com- 
rades was  complete. 

The  verdict  of  the  German  electors  has,  therefore, 
been  received  with  scarcely  veiled  vexation.  The 
popularity  which  the  Kaiser  is  still  enjoying  has 
been  a  revelation  to  the  English,  lulled  by  the  fallacy 
which  the  press  has  been  eagerly  sustaining,  that 
the  Emperor  was  little  liked,  had  lost  popular  con- 
fidence, and  was,  therefore,  less  to  be  feared.  Yes- 
terday's Morning  Post  said  in  a  leader  entitled 
"Caveant  Consules"  which  I  enclose :  "The  opposi- 
tion papers  implore  the  present  anti-militarist  Brit- 
ish Government  to  hold  itself  ready  for  any  event 
and  not  to  carry  out  the  project  of  weakening  the 
navy  for  economic  reasons  at  a  moment  when  the 
German  Emperor  might  feel  tempted  to  make  use 
of  his  regained  popularity  and  to  launch  an  aggres- 
sive foreign  policy."  The  recent  speech  of  His  Im- 
perial Majesty  is  represented  as  a  threat.  In  this, 
however,  the  exigencies  of  the  current  parliamen- 
tary policy  must  be  taken  into  account.  The  oppo- 
sition probably  finds  that  the  Imperial  words,  after 
the  electoral  success  in  question,  can  be  turned  to 
profit  in  a  fight  against  the  Government  of  Mr. 
Campbell-Bannerman  who  intends  to  propose  at 
the  Hague  the  restriction  of  armaments  and  who 
continues  to  diminish  the  effective  strength  of  the 
army  and  to  retard  the  construction  of  men-of 
war.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Liberals  are  never  in 
sympathy  with  a  personal  regime,  and  the  Labor 
party  is  always  inclined  to  deplore  any  check  to 
continental  socialism.  However  that  may  be,  the 
public  seems  disappointed  at  the  result  of  the  elec- 
tions and  the  anti-German  sentiment  inspired  by 
fear  and  jealousy,  of  which  I  have  often  had  the 
honor  to  advise  you,  has  lost  nothing  of  its  intensity. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Count  de  Lalaing. 


27    — 


No.  23. 


No.  23. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  9  Fevrier  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

J'ai  ete  fort  etonne  de  voir  des  Journaux  serieux 
de  I'etranger  attribuer  una  signification  belliqueuse  a 
la  courte  allocution  que  I'Empereur  a  adressee,  dans 
la  nuit  du  5  Fevrier,  a  la  foule  venue  pour  I'acclamer 
lorsque  les  principaux  resultats  des  ballottages  ont 
ete  connus.  J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  envoyer  le 
texte  de  cette  allocution  par  mon  rapport  d'avant- 
hier.  Personne  ici  n'a  songe  a  interpreter  les  paroles 
de  Sa  Majeste  dans  le  sens  d'une  menace  a  I'adresse 
des  puissances  etrangeres.  On  connait  trop  bien  le 
style  habituel  de  I'Empereur  pour  se  meprendre  sur 
la  portee  de  ses  discours.  II  n'est  pas  permis  de 
douter  non  plus  de  la  sincerite  des  intentions  pacifi- 
ques  de  Sa  Majeste.  Elle  en  a  fourni  sufifisamment 
de  preuves  pendant  un  regne  de  dix-huit  ans. 

II  me  semble  qu'a  I'etranger  aussi  on  doit  savoir 
a  quoi  s'en  tenir.  Aussi  je  me  demande  si  I'alarme 
manifestee  est  bien  reelle.  N'est-ce  pas  plutot  la 
continuation  de  la  campagne  de  denigrement  entre- 
prise  depuis  des  annees  dans  la  presse  de  Paris,  de 
Londres  et  de  Saint-Petersbourg  et  dans  laquelle  le 
"Temps,"  organe  officieux  du  ministere  des  affaires 
etrangeres  de  France,  s'est  particulierement  distin- 
gue pendant  les  dernieres  semaines? 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


Berlin,  February  9,  1907. 
Sir:— 

I  have  been  greatly  surprised  to  see  that  serious 
newspapers  abroad  are  attributing  a  bellicose  mean- 
ing to  the  short  address  which  the  Emperor  made 
on  the  evening  of  February  5th  to  the  crowd  which 
came  to  give  him  an  ovation  when  the  main  results 
of  the  polling  had  become  known.  I  had  the  honor 
to  send  you  the  text  of  that  address  in  my  report 
of  the  day  before  yesterday.  Nobody  here  has 
thought  of  interpreting  the  words  of  His  Majesty 
in  the  sense  of  a  threat  directed  against  foreign 
Powers.  The  habitual  style  of  the  Emperor  is  too 
well  known  for  people  to  be  under  any  misappre- 
hension as  to  the  import  of  his  speeches.  Nor  is 
it  right  to  doubt  the  sincerity  of  His  Majesty's  paci- 
fic intentions.  He  has  furnished  sufficient  proof  of 
them  during  a  reign  of  eighteen  years. 

It  seems  to  me  that  people  abroad,  too,  ought  to 
know  what  to  believe  in  this  matter.  I  question  my- 
self also  as  whether  the  alarm  displayed  is  quite 
genuine.  Is  it  not  rather  the  continuation  of  that 
campaign  of  vilification  undertaken  years  ago  in 
the  press  of  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburg,  and 
in  which  during  the  last  weeks  the  Temps,  the  semi- 
official organ  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  has  particularly  distinguished  itself? 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  24. 


No.  24. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M.  le 
Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  10  Fevrier  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Les  souverains  de  I'Angleterre  ont  quitte  hier 
Paris  pour  rentrer  a  Londres.  lis  ont  conserve  I'in- 
cognito  et  sauf  pour  le  dejeuner  offert  en  leur  hon- 
neur  par  le  President  de  la  Republique,  ils  n'ont  pas 
ete  en  contact  avec  le  monde  officiel. 

Le  Roi  et  la  Reine  ont  fait  des  visites  a  leurs  amis, 
a  Paris,  ont  ete  chez  les  artistes,  au  theatre  et  dans 
les  restaurants  comme  de  simples  mortels.  Cette  at- 
titude affable  et  cordiale  a  seduit  le  public. 

Dans  les  spheres  officielles  le  Roi  a,  parait-il,  su 
resserrer  encore  les  liens  de  sympathie  entre  les  deux 
pays  en  affirmant  sa  politique  pacifique  et  en  de- 
veloppant  les  raisons  pour  lesquelles  I'entente  cor- 
diale devait  en  etre  la  base  comme  garantie  de  I'equi- 
libre  des  Puissances  en  Europe. 

Dans  ses  entretiens  avec  M.  Clemenceau  et  avec  le 
Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  le  Roi  a  insiste  sur  la  neces- 
site  de  maintenir  fortes  les  annees  de  terre  et  de  mer 
de  la  France. 

•  Au  Prince  de  Radolin,  il  a  donne  les  assurances  les 
plus  tranquillisantes  et  lui  a  dit  que  son  voyage 
n'avait  pour  but  que  de  distraire  la  Reine  qui  n'etait 


Sir: 


Paris,  February  10,  1907. 


The  Sovereigns  of  England  left  Paris  yesterday 
to  return  to  London.  They  preserved  their  incog- 
nito and  with  the  exception  of  the  luncheon  given 
in  their  honor  by  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
they  have  not  come  into  contact  with  official  circles. 

The  King  and  the  Queen  paid  visits  to  their 
friends  at  Paris,  went  to  the  artists,  the  theatre,  and 
the  restaurants  like  ordinary  mortals.  This  affable 
and  cordial  demeanour  has  charmed  the  public. 

In  official  circles,  it  seems,  the  King  has  known 
how  to  keep  up  the  bonds  of  sympathy  between  the 
two  countries  by  asserting  his  pacific  policy  and 
by  explaining  the  reasons  why  the  entente  cordiale 
must  be  the  basis  of  that  policy  as  a  guaranty  of 
the  balance  of  the  Powers  of  Europe. 

In  his  conversations  with  M.  Clemenceau  and  the 
Minister  of  War  the  King  emphasized  the  necessity 
of  keeping  strong  the  forces  of  France  on  land  and 
at  sea. 

To  Prince  von  Radolin  he  gave  most  quieting 
assurances,  telling  him  that  his  journey  had  no  other 
purpose  than  to  distract  the  Queen  who  had  not 


—    28 


plus  venue  a  Paris  depuis  fort  longtemps.  Rien,  en 
effet  n'a  transpire  jusqu'ici  sur  des  echanges  de  vues 
importants  ou  au  sujet  d'arrangements  stipules  sur 
un  point  special. 

On  reste  done  generalement  d'avis  que  le  Roi  a 
simplement  voulu  affirmer  par  sa  presence  a  Paris 
que  I'accord  avec  la  France  est  aussi  complet  que 
jamais,  et  que  TAlleniagne,  un  peu  grisee  par  le  suc- 
ces  des  elections,  ne  doit  pas  I'oublier. 

On  ne  saurait  se  dissimuler  que  cette  tactique,  qui 
a  pour  but  apparent  d'eviter  la  guerre,  risque  d'amener 
un  grand  mecontentement  a  Berlin  et  de  provoquer 
le  desir  de  tout  tenter  pour  sortir  de  I'etreinte  dans 
laquelle  la  politique  anglaise  resserre  rAllemagne. 

On  se  demande  quel  est  en  realite  le  but  que  pour- 
suit  le  Gouvernement  Britannique  en  provoquant 
ainsi  la  mauvaise  humeur  de  I'Empereur  Guillaume. 
II  est  peu  probable  qu'il  n'y  ait  la  qu'une  manifesta- 
tion du  peu  de  sympathie  qui  existe  entre  I'oncle  et 
le  neveu. 

Je  crois  que  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
aurait  autant  aime  eviter  cette  derniere  visite  an- 
glaise et  qu'il  comprend  qu'il  endosse  un  peu  trop  la 
responsabilite  des  antipathies  anglo-germaines. 

La  France,  qui  desire  sincerement  le  maintien  de  la 
Paix  et  I'amelioration  de  ses  relations  avec  I'AUe- 
magne  aura  de  grands  efforts  de  diplomatic  a  faire 
pour  demontrer  a  Berlin  que  I'entente  cordiale  ne 
peut  rien  avoir  de  deplaisant  pour  I'Allemagne  et 
qu'elle  n'est  pas  conclue  pour  mettre  obstacle  a  son 
expansion. 

On  sent  si  bien  qu'on  est  ici  dans  une  situation 
delicate  et  entraine  a  un  jeu  dangereux  que  tous  les 
organes  officieux  ou  serieux  de  la  Presse  gardent  le 
silence  sur  cette  situation  et  qu'aucun  d'eux  n'ose  se 
rejouir  de  cette  nouvelle  demonstration  de  I'amitie 
anglaise. 

D'autre  part,  nous  venons  de  voir  Mr.  Pichon  sou- 
tenir  a  la  Chambre  centre  les  socialistes,  I'utilite  et 
la  fermete  de  I'alliance  russe. 

On  comprend  qu'il  faudrait  peu  de  chose  pour 
eveiller  les  susceptibilites  et  que  la  plus  grande  pru- 
dence est  de  rigueur  dans  un  moment  surtout  oti 
FAIlemagne  conservatrice  triomphe  et  oil  elle  serait 
peut-etre  facilement  entrainee  contre  la  France  ra- 
dicale  et  socialiste. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  A.  Leghait. 


been  in  Paris  for  a  very  long  time.  Nothing,  in 
fact,  has  so  far  transpired  concerning  an  exchange 
of  important  opinions  or  concerning  arrangements 
made  on  any  special  point. 

It  may,  therefore,  be  believed  that  the  King  sim- 
ply wished  to  affirm  by  his  presence  in  Paris  that 
the  understanding  with  France  is  as  perfect  as  ever 
and  that  Germany,  a  little  intoxicated  by  the  suc- 
cess of  the  elections,  should  not  forget  it. 

The  fact  can  hardly  be  glanced  over  that  these 
tactics,  outwardly  intended  to  avoid  war,  threaten 
to  lead  to  considerable  displeasure  at  Berlin,  and  to 
provoke  the  desire  to  try  everything  in  order  to 
extricate  Germany  from  the  grasp  in  which  she  is 
held  by  the  English  policy. 

It  is  open  to  question  as  to  what  the  British  Gov- 
ernment is  really  aiming  at  in  thus  provoking  the 
displeasure  of  Emperor  William.  It  is  hardly  pro- 
bable that  all  this  is  nothing  but  a  manifestation  of 
the  lack  of  harmony  between  uncle  and  nephew. 

I  believe  that  the  French  Government  would 
rather  have  avoided  this  last  English  visit  and  that 
it  is  aware  that  it  is  taking  upon  its  shoulders  too 
much  of  the  responsibility  for  the  Anglo-German 
antipathy. 

France,  which  sincerely  desires  to  maintain  peace 
and  to  improve  her  relations  with  Germany,  will 
have  to  make  great  efforts  at  diplomacy  if  she  wishes 
to  demonstrate  at  Berlin  that  the  entente  cordiale 
need  not  be  obnoxious  to  Germany  and  that  it  was 
not  concluded  in  order  to  put  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  her  expansion.    • 

It  is  realized  here  so  well  that  France  is  in  a  deli- 
cate situation  and  has  been  dragged  into  a  danger- 
ous game,  that  all  the  semi-official  organs  and  other 
serious  papers  are  keeping  silent  on  this  occasion 
and  that  none  of  them  dares  to  show  pleasure  in  this 
new  demonstration  of  English  friendship. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  just  seen  M.  Pichon 
uphold  in  the  Chamber  against  the  socialists  the 
usefulness  and  the  stability  of  the  Russian  Alliance. 

It  is  understood  here  that  it  would  require  very 
little  to  cause  irritation  and  that  the  greatest  cir- 
cumspection is  essential,  particularly  at  a  time  when 
conservative  Germany  is  triumphant  and  might  per- 
haps be  easily  carried  away  against  radical  and 
socialist  France. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.   Leghait. 


No.  25. 


No.  25. 


M.  E.  de  Cartier,  Charge  d' Affaires  de  Belgique  a 
Lrondres,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


M.  E.  de  Cartier,  Belgian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Lon- 
don, to  Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Londres,  le  28  Mars  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Depuis  que  la  direction  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  de 
Russie  a  ete  confiee  a  M.  Iswolski,  un  rapprochement 
sensible  s'est  produit  entre  les  Cabinets  de  Saint 
James  et  de  Saint-Petersbourg  et  I'accord  sur  beau- 
coup  de  questions  qui,  il  y  a  deux  ans  encore,  parais- 
sait  impossible,  semble  aujourd'hui  a  la  veille  de  se 
realiser. 

L'incident  du  Doggerbank,  les  sympathies  britan- 
niques  pour  le  Japon  lors  de  la  guerre  de  1904,  les 


London,  March  28,  1907. 
Sir:— 

Since  the  direction  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  of  Rus- 
sia has  been  entrusted  to  M.  Iswolski  a  noticeable 
rapprochement  has  taken  place  between  the  Cabi- 
nets of  St.  James's  and  St.  Petersburg  and  on  many 
questions  on  which  it  seemed  impossible  only  two 
years  ago,  an  understanding  seems  to-day  to  be  on 
the  point  of  being  effected. 

The  Doggerbank  incident,  the  British  sympathies 
for  Japan  at  the  'time  of  the  war  of  1904,  the  violent 


29 


rivalites  ardentes  en  Perse,  sont  choses  du  passe,  et 
s'il  faut  ajouter  foi  a  certains  indices,  la  diplomatic 
anglaise,  dont  toutes  les  ressources  tendent  vers 
I'isolement  de  I'Allemagne,  semble  nous  reserver 
pour  un  avenir  rapproche  le  spectacle  d'une  entente 
anglo-russe. 

Ainsi  qu'en  1905  la  reception  de  la  flotte  frangaise 
en  Angleterre  etait  le  signal  avant-coureur  de  I'en- 
tente  cordiale,  on  pent  par  analogic  voir  dans  I'ac- 
cueil  fait  actuellement  a  une  escadre  russe  a  Ports- 
mouth, les  premices  de  relations  plus  cordiales  avec 
la  Russie. 

Les  visites  de  courtoisie  ont  ete  echangees  entre 
amiraux  russes  et  anglais  et  le  commandant  en  chef 
de  Portsmouth,  I'amiral  Sir  D.  H.  Bosanquet  a  donne 
un  banquet  en  I'honneur  de  I'escadre  etrangere.  Un 
telegramme  du  Roi  Edouard  adresse  ces  jours-ci  a 
I'Amiraute  contient  le  desir  formel  de  Sa  Majeste  de 
voir  un  nombre  d'officiers  et  marins  russes  visiter 
Londres.  En  consequence,  20  officiers  et  une  cen- 
taine  de  marins  sont  arrives  avant-hier  par  train 
special  dans  la  capitale  et  ont  ete  les  botes  de  I'Ami- 
raute. II  y  a  eu  les  lunchs,  diners  et  spectacles  de  gala 
de  rigueur,  en  la  presence  de  hautes  personnalites 
du  Foreign  Office  et  de  I'Amiraute.  La  foule  a  ova- 
tionne  les  marins  russes  a  I'Alhambra  et  les  a  ac- 
clames  a  leur  arrivee  a  la  gare.  Les  journaux  sont 
unanimes  a  se  feliciter  de  cette  reception  et  ne  man- 
quent  pas  d'attirer  I'attention  du  public  sur  la  simili- 
tude des  fetes  actuelles  avec  celles  offertes  aux 
marins  frangais. 

Le  "Times"  fait  remarquer  que  d'ailleurs  I'entente 
cordiale  devait  avoir  comme  "corollaire  inevitable" 
un  rapprochement  de  I'Angleterre  et  de  la  Russie  et 
dans  un  avenir  plus  lointain  un  rapprochement  in- 
time  entre  ces  deux  pays,  la  France  et  le  Japon,  de 
nature  a  assurer  d'une  faqon  puissante  et  inattaqua- 
ble  au  monde  entier  les  bienfaits  d'une  ere  durable 
de  paix  et  de  prosperite. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.l  E.  de  Cartier. 


rivalry  in  Persia,  are  things  of  the  past  and  if  faith 
can  be  placed  in  certain  indications,  British  diplo- 
macy, ail  the  resources  of  which  are  directed  toward 
the  isolation  of  Germany,  seems  to  have  in  store  for 
us  in  the  near  future  the  spectacle  of  an  Anglo-Rus- 
sian entente. 

As  in  1905  the  reception  of  the  French  fleet  was 
the  signal  preceding  the  entente  cordiale,  the  recep- 
tion at  present  extended  to  a  Russian  squadron  at 
Portsmouth  may  be  similarly  regarded  as  the  be- 
ginning of  more  cordial  relations  with  Russia. 
Ceremonial  visits  were  exchanged  between  Russian 
and  British  admirals  and  the  commander-in-chief 
of  Portsmouth,  Admiral  Sir  D.  H.  Bosanquet,  gave 
a  dinner  in  honor  of  the  foreign  squadron. 

A  telegram  from  King  Edward  addressed  during 
these  days  to  the  Admiralty  expresses  the  formal 
desire  of  His  Majesty  to  have  a  number  of  the  Rus- 
sian officers  and  men  visit  London.  In  consequence, 
20  officers  and  100  marines  arrived  at  the  capital 
by  special  train  the  day  before  yesterday,  where 
they  were  guests  of  the  Admiralty.  There  were  the 
indispensible  luncheons,  dinners,  and  gala  perform- 
ances in  presence  of  high  personalities  from  the 
Foreign  Office  and  the  Admiralty.  The  crowds 
cheered  the  Russian  marines  at  the  Alhambra  and 
on  their  arrival  at  the  station.  The  papers  are  unan- 
imous in  congratulating  themselves  on  this  recep- 
tion and  do  not  fail  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
public  to  the  similarity  between  the  present  festi- 
vities and  those  held  in  honor  of  the  French  marines. 

The  Times  points  out  that  the  entente  cordiale 
should  moreover  produce  as  an  "inevitable  corol- 
lary" a  rapprochement  between  England  and  Russia 
and  should,  in  a  more  distant  future,  draw  these  two 
countries  and  France  and  Japan  closely  together  so 
as  to  ensure  to  the  whole  world,  in  a  powerful  and 
unassailable  manner,  the  blessings  of  an  era  of  last- 
ing peace  and  prosperity. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  E.  de  Cartier. 


No.  26. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres.  . 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  28  Mars  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Par  I'acte  d'Algesiras  la  France  a  promis,  comme 
tons  les  autres  Etats  interesses,  de  respecter  I'in- 
dependance  du  Sultan  du  Maroc.  Cela  n'a  pas  em- 
peche  le  ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres  frangais  de 
dire  a  mon  collegue  a  Paris  que  le  Sultan  est  un 
fantoche  qui  n'a  pas  autre  chose  a  faire  que  d'obeir 
aux  injonctions  du  corps  diplomatique.  Cela  n'em- 
peche  pas  non  plus  une  entreprise  frangaise  protegee 
par  le  gouvernement  frangais  d'etablir  au  Maroc  la 
telegraphic  sans  fil  au  mepris  des  droits  regaliens  du 
Sultan  et  malgre  ses  protestations. 

L'acte  d'Algesiras  proclame  la  complete  egalite  de 
tons  sauf  en  ce  qui  concerne  la  police  et  la  banque. 
En  depit  de  la  clarte  du  texte  M.  Pichon  y  lit  qu'en 
tout  la  suprematie  doit  appartenir  a  la  France. 

L'acte  d'Algesiras  garantit  le  regime  de  la  porte 
ouverte.    A  Paris  on  regarde  comme  un  coup  porte  a 


Sir: 


Berlin,  March  28,  1907. 


By  the  act  of  Algeciras  France  promised,  as  did 
all  the  other  interested  states,  to  respect  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Sultan  of  Morocco.  That  has  not 
prevented  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
from  saying  to  my  colleague  at  Paris  that  the  Sultan 
was  a  puppet  who  had  nothing  else  to  do  but  to 
obey  the  injunctions  of  the  diplomatic  corps.  Nor 
does  it  prevent  a  French  concern  which  enjoys  the 
support  of  the  French  Government  from  installing 
wireless  telegraphy  in  Morocco  in  defiance  of  the 
sovereign  rights  of  the  Sultan  and  notwithstanding 
his  protests. 

The  act  of  Algeciras  proclaims  complete  equality 
for  all  except  in  police  matters  and  banking.  In 
spite  of  the  clear  wording  M.  Pichon  reads  into  it 
that  in  all  matters  France  is  to  enjoy  supremacy. 

The  act  of  Algeciras  guarantees  the  principle  of 
the  open  door.    In  Paris  every  attempt  at  competi- 


la  France  et  on  qualifie  d'intrigue  toute  tentative  de 
concurrence  meme  la  plus  loyale  et  la  plus  correcte. 
L'acte  d'Algesiras  consacre  I'integrite  du  terri- 
toire  marocain.  Le  conseil  des  ministres  frangais 
prenant  pretexte  de  I'assassinat  du  docteur  Mau- 
champ,  vote  a  I'unanimite  Toccupation  de  la  ville 
marocaine  d'Oudscha  comme  gage  de  la  punition  des 
coupables  et  de  I'indemnite  a  obtenir,  sans  pouvoir 
alleguer  le  moindre  fait  de  nature  a  faire  croire  que 
le  Sultan  ait  une  velleite  quelconque  de  se  soustraire 
a  ses  obligations.  Le  gouvernement  frangais  declare, 
il  est  vrai,  qu'Oudscha  sera  evacue  aussitot  que  satis- 
faction lui  aura  ete  donnee ;  mais  la  maniere  dont 
sont  executes  les  engagements  pris  a  Algesiras  mon- 
tre  assez  ce  que  valent  les  promesses  frangaises. 


L'arrogance  frangaise  redevient  ce  qu'elle  etait 
aux  plus  mauvais  jours  du  second  empire  et  c'est 
I'entente  cordiale  qui  en  est  la  cause.  Elle  a  encore 
augmente  d'un  degre  depuis  que  les  negociations  en- 
tre  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg  auxquelles  la 
France  n'aura  sans  doute  pas  ete  etrangere  parais- 
sent  devoir  aboutir  a  une  entente. 

S'il  ne  s'etait  agi  que  des  questions  officiellement 
traitees  entre  les  cabinets,  I'Egypte,  le  Maroc,  les 
nouvelles  Hebrides,  les  pecheries  de  Terre-neuve,  la 
Perse,  I'Afganistan,  le  Thibet,  nous  ne  pourrions  que 
nous  feliciter  de  voir  disparaitre  des  causes  de  con- 
flit  entre  les  grandes  puissances;  mais  au  fond  des 
arrangements  conclus  ou  qui  vont  I'etre  se  retrouve 
toujours  la  haine  de  I'Allemagne  entretenue  a  Paris 
par  le  souvenir  toujours  vivace  de  I'humiliation  de 
1870,  a  Londres  par  la  jalousie  qu'  inspire  le  develop- 
pement  industriel,  commercial  et  maritime  de  I'Alle- 
magne, a  Saint-Petersbourg  par  rien  du  tout,  si  ce 
n'est  le  prejuge  et  la  blessure  infligee  a  I'incommen- 
surable  orgueil  slave  par  la  comparaison  entre  la 
civilisation  allemande  et  la  barbaric  moscovite.  C'est 
la  continuation  de  la  campagne  entreprise  en  vue 
d'isoler  I'Allemagne  qui  a  ete  fort  habilement  menee 
et  qui  a  commence  par  la  reconciliation  entre  la 
France  et  I'ltalie  et  par  les  arrangements  conclus 
avec  cette  derniere  puissance,  par  I'Angleterre  aussi, 
au  sujet  des  aflfaires  de  la  Mediterranee. 

Je  ne  dis  pas  qu'il  y  ait  d'ores  et  deja  entre  les 
cabinets  un  plan  de  coalition  en  vue  d'une  agression 
contre  I'Allemagne.  Celle-ci  est  de  taille  a  se  de- 
fendre  et  la  responsabilite  d'une  guerre  dont  Tissue 
est  plus  que  douteuse  est  de  nature  a  faire  reculer  les 
plus  braves  ;  mais  il  ne  faut  pas  oublier  que  toutes  les 
dernieres  guerres  n'ont  pas  ete  decretees  par  les  gou- 
vernements.  Elles  leur  ont  ete  imposees  par  des 
mouvements  populaires  et  le  nouveau  groupement 
des  puissances  europeennes  est  de  nature  a  pousser 
I'opinion  publique  dans  une  voie  dangereuse.  Deja 
les  effets  s'en  font  sentir. 

La  presse  frangaise  a  I'unisson  rend  I'Allemagne 
responsable  de  I'assassinat  du  docteur  Mauchamp  ou 
elle  voit  une  suite  des  excitations  parties  de  Berlin. 
Ne  serait-il  pas  plus  logique  d'expliquer  la  fermen- 
tation qui  agite  les  indigenes  marocains  par  le  cynis- 
me  avec  lequel  la  France  et  I'Angleterre,  trafiquant 
de  ce  qui  ne  leur  appartient  pas,  se  sont  concertees 
pour  faire  du  Maroc  une  colonic  frangaise? 

Un  general  frangais  commandant  un  corps  d'armee 
dit  publiquement  que  la  guerre  entre  la  France  et 
I'Allemagne  est  inevitable,  en  repondant  a  un  toast 
dans  lequel  le  colonel  Goepp  avait  exprime  le  regret 
d'avoir  ete  mis  a  la  retraite  avant  I'heure  de  la  re- 
vanche. Pour  toute  punition  le  gouvernement  fran- 
gais  donne  un  autre  commandement  au  general 
Baillard;  mais  a  soin  d'expliquer  en  meme  temps 


tion,  however  loyal  and  correct,  is  regarded  as  a 
blow  aimed  at  France  and  is  stamped  as  an  intrigue. 

The  act  of  Algeciras  solemnly  sanctions  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Moroccan  territory.  The  French  Cab- 
inet, seizing  on  the  pretext  of  the  assassination  of 
Dr.  Mauchamp,  votes  unanimously  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Moroccan  town  of  Oudschda  as  a  secur- 
ity for  the  punishment  of  the  culprits  and  for  the 
claimed  indemnity  without  being  able  to  cite  the 
smallest  fact  which  might  justify  a  belief  that  the 
Sultan  had  any  intention  of  evading  his  obligations. 
The  French  Government,  it  is  true,  declares  that 
Oudschda  will  be  evacuated  the  moment  that  satis- 
faction is  given ;  but  the  manner  in  which  the  obli- 
gations assumed  at  Algeciras  are  being  observed 
shows  clearly  enough  what  the  French  promises 
are  worth. 

French  arrogance  is  becoming  again  what  it  was 
during  the  worst  days  of  the  second  Empire  and  the 
cause  of  this  is  the  entente  cordiale.  It  has  increased 
still  more  since  it  appears  that  the  negotiations  be- 
tween London  and  St.  Petersburg,  to  which  without 
doubt  France  has  not  been  a  stranger,  are  going 
to  lead  to  an  entente. 

If  the  points  in  question  only  concerned  matters 
to  be  treated  officially  between  the  cabinets — as  in 
the  case  of  Egypt,  Morocco,  the  New  Hebrides,  the 
fisheries  of  Terra  Nova,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Thibet 
— we  could  only  congratulate  ourselves  to  see  the 
causes  of  conflict  disappear  between  the  Great  Pow- 
ers; but  at  the  bottom  of  the  arrangements  con- 
cluded, or  which  are  going  to  be  concluded,  we 
always  find  hatred  of  Germany  kept  alive,  in  Paris 
by  the  deep-rooted  memory  of  the  humiliation  of 
1870,  in  London  by  the  jealousy  inspired  by  the  in- 
dustrial, commercial,  and  maritime  development  of 
Germany,  in  St.  Petersburg  by  nothing  at  all  unless 
it  be  prejudice  and  the  wound  inflicted  on  the  bound- 
less Slavic  pride  by  the  comparison  between  Ger- 
man civilization  and  Muscovite  barbarism.  It  is 
the  continuation  of  the  campaign  undertaken  to  iso- 
late Germany,  which  was  very  ably  conducted  and 
began  with  the  reconciliation  between  France  and 
Italy  and  with  the  arrangements  concluded  with 
the  latter  Power,  also  by  England,  concerning  Medi- 
terranean matters. 

I  do  not  say  that  at  present  a  coalition  is  being 
planned  by  the  Cabinets  with  a  view  to  an  attack 
on  Germany.  The  latter  is  capable  of  defending 
herself  and  the  responsibility  for  a  war,  the  issue 
of  which  is  doubtful,  would  cause  the  bravest  to 
shrink ;  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  all  of  the 
last  wars  were  not  made  by  the  Governments. 
These  were  forced  on  them  by  popular  movements 
and  the  new  grouping  of  the  European  Powers  is 
such  that  it  will  push  public  opinion  along  a  danger- 
ous path.    The  efifects  of  this  are  already  being  felt. 

The  French  press  is  united  in  rriaking  Germany 
responsible  for  the  murder  of  Dr.  Mauchamp  in 
which  it  sees  the  result  of  instigations  which  orig- 
inated in  Berlin.  Would  it  not  be  more  logical  to 
explain  the  unrest  which  stirs  the  Moroccan  natives 
by  the  cynicism  with  which  France  and  England, 
trafficking  with  what  does  not  belong  to  them,  have 
agreed  to  turn  Morocco  into  a  French  colony? 

A  French  general,  commanding  an  army  corps,  in 
reply  to  a  toast  in  which  Colonel  Goepp  had  ex- 
pressed his  regret  at  having  been  retired  before  the 
hour  of  the  "revanche,"  pubHcly  said  that  the  war 
Ijetween  France  and  Germany  is  inevitable.  The 
sole  punishment  administered  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment was  to  give  another  command  to  General 
Baillard,  explaining  at  the  same  time  that  that  meas- 


31 


que  la  mesure  prise  n'a  pas  pour  unique,  ni  meme 
pour  principale  cause  le  discours  inconvenant  de 
I'officier  deplace.  On  I'a  eloigne  de  Nancy  parce 
qu'il  avait  pris  une  attitude  indisciplinee  vis-a-vis 
du  ministre  de  la  guerre. 

La  presse  anglaise  poursuit  avec  plus  d'acharne- 
ment  que  jamais  sa  campagne  de  denigrement.  EUe 
voit  la  main  d'Allemagne  partout  oii  il  arrive  quel- 
que  chose  de  facheux  pour  I'Angleterre.  Au  besoin 
elle  invente  de  toutes  pieces,  comme  le  pretendu 
projet  de  fermeture  de  la  mer  baltique.  Tout  cela 
se  passe  au  moment  ou  I'Angleterre  jette  un  brandon 
de  discorde  en  cherchant  a  imposer  a  la  conference 
de  La  Haye  la  discussion  non  de  son  propre  de- 
sarmement,  mais  de  celui  de  ses  adversaires  et  im- 
plique  une  diminution  de  la  securite  europeenne. 

Jusqu'a  present  la  presse  allemande  se  borne  a 
enregistrer  les  faits  et  les  officieux  demontrent  com- 
bien  il  est  absurde  d'endosser  a  I'Allemagne  la  res- 
ponsabilite  d'un  crime  qu'elle  deplore  aussi  vive- 
ment  que  les  Frangais  et  qui  atteint  tous  les  Euro- 
peens  quelle  que  soit  leur  nationalite;  mais  ils  s'abs- 
tiennent  des  reflexions  que  je  viens  de  vous  sou- 
mettre  et  qui  pourtant  doivent  leur  venir  d'elles- 
memes  a  I'esprit.  On  voit  que  I'Allemagne  ne  desire 
avant  tout  evifer  la  reouverture  de  la  question  maro- 
caine,  quelque  penibles  que  lui  soient  les  empiete- 
ments  frangais.  M.  Delcasse  a  ete  demissione;  mais 
il  a  laisse  la  tradition  de  sa  politique  a  ses  succes- 
seurs. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


ure  had  not  for  its  only  nor  even  for  its  principal 
cause  the  unbecoming  speech  of  the  displaced  offi- 
cer. He  was  removed  from  Nancy  because  of  un- 
disciplined demeanor  towards  the  Minister  of  War. 

The  English  press  is  pursuing  with  more  despera- 
tion than  ever  its  campaign  of  vilification.  It  sees 
Germany's  hand  whenever  something  happens  that 
is  vexatious  to  England.  In  cases  of  need  it  invents 
whole  stories,  as  for  instance,  the  alleged  project  of 
a  closure  of  the  Baltic  Sea.  All  this  happens  at  a 
time  when  England  throws  a  fire-brand  of  discord 
and  threatens  to  bring  about  a  diminution  of  Euro- 
pean security  by  trying  to  force  on  the  conference 
at  the  Hague  the  discussion  not  of  her  own  disarm- 
ament but  that  of  her  adversaries. 

Up  to  the  present  the  German  press  confines  it- 
self to  registering  the  facts  and  the  semi-official 
papers  demonstrate  how  absurd  it  is  to  lay  on  Ger- 
many the  responsibility  for  a  crime  which  she  de- 
plores as  much  as  the  French  and  which  touches 
all  Europeans,  whatever  their  nationality;  but  they 
refrain  from  the  reflections  which  I  have  just  sub- 
mitted, although  it  must  be  assumed  that  they  have 
them  in  mind.  It  is  evident  that  before  all  things 
Germany  desires  that  the  Moroccan  question  be  not 
reopened,  however  painful  the  French  infringement 
may  be  to  her.  M.  Delcasse  was  dismissed,  but  he 
bequeathed  the  tradition  of  his  policy  to  his  suc- 
cessors. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Greindl. 


No.  27. 


No.  27. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  8  Avril  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

Ainsi  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  il  y  a 
quelques  jours  encore  j'ai  ete  d'avis  des  que  j'ai  con- 
nu  I'acte  d'Algesiras  que  la  France  ne  renongait  pas 
a  son  projet  de  main-mise  sur  le  Maroc,  I'ajournant 
seulement  jusqu'a  des  temps  meilleurs.  Elle  s'est 
fait  donner  la  police,  I'influence  preponderante  dans 
la  Banque.  Elle  a  une  immense  frontiere  commune 
habitee  par  des  tribus  mal  soumises  qui  lui  four- 
niront  des  pretextes  d'intervention.  Au  besoin  elle 
en  inventera  comme  jadis  en  Tunisie.  Elle  a  en 
Algerie  une  armee  toujours  prete.  Elle  dispose  done 
des  moyens  de  realrser  ses  desseins  ambitieux.  Si 
je  m'etais  fait  d'illusion  que  les  promesses  d'Al- 
gesiras seraient  loyalement  executees,  I'attitude  du 
gouvernement  franqais  dans  la  question  du  choix  du 
directeur  des  travaux  publics,  I'occupation  d'Oudjda 
et  un  recent  article  du  journal  "Le  Temps"  me 
I'auraient  fait  perdre. 

L'organe  officieux  du  ministere  des  affaires  etran- 
geres franqais  ecrit  en  commentant  I'entrevue  du 
Prince  de  Biilow  et  de  M.  Tittoni  a  Rapallo,  qu'on 
ne  parait  pas  bien  comprendre  a  Berlin  qu'un  ar- 
rangement entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  n'est  pos- 
sible que  sur  la  base  suivante:  De  la  part  de  la 
France,  des  concessions  relatives  au  chemin  de  fer 
de  Bagdad ;  de  la  part  de  I'Allemagne  I'assurance 


Sir: 


Berlin,  April  8,   1907. 


As  I  had  the  honor  of  writing  to  you  only  some 
days  ago,  from  the  time  when  I  learned  of  the  act 
of  Algeciras  I  was  of  the  opinion  that  France  was 
not  renouncing  her  plan  to  put  her  hand  on  Moroc- 
co, but  was  simply  deferring  it  until  better  times. 
She  was  given  the  police  and  the  preponderant  influ- 
ence in  the  bank.  She  has  an  immense  stretch  of 
contiguous  frontier  inhabited  by  insufficiently  sub- 
dued tribes  which  will  furnish  her  with  pretexts  for 
intervention.  If  need  be,  she  will  invent  them  as  she 
formerly  did  in  Tunis.  She  has  in  Algiers  an  ever 
ready  army.  She  therefore  has  at  hand  the  means 
with  which  to  realize  her  ambitious  plans.  If  I 
had  ever  labored  under  the  delusion  that  the  prom- 
ises of  Algeciras  would  be  loyally  followed  out,  the 
attitude  of  the  French  Government  in  the  question 
of  the  selection  of  the  director  of  public  works,  the 
occupation  of  Oudschda  and  a  recent  article  in  the 
Temps  would  have  cured  me  of  it. 

The  semi-official  organ  of  the  French  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Afifairs,  in  commenting  on  the  interview 
between  Prince  von  Biilow  and  M.  Tittoni  at  Ra- 
poUo,  writes  that  it  seemed  not  to  be  properly  com- 
prehended at  Berlin  that  an  understanding  between 
France  and  Germany  was  only  possible  on  the  fol- 
lowing basis :  on  the  part  of  France  concessions 
relative  to  the  Bagdad  railway ;  on  the  part  of  Ger- 


d'une  adhesion  a  la  politique  marocaine  telle  qu'elle 
est  determinee  par  le  traite  du  8  Avril  1904. 

Un  telegramme  officieux  de  Berlin  insere  avant- 
hier  dans  le  numero  362  de  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne" 
repond  que  le  journal  "Le  Temps"  parait  avoir 
oublie  d'une  maniere  assez  etonnante,  que  depuis  le 
traite  du  8  Avril  1904,  les  arrangements  d'Algesiras 
ont  cree  une  situation  nouvelle  qui  ne  peut  pas  etre 
changee  par  un  accord  conclu  rien  qu'entre  la 
France  et  I'Allemagne.  Le  telegramme  officieux  dit 
qu'a  Berlin  on  comprend  fort  bien  qu'a  raison  de  sa 
position  geographique,  la  France  s'efforce  d'obtenir 
une  situation  particuliere  au  Maroc.  L'Allemagne 
ne  songe  nullement  a  la  lui  contester  et  I'acte  d'Al- 
gesiras la  lui  a  reconnue.  On  ne  comprend  pas  bien 
comment  I'Allemagne  pourrait  aller  au  dela  et  s'as- 
socier  a  la  politique  de  I'arrangement  anglo-frangais. 
Toute  la  politique  frangaise  au  Maroc  souffre  de  ce 
que  Ton  croit  en  France  qu'il  existe  au  Maroc  un  an- 
tagonisme  entre  I'Allemagne  et  la  France.  Sous 
I'empire  de  ce  prejuge  on  attribue  en  France  a  la 
politique  allemande  des  visees  qu'elle  n'a  absolument 
pas.  On  a  repete  a  satiete  a  Algesiras  que  I'Alle- 
magne n'a  en  vue  que  des  interets  economiques  et 
Ton  ne  comprend  pas  comment  la  France  pourrait 
s'y  opposer  si  elle  veut  honnetement  respecter  le 
principe  de  la  porte  ouverte  solennellement  pro- 
clame.  La  situation  serait  bien  vite  eclaircie,  si  en 
France  on  voulait  bien  renoncer  a  une  idee  pre- 
congue  et  qui  n'a  aucun  fondement. 


Le  telegramme  officieux  ajoute  qu'on  ne  voit  pas 
bien  quelle  concession  la  France  pourrait  faire  a 
I'Allemagne  au  sujet  du  chemin  de  fer  de  Bagdad. 
Ce  chemin  de  fer  se  construira  un  jour  ou  I'autre  et 
I'Allemagne  n'est  nullement  pressee  comme  on 
semble  le  croire.  De  plus  la  construction  du  chemin 
de  fer  est  une  affaire  turque  qui  ne  regarde  I'Alle- 
magne que  parce  que  la  concession  en  a  ete  regu- 
lierement  accordee  a  un  groupe  financier  oii  les  capi- 
taux  allemands  sont  preponderants. 

Ainsi  que  vous  le  voyez,  Monsieur  le  Baron,  la 
France  pretend,  comme  avant  1870,  a  un  droit  d'in- 
tervention  dans  des  affaires  qui  ne  la  regardent  ab- 
solument pas  et  s'imagine  qu'elle  possede  un  droit  de 
veto  sur  les  arrangements  conclus  entre  puissances 
independantes. 

Nous  venons  de  faire  a  nos  depens  I'experience  de 
ce  retour  aux  traditions  du  second  empire  ou  plutot 
de  la  politique  generale  frangaise.  Chaque  fois  que 
dans  le  cours  de  I'histoire,  la  France  s'en  est  cru  la 
force,  elle  a  tente  de  s'arroger  la  suprematie  sur  le 
monde  entier.  Maintenant  c'est  I'entente  cordiade 
avec  I'Angleterre  qui  lui  donne  cette  confiance. 

Les  exemples  se  multiplient.  Vous  savez  que  le 
Danemark  est  absolument  libre  echangiste.  Ses 
droits  de  douane  sont  purement  fiscaux.  II  se  pro- 
pose de  les  abaisser  encore  et  pour  que  les  recettes 
du  tresor  n'aient  pas  a  en  souffrir,  il  a  I'intention 
d'elever  les  droits  sur  les  vins,  mais  encore  dans  une 
mesure  tres  moderee.  Rien  n'est  mieux  justifie.  Le 
vin  est  un  article  de  luxe  et  il  est  equitable  de  de- 
mander  aux  classes  aisees  un  sacrifice  destine  a  aug- 
menter  le  bien-etre  general.  J'ai  appris  par  une  voie 
indirecte,  mais  absolument  sure,  que  le  ministre  de 
France  a  Copenhague  a  neanmoins  adresse  au  gou- 
vernement  danois  des  representations  formulees  sur 
un  ton  imperieux  et  accompagnees  de  menaces  de 
represailles.  La  demarche  frangaise  est  d'autant 
plus  insolite,  que  le  Danemark  n'est  lie  envers  la 
France  par  aucun  traite  et  que  le  tarif  douanier  fran- 


many  the  assurance  of  her  adherence  to  the  Moroc- 
can policy  as  determined  by  the  treaty  of  April  8, 
1904. 

A  semi-official  telegram  from  Berlin  printed  the 
day  before  yesterday  in  No.  362  of  the  Cologne  Gaz- 
ette replies  that  the  Temps  seems  to  have  forgot- 
ten in  an  astonishing  manner  that  since  the  treaty 
of  April  8,  1904,  the  agreement  of  Algeciras  had 
created  a  new  situation  which  could  not  be  altered 
by  any  agreement  made  only  between  France  and 
Germany.  The  telegram  said  that  it  was  under- 
stood perfectly  well  at  Berlin  that  by  reason  of  her 
geographical  position  France  was  seeking  to  obtain 
a  special  position  in  Morocco.  Germany  did  not 
think  of  disputing  this  and  the  act  of  Algeciras  had 
granted  it.  It  was  not  easy  to  understand  how 
Germany  could  go  beyond  that  and  how  she  could 
associate  herself  with  the  policy  of  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement.  The  entire  French  policy  in 
Morocco  was  suffering  under  a  belief  prevailing  in 
France  that  an  antagonism  between  Germany  and 
France  existed  in  Morocco.  Under  the  influence 
of  this  prejudice  people  in  France  were  attributing 
to  German  policy  intentions  which  it  absolutely  did 
not  have.  It  had  been  repeated  ad  nauseam  at  Alge- 
ciras that  Germany  had  only  economic  interests  in 
view  and  that  it  was  incomprehensible  how  France 
could  be  opposed. to  that  if  she  were  willing  honestly 
to  respect  the  principle  of  the  open  door  which 
had  been  solemnly  proclaimed.  The  situation  would 
be  speedily  cleared  if  France  were  willing  to  re- 
nounce a  preconceived  idea  which  had  no  foundation 
whatsoever. 

The  telegram  adds  that  it  was  not  quite  clear 
what  concession  France  could  make  to  Germany 
in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad  railway.  This  railroad 
would  be  built  some  day  and  Germany  was  nowise 
in  a  hurry,  as  seemed  to  be  believed.  Besides,  the 
construction  of  the  railway  was  a  Turkish  affair 
which  concerned  Germany  only  in  so  far  as  the 
concession  had,  in  a  legitimate  manner,  been  given 
to  a  financial  group  in  which  German  capital  was 
predominant. 

Thus  you  perceive.  Sir,  that  France  is  making 
pretensions  as  in  1870,  to  a  right  of  intervention  in 
affairs  which  are  in  no  way  her  concern,  and  she 
imagines  that  she  possesses  a  right  of  veto  over 
agreements  concluded  between  independent  Powers. 

We  have  recently  had  our  own  experiences,  to 
our  cost,  of  this  return  to  the  traditions  of  the  sec- 
ond Empire,  or  rather  of  the  general  French  policy. 
Every  time  in  the  course  of  history  when  France 
thought  herself  strong  she  has  tried  to  arrogate  to 
herself  supremacy  over  the  whole  world.  Now  it 
is  the  entente  cordiale  with  England  that  gives  her 
this  confidence. 

Instances  are  accumulating.  You  know  that  Den- 
mark is  absolutely  a  free-trade  country.  Her  cus- 
tom duties  are  purely  fiscal.  She  proposes  to  lower 
them  still  more,  and  in  order  that  the  revenues  of 
her  treasury  do  not  suffer  therefrom,  she  proposes 
to  raise  the  duty  on  wines,  but  only  in  a  very  mod- 
erate degree.  Nothing  is  more  justified.  Wine  is 
an  article  of  luxury  and  it  is  just  to  demand  from 
the  well-to-do  classes  a  sacrifice  destined  to  increase 
the  general  welfare.  I  learn  indirectly,  but  from 
an  absolutely  reliable  source,  that  the  French  Min- 
ister at  Copenhagen  has  nevertheless  approached 
the  Danish  Government  with  representations  form- 
ulated in  an  imperious  tone  and  accompanied  by 
threats  of  reprisals.  The  French  procedure  is  all 
the  more  unusual  as  Denmark  is  bound  to  France 
by  no  treaty  and  the  French  customs  tariff  imposes 


gais  frappe  de  droits  prohibitifs  les  produits  agri- 
coles  qui  sont  les  seules  marchandises  d'exportation 
daiioises. 

Ce  qui  s'est  passe  a  Bruxelles,  a  Berlin  et  a  Copen- 
hague  n'est  peut-etre  pas  isole.  II  est  vraisemblable 
qu'ailleurs  aussi  la  France  est  revenue  a  ses  ancien- 
nes  allures  ne  tenant  aucun  compte  des  engage- 
ments qui  la  genent  et  pretendant  imposer  partout 
ses  volontes. 

Agreez  etc. 

Fs.l  Greindl. 


a  prohibitive  duty  on  agricultural  products  which 
form  the  only  Danish  articles  of  export. 

What  has  happened  in  Brussels,  Berlin,  and  Cop- 
enhagen are  perhaps  not  isolated  cases.  It  is  prob- 
able that  elsewhere,  also,  France  has  reverted  to  her 
old  conduct  of  not  respecting  her  obligations  when 
they  annoy  her  and  of  demanding  subservience  to 
her  will  everywhere. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  28. 


No.  28. 


M.  E.  de  Carrier,  Charge  d' Affaires  de  Belgique  a 
Londres,  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


M.  E.  de  Cartier,  Belgian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Lon- 
don, to  Baron  de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Londres,  le  12  Avril  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron  1 

L'opinion  publique  a  suivi  avec  un  interet  modere 
les  peripeties  du  sejour  que  Leurs  Majestes  le  Roi  et 
la  Reine  ont  fait  dans  les  eaux  espagnoles  et  elle  ne 
semble  guere  se  preoccuper  pour  le  moment  des  pos- 
sibilites  d'ordre  politique  que  comporte  cette  ren- 
contre des  souverains  de  I'Espagne  et  de  I'Angle- 
terre. 

Cette  indifference  plus  apparente  peut-etre  que 
reelle,  peut  a  priori  sembler  etrange,  lorsqu'on  la 
compare  a  I'enthousiasme  suscite  par  les  prodromes 
de  I'entente  cordiale  franco-aijglaise,  mais  elle  s'ex- 
pHque  fort  bien  par  I'etat  d'esprit  qui  regne  en  ce 
moment,  tant  parmi  les  cercles  politiques  que  parmi 
la  population  en  general.  De  plus  en  plus  le  peuple 
anglais  s'habitue  a  considerer  que  les  questions 
d'ordre  international  sont  la  province  presque  ex- 
clusive du  Roi  Edouard,  dont  il  admire,  avec  raison, 
le  profond  sens  politique  et  la  feconde  diplomatie. 
L'absence  complete  de  divergences  entre  les  deux 
grands  partis  historiques  en  ce  qui  concerne  les 
destinees  politiques  de  I'Angleterre,  circonstance  qui 
permet  a  Sir  Edward  Grey  de  continuer  I'oeuvre  de 
Lord  Lansdowne  sans  atermoiement  ni  a-coups  est 
la  preuve  la  plus  evidente  de  cet  etat  d'esprit. 

Confiante  d'un  cote  dans  le  jugement  eclaire  et  le 
tact  heureux  du  Roi,  et  assuree  en  outre  de  la  valeur 
du  ministre  charge  de  la  defense  de  ses  interets  in- 
ternationaux  l'opinion  publique  se  detache  de  plus 
en  plus  des  questions  de  haute  politique,  sachant  par 
experience  que  les  destinees  de  I'Empire  sont  en 
bonnes  mains. 

L'entrevue  de  Carthagene  a  du  presenter  un  veri- 
table interet  politique  et  il  est  a  prevoir  que  la  ques- 
tion marocaine  a  ete  I'objet  d'un  echange  de  vues 
tant  entre  les  souverains  que  parmi  les  hommes 
d'etat  qui  les  accompagnaient.  C'est  ainsi  que  Sir 
Charles  Hardinge,  sous-secretaire  d'Etat  permanent 
aux  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  suivi  le  Roi  Edouard 
dans  ce  voyage  et  il  est  permis  de  supposer  que  ses 
conversations  avec  les  ministres  espagnols  auront  pu 
calmer  les  inquietudes  que  I'occupation  d'Oudja  a 
du  provoquer  a  Madrid.  La  visite  que  le  RoJ 
Edouard  a  faite  a  son  royal  neveu  a  Carthagene 
aurait  surtout  pour  but  de  chercher  a  resserrer  les 
liens  qui  unissent  I'Espagne  a  la  Grande-Bretagne  et 
d'affaiblir  autant  que  possible  I'influence  allemande 


Sir: 


London,  April  12,  1907. 


Public  opinion  has  followed  only  with  moderate 
interest  the  events  of  the  sojourn  of  their  Majesties, 
the  King  and  Queen,  at  the  Spanish  baths  and  for 
the  moment  it  hardly  seems  to  concern  itself  about 
the  political  possibilities  which  this  meeting  of  the 
rulers  of  Spain  and  England  opens  up. 

This  indifference,  which  is  perhaps  more  exter- 
nal than  real,  may  seem  strange  a  priori  when  com- 
pared with  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by  the  events 
which  preceded  the  Franco-English  entente  cord- 
iale ;  but  it  is  very  easily  explained  by  the  spirit 
which  prevails  at  present  in  political  circles  as  well 
as  among  the  population  in  general.  More  and 
more  the  English  people  are  becoming  accustomed 
to  consider  international  questions  as  belonging  al- 
most exclusively  to  the  province  of  King  Edward 
whose  profound  political  acumen  and  successful  dip- 
lomacy they  justly  admire.  The  complete  absence 
of  differences  of  opinion  between  the  two  great  his- 
torical parties  as  to  the  political  destinies  of  Eng- 
land— a  circumstance  which  permits  Sir  Edward 
Grey  to  continue  the  work  of  Lord  Lansdowne 
without  delay  or  interruption — is  the  best  proof  of 
this  spirit. 

Placing  full  confidence,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the 
clear  judgment  and  good  tact  of  the  King,  and  con- 
vinced on  the  other,  of  the  ability  of  the  Minister 
entrusted  w'ith  the  care  of  England's  international 
interests,  public  opinion  is  becoming  more  and  more 
detached  from  questions  of  high  politics,  knowing 
from  experience  that  the  destinies  of  the  Empire 
are  in  good  hands. 

The  meeting  at  Carthagena  must  have  been  of 
great  political  interest  and  it  must  be  assumed  that 
its  object  was  an  exchange  of  ideas  on  the  Moroccan 
question  between  the  Sovereigns  as  well  as  between 
the  statesmen  who  accompanied  them.  Sir  Charles 
Hardinge,  permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  AfJFairs,  accompanied  King  Edward  on  this 
voyage  and  it  may  be  supposed  that  in  his  conversa- 
tions with  the  Spanish  Ministers  he  has  been  able 
to  assuage  the  uneasiness  which  the  occupation  of 
Oudschda  must  have  caused  in  Madrid.  The  aim  of 
the  visit  which  King  Edward  is  paying  to  his  Ro3ral 
nephew  at  Carthagena  will  be  above  all  to  tighten 
the  bonds  which  join  Spain  to  Great  Britain  and  to 
weaken  as  much  as  possible  the  German  influence 


k  Madrid.  Mais  jusqu'ici  aucun  indice  n'a  revele  les 
resultats  pratiques  ou  les  decisions  arretees  au  cours 
de  cette  entrevue. 
Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  E.  de  Cartier. 


in  Madrid.  But  so  far  no  indication  has  revealed 
the  practical  results  or  the  decisions  reached  in  the 
course  of  this  meeting. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  E.  de  Cartier. 


No.  29. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  Baron 
de  Favereau,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  18  Avril  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Baron ! 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  accuser  reception  de  votre 
depeche  du  15  Avril  par  laquelle  vous  avez  bien 
voulu  me  communiquer  I'interessant  rapport  qui 
vous  a  ete  adresse  le  8  du  meme  mois,  par  mon  col- 
legue  a  Madrid. 

Des  trois  conjectures  que  vous  soumet  M.  le 
Baron  Joostens  pour  expliquer  I'entrevue  de  Cartha- 
gene,  la  derniere  est  la  plus  vraisemblable.  On  peut 
meme  dire  que  c'est  une  certitude. 

Comme  le  traite  d'alliance  avec  le  Japon,  I'entente 
cordiale  avec  la  France,  les  negociations  pendantes 
avec  la  Russie,  la  visite  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  au  Roi 
d'Espagne  est  un  des  mouvements  de  la  campagne 
personnellement  dirigee  avec  autant  de  perseverance 
que  de  succes,  par  Sa  Majeste  Edouard  VII,  pour 
isoler  rAllemagne.  L'Angleterre  ne  peut  guere  at- 
tendre  d'aide  materielle  de  la  part  de  I'Espagne. 
D'apres  une  information  des  journaux,  elle  aurait 
promis  son  concours  pour  aider  a  la  reconstitution  de 
la  flotte  espagnole  et  a  la  fortification  de  la  cote  iberi- 
que.  La  creation  d'une  flotte  est  une  oeuvre  de 
longue  haleine,  partout  difficile  et  particulierement 
dans  un  pays  aux  finances  delabrees  et  ovi  non  seule- 
ment  les  ministres  mais  aussi  tous  les  hauts  fonc- 
tionnaires  changent  a  chaque  instant.  L'Angleterre 
n'a  pas  besoin  du  concours  de  I'Espagne  pour  con- 
centrer  sa  flotte  dans  la  Manche  et  la  Mer  du  Nord, 
sans  compromettre  sa  position  dans  la  Mediterranee. 
Depuis  qu'elle  a  acquis  I'amitie  de  la  France,  plus 
personne  n'est  en  etat  de  I'y  menacer. 

Mais  malgre  I'impuissance  militaire  et  financiere 
de  I'Espagne,  une  entente  avec  les  pays  iberiques 
n'est  pas  sans  valeur.  Nous  venons  d'en  avoir  la 
preuve  a  Algesiras,  a  Tanger  et  tout  recemment  .par 
I'appui  que  le  cabinet  de  Madrid  a  donne  a  la  propo- 
sition anglaise  de  limitation  des  armements.  II  n'est 
pas  aise  de  se  rendre  compte  des  motifs  qui  ont 
determine  I'Espagne  a  se  mettre  dans  I'afifaire  maro- 
caine  a  la  remorque  de  la  France  et  de  I'Angleterre. 
S'est-elle  imaginee  que  la  France  avait  serieusement 
et  loyalement  I'intention  de  partager  avec  elle  I'influ- 
ence  au  Maroc?  Ou  bien  reconnaissant  qu'elle  doit 
renoncer  pour  toujours  a  ses  aspirations  seculaires 
s'est-elle  contentee  de  sauver  au  moins  les  appa- 
rences? 

Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  I'entente  de  I'Espagne  avec  I'An- 
gleterre et  la  France  est  un  fait  qui  n'est  pas  nou- 
veau.  L'entrevue  de  Carthagene  est  simplement  la 
confirmation  et  probablement  la  consolidation  d'une 
situation  deja  existante. 

La  visite  que  doit  faire  aujourd'hui  a  Gaete,  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre  au  Roi  d'ltalie,  ne  nous  revele  rien  non 
plus.  L'entente  de  I'ltalie  avec  I'Angleterre  et  la 
France  est  aussi  un  fait  en  depit  de  la  triple  alliance. 
Elle  date  du  jour  ou  I'ltalie  s'est  mise  d'accord  avec 


Berlin,  April  18,  1907. 
Sir:— 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  despatch  of  April  15  in  which  you  were  good 
enough  to  inform  me  of  the  interesting  report  which 
was  sent  to  you  on  the  8th  of  the  month  by  my  col- 
league in  Madrid. 

Of  the  three  conjectures  which  Baron  Joostens 
submits  to  you  in  explanation  of  the  meeting  of 
Carthagena  the  last  is  the  most  probable.  One  can 
even  say  that  it  is  a  certainty. 

Like  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Japan,  the  entente 
cordiale  with  France,  the  negotiations  pending  with 
Russia,  the  visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  the  King 
of  Spain  is  one  of  the  manoeuvres  in  the  campaign 
personally  conducted  with  as  much  perseverance  as 
success  by  His  Majesty,  King  Edward  VII,  in  order 
to  isolate  Germany.  England  can  hardly  expect 
material  aid  from  Spain.  According  to  a  newspaper 
report  she  had  promised  her  support  in  the  recon- 
struction of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  in  the  fortification 
of  the  Iberian  coast.  The  creation  of  a  fleet  is  a 
long  winded  matter,  difficult  everywhere  but  parti- 
cularly so  in  a  country  with  shattered  finances  and 
where  not  only  the  ministers  but  all  the  high  offi- 
cials also  change  every  moment.  England  does  not 
need  Spain's  support  in  order  to  concentrate  her 
fleet  in  the  Channel  and  in  the  North  Sea  without 
compromising  thereby  her  position  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Since  she  has  acquired  the  friendship  of 
France  nobody  is  any  longer  in  a  position  to  men- 
ace her  there. 

But  despite  the  military  and  financial  impotence 
of  Spain,  an  entente  with  the  Iberian  countries  is 
not  without  value.  We  have  just  had  a  proof  of 
that  in  Algeciras,  in  Tangiers,  and  very  recently  in 
the  support  which  the  Cabinet  at  Madrid  lent  to  the 
English  proposal  concerning  the  restriction  of  arma- 
ments. It  is  not  easy  to  understand  the  motives 
which  have  induced  Spain  to  let  herself  be  taken 
in  tow  by  France  and  England  in  the  Moroccan  af- 
fair. Did  she  imagine  that  France  had  the  serious 
and  loyal  intention  of  giving  her  a  share  in  the  in- 
fluence in  Morocco?  Or  well  aware  that  she  would 
have  to  renounce  forever  her  century-old  aspira- 
tions, was  she  content  with  at  least  keeping  up  ap- 
pearances? 

However  that  may  be,  Spain's  entente  with  Eng- 
land and  France  is  a  fact  which  is  not  new.  The 
meeting  of  Carthagena  amounts  simply  to  a  con- 
firmation and  probably  a  strengthening  of  an  already 
existing  situation. 

The  visit  which  the  King  of  England  is  to  make 
to-day  to  the  King  of  Italy  at  Gaeta  does  not  reveal 
anything  either.  Italy's  understanding  with  Eng- 
land and  France  is  also  a  fact,  in  spite  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.     It  dates  from  the  day  when  Italy  came 


ces  puissances  au  sujet  dii  partage  des  interets  dans 
la  Mediterranee.  Si  elle  n'avait  pas  existe  aupara- 
vant,  elle  aurait  surgi  d'elle  meme,  lorsque  I'entente 
cordiale  entre  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  a  ete  con- 
clue.  Comment.  I'ltalie  pourrait-elle  en  cas  de  con- 
flit,  defendre  son  immense  etendue  de  cotes  contre 
les  flottes  anglaise  et  frangaise  reunies?  Et  que  pour- 
raient  faire  ses  allies  alleniand  et  austro-hongrois 
pour  la  proteger? 

Cette  ardeur  a  unir  dans  un  but  soi-disant  defensif 
des  puissances  que  personne  ne  menace,  peut  pa- 
raitre  a  boo  droit  suspecte.  On  ne  peut  pas  oublier 
a  Berlin  Toffre  des  100000  hommes  faite  par  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre  a  M.  Delcasse.  Nous-memes  nous 
avons  a  enregistrer  les  singulieres  ouvertures  faites 
par  le  colonel  Barnardiston  au  general  Ducame,  qui 
sait  s'il  n'y  a  pas  eu  d'autres  intrigues  semblables 
qui  ne  sont  pas  parvenues  a  notre  connaissance. 
Aussi  est-il  aise  de  concevoir  que  les  demarches  du 
Roi  d'Angleterre  causent  ici  de  certaines  apprehen- 
sions et  qu'a  Vienne  on  les  partage.  Elles  ont  trouve 
leur  expression  dans  un  article  de  la  "Freie  Presse" 
reproduit  et  appuye  par  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne" 
dans  son  numero  402  d'avant-hier.  Cet  article  de  la 
"Gazette  de  Cologne"  a  cause  un  grand  emoi  parmi 
plusieurs  de  mes  collegues.  Je  ne  vous  I'ai  pas  en- 
voye  parce  que  j'ai  vu  du  premier  coup,  qu'il  n'ex- 
primait  que  I'opinion  de  la  redaction.  L'evenement 
m'a  donne  raison.  La  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  a  ete 
desavouee  dans  ses  propres  colonnes  (No.  409  de  ce 
matin)  par  un  telegramme  officieux  de  Berlin.  Elle 
I'insere,  mais  en  le  faisant  suivre  de  ses  reserves. 
Le  gouvernement  allemand  ne  peut  pas  parler  autre- 
ment  qu'il  ne  I'a  fait;  mais  je  serais  bien  etonne  si 
au  fond  de  sa  pensee,  il  n'y  avait  pas  identite  entre 
ce  que  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  peut  dire  et  ce  qu'il 
est  oblige  de  taire. 

D'apres  le  rapport  de  M.  le  Baron  Joostens  il  sem- 
ble  qu'on  attache  a  Madrid  une  importance  exageree 
a  I'idee  de  compromis  franco-allemand.  Ainsi  que  je 
I'ai  ecrit,  les  ouvertures  de  la  presse  officieuse  fran- 
Qaise  ont  ete  bien  accueillies  par  les  officieux  alle- 
mands.  La  reponse  de  I'Empereur  au  discours  qu'a 
prononce  M.  Cambon  lors  de  la  remise  de  ses  let- 
tres  de  creance,  a  ete  particulierement  cordiale ;  mais 
il  ne  peut  s'agir  que  d'un  accord  sur  des  points  se- 
condaires  et  trop  fragile  pour  resister  a  une  commo- 
tion politique  grave.  A  propos  de  I'interpellation 
Bailloud,  M.  Clemenceau  nous  a  dit  quel  est  le  senti- 
ment frangais  intime.  Jusqu'a  ce  que  1870  soit 
oublie.  il  ne  pourra  y  avoir  au  maximum  entre  Ber- 
lin et  Paris  que  des  relations  correctes  et  tres  pre- 
caires. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.l  Greindl. 


to  an  agreement  with  these  Powers  in  the  matter 
of  the  division  of  interests  in  the  Mediterranean.  If 
this  understanding  had  not  existed  before,  it  would 
have  come  about  of  its  own  accord,  when  the  entente 
cordiale  between  France  and  England  was  con- 
cluded. How  could  Italy  in  case  of  a  conflict  defend 
her  extensive  coast  against  the  combined  British 
and  French  fleets?  And  what  could  her  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  allies  do  to  protect  her? 

This  zeal  in  uniting  Powers,  whom  no  one  is 
menacing,  for  alleged  purposes  of  defense,  can  with 
good  reason  seem  suspicious.  The  offer  of  100,000 
men  made  by  the  King  of  England  to  M.  Delcasse 
cannot  be  forgotten  in  Berlin.  We  ourselves  have 
to  record  the  singular  overtures  made  by  Colonel 
Barnardiston  to  General  Ducame  and  who  knows 
if  there  have  not  been  other  similar  intrigues  which 
have  not  come  to  our  knowledge.  It  is,  therefore, 
easy  to  understand  that  the  steps  taken  by  the  King 
of  England  are  causing  certain  apprehensions  here 
and  that  these  are  shared  in  Vienna.  They  have 
found  expression  in  an  article  of  the  Freie  Presse 
reprinted  and  indorsed  by  the  Cologne  Gazette  in 
its  issue,  No.  402,  of  the  day  before  yesterday.  This 
article  in  the  Cologne  Gazette  has  caused  great  anx- 
iety among  several  of  my  colleagues.  I  did  not  send 
it  to  you  because  I  saw  at  a  glance  that  it  only 
expressed  the  opinion  of  the  editor.  The  events 
have  proven  me  to  be  right.  The  Cologne  Gazette 
has  been  disavowed  in  its  own  columns  (No.  409, 
of  this  morning)  by  a.  semi-official  telegram  from 
Berlin.  The  paper  prints  it,  but  adds  its  own  reser- 
vations. The  German  Government  cannot  speak 
otherwise  than  it  has  done;  but  I  would  be  very 
much  surprised  if  the  Government's  real  thoughts 
on  matters  in  regard  to  which  it  has  to  be  silent 
are  not  identical  with  what  it  is  permissible  for  the 
Cologne  Gazette  to  say. 

According  to  the  report  of  Baron  Joostens  it 
seems  that  an  exaggerated  importance  is  being  at- 
tached in  Madrid  to  the  idea  of  a  Franco-German 
compromise.  As  I  have  reported,  the  overtures  of 
the  semi-official  French  press  were  well  received  by 
the  semi-official  German  papers.  The  Kaiser's  re- 
ply to  the  address  which  M.  Cambon  made  when 
he  presented  his  credentials  was  markedly  cordial ; 
but  there  can  be  question  of  an  agreement  on  points 
of  secondary  importance  only,  and  even  that  would 
be  too  fragile  to  withstand  any  serious  political  dis- 
turbance. In  regard  to  M.  Bailloud's  question,  M. 
Clemenceau  has  informed  us  as  to  what  the  real 
French  sentiment  is.  Until  1870  has  been  forgotten, 
there  can  at  the  most  be  only  correct  and  very  pre- 
carious relations  between  Berlin  and  Paris. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  30. 


No.  30. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  24  Mai  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Les  relations  anglo-allemandes  continuent  a  etre 
officiellement  d'une  froide  correction,  mais  I'anti- 
pathie  qu'on  ressent  ici  dans  toutes  les  classes  du 


London,  May  24th,  1907. 
Sir:— 

The  Anglo-German  relations  continue  to  be  offi- 
cially of  a  cool  correctness,  but  the  antipathy  for 
the  German  nation  which  is  felt  here  in  all  classes 


public  pour  la  nation  germanique  est  aussi  marquee 
que  lorsqne  je  vous  ai  ecrit  le  8  Fevrier  1907. 

Certains  bons  esprits  se  rendent  cependent  compte 
de  rinconvenient  qu'il  y  a  a  laisser  durer  un  etat 
d'esprit  aussi  malveillant,  mais  les  palliatifs  qu'on  a 
employes,  et  que  le  Gouvernement  liberal  favorise, 
restent  jusqu'ici  impuissants.  C'est  en  vain  qu'on  a 
organise  et  qu'on  organise  encore  des  visites  a  Ber- 
lin de  conseillers  municipaux,  de  membres  de  la 
Chambre  et  de  representants  de  journaux  importants. 

Une  certaine  categorie  de  la  presse,  connue  ici 
sous  le  nom  de  "presse  jaune,"  est  en  grande  partie 
responsable  de  I'inimitie  que  I'on  constate  entre  les 
deux  nations.  Que  doit-on,  en  effet,  attendre  d'un 
journaliste  comme  Mr.  Harmsworth,  aujourd'hui  de- 
venu  Lord  Northcliffe,  editeur  du  "Daily  Mail,"  du 
"Daily  Mirror,"  "Daily  Graphic,"  "Daily  Express," 
"Evening  News"  et  "Weekly  Dispatch,"  et  qui  dans 
une  interview  qu'il  donne  au  "Matin,"  s'ecrie  :  "Oui, 
nous  detestons  les  AUemands  et  cordialement.  lis 
se  rendent  odieux  a  toute  I'Europe.  Je  ne  permettrai 
pas  qu'on  imprime  dans  mon  journal  la  moindre 
chose  qui  put  blesser  la  France,  mais  je  ne  voudrais 
pas  qu'on  y  inserat  quoique  ce  fut  qui  piit  etre  agre- 
able  a  I'Allemagne." 

Et  en  1899,  ce  meme  editeur  attaquait  les  Franqais 
avec  la  meme  violence,  voulait  boycotter  I'exposi- 
tion  de  Paris  et  ecrivait:  "Les  Frangais  ont  reussi 
a  persuader  John  Bull  qu'ils  sont  ses  ennemis  achar- 
nes.  L'Angleterre  a  longtemps  hesite  entre  la 
France  et  I'Allemagne,  mais  elle  a  toujours  respecte 
le  caractere  allemand  tandis  qu'elle  en  est  arrivee  a 
avoir  du  mepris  pour  la  France.  Une  entente  cor- 
diale  ne  peut  subsister  entre  I'Angleterre  et  sa  plus 
proche  voisine.  En  voila  assez  dcla  France,  qui  n'a 
ni  courage,  ni  sens  politique." 

Ce  sont  ces  journalistes-la,  editeurs  de  feuilles  a 
bon  marche  et  de  lecture  courante  qui  faussent  a 
plaisir  I'esprit  de  tout  un  peuple. 

II  est  evident  que  I'Angleterre  officielle  poursuit 
une  politique  sourdement  hostile,  qui  tend  a  aboutir 
a  I'isolement  de  I'Allemagne  et  que  le  Roi  Edouard 
n'a  pas  dedaigne  de  mettre  son  influence  personnelle 
au  service  de  cette  idee,  mais  11  y  a  un  danger  evident 
a  envenimer  aussi  ouvertement  I'opinion  publique 
que  le  fait  la  presse  irresponsable  dent  il  s'agit. 

Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Cte  de  Lalaing. 


of  the  public  is  as  marked  as  when  I  wrote  to  you 
on  February  8,  1907. 

Certain  sensible  people,  however,  realize  the  harm 
which  is  being  done  by  permitting  such  a  spirit  of 
ill-feeling  to  continue,  but  the  palliatives  which  have 
been  used  and  which  the  Liberal  Government  favors 
have  hitherto  been  impotent.  It  is  in  vain  that 
visits  of  municipal  councillors,  of  members  of  Par- 
liament, and  of  representatives  of  important  news- 
papers to  Berlin  were  and  are  still  being  organized. 

A  certain  category  of  the  press,  known  here  as 
the  "yellow  press",  is  to  a  great  degree  responsible 
for  the  hostility  between  the  two  nations.  What, 
indeed,  can  one  expect  of  a  journalist  like  Mr. 
Harmsworth,  to-day  Lord  Northcliffe,  editor  of  the 
Daily  Mail,  the  Daily  Mirror,  the  Daily  Graphic, 
the  Daily  Express,  the  Evening  News  and  the 
Weekly  Dispatch,  who  in  an  interview  given  to  the 
Matin  exclaims :  "Yes,  we  detest  the  Germans,  and 
cordially  too.  They  are  making  themselves  odious 
all  over  Europe.  I  shall  not  permit  the  slightest 
thing  which  might  offend  France  to  be  printed  in 
my  paper,  but  I  would  not  have  anything  whatso- 
ever inserted  in  it  that  might  be  agreeable  to  Ger- 
many." 

In  1899,  this  same  editor  attacked  the  French 
with  the  same  violence,  wanted  to  boycott  the  Paris 
Exposition,  and  wrote :  "The  French  have  succeeded 
in  convincing  John  Bull  that  they  are  his  bitter  ene- 
mies. England  hesitated  for  a  long  time  between 
France  and  Germany  but  she  always  respected  the 
German  character,  whereas  she  has  come  to  regard 
France  with  contempt.  An  entente  cordiale  cannot 
exist  between  England  and  her  nearest  neighbor. 
Enough  of  France,  which  has  neither  courage  nor 
political  sense." 

It  is  these  journalists,  editors  of  cheap  and  widely 
read  papers,  who  pervert  at  will  the  spirit  of  an 
entire  nation. 

It  is  evident  that  official  England  is  pursuing  a 
policy  of  stubborn  hostility  which  aims  at  the  isola- 
tion of  Germany,  and  that  King  Edward  did  not 
disdain  to  use  his  personal  influence  in  the  service 
of  this  idea,  but  it  is  clearly  dangerous  to  poison  pub- 
lic opinion  as  openly  as  the  irresponsible  press  in 
question  is  doing. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  31. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  30  Mai  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Rendant  la  visite  que  leur  ont  faite,  il  y  a  quelques 
mois,  les  journalistes  allemands  en  Angleterre,  une 
deputation  des  journalistes  anglais  se  trouve  actuel- 
lement  en  Allemagne.  Rien  n'a  ete  epargne  pour 
leur  preparer  la  reception  la  plus  cordiale.  Un  ba- 
teau du  Norddeutsche  Lloyd  a  ete  prendre  les  jour- 
nalistes anglais  a  Douvres  et  les  a  amenes  le  27  Mai 
a  Bremerhaven.  Les  autorites  de  la  ville  de  Breme, 
puis  celles  de  la  ville  de  Hambourg  leur  ont  fait  le 
meilleur  accueil  et  les  discours  les  plus  amicaux  ont 
ete  prononces  de  part  et  d'autre. 

II  en  a  ete  de  meme  a  Berlin  ou  les  journalistes 
anglais  sont  arrives  hier  a  une  heure  de  I'apres-midi. 


Berlin,  May  30th,  1907. 
Sir:— 

A  deputation  of  English  journalists  is  at  present 
in  Germany  to  return  the  visit  which  the  German 
journalists  paid  them  in  England  a  few  months  ago. 
Nothing  has  been  spared  to  prepare  the  most  cord- 
ial reception  for  them.  A  North  German  Lloyd 
steamer  went  to  fetch  the  English  journalists  at 
Dover  and  took  them  on  May  27th  to  Bremerhaven. 
The  authorities  of  the  city  of  Bremen,  and  later 
those  of  the  city  of  Hamburg,  gave  them  a  splendid 
reception  and  the  most  friendly  speeches  were  made 
on  both  sides. 

The  same  thing  happened  in  Berlin  where  the 
English  journalists  arrived  at  one  o'clock  yesterday 


37 


Le  Due  de  Trachenberg,  president  du  comite  de  re- 
ception, les  attendait  a  la  gare.  Apres  le  dejeuner 
des  automobiles  ont  conduit  les  visiteurs  anglais  a 
travers  la  ville  pour  leur  en  montrer  les  edifices.  Le 
soir  il  y  a  eu  un  banquet  au  jardin  zoologique  oil  as- 
sistaient  des  personnages  tres  considerables  de  la 
presse,  du  gouvernement  et  du  monde  des  commer- 
gants.  Les  toasts  ont  ete  nombreux  et  tous  inspires 
par  la  meme  pensee:  il  importe  pour  dissiper  des 
prejuges  nuisibles  aux  bonnes  relations  entre  les 
deux  pays  d'etablir  des  relations  personnelles  et  con- 
fiantes  entre  les  journalistes  allemands  et  anglais. 
L'idee  est  juste  et  on  ne  peut  qu'approuver  ceux  qui 
en  ont  pris  I'initiative ;  mais  j'ai  assiste  a  tant  de  ten- 
tatives  de  rapprochement  avortees  que  je  ne  peux 
pas  m'empecher  d'un  certain  scepticisme  quant  au 
resultat  definitif,  que  de  fois  on  a  echange  les  paroles 
les  plus  cordiales  dont  huit  jours  plus  tard  le  souve- 
nir etait  deja  efface  pour  faire  place  a  des  polemiques 
atissi  aigres  qu'auparavant. 

La  tension  des  relations  entre  les  deux  pays  est 
d'autant  plus  difficile  a  faire  disparaitre  qu'elle  n'a 
pas  pour  cause  des  points  litigieux  determines.  S'il 
existait  entre  TAllemagne  et  I'Angleterre  un  conflit 
tel  que  celui  qui  existait  autrefois  entre  Londres  et 
Paris  au  sujet  de  I'Egypte,  une  transaction  y  pour- 
rait  mettre  fin.  Sur  aucun  point  du  globe,  il  n'y  a 
rien  de  pareil  qui  nuise  aux  relations  entre  I'Alle- 
magne  et  I'Angleterre.  Leur  froideur  ne  resulte 
d'aucun  fait  concret.  C'est  une  question  de  senti- 
ment. 

L'Angleterre  jalouse  les  prodigieux  progres  de 
I'industrie,  du  commerce  et  de  la  marine  rnarchande 
de  rAllemagne.  Habituee  a  etre  sans  rivale,  il  lui 
semble  que  toute  concurrence  est  un  empietement 
sur  son  doraaine. 

Elle  feint  d'eprouvcr  des  alarmes  dont  la  sincerite 
me  semble  plus  que  douteuse,  en  presence  du  de- 
veloppement  de  la  marine  de  guerre  de  I'empire. 
Elle  doit  savoir  pourtant  que,  meme  dans  un  avenir 
tres  eloigne,  une  agression  allemande  restera  ma- 
teriellement  impossible.  C'est  I'Allemagne  au  con- 
traire  qui  a  tout  a  redouter.  Depuis  des  siecles 
I'Angleterre  s'est  appliquee  a  detruire  les  forces  na- 
vales  etrangeres  des  qu'elles  prenaient  une  certaine 
importance.  La  France  I'a  eprouve  apres  la  Hol- 
lande.  Puis  est  venu  le  tour  du  Danemark  dont  les 
vaisseaux  ont  ete  aneantis  sans  I'ombre  d'un  pre- 
texte,  par  I'amiral  Nelson  entre  en  ami  dans  le  port 
de  Copenhague.  C'est  la  mefiance  allemande  qui  a 
rendu  populaire  le  developpement  de  la  flotte  de  I'em- 
pire tout  au  plus  assez  forte  pour  jouer  un  role  de- 
fensif  et  dont  la  majorite  du  peuple  ne  voulait  pas 
entendre  parler  aussi  longtemps  que  Ton  croyait 
pouvoir  compter  ici  sur  I'amitie  ou  au  rrioins  sur  la 
neutralite  de  I'Angleterre. 

Cette  defiance  est  encore  nourrie  par  le  soin  que 
met  personnellement  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  conclure 
des  ententes  avec  le  monde  entier  sauf  avec  I'Alle- 
magne contre  laquelle  il  n'a  aucun  grief  a  formuler. 
La  presse  y  aide  en  representant  chacun  des  succes 
de  la  politique  exterieure  de  I'Angleterre  comme 
tendant  au  but  final  de  I'isolement  de  I'Allemagne. 
Qui  oserait  afiirmer  qu'elle  se  trompe  sur  ce  point? 

Loin  de  provoquer  la  tension  des  relations  avec 
I'Angleterre,  I'Allemagne  en  souffre,  comme  le  prou- 
vent  les  tentatives  rep6t6es  de  rapprochement  dont 
I'initiative  est  partie  invariablement  de  Berlin.   Une 

des  causes  de  leur  insucces  est  peut-etre  I'exube- 
rance  avec  laquelle  elles  se  sont  produites.  Les 
bruyantes  demonstrations  d'amitie  ne  rdpondant  ni 
a  la  realite  des  faits  ni  aux  sentiments  des  deux 


afternoon.  The  Duke  of  Trachenberg,  chairman  of 
the  reception-committee,  awaited  them  at  the  sta- 
tion. After  luncheon,  the  English  visitors  were 
driven  in  automobiles  through  the  city  in  order  to 
view  the  buildings.  In  the  evening  there  was  a 
banquet  at  the  Zoological  Garden  at  which  prom- 
inent members  of  the  press,  of  the  Government,  and 
of  the  commercial  world  were  present.  The  toasts 
were  numerous  and  were  all  inspired  by  the  same 
thought :  in  order  to  dissipate  the  prejudices  harm- 
ful to  the  friendly  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries it  was  necessary  to  establish  confidence  by  per- 
sonal relations  between  German  and  English  jour- 
nalists. The  idea  is  right  and  one  cannot  but  praise 
those  who  took  the  initiative;  but  I  have  seen  so 
many  abortive  attempts  at  a  rapprochement  that  I 
cannot  rid  myself  of  a  certain  amount  of  scepticism 
as  to  the  ultimate  result.  How  many  times  have 
most  cordial  words  been  exchanged,  the  memory 
of  which  was  effaced  a  week  later,  to  give  way  to 
polemics  just  as  bitter  as  before. 

The  tension  in  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries  is  so  much  more  difficult  to  remove  be- 
cause it  is  not  due  to  definite  points  of  dissension. 
If  there  existed  between  Germany  and  England  a 
conflict  such  as  formerly  existed  between  London 
and  Paris  in  the  matter  of  Egypt,  a  compromise 
could  put  an  end  to  it.  Nowhere  in  the  world  is 
there  anything  similar  which  could  injure  the  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  England.  The  coldness 
between  them  is  not  due  to  any  concrete  fact.  It 
is  a  question  of  sentiment. 

England  is  jealous  of  the  prodigious  progress  in 
German  industry,  commerce,  and  the  merchant  mar- 
ine. Accustomed  to  be  without  a  rival,  she  con- 
siders any  competition  as  an  encroachment  on  her 
domain. 

She  affects  to  feel  alarm,  the  sincerity  of  which 
seems  more  than  doubtful  to  me,  in  regard  to  the 
development  of  the  German  navy.  She  ought  to 
know,  however,  that  even  in  a  very  distant  future, 
an  attack  by  Germany  would  be  practically  imposi- 
ble.  It  is  Germany,  on  the  contrary,  who  has  every- 
thing to  fear.  For  centuries  England  has  applied 
herself  to  the  destruction  of  foreign  naval  forces  as 
soon  as  they  acquired  a  certain  degree  of  import- 
ance. France  experienced  this  after  Holland  had 
done  so.  Then  it  was  the  turn  of  Denmark,  whose 
vessels  were  destroyed  without  the  shadow  of  a 
pretext  by  Admiral  Nelson  who  entered  the  harbor 
of  Copenhagen  as  a  friend.  It  was  distrust  that 
popularized  in  Germany  the  development  of  the 
Empire's  fleet,  which  is  at  the  most  strong  enough 
to  play  a  defensive  part  and  of  which  the  majority 
of  the  people  would  not  hear  as  long  as  they  be- 
lieved that  they  could  count  on  the  friendship  or 
at  least  the  neutrality  of  England. 

This  distrust  is  increased  by  the  care  which  the 
King  of  England  is  personally  taking  to  conclude 
ententes  with  the  entire  world  except  Germany, 
against  whom  he  has  no  ground  for  complaint  what- 
soever. In  this  the  press  is  helping  by  representing 
each  success  of  England's  foreign  policy  as  ulti- 
mately aimed  at  the  isolation  of  Germany.  Who 
would  dare  to  assert  that  it  is  mistaken  on  this 
point? 

Far  from  provoking  tension  in  her  relations  with 
England,  Germany  is  suffering  under  it,  as  is  proven 
by  the  repeated  efforts  at  rapprochement,  in  which 
Berlin  invariably  took  the  initiative.  One  of  the 
reasons  for  their  failure  is  perhaps  the  exuberance 
with  which  they  were  undertaken.  The  loud  dem- 
onstrations of  friendship,  which  corresponded 
neither  with  the  actuaJ-iactsjior  with  the  sentiments 


peuples,  ont  produit  chaque  fois  en  Angleterre  com- 
me  en  Allemagne  une  reaction  que  I'on  eut  ecartee 
si  Ton  s'etait  simplement  propose  d'entretenir  des 
rapports  corrects  et  normaux. 

On  nest  pas  retombe  dans  cette  faute  au  banquet 
d'hier.  Les  importants  discours  politiques  pro- 
nonces  par  M.  de  Miihlberg  comme  representant  du 
chancelier  et  par  I'ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  ont  evite  toute  exageration  dan- 
gereuse  et  se  sont  attaches  a  exposer  la  situation 
telle  qu'elle  est.  Je  vous  envoie  ces  deux  discours, 
quoique  je  suppose  que  les  agences  telegraphiques 
vous  les  auront  deja  transmis;  mais  vous  tiendrez 
sans  doute  a  en  avoir  le  texte  authentique  sous  les 
yeux. 

M.  de  Miihlberg  a  dit  en  substance,  que  lorsqu'il 
parcourt  les  journaux  etrangers,  y  compris  les  jour- 
naux  anglais,  il  y  trouve  presque  quotidiennement 
une  legende  habilement  propagee  et  devotement  ac- 
ceptee  par  de  nombreux  croyants,  d'apres  laquelle 
TAllemagne  menacerait  la  paix  du  monde.  C'est 
surtout  I'armee  allemande  que  I'etranger  considere 
avec  mefiance  comme  une  formidable  machine  de 
guerre  destinee  a  porter  un  jour  le  trouble  dans  le 
monde  entier.  II  est  vrai  que  I'Allemagne  possede 
une  armee  brave  et  puissante  et  qu'elle  en  est  fiere; 
mais  peut-on  dire  que  jamais  depuis  I'existence  de 
I'empire  elle  en  ait  fait  mauvais  usage.  Le  systeme 
militaire  allemand  est  vieux  de  cent  ans.  II  est  done 
ne  bien  avant  I'empire,  a  une  epoque  oti  I'on  ne 
songeait  certes  pas  a  des  conquetes  et  a  des  anne- 
xions. La  Prusse  etait  tombee  au  dernier  degre  de 
la  misere  et  ses  enfants  ont  tout  sacrifie  pour  as- 
surer I'independance  nationale  et  pour  secouer  le 
joug  de  I'etranger.  A  travers  toutes  les  vicissitudes 
les  bases  du  systeme  militaire  allemand  n'ont  pas 
varie. 

■  On  entend  dire  et  surtout  en  Angleterre  que  pour 
ce  qui  concerne  la  flotte,  I'Allemagne  cache  ses 
visees.  11  suffit  de  lire  la  loi  d&  14  Janvier  1900  pour 
voir  que  c'est  impossible.  Elle  trace  des  limites  que 
le  pouvoir  executif  est  hors  d'etat  de  depasser.  Une 
comparaison  avec  Teiifectif  de  la  flotte  anglaise  de- 
montre  a  tout  observateur  impartial  que  I'Allemagne 
ne  se  propose  que  de  proteger  ses  cotes  et  son  com- 
merce maritime.  Elle  n'aspire  a  rien  de  plus.  C'est 
ce  que  doit  vouloir  toute  grande  nation  soucieuse  de 
son  honneur. 

On  demandera  peut-etre,  a  dit  M.  de  Miihlberg,  si 
I'Allemagne  a  vraiment  besoin  de  moyens  de  pro- 
tection aussi  couteux.  Que  Ton  jette  un  coup  d'oeil 
sur  I'histoire  du  peuple  allemand.  Elle  contient  de 
terribles  et  inoubliables  lemons.  II  n'y  a  pas  de  pays 
en  Europe  qui  ait  plus  souiTert  et  plus  saigne  sous 
les  coups  de  peuples  guerriers  etrangers.  lis  sont 
venus  de  toutes  les  contrees  de  la  terre  semant  la 
mort  et  la  ruine  autour  d'eux. 

Des  sceptiques  objecteront  peut-etre  que  I'armee 
et  la  flotte  allemande  sont  de  dangereux  instruments 
dont  on  pent  etre  un  jour  tente  de  se  servir  pour 
donner  de  I'espace  a  sa  population  toujours  crois- 
sante.  L'Allemagne  n'a  pas  besoin  de  nouveaux  ter- 
ritoires  quoique  le  nombre  de  ses  habitants  aug- 
mente  de  800  000  a  900000  ames  par  an  et  que  I'emi- 
gration  soit  devenue  insignifiante,  il  manque  des 
bras  partout  pour  I'agriculture  comme  pour  I'indus- 
trie. 

M.  de  Miihlberg  ne  veut  pas  dire  que  les  Alle- 
mands  soient  des  ascetes.  lis  aspirent  a  une  libre  et 
loyale  concurrence  dans  le  commerce  mondial.  On 
a  pretendu  que  la  politique  allemande  manque  de 
stabilite  et  de  continuite.  C'est  une  erreur.  Cette 
politique  est  partout  celle  de  la  porte  ouverte.  Les 
Anglais   doivent  la  comprendre.     Dans   toutes   les 


of  the  two  nations,  each  time  caused  a  reaction 
both  in  England  and  in  Germany  which  could  have 
been  avoided  if  it  had  been  determined  simply  to 
maintain  correct  and  normal  relations. 

This  mistake  was  not  repeated  at  yesterday's 
banquet.  The  important  political  speeches  made  by 
Mr.  von  Miihlberg,  representing  the  Chancellor,  and 
by  the  British  Ambassador,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles, 
avoided  all  dangerous  exaggeration  and  endeavored 
to  represent  the  situation  at  it  is.  I  am  sending  you 
these  two  speeches  although  I  assume  that  the  tele- 
graphic agencies  have  already  informed  you  of 
them ;  but  you  will  doubtless  prefer  to  have  the 
authentic  text  before  you. 

Mr.  von  Miihlberg  said  in  substance  that  reading 
the  foreign  papers,  including  the  English,  he  found 
almost  daily  a  cleverly  propagated  tale,  piously  ac- 
cepted by  numerous  believers,  according  to  which 
Germany  was  menacing  the  peace  of  the  world.  It 
was  above  all  the  German  army  which  the  foreigner 
regarded  with  distrust  as  a  formidable  war  machine 
destined  one  day  to  bring  trouble  to  the  entire 
world.  It  was  true  that  Germany  possessed  a  brave 
and  powerful  army  and  that  she  was  proud  of  it; 
but  could  it  be  said  that  since  the  existence  of  the 
Empire  she  had  ever  misused  it?  The  German  mili- 
tary system  was  a  hundred  years  old.  It  had  there- 
fore come  into  existence  long  before  the  Empire, 
at  an  epoch  when  conquests  and  annexations  were 
certainly  not  thought  of.  Prussia  was  at  that  time 
plunged  in  the  deepest  misery  and  her  children  had 
sacrificed  everything  in  order  to  ensure  national  in- 
dependence and  to  shake  off  the  foreign  yoke. 
Through  all  vicissitudes  the  principles  of  the  Ger- 
man military  system  had  not  varied. 

It  was  rumored,  above  all  in  England,  that  in 
matters  of  the  fleet  Germany  was  concealing  her 
aims.  It  sufficed  to  read  the  law  of  January  14, 
1900,  to  see  that  that  was  impossible.  In  it  the 
limits  were  defined  which  the  executive  power  could 
not  overstep.  A  comparison  with  the  strength  of 
the  British  fleet  proved  to  any  impartial  observer 
that  all  Germany  intended  was  to  protect  her  coast 
and  her  merchant  marine.  She  did  not  aspire  at 
anything  more.  That  much  every  great  nation, 
careful  of  her  honor,  must  desire. 

It  would  perhaps  be  asked,  said  Mr.  von  Miilberg, 
whether  Germany  really  needed  such  expensive 
means  of  protection.  It  was  only  necessary  to 
glance  at  the  history  of  the  German  people.  It 
contained  terrible  and  unforgettable  lessons.  There 
was  not  a  country  in  Europe  which  had  suffered 
and  bled  more  under  the  blows  dealt  by  foreign 
warlike  nations.  They  had  come  from  all  countries 
of  the  earth  sowing  death  and  ruin  around  them. 

Sceptics  would  perhaps  object  that  the  German 
army  and  navy  were  dangerous  instruments  which 
Germany  might  perhaps  be  tempted  some  day  to 
use  in  order  to  make  room  for  her  constantly  grov^- 
ing  population.  Germany  did  not  need  new  terri- 
tory, although  the  number  of  her  inhabitants  was 
increasing  by  800,000  to  900,000  souls  yearly  and 
although  her  emigration  had  become  insignificant; 
hands  were  lacking  everywhere,  in  the  field  of  agri- 
culture as  well  as  of  industry. 

The  speaker  did  not  wish  to  imply  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  ascetics.  Their  aim  was  free  and  fair 
competition  in  the  commerce  of  the  world.  It  had 
been  asserted  that  the  German  policy  lacked  stabil- 
ity and  consistency.  That  was  a  mistake.  Ger- 
many's policy  was  everywhere  that  of  the  open 
door,  which  the  English  ought  to  be  able  to  appre- 


contrees  ou  I'Angleterre  a  etendu  sa  sphere  d'in- 
fluence,  elle  s'est  efforcee  de  developper  les  sources 
de  production  du  pays  at  de  relever  le  niveau  de  la 
civilisation.  Lord  Cromer  I'a  fait  tout  recemment 
en  Egypte.  La  politique  de  I'Empereur  d'AUemagne 
partage  cette  conception  de  ce  que  doivent  etre  Tac- 
tion et  le  but  d'un  etat  civilise.  C'est  sur  ce  point 
que  TAllemagne  et  I'Angleterre  peuvent  se  rencon- 
trer  et  se  tendre  la  main  pour  un  travail  commun, 
sans  prejudice  de  leurs  amities  et  de  leurs  alliances. 
C'est  ainsi  que  la  presse  des  deux  pays,  interprete 
des  pensees  et  des  sentiments  des  deux  peuples,  peut 
collaborer  avec  le  monde  official, a  I'entente  mutuelle, 
au  respect  reciproque,  en  dissipant  de  fausses  legen- 
des  et  des  mefiances  injustifiees. 

Dans  sa  reponse  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  a  dit  qu'il 
avait  naturellement  a  coeur  d'ameliorer  les  relations 
entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre.  II  a  exprime  la 
satisfaction  que  lui  avaient  causee  les  idees  emises 
par  M.  de  Miihlberg  sur  le  but  auquel  devaient  viser 
les  deux  pays  pour  realiser  une  amitie  entre  eux, 
sans  porter  atteinte  a  celles  qui  existent  avec  d'au- 
tres  puissances.  M.  de  Muhlberg  a,  comme  I'annee 
derniere  le  comte  de  Metternich,  fait  allusion  a  cer- 
tains articles  de  journaux,  creant  une  atmosphere 
d'aigreur  et  de  defiance  ne  reposant  que  sur  des 
malentendus  et  peut-etre  plus  difficile  a  dissiper  que 
des  divergences  de  vue  reelle.  La  situation  s'est  no- 
tablement  amelioree ;  mais  il  serait  premature  de 
dire  que  tous  les  malentendus  sont  deja  ecartes.  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  espere  avec  confiance  que  les  rela- 
tions personnelles  entre  les  journalistes  allemands 
et  anglais,  le  bon  accueil  qui  a  ete  reserve  a  ceux-ci 
et  les  assurances  donnees  par  M.  de  Miihlberg  au 
nom  du  gouvernement  Imperial  contribueront  non 
seulement  a  detruire  les  prejuges  mais  a  etablir  en- 
tre les  deux  peuples  des  relations  amicales  au  grand 
avantage  mutuel. 

Je  me  feliciterais  de  voir  la  realisation  des  voeux 
exprimes  par  M.  de  Miihlberg  et  Sir  Frank  Lascelles 
avec  une  sincerite  dont  je  suis  absolument  convain- 
cu.  La  tension  des  relations  entre  I'Allemage  et 
I'Angleterre  peut  servir  des  calculs  mesquins  de  po- 
litique a  courte  vue;  mais  elle  compromet  I'interet 
superieur  de  la  conversation  de  la  paix  europeenne 
que  la  preponderance  allemande  nous  a  garanti  de- 
puis  36  ans.  Elle  encourage  les  visees  des  hommes 
d'etat  mecontents  du  statu  quo. 


Sir  Frank  Lascelles  doit  connaitre  mieux  que  per- 
sonne  combien  la  tache  qu'il  assigne  aux  deux  na- 
tions est  ardue.  C'est  celle  qu'il  s'est  imposee  a  lui- 
meme.  J'ai  assiste  depuis  douze  ans  aux  efforts 
qu'il  a  faits  pour  s'en  acquitter.  Possedant  a  juste 
titre  I'entiere  confiance  de  I'Empereur  et  du  gou- 
vernement allemand,  doue  d'eminentes  qualites 
d'homme  d'etat  il  n'y  a  que  tres  mediocrement  reussi 
jusqu'ici.  Son  discours  d'hier  prouve  a  la  fois  qu'il 
ne  se  fait  pas  d'illusions  et  qu'il  persevere  neanmoins 
sans  decouragement  dans  la  voie  qu'il  s'est  tracee. 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


ciate.  In  all  the  countries  to  which  England  had 
extended  her  sphere  of  influence,  she  had  labored 
to  develop  the  resources  of  the  country  and  to  raise 
the  standard  of  civilization.  Lord  Cromer  had  done 
this  only  recently  in  Egypt.  The  policy  of  the 
German  Emperor  shared  this  conception  of  what 
the  actions  and  the  goal  of  a  civilized  State  ought 
to  be.  On  this  point,  Germany  and  England  could 
agree  and  join  hands  in  mutual  labor  without  pre- 
judice to  their  friendships  and  alliances.  Thus  the 
press  of  the  two  countries,  the  interpreter  of  the 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  two  nations,  could  col- 
laborate with  the  official  world  for  mutual  under- 
standing and  respect,  by  dissipating  false  stories 
and  unjustified  mistrust. 

In  his  reply  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  said  that  the  im- 
provement of  the  relations  between  Germany  and 
England  was,  of  course,  close  to  his  heart.  He  ex- 
pressed his  satisfaction  with  the  ideas  given  utter- 
r.nce  to  by  Mr.  von  Miihlberg  in  regard  to  the  aim 
which  the  two  countries  ought  to  pursue  in  order 
to  form  a  friendship  without  impairing  those  which 
existed  with  other  Powers.  Mr.  von  Muhlberg  had, 
like  Count  von  Metternich  the  year  before,  alluded 
to  certain  newspaper  articles  which  were  creating 
an  atmosphere  of  bitterness  and  distrust,  based  only 
on  misunderstandings  which  were,  however,  perhaps 
more  difficult  to  dissipate  than  real  differences  of 
opinion.  The  situation  had  improved  considerably ; 
but  it  would  be  premature  to  say  that  all  misunder- 
standings had  already  been  dispelled.  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles  expressed  the  confident  hope  that  the  per- 
sonal relations  between  the  German  and  English 
journaHsts,  the  friendly  reception  which  had  been 
accorded  to  the  latter,  and  the  assurances  given  by 
Mr.  von  Miihlberg  in  the  name  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment would  help  not  only  to  destroy  prejudices, 
but  also  to  establish  friendly  relations  between  the 
two  peoples  to  their  great  mutual  advantage. 

I  would  be  very  happy  to  see  the  wishes  realized 
which  Mr.  von  Miihlberg  and  Sir  Frank  Lascelles 
expressed  with  a  sincerity  of  which  I  am  absolutely 
convinced.  The  tension  in  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  England  may  be  of  service  in  petty 
and  short-sighted  political  calculations,  but  it  com- 
promises the  greater  interest  of  the  preservation  of 
European  peace  which  has  been  kept  through  Ger- 
many's powerful  influence  for  the  last  36  years. 
Strained  relations  between  Germany  and  England 
encourage  the  schemes  of  statesmen  who  are  dis- 
satisfied with  the  status  quo. 

Sir  Frank  Lascelles  ought  to  know  better  than 
anyone  else  how  difficult  the  task  is  which  he  is 
assigning  to  the  two  nations.  It  is  the  task  which 
he  has  imposed  on  himself.  For  twelve  years  I  have 
witnessed  the  efforts  which  he  has  made  to  accom- 
plish it.  Though  possessing,  as  he  is  entitled  to, 
the  complete  confidence  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the 
German  Government,  and  though  eminently  quali- 
fied as  a  statesman,  he  has  had  only  moderate  suc- 
cess so  far.  His  speech  of  yesterday  proves  that  he 
has  no  illusions  but  that,  nevertheless,  he  is  going 
to  continue  undismayed  along  the  path  which  he  has 
chosen. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


40 


No.  32. 


No.  32. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  8  Juin  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

L'Empereur  a  adresse,  par  le  telegraphe,  a  M.  de 
Miihlberg,  de  tres  vives  felicitations  a  roccasion  du 
discours  prononce  au  banquet  des  journalistes  an- 
glais dont  j'ai  eu  Fhonneur  de  vous  rendre  compte 
par  men  rapport  du  30  Mai  dernier;  ce  telegramme 
qui  n'a  pas  ete  public,  prouve  que  le  sous-secretaire 
d'etat  au  departement  Imperial  des  affaires  etran- 
geres a  fidelement  interprete  la  pensee  de  Sa  Ma- 
jeste.  , 

La  visite  des  journalistes  a  fini  aussi  bien  qu'elle  a 
commence.  Le  31  Mai  ils  ont  ete  invites  a  la  parade 
de  printemps  de  la  garnison  de  Potsdam.  Un  train 
special  les  avait  amenes  et  des  places  leur  avaient 
ete  reservees  devant  le  chateau.  lis  ont  chaude- 
ment  acclame  I'Empereur,  *lorsque  Sa  Majeste  a 
passe  devant  eux.  Conduits  par  le  Due  de  Trachen- 
berg  ils  ont  ete  au  nouveau  Palais  et  a  Sanssouci 
dont  un  maitre  de  ceremonie  leur  a  fait  les  hon- 
neurs.  Un  dejeuner  leur  a  ete  offert  a  I'orangerie. 
Au  moment  du  cafe  I'Empereur  y  est  arrive  et  s'est 
entretenu  tres  gracieusement  avec  les  principaux  des 
invites.  Les  journalistes  ont  ete  ensuite  deposer  des 
couronnes  de  fleurs  sur  les  tombeaux  de  I'Empereur 
et  de  rimperatrice  Frederic. 

Le  lendemain  les  journalistes  anglais  sont  partis 
pour  Dresde  ou  ils  ont  ete  tout  aussi  bien  regus  par 
le  Roi,  la  municipalite,  la  presse  et  la  population. 
II  en  a  ete  de  meme  a  Munich,  a  Frankfort,  a  Co- 
logne et  a  Riidesheim.  De  cette  derniere  ville,  les 
journalistes  se  sont  diriges  vers  Kiel  ou  ils  se  sont 
embarques  pour  Copenhague,  tres-satisfaits,  parait- 
il_,  de  I'accueil  qui  leur  a  ete  fait.  La  presse  ofifi- 
cieuse  a  exprime  a  diverses  reprises,  le  desir  que  les 
rapports  personnels  etablis  entre  les  journalistes  an- 
glais et  leurs  confreres  allemands  contribuent  a 
I'amelioration  des  relations  entre  les  deux  pays.  Les 
representants  des  journaux  anglais  ont  du  emporter 
I'impression  que  ce  voeu  est  tres  sincerement  celui 
de  la  nation  et  du  gouvernement. 

D'autres  manifestations  du  meme  genre  sont  de 
nature  a  corroborer  cette  conviction.  Une  commis- 
sion parlementaire  anglaise  est  en  Allemagne  pour 
y  etudier  les  voies  navigables.  Elle  y  a  ete  tres  bien 
regue  et  rien  n'a  ete  neglige  pour  faciliter  sa  mis- 
sion. 

La  visite  du  Lord  Maire  de  Londres  est  annoncee 
pour  le  22  Juin.  On  lui  prepare  I'accueil  le  plus  cor- 
dial. 

Que  restera-t-il  de  toutes  ces  demonstrations? 
Probablement  rien.  Le  rapport  que  vous  avez  bien 
voulu  me  communiquer  par  votre  depeche  d'avant 
hier  me  montre  que  mon  collegue  de  Londres  mieux 
place  que  je  ne  le  suis  pour  juger  la  situation,  est 
encore  plus  sceptique  que  moi.  Comma  le  dit  tres 
justement  M.  le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  le  Roi  d'Angle- 
terre  dirige  personnellement  une  politique  dont  le 
but  final  est  I'isolement  de  1' Allemagne.  Son  action 
repond  au  sentiment  de  la  nation,  egaree  par  une 
presse  sans  scrupules  ne  visant  qu'aux  gros  tirages 
et  a  cet  effet  uniquement  soucieuse  de  flatter  les  pas- 
sions populaires.  Ce  ne  sont  pas  seulement  les  jour- 
naux a  bon  marche  qui  s'abaissent  a  un  pareil  role. 
Le  "Times"  poursuit  depuis  des  annees  une  cam- 
pagne  de  denigrement  et  de  calomnies.    Son  corres- 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  June  8,  1907. 


The  Emperor  heartily  congratulated  Mr.  von 
Miihlberg  by  telegraph  on  the  speech  he  made  at 
the  banquet  given  in  honor  of  the  English  journal- 
ists, of  which  I  had  the  honor  to  inform  you  in  my 
report  of  May  30th.  This  telegram,  which  has  not 
been  published,  proves  that  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State  in  the  Imperial  Department  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs faithfully  interpreted  His  Majesty's  ideas. 

The  visit  of  the  journalists  ended  as  happily  as  it 
began.  On  May  31st,  they  were  invited  to  the 
Spring  parade  of  the  Potsdam  garrison.  A  .special 
train  took  them  there  and  places  had  been  reserved 
for  them  in  front  of  the  Palace.  They  warmly 
cheered  the  Emperor  when  His  Majesty  passed  by. 
Conducted  by  the  Duke  of  Trachenberg,  they  vis- 
ited the  New  Palace  and  Sanssouci  where  a  master 
of  ceremonies  did  the  honors.  A  luncheon  was 
served  to  them  in  the  "Orangerie."  When  coffee 
was  served,  the  Emperor  arrived  and  conversed 
very  graciously  with  the  principal  guests.  After- 
wards the  journalists  placed  wreaths  on  the  tombs 
of  'Emperor  William  and  of  Empress  Frederick. 

On  the  next  day  the  English  journalists  left  for 
Dresden  where  they  were  equally  well  received  by 
the  King,  the  municipal  authorities,  the  press,  and 
the  people.  It  was  the  same  at  Munich,  at  Frank- 
fort, at  Cologne,  and  at  Riidesheim.  From  this  last- 
named  city  the  journalists  went  to  Kiel  where  they 
embarked  for  Copenhagen,  apparently  very  well  sat- 
isfied with  the  reception  which  they  had  received. 
The  semi-official  press  repeatedly  expressed  the  de- 
sire that  the  personal  relations  established  between 
the  English  journalists  and  their  German  colleagues 
might  help  to  ameliorate  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries.  The  representatives  of  the  English 
papers  must  have  received  the  impression  that  this 
wish  is  very  sincerely  that  of  the  nation  and  of  the 
Government. 

Other  manifestations  of  the  same  kind  will 
strengthen  this  conviction.  A  committee  from  the 
British  ParHament  is  in  Germany  at  present  in  or- 
der to  study  the  navigable  waterways.  They  were 
very  well  received  and  nothing  has  been  spared  to 
facilitate  their  task. 

The  visit  of  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  has  been 
announced  for  June  22nd.  The  most  cordial  recep- 
tion is  being  prepared  for  him. 

What  will  come  of  all  these  demonstrations? 
Probably  nothing.  The  report  which  you  sent  to 
me  in  your  despatch  of  the  day  before  yesterday, 
shows  me  that  my  colleague  at  London,  who  is  in 
a  better  position  than  I  to  judge  the  situation,  is 
even  more  sceptical  than  I.  As  Count  de  Lalaing 
rightly  says,  the  King  of  England  is  personally  di- 
recting a  policy,  the  ultimate  aim  of  which  is  the 
isolation  of  Germany.  His  action  corresponds  with 
the  sentiments  of  the  nation,  misled  by  an  unscrupu- 
lous press,  the  sole  interest  of  which  consists  in  a 
large  circulation  and  which  is  therefore  only  anxious 
to  flatter  the  passions  of  the  populace.  It  is  not 
only  the  cheap  papers  that  lower  themselves  to  such 
a  part.  For  years  the  Times  has  pursued  a  cam- 
paign of  vilification  and  slander.    Its  Berlin  corre- 


pondant  de  Berlin  qui  a  pourtant  toute  facilite  pour 
etre  bien  informe,  nourrit  la  haine  des  Anglais  centre 
les  Allemands  en  pretant  au  gouvernement  Imperial 
des  projets  ambitieux  dont  I'absurdite  saute  aux 
yeux  et  en  I'accusant  de  manoeuvres  tenebreuses 
auxquelles  on  n'a  jamais  songe.  Neanmoins  le  pu- 
blic anglais  y  croit  sans  sourciller,  parce  que  ces  in- 
ventions correspondent  a  ses  prejuges.  Comment  le 
courant  antiallemand  pourrait-il  etre  detourne  par 
la  tres  petite  phalange  d'ecrivains  plus  conscienci- 
eux  et  plus  clairvoyants?  Les  journalistes  anglais 
qui  ont  accepte  I'hospitalite  allemande  appartien- 
nent  sans  doute  en  tres  grande  majorite  a  cette  elite. 
On  a  preche  des  convertis. 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


spondent,  who  has  every  opportunity  to  be  well- 
informed,  nourishes  the  hatred  of  the  English 
against  the  Germans  by  imputing  to  the  Imperial 
Government  ambitious  schemes  the  absurdity  of 
which  is  self-evident,  and  by  accusing  it  of  shady 
manoeuvres  of  which  it  has  never  thought.  Never- 
theless, the  English  public  believes  in  them  without 
wincing,  because  these  inventions  correspond  with 
its  prejudices.  How  could  the  anti-German  current 
be  turned  by  the  very  small  group  of  more  consci- 
entious and  more  clear-sighted  writers?  The  great 
majority  of  the  English  journalists  who  accepted 
the  hospitality  of  Germany  belong  without  a  doubt 
to  this  select  group.  One  has  been  preaching  to 
converts. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  33. 


No.  33. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


A.   Leghait,   Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  17  Juin  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Les  relations  amicales  et  I'entente  qui  existent 
depuis  environ  deux  ans  entre  la  France,  I'Angle- 
terre  et  I'Espagne,  viennent  de  s'affirmer  par  des 
liens  plus  precis  qui  caracterisent  nettement  le 
groupement  des  puissances  et  le  soin  qu'elles  pren- 
nent  de  se  premunir  par  des  stipulations  pacifiques 
centre  d'autres  eventualites. 

La  France  et  I'Angleterre  viennent  chacune  de 
conclure  simultanement  avec  I'Espagne  un  arrange- 
ment identique.  D'apres  les  declarations  faites  bier 
par  M.  Pichon  cet  accord  est  d'ordre  purement  di- 
plomatique et  ne  contient  ni  convention  militaire,  ni 
clauses  secretes.  II  a  pour  objet  le  maintien  du 
statu  quo  dans  les  parties  de  la  Mediterranee  et  de 
I'Atlantique  qui  interessent  les  puissances  contrac- 
tantes.  Celles-ci  se  garantissent  mutuellement  leurs 
possessions  respectives  et  la  libei;te  de  leurs  com- 
munications avec  ces  possessions.  Le  texte  de  cet 
arrangement  a  ete  communique  aux  gouvernements 
d'Allemagne,  de  Russie,  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  d'ltalie, 
du  Japon,  des  Etats-Unis  et  du  Portugal. 

Vous  trouverez.  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  dans  I'arti- 
cle  ci-annexe  des  details  tres  exacts  sur  I'origine  et  la 
portee  de  ces  accords  ainsi  que  sur  les  instructions 
donnees  aux  ambassadeurs  de  France  charges  de  les 
expliquer  aux  gouvernements  aupres  desquels  ils 
sont  accredites.  II  ne  s'agit  pas  d'une  triple-alliance 
ni  meme  d'un  accord  a  trois  qui  eussent  donne  a  cet 
arrangement  une  importance  qui  eut  pu  paraitre 
alarmante  a  certaines  chancelleries,  mais  si  on  con- 
sidere  le  but  identique  et  la  simultaneite  des  deux 
arrangements,  on  se  rend  compte  qu'il  existe  bien  un 
triple  accord  avec  un  meme  objectif. 

Apres  I'arrangement  franco-japonais  qui  n'est 
qu'une  habile  manoeuvre  anglaise,  la  France  trouve 
de  nouvelles  garanties  pour  ses  possessions  d'outre- 
mer  en  s'associant  a  la  politique  de  la  Grande-Bre- 
tagne  qui  veut  assurer  le  statu  quo  dans  la  Medi- 
terranee et  empecher  qu'une  autre  puissance  puisse 
y  exercer  une  influence  ou  y  acquerir  des  posses- 
sions. 


Sir: 


Paris,  June  17th,  1907. 


The  friendly  relations  and  the  good  understand- 
ing which  have  existed  for  about  two  years  between 
France,  England,  and  Spain  have  just  been 
strengthened  by  more  definite  bonds  which  clearly 
characterize  the  groupings  of  the  Powers  and  the 
care  which  they  are  taking  to  fortify  themselves 
against  other  eventualities  by  means  of  pacific 
agreements. 

France  and  England  have  just  simultaneously 
concluded  identical  agreements  with  Spain.  Ac- 
cording to  the  statements  made  yesterday  by  M. 
Pichon,  these  agreements  are  of  a  purely  diplomatic 
order  and  do  not  contain  either  a  military  conven- 
tion or  any  secret  clauses.  Their  object  is  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo  in  those  parts  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  of  the  Atlantic  in  which  the  contracting 
Powers  are  interested.  These  latter  mutually  guar- 
antee their  respective  possessions  and  the  freedom 
of  their  communications  with  these  possessions.  ■ 
The  text  of  this  agreement  has  been  communicated 
to  the  Governments  of  Germany,  Russia,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United  States  and  Por- 
tugal. 

You  will  find,  Sir,  in  the  article  here  appended, 
very  exact  details  on  the  origin  and  the  import  of 
the  agreements,  as  well  as  on  the  instructions  given 
to  the  French  Ambassadors  charged  to  explain  them 
to  the  Governments  to  which  they  are  accredited. 
It  is  not  a  question  of  a  Triple  Alliance,  nor  even 
of  a  three-sided  agreement,  which  would  have  im- 
parted to  these  arrangements  an  importance  that 
might  have  appeared  alarming  to  certain  Chancel- 
leries; but  if  the  identical  aim  of  the  two  agree- 
ments be  considered  and  the  fact  that  they  were 
made  simultaneously,  it  will  be  realized  that  this  is 
a  triangular  agreement  with  one  and  the  same  goal. 

After  the  Franco-Japanese  agreement  which  was 
nothing  but  a  clever  English  move,  France  is  find- 
ing new  guarantees  for  her  over-sea  possessions  by 
joining  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  which  aims  at 
ensuring  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
at  preventing  other  Powers  from  exercising  any  in- 
fluence or  from  acquiring  possessions  there. 


42 


On  se  plait  a  reconnaitre  que  ces  accords  ont  un 
caractere  fort  pacifique  et  Ton  aime  meme  a  croire 
qu'ils  sont  une  garantie  de  paix,  mais  on  se  demande 
aussi  quelles  sont  les  menaces  qui  justifient  de  si 
grandes  precautions,  la  France  beneficie  pour  le 
moment  de  I'entente  cordiale  avec  I'Angleterre  et 
Ton  glorifie  ici  les  succes  diplomatiques  de  M. 
Pichon,  mais  il  ne  manque  pas  de  gens  qui  craignent 
qu'a  force  de  vouloir  assurer  la  paix  on  ne  provoque 
la  guerre;  cette  crainte  est  dans  tons  les  esprits 
sages  et  ils  s'efforcent  de  premunir  I'opinion  publi- 
que  et  le  Parlement  contre  la  tentation  de  se  laisser 
griser  par  ces  succes  sans  prendre  les  precautions 
voulues  contre  les  dangers  auxquels  ils  s'exposent, 
ils  rappellent  sans  cesse  que  si  des  difficultes  de- 
vaient  surgir  en  Europe,  la  France  serait  la  premiere 
:■  en  supporter  le  poids  et  a  en  subir  les  conse- 
quences. 

L'Angleterre  prepare  admirablement  son  terrain 
mais  la  France  qui  s'associe  a  sa  politique  a-t-elle 
toutes  les  garanties  voulues  pour  ne  pas  en  etre  un 
jour  la  victime?  L'incertitude  qui  regne  a  ce  sujet, 
permet  de  supposer  qu'il  existe  entre  elle  et  le  gou- 
vernement  Britannique  un  accord  plus  complet  que 
celui  de  I'entente  cordiale  mais  qui  resterait  a  I'etat 
latent  jusqu'au  jour  oil  les  evenements  exigeraient 
la  mise  au  jour  de  ses  stipulations. 

La  France,  pour  se  premunir  actuellement  contre 
des  perils  peut-etre  illusoires  ou  pour  fortifier  la 
situation  des  dirigeants  de  la  politique  interieure 
contracte  une  dette  de  reconnaissance  qui  lui  sem- 
blera  lourde  le  jour  ou  I'Angleterre  devoilera  dans 
quel  but  elle  veut  employer  les  influences  qu'elle  a 
groupees  autour  d'elle. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


A.  Leghait. 


While  it  is  pleasing  to  see  that  these  agreements 
are  of  a  very  pacific  character  and  while  it  is  desir- 
able to  believe  that  they  are  a  guarantee  of  peace, 
it  is  natural  to  ask  what  the  dangers  are  which 
justify  such  great  precautions.  France  is  for  the 
moment  benefiting  from  the  entente  cordiale  with 
England  and  the  diplomatic  success  of  M.  Pichon 
is  being  glorified  here,  but  there  are  many  people 
who  fear  that  war  will  be  caused  by  these  very 
efforts  to  ensure  peace ;  that  fear  is  felt  by  all  wise 
people  and  they  are  endeavoring  to  fortify  public 
opinion  and  Parliament  against  the  temptation  to 
become  intoxicated  with  these  successes  without 
taking  the  necessary  precautions  against  the  dan- 
gers to  which  they  are  exposing  themselves.  They 
do  not  cease  to  point  out  that  if  difficulties  should 
arise  in  Europe,  France  would  be  the  first  to  feel 
the  weight  of  them  and  to  suffer  the  consequences. 

England  is  preparing  her  ground  admirably  but 
has  France,  who  is  joining  her  in  her  policy,  all  the 
necessary  guarantees  that  she  will  not  be  the  victim 
of  this  policy  one  day?  The  uncertainty  which  pre- 
vails in  regard  to  this  subject  justifies  the  supposi- 
tion that  there  exists  between  her  and  the  British 
Government  a  more  complete  agreement  than  that 
of  the  entente  cordiale,  but  which  will  remain  latent 
until  that  day  when  events  will  demand  that  its 
stipulations  be  made  public. 

In  order  to  arm  herself  for  the  moment  against 
perils  which  are  perhaps  illusory  or  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  the  directors  of  her  in- 
ternal policy,  France  is  contracting  a  debt  of  grati- 
tude which  will  seem  heavy  to  her  on  the  day  when 
England  reveals  the  purpose  for  which  she  wants 
to  use  the  influences  which  she  has  grouped  around 
herself. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  34. 


No.  34. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  19  Juin  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Comme  corollaire  a  I'arrangement  recemment 
conclu  entre  I'Espagne  et  la  France,  au  sujet  du 
maintien  du  statu  quo  en  ce  qui  concerne  leurs  ter- 
ritoires  dans  le  bassin  de  la  Mediterranee  et  sur 
I'Atlantique,  I'Espagne  vient  de  signer  egalement 
une  convention  avec  I'Angleterre  qui  a  pour  but 
de  garantir  les  possesions  des  deux  pays  dans  les 
regions  baignees  par  la  Mediterranee  et  I'ocean.  Le 
texte  de  ce  dernier  arrangement  n'est  pas  encore 
connu  du  public;  le  fait  meme  de  I'entente  inter- 
venue  entre  Madrid  et  Londres  n'a  ete  divulgue  que 
par  une  indiscretion  d'un  journal  parisien. 

Le  motif  allegue  par  les  Anglais  comme  dictant 
leur  politique,  pacifique  avant  tout  naturellement, 
est  d'assurer  la  route  vers  les  Indes  et  I'Extreme- 
Orient  par  une  garantie  supplementaire.  Les  ports 
espagnols  seraient  a  leur  disposition  en  cas  de  be- 
soin.  Inutile  de  dire  que  la  presse  britannique  de- 
clare que  I'Allemagne  aurait  tort  de  se  plaindre  de 
I'entente  hispano-anglaise  nullement  dirigee  contre 
Berlin.     II  est  difficile,  cependant  de  supposer  que 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


London,  Tune  19,  1907. 
Sir:— 

As  a  corollary  to  the  agreement  recently  con- 
cluded between  Spain  and  France  concerning  the 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  regard  to  the  ter- 
ritories in  the  Mediterranean  basin  and  on  the  At- 
lantic, Spain  too  has  just  signed  an  agreement  with 
England  the  aim  of  which  is  to  guarantee  the  pos- 
sessions of  the  two  countries  in  the  regions  border- 
ing on  the  Mediterranean  and  the  ocean.  The  text 
of  this  agreement  has  not  yet  been  made  public; 
even  the  fact  that  an  understanding  had  been 
reached  between  Madrid  and  London  was  only  di- 
vulged through  the  indiscretion  of  a  Paris  paper. 

The  motive  which  the  English  allege  is  dictating 
their  policy,  of  course  above  all  pacific,  is  to  ensure 
the  route  to  India  and  the  Far  East  by  a  supple- 
mentary guarantee.  The  Spanish  ports  would  in 
case  of  need  be  at  their  disposal.  It  is  needless  to 
say  that  the  British  press  declares  that  Germany 
would  be  wrong  to  complain  on  account  of  the 
Anglo-Spanish  understanding  which  was  by  no 
means  directed  against  Berlin.    It  is  difficult,  how- 


TAllemagne  n'y  verra  pas  la  continuation  de  la  po- 
litique anglaise,  qui  vise,  de  toutes  fagons,  a  I'isole- 
ment  de  I'empire  germanique. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


ever,  to  suppose  that  Germany  will  not  see  in  this 
understanding  the  continuation  of  the  British  policy 
which  aims  in  every  way  at  the  isolation  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  35. 


No.  35. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  to  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  22  Juin  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

A  en  juger  par  les  premieres  appreciations  pu- 
bliees  dans  les  journaux  ayant  acces  a  la  chancel- 
lerie  Imperiale,  le  gouvernement  allemand  veut  ob- 
server une  attitude  tout  a  fait  passive  en  presence 
des  deux  nouvelles  ententes  internationales  qui  vien- 
nent  de  nous  etre  revelees. 

L'arrangement  entre  la  France  et  le  Japon  con- 
sacre  les  deux  principes  de  I'integrite  de  la  Chine  et 
de  la  porte  ouverte.  C'est  ce  qui  avait  deja  ete 
stipule,  il  y  a  sept  ans,  par  un  arrangement  entre 
I'AlIemagne  et  I'Angleterre  auquel  diverses  puis- 
sances, entre  autres  la  France  et  le  Japon  ont  ad- 
here. 

L'accord  entre  I'Angleterre,  la  France  et  I'Es- 
pagne  n'est  pas  encore  public  et  I'intention  des  puis- 
sances contractantes  etait  de  ne  le  faire  connaitre 
qu'au  mois  d'aout.  Une  indiscretion  commise  a 
Rome  I'a  livre  prematurement  aux  journaux.  J'ai 
eu  I'occasion  de  m'assurer  que  leurs  renseignements 
sent  exacts.  Les  trois  puissances  reconnaissent  le 
statu  quo  dans  la  Mediterranee  et  dans  TAtlantique 
et  s'entendront  sur  les  mesures  a  prendre  si  leurs 
possessions  venaient  a  etre  menacees. 

II  n'y  a  rien  la-dedans  qui  touche  aux  interets  de 
I'AlIemagne.  Le  gouvernement  Imperial  a  ete  tenu 
au  courant  des  negociations  entre  la  France  et  le 
Japon  par  les  soins  des  gouvernements  japonais  et 
frangais.  Les  ambassadeurs  d'Espagne,  de  France 
et  d'Angleterre  ont  separement  communique  au  de- 
partement  Imperial  des  affaires  etrangeres,  depuis 
plusieurs  jours  deja,  les  notes  echangees  pour  cons- 
tater  l'accord  intervenu  entre  leurs  pays.  Tout  a 
done  ete  d'une  correction  parfaite  et  il  n'y  a  rien  qui 
pourrait  servir  de  base  a  une  plainte  officielle. 

L'impression  produite  a  Berlin  n'en  a  pas  moins 
du  etre  fort  penible  pour  les  raisons  que  j'ai  pris 
la  liberte  de  vous  exposer  par  mon  rapport  du  13 
Mai  dernier. 

La  mode  est  aux  ententes  internationales.  Apres 
I'alliance  franco-russe,  nous  avons  eu  l'accord  de 
ritalie  avec  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  au  sujet  de  la 
Mediterranee,  I'alliance  entre  I'Angleterre  et  le  Ja- 
pon, l'arrangement  par  lequel  I'Angleterre  et  la 
France  ont  trafique  de  I'Egypte  et  du  Maroc.  L'An- 
gleterre  negocie  avec  la  Russie  pour  la  delimitation 
des  frontieres  et  des  spheres  d'influence  en  Asie. 
Toutes  ces  ententes  s'expliquaient  ou  par  le  desir  de 
mettre  fin  a  d'anciens  differends,  ou  d'empecher  qu'il 
n'en  surgisse  de  nouveau  ou  de  donner  aux  gouver- 
nements interesses  la  securite  qu'ils  ne  seraient  pas 
genes  dans  I'assouvissement  de  leurs  convoitises. 

Les  deux  derniers  accords  ne  repondent  pas  com- 
me  ceux  que  je  viens  de  citer,  a  des  necessites  politi- 


Berlin,  June  22,  1907. 
Sir:- 

To  judge  from  the  first  comments  published  in 
the  papers  which  have  access  to  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellery, the  German  Government  is  going  to  ob- 
serve an  absolutely  passive  attitude  in  regard  to 
the  two  new  international  agreements  which  have 
just  been  revealed. 

The  agreement  between  France  and  Japan  sanc- 
tions two  principles,  that  of  the  integrity  of  China, 
and  that  of  the  open  door.  These  were  stipulated 
seven  years  ago  in  an  agreement  between  Germany 
and  England  to  which  several  Powers,  among 
others  France  and  Japan,  took  adherence. 

The  agreement  between  England,  France,  and 
Spain  has  not  yet  been  published  and  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  contracting  Powers  not  to  let  it  be- 
come known  before  the  month  of  August.  An  in- 
discretion committed  at  Rome  put  it  prematurely 
in  the  hands  of  the  press.  I  have  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  assure  myself  that  the  information  given 
by  the  papers  is  correct.  The  three  Powers  recog- 
nize the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the 
Atlantic  and  will  confer  as  to  the  measures  to  be 
taken  if  their  possessions  should  be  menaced. 

There  is  nothing  in  this  which  touches  the  inter- 
ests of  Germany.  The  Imperial  Government  has 
been  informed  of  the  negotiations  between  France 
and  Japan  by  the  Japanese  and  French  Govern- 
ments. Several  days  ago  the  Ambassadors  of  Spain, 
France,  and  England  communicated  separately  to 
the  Imperial  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  the 
notes  exchanged  in  confirmation  of  the  agreements 
concluded  between  their  countries.  Everything  was 
thus  done  with  absolute  correctness  and  there  is 
nothing  which  might  serve  as  a  basis  for  an  official 
complaint. 

The  impression  produced  at  Berlin  must  never- 
theless have  been  a  very  disagreeable  one,  for  the 
reasons  which  I  took  the  liberty  of  explaining  to 
you  in  my  report  of  May  13. 

International  understandings  are  the  fashion. 
After  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  we  had  the  un- 
derstanding of  Italy  with  France  and  England  on 
the  Mediterranean,  the  alliance  between  England 
and  Japan,  and,  finally,  the  agreement  between  Eng- 
land and  France  by  which  they  settled  their  bargain 
over  Egypt  and  Morocco.  At  present  England  is 
negotiating  with  Russia  concerning  the  regulation  of 
boundaries  and  spheres  of  influence  in  Asia.  All 
these  understandings  arose  either  from  a  desire  to 
put  an  end  to  old  diflferences  or  to  prevent  new 
ones  from  arising  or  from  a  wish  of  the  interested 
Governments  to  be  certain  that  they  would  not  be 
hampered  in  satisfying  their  covetousness. 

The  two  latest  understandings  do  not,  like  those 


44 


ques.  S'ils  ne  cachent  pas  d'arriere-pensee,  on  pour- 
rait  dire  qu'ils  ont  un  caractere  ornemental.  Le 
Japon  est  de  force  a  garantir  tout  seul  I'integrite  de 
la  Chine,  jusqu'au  jour  oii  il  lui  conviendra  de  I'en- 
tamer  lui-meme.  On  admettra  difficilement  que 
I'Angleterre  ait  besoin  du  secours  de  I'Espagne  pour 
defendre  ses  positions  en  Egypte,  a  Cypre,  a  Malte 
et  a  Gibraltar.  Qui  songe  a  les  attaquer  et  qui  de 
plus  aurait  les  moyens  materiels  de  le  faire?  .  La 
France  n'est  pas  moins  en  securite  en  Algerie  et  a 
Tunis.  Le  danger  ne  pourrait  provenir  que  de  I'une 
des  puissances  signataires,  si  I'amitie  existant  actuel- 
lement  entre  elles  venait  a  se  rompre.  Dans  une 
pareille  hypothese,  les  arrangements  d'aujourd'hui 
deviendraient  caducs  d'eux-memes. 

S'ils  ne  contiennent  aucune  clause  secrete,  ils  sem- 
blent  n'avoir  ete  conclus  que  pour  le  plaisir  de  laisser 
une  fois  de  plus  TAllemagne  en  dehors  du  reglement 
des  interets  mondiaux.  Ces  precautions  prises  cen- 
tre des  perils  imaginaires  sont  de  nature  a  eveiller 
et  a  nourrir  chez  les  peuples  I'idee  que  rAUemagne 
est  la  puissance  agressive  centre  les  entreprises  de 
laquelle  les  autres  pays  sont  obliges  de  se  liguer. 

II  n'y  aurait  pas  grand  mal  si  ces  traites  n'etaient 
que  superflus ;  mais  ils  compromettent  la  cause  de  la 
paix  qu'ils  pretendent  servir,  parce  qu'ils  font  naitre 
dans  les  milieux  hostiles  a  I'Allemagne  la  confiance 
que  le  moment  approche  oii  leurs  desseins  pourront 
se  realiser. 

La  presse  allemande  est  mecontente;  mais  aucun 
communique  officieux  n'a  encore  paru. 

Le  fait  suivant  vous  permettra  du  reste,  mieux 
que  ne  pourront  le  faire  les  declarations  officielles 
ou  officieuses  d'apprecier  le  sentiment  intime  du 
gouvernement  Imperial.  L'ambassadeur  d'Espagne 
est  le  premier  qui  ait  communique  au  sous-secre- 
taire d'etat  les  notes  echangees  entre  son  pays,  la 
France  et  I'Angleterre.  Apres  en  avoir  donne  lec- 
ture, il  s'est  attache  a  demontrer  que  I'arrangement 
conclu  n'est  nullement  dirige  contre  I'Allemagne  et 
a  un  but  exclusivement  pacifique  et  defensif.  M.  de 
Muhlberg  I'a  interrompu  en  disant:  "Oui,  je  sais; 
nous  marchons  vers  une  ere  de  paix  perpetuelle." 
Cette  remarque  ironique  est  plus  eloquente  que  de 
longs  discours.  M.  de  Miihlberg  n'a  manifesto  au- 
cune impression  lorsque  quelques  instants  apres  il 
a  regu  la  communication  de  l'ambassadeur  de 
France. 

_  II  n'est  pas  venu  a  la  meme  reserve  envers  les 
tiers.  Je  I'ai  vu  hier  et  j'ai  pu  constater  que  ses  ap- 
preciations concordent  avec  les  miennes.  II  a  ajoute 
que  I'arrangement  emeut  surtout  par  la  mise  en 
scene.  Le  contenu  des  notes  est  assez  insignifiant 
et  elles  n'auraient  pas  produit  le  meme  effet  si  elles 
avaient  ete  immediatement  livrees  a  la  publicite.  II 
va  sans  dire  que  le  sous-secretaire  d'etat  ne  prend 
pas  au  tragique  un  incident  qui  ne  change  rien  a 
une  situation  deja  connue;  mais  il  en  note  un  nou- 
veau  symptome. 

Je  dois  vous  prier  de  considerer  ce  que  m'a  dit 
M.  de  Miihlberg  comme  strictement  confidentiel. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


which  I  have  just  quoted,  respond  to  any  demands 
of  political  necessity.  If  they  do  not  conceal  some 
hidden  motives  one  might  say  that  they  are  of  a 
purely  ornamental  character.  Japan  is  strong 
enough  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  China  all  alone 
until  the  day  when  it  will  suit  her  to  violate  it  her- 
self. It  would  be  hard  to  admit  that  England  needs 
Spain's  assistance  in  order  to  defend  her  position  in 
Egypt,  Cyprus,  Malta,  and  Gibraltar.  Who  is  think- 
ing of  attacking  it  and  who,  moreover,  would  have 
the  material  means  to  do  so?  France  is  no  less  se- 
cure in  Algiers  and  Tunis.  The  danger  could  only 
come  from  one  of  the  signatory  Powers,  if  the 
friendship  existing  between  them  at  present  were 
to  break.  In  such  an  event  the  present  treaties 
would  become  null  and  void  ipso  facto. 

If  they  do  not  contain  any  secret  clause,  they 
seem  to  have  been  concluded  only  for  the  pleasure 
of  leaving  Germany  outside  once  more  in  the  regu- 
lation of  the  interests  of  the  world.  These  precau- 
tions taken  against  imaginary  perils  are  bound  to 
awaken  and  to  foster  among  the  nations  the  idea 
that  Germany  is  the  aggressive  Power,  against  the 
enterprises  of  which  the  other  countries  must  unite. 
Matters  would  not  be  so  bad  if  the  treaties  were 
simply  superfluous,  but  they  compromise  the  cause 
of  peace  which  they  pretend  to  serve  because  they 
nurse  a  belief  in  anti-German  circles  that  the  mo- 
ment is  approaching  when  their  schemes  can  be 
realized. 

The  German  press  is  dissatisfied;  but  no  semi- 
official comment  has  as  yet  been  made. 

But  from  the  following  fact  you  will  be  able  to 
understand,  better  than  from  the  official  or  semi- 
official statements,  the  real  sentiment  of  the  Im- 
perial Government.  The  Ambassador  of  Spain  was 
the  first  to  present  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State 
the  notes  exchanged  between  his  country,  France, 
and  England.  After  he  had  let  the  Secretary  read 
them,  he  endeavored  to  show  that  the  agreement 
was  in  no  way  directed  against  Germany  and  had 
an  exclusively  pacific  and  defensive  aim.  Mr.  von 
Miihlberg  interrupted  him  with  the  remark :  "Yes,  I 
know;  we  are  marching  towards  an  era  of  eternal 
peace."  This  ironical  remark  is  more  eloquent  than 
long  speeches.  Mr.  von  Muhlberg  gave  no  sign  of 
his  impressions  when  a  few  minutes  later  he  re- 
ceived the  communication  of  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor. 

He  did  not  observe  the  same  reserve  in  regard 
to  the  third.  I  saw  him  yesterday  and  I  found  that 
his  opinion  agreed  with  mine.  He  added  that  the 
agreement  was  disquieting  above  all  for  its  mise  en 
scene.  The  content  of  the  note  is  rather  insignifi- 
cant and  they  would  not  have  produced  the  same 
effect  if  they  had  been  made  public  immediately.  It 
goes  without  saying  that  the  Under-Secretary  of 
State  does  not  take  an  incident  tragically  which 
changes  nothing  in  a  situation  already  well-known, 
but  he  notes  it  as  a  new  symptom. 

I  beg  of  you  to  regard  what  Mr.  von  Miihlberg 
told  me  as  strictly  confidential. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  36. 


No.  36. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  ler  Juillet  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

La  presse  allemande  s'est  occupee,  sansdu  reste 
y  insister  beaucoup,  de  I'invitation  a  diner  que 
I'Empereur  a  adressee  a  Kiel  a  M.  Etienne  et  sur 
les  deux  longs  entretiens  qui  I'ont  suiyie.  Le 
compte-rendu  de  ces  deux  audiences  public  par  le 
"Journal"  de  Paris  en  denature  evidemment  le  ca- 
ractere.  II  attribue  a  I'Empereur  des  paroles  que 
Sa  Majeste  n'a  certainement  pas  prononcees.  Plus 
vraisemblable  est  la  version  donnee,  d'apres  un  te- 
legramme  de  la  Gazette  de  Voss,  par  le  senateur 
Saint  Germain,  ami  de  M.  Etienne:  L'Empereur  au- 
rait  dit  qu'il  etait  pret  a  se  joindre  aux  autres  puis- 
sances pour  presser  le  Makhzen  d'executer  les  re- 
formes  sur  lesquelles  on  s'est  mis  d'accord  a  Alge- 
siras  et  qu'il  n'a  pas  d'objection  a  ce  que  la  France 
exerce  la  police  sur  la  frontiere  qui  separe  I'Algerie 
du  Maroc. 

Quel  qu'ait  ete  le  sujet  de  la  conversation,  un  fait 
est  certain,  c'est  que  Sa  Majeste  a  accueilli  M. 
Etienne  de  la  maniere  la  plus  aimable  efque  celui-ci 
en  a  ete  tres  agreablement  impressionne.  Sa  Ma- 
jeste reqoit  du  reste  toujours  avec  une  distinction 
tres  marquee  tons  les  Frangais  qui  se  presentent  a 
Elle. 

De  Kiel  M.  Etienne  s'est  rendu  a  Berlin  ou  il  a 
eu  un  tres  long  entretien  avec  le  Chancelier.  Une 
petite  notice  publiee  par  les  journaux  et  evidem- 
ment inspiree  dit  que  le  Prince  de  Biilow  aura  sans 
doute  ete  charme  par  la  personne  de  I'homme  d'etat 
eminent  qui  lui  a  rendu  visite  et  que  I'accueil  ami- 
cal  et  flatteur  que  M.  Etienne  a  trouve  a  Berlin  aura 
correspondu  a  celui  que  I'Empereur  a  reserve  a  Kiel 
a  ses  botes  fran^ais. 

II  est  visible  que  le  nouvel  ambassadeur  de 
France  a  Berlin,  M.  Cambon,  a  le  desir  d'ameliorer 
les  relations  de  son  pays  avec  I'Allemagne  et  il  y  a 
lieu  de  croire  qu'il  a  presente  des  propositions  con- 
cretes ou  qu'il  se  propose  d'en  faire  lorsqu'il  jugera 
le  moment  favorable. 

En  effet,  M.  Cambon,  sans  me  faire  aucune  con- 
fidence, m'a  dit  recemment  qu'il  regrettait  de  trou- 
ver  le  gouvernement  allemand  toujours  en  defiance 
envers  la  France.  Peu  de  temps  auparavant  M.  de 
Miihlberg  m'avait  dit  que  M.  Cambon  s'etait  ex- 
prime  dans  le  meme  sens  avec  lui  et  qu'il  ne  deman- 
dait  pas  mieux  que  d'etre  confiant  si  la  France  prou- 
vait  sa  sincerite  par  des  faits.  Le  regret  exprime 
par  M.  Cambon  n'aurait  pas  de  raison  d'etre  si  I'am- 
bassadeur  n'avait  pas  fait  ou  essaye  de  faire  des  ou- 
vertures  sur  quelque  point  determine. 

Le  voyage  de  M.  Etienne  a  Kiel  et  la  maniere 
dont  il  y  a  ete  recju  sont  done  a  noter  comme  des 
symptomes,  dont  il  ne  faut  pas  toutefois  exagerer 
I'importance.  Des  relations  correctes  entre  Berlin 
et  Paris  sont  le  maximum  de  ce  qui  pent  etre  ob- 
tenu.  Pour  un  rapprochement  vrai  et  durable  il  fau- 
drait  ne  plus  penser  a  la  revanche,  et  il  n'y  a  pas 
un  Frangais,  meme  parmi  les  plus  sages  et  les  plus 
pacifiques,  qui  n'en  conserve  I'espoir  au  fond  du 
cceur. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


Berlin,July  1,  1907. 


Agreez,  etc. 
'[s.] 


Greindl. 


The  German  press  has  concerned  itself,  though 
not  to  any  great  extent,  with  the  invitation  to  din- 
ner which  the  Emperor  at  Kiel  sent  to  M.  Etienne 
and  with  the  two  long  conversations  which  followed 
it.  The  account  of  these  audiences,  published  by 
Le  Journal  of  Paris,  obviously  misrepresents  their 
character.  It  attributes  to  the  Emperor  words 
which  His  Majesty  certainly  did  not  utter.  More 
likely  is  the  version  given,  according  to  a  telegram 
to  the  Vossische  Zeitung,  by  Senator  Saint  Ger- 
main, a  friend  of  M.  Etienne :  The  Emperor  is  re- 
ported as  having  said  that  he  was  ready  to  join  the 
other  Powers  in  order  to  press  the  Makhzen  to 
carry  out  the  reforms  which  had  been  agreed  upon 
at  Algeciras  and  that  he  did  not  object  to  France 
maintaining  the  police  on  the  frontier  which  sep- 
arates Algiers  from  Morocco. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  subject  of  the  con- 
versation, one  fact  is  certain,  viz.,  that  His  Majesty 
received  M.  Etienne  in  the  most  pleasant  manner 
and  that  the  latter  was  very  agreeably  impressed. 
His  Majesty  always  receives  all  Frenchmen  who 
are  presented  to  him  with  special  distinction. 

From  Kiel,  M.  Etienne  returned  to  Berlin  where 
he  had  a  long  conversation  with  the  Chancellor.  A 
short,  evidently  inspired  statement,  published  by 
the  newspapers,  says  that  Prince  von  Biilow  was 
without  doubt  charmed  by  the  personaHty  of  the 
eminent  statesman  who  visited  him,  and  that  the 
friendly  and  flattering  reception  which  M.  Etienne 
had  been  accorded  in  Berlin  will  have  corresponded 
with  that  which  the  Emperor  had  given  to  his 
French  guests  at  Kiel. 

It  is  evident  that  the  new  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  M.  Cambon,  wishes  to  improve  the  relations 
between  his  country  and  Germany  and  there  is  rea- 
son to  believe  that  he  has  presented  concrete  pro- 
posals, or  that  he  intends  to  do  so  when  he  thinks 
the  moment  favorable. 

In  fact,  M.  Cambon  recently  told  me,  not  in  any 
way  confidentially,  that  he  regretted  to  find  the 
German  Government  always  distrustful  of  France. 
A  short  time  before  that  Mr.  von  Miihlberg  had 
told  me  that  M.  Cambon  had  expressed  himself  to 
the  same  eflfect  to  him  and  that  he  desired  nothing 
more  than  to  trust  France,  if  she  proved  her  sin- 
cerity by  facts.  The  regret  expressed  by  M.  Cam- 
bon would  have  no  meaning  if  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor had  not  made  or  tried  to  make  overtures  on 
some  definite  point  or  other. 

M.  Etienne's  trip  to  Kiel  and  the  way  in  which 
he  was  received  there  are,  therefore,  symptoms 
worthy  of  notice,  but  the  importance  of  which  must 
not  be  exaggerated.  Correct  relations  between  Ber- 
lin and  Paris  are  the  maximum  of  what  can  be 
attained.  In  order  to  bring  about  a  real  and  lasting 
rapprochement  it  would  be  necessary  to  cease 
thinking  of  revenge,  and  there  is  not  a  Frenchman, 
even  among  the  wisest  and  most  pacific,  who  does 
not  cherish  the  hope  of  revenge  in  the  bottom  of  his 
heart. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


E.  de  Cartier,  Charge  d' Affaires  de  Belgique  a 
Londres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


M.  E.  de  Cartier,  Belgian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Lon- 
don, to  M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


Londres,  le  10  Aout  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Le  public  anglais  suit  avec  interet  les  developpe- 
ments  de  la  crise  marocaine.  Les  journaux  publient 
de  longues  colonnes  d'informations,  mais  se  mon- 
trent  en  general  assez  sobres  dans  les  remarques 
et  reflexions  que  leur  suggerent  les  tristes  evene- 
ments  qui  se  deroulent  a  Casablanca  et  ailleurs. 

Si  I'opinion  publique  est  entierement  favorable  a 
la  France  dans  cette  affaire,  ce  n'est  peut-etre  pas 
tant  qu'elle  soit  particulierement  heureuse  a  la  pen- 
see  de  voir  la  "penetration  pacifique,"  naguere  pro- 
nee  par  M.  Delcasse,  sortir  ses  premiers  effets,  que 
parce  qu'elle  s'imagine,  a  tort  ou  a  raison,  que  les 
entreprises  militaires  qui  ont  actuellement  les  ports 
marocains  pour  theatre  sont  desagreables  a  I'Alle- 
magne. 

Apres  avoir  decerne  force  louanges  a  la  bravoure 
frangaise  et  au  courage  espagnol,  les  grands  jour- 
naux anglais  signalent  avec  insistance  quelques  ar- 
ticles publics  dans  les  organes  de  la  presse  vien- 
noise  qu'ils  soupQonnent  d'avoir  reflete  les  aspira- 
tions de  la  Friedrichstrasse  (sic!)  et  s'attachent  a  en 
opposer  le  sens  aux  declarations,  conques  dans  un 
style  moins  sibyllin,  que  reproduisent  les  principaux 
journaux  allemands. 

Sans  aller  jusqu'a  exprimer  le  voeu  que  le  bom- 
bardement  de  Casablanca  soit  suivi,  pour  le  Maroc, 
des  memes  resultats  que  celui  d'Alexandrie,  en  1882, 
pour  I'Egypte,  la  presse  anglaise  signale  la  necessite 
d'assurer,  coute  que  coute,  le  retablissement  de  I'or- 
dre  et  de  la  securite  des  personnes  et  des  biens. 
Seul,  le  "Standard,"  refletant  en  I'occurrence  ce  sen- 
timent d'inferventionnisme  aigu  qui  sommeille  dans 
I'ame  britannique,  s'etonne  de  I'apathie  que  temoi- 
gne  le  gouvernement  devant  la  gravite  des  evene- 
ments  en  cours.  II  regrette  de  voir  la  France  assu- 
mer  seule  la  tache  de  faire  la  police,  conjointement 
avec  I'Espagne,  et  se  plaint  de  voir  I'Angleterre  sa- 
tisfaite  de  jouer  un  role  efface. 

Le  "Daily  News,"  qui  ne  se  repose  de  sa  cam- 
pagne  anticongolaise  que  pour  dresser  des  autels 
aux  nihilistes  russes  et  aux  anarchistes  italiens,  s'in- 
surge,  quelque  peu  prematurement,  semble-t-il,  cen- 
tre la  barbarie  de  la  repression  a  Mazagan. 

La  "Tribune,"  organe  des  pasteurs  non-confor- 
mistes  et  des  radicaux  humanitariens,  signale  avec 
melancolie  le  fait  que  les  escadres  frangaises  et  es- 
pagnoles  bombardaient  Casablanca  au  moment 
meme  ou  la  Conference  de  la  Haye  adoptait  une  de- 
claration tendant  a  defendre  le  bombardement  des 
ports  ouverts. 

La  "Westminster  Gazette,"  le  journal  qui  repre- 
sente  les  vues  de  la  section  moderee  du  parti  au  pou- 
voir,  apres  avoir  fait  allusion  aux  entretiens  de  M. 
Cambon  avec  le  Prince  de  Biilow,  exprime  I'espoir 
que  la  France  pourra,  a  la  grande  satisfaction  de 
I'Europe  et  au  prix  de  la  vie  d'une  demi-douzaine 
de  marins,  obtenir  enfin  des  coudees  plus  franches 
au  Maroc,  en  vue  de  lui  permettre  de  mener  a  bien 
la  tache  que  les  traites  lui  ont  imposee. 

Les  journaux  du  matin  publient,  sans  commen- 
taires,  quelques  informations  relatives  au  siege  du 
Consulat  anglais  de  Casablanca  et  signalent  le  desir 


Sir:- 


London,  August  10,  1907. 


The  English  public  is  following  with  interest  the 
developments  of  the  Moroccan  crisis.  The  papers 
are  publishing  long  columns  of  information  but  are, 
on  a  whole,  fairly  sober  in  the  remarks  and  reflec- 
tions which  the  sad  events  which  are  now  taking 
place  at  Casablanca  and  elsewhere  suggest  to  them. 

If  public  opinion  is  entirely  favorable  to  France 
in  this  affair  it  is  not  perhaps  so  much  because  it 
rejoices  particularly  in  the  thought  of  seeing  the 
"pacific  penetration,"  recently  preached  by  M.  Del- 
casse, produce  its  first  results  as  because  it  im- 
agines, rightly  or  wrongly,  that  the  military  oper- 
ations which  are  at  present  going  on  at  the  Moroc- 
can ports  are  disagreeable  to  Germany. 

After  extolling  French  bravery  and  Spanish  cour- 
age at  length,  the  big  EngHsh  papers  draw  special 
attention  to  .articles  published  in  the  organs  of  the 
Viennese  press  which  they  surmise  reflect  the  secret 
aspirations  of  the  Friedrichstrasse  (sic  I)  ;  these  they 
endeavor  to  compare  with  the  statements,  couched 
in  a  less  sibylline  style,  which  are  printed  in  the 
principal  German  papers. 

Without  going  so  far  as  to  express  the  desire  that 
the  bombardment  of  Casablanca  be  followed  with 
the  same  results  for  Morocco  as  that  of  Alexandria, 
in  1882  had  for  Egypt,  the  English  press  points 
out  the  necessity  of  ensuring,  at  any  price,  the  re- 
establishment  of  order  and  the  safety  of  life  and 
property.  Only  the  Standard,  reflecting  on  this 
occasion  that  strong  desire  for  intervention  which 
is  dormant  in  the  British  soul,  is  astonished  at  the 
apathy  which  the  Government  is  displaying  in  face 
of  the  gravity  of  the  present  events.  It  regrets 
to  see  France  alone,  conjointly  with  Spain,  assume 
the  task  of  policing  and  complains  of  having  to  see 
England  satisfied  with  playing  a  minor  part. 

The  Daily  News,  which  is  resting  from  its  anti- 
Congo  campaign  only  in  order  to  erect  altars  to  the 
Russian  nihilists  and  the  Italian  anarchists,  is  get- 
ting excited,  rather  prematurely  it  seems  to  me, 
about  the  barbarous  oppression  at  Mazagan. 

The  Tribune,  the  organ  of  the  non-conformist 
ministers  and  the  radical  humanitarians,  melan- 
cholically  points  out  that  the  French  and  Spanish 
squadrons  bombarded  Casablanca  at  the  same  mo- 
ment that  the  Conference  at  the  Hague  adopted  a 
declaration  against  the  bombardment  of  open  ports. 

The  Westminster  Gazette,  which  represents  the 
views  of  the  moderate  element  of  the  party  in 
power,  after  alluding  to  the  conversations  of  M. 
Cambon  with  Prince  von  Biilow,  expresses  the  hope 
that  Europe  will  at  last  have  the  great  satisfaction 
of  seeing  France,  at  no  greater  price  than  the  lives 
of  half  a  dozen  marines,  obtain  more  elbow-room 
in  Morocco,  which  will  permit  her  to  carry  to  a 
successful  end  the  task  which  the  treaties  have  im- 
posed on  her. 

The  morning  papers  publish  without  comment 
news  relative  to  the  siege  of  the  British  consulate 
at  Casablanca,  and  report  the  desire  expressed  by 


47 


exprime  par  le  consul  britannique  de  Mazagan  de 
voir  les  personnes  et  les  biens  anglais  mis  sous  la 
protection  d'une  canonniere. 

Les  inquietudes  sur  le  sort  reserve  au  Kaid  Mac- 
Lean  se  sont  momentanement  assoupies  depuis 
qu'on  a  appris  qu'il  n'etait  plus  le  captif  de  Raisuli 
mais  sous  la  sauvegarde  des  Hkmass. 

J'aurai  soin  de  vous  tenir  au  fait  des  developpe- 
ments  que  pourraient  presenter  les  evenements  ac- 
tuels  en  tant  qu'affectant  les  interets  anglais,  et 
saisis,  etc. 

[s.]  E.  de  Cartier. 


the  British  Consul  at  Mazagan  to  see  English 
people  and  property  put  under  the  protection  of  a 
gun-boat. 

The  uneasiness  felt  concerning  the  fate  of  Kaid 
MacLean  has  momentarily  been  allayed  since  it  has 
been  learned  that  he  is  no  longer  the  captive  of 
Raisuli  but  is  under  the  protection  of  the  Hkmass. 

I  shall  take  care  to  keep  you  informed  of  the  de- 
velopments wfhich  the  present  events  may  take  in 
so  far  as  they  affect  the  interests  of  England,  and 
seize  the  opportunity,  etc.     .     .     . 

[Signed]  E.  de  Cartier. 


No.  38. 


No.  38. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  11  Octobre  1907. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  signaler  I'article  de  fond 
ci-joint,  qui  a  paru  dans  le  "Times"  d'hier,  au  sujet 
de  la  prochaine  visite  de  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne, 
et  qui  est  tres  commente.  Le  journal  precite  saisit 
I'occasion  pour  decocher  au  Prince  de  Btilowr  une 
serie  de  traits  aceres.  II  lui  reproche  de  feindre  un 
desir  sincere  de  rapprochement  avec  I'Angleterre, 
tout  en  encourageant  sous  main  la  presse  reptile 
dans  ses  attaques.  II  insinue  que  s'il  revient  en  ap- 
parence  a  de  meilleurs  sentiments  a  I'egard  de  la 
Grande-Bretagne,  c'est  uniquement  parce  que  I'en- 
tente  cordiale  entre  Londres  et  Paris  et  I'arrange- 
ment  anglo-russe  ont  ouvert  les  yeux  du  chancelier 
sur  la  forte  position  de  I'Angleterre.  Et  puis  la  flotte 
allemande  n'est  pas  prete. 

"Esperons  plutot,  ajoute  perfidement  le  "Times," 
que  Ton  regrette  a  Berlin  I'attitude  hostile  adoptee 
lors  de  la  guerre  des  Boers.  Nous  sommes  prets 
a  pardonner,  mais  pas  a  oublier  cet  incident,  pourvM 
que  le  repentir  soit  serieux,  ce  que  rien  dans  I'atti- 
tude allemande  au  Maroc  ou  a  la  Haye  n'a  prouve 
jusqu'ici.  S'il  veut  montrer  sa  sincerite,  que  le 
Chancelier  fasse  a  nos  amis  les  Frangais  des  avan- 
ces  analogues  a  celles  qu'il  nous  prodigue  aujour- 
d'hui.  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  dit  que  des  bonnes  re- 
lations entre  I'AUemagne  et  la  France  depend  I'ame- 
lioration  des  rapports  entre  I'AUemagne  et  I'Angle- 
terre." 

La  presse  liberale  condamne  ce  langage.  qu'elle 
qualifie  d'insolent  et  de  maladroit.  La  "Tribune" 
et  la  "Westminster  Gazette"  notamment  I'appre- 
cient  severement  et  afifirment  que  I'Empereur  sera 
bien  accueilli.  Quant  aux  socialistes,  ils  ont  an- 
nonce  qu'ils  se  chargent  de  montrer  au  Kaiser,  lors- 
qu'il  traversera  les  rues  de  Londres,  ce  que  I'ouvrier 
anglais  pense  de  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale,  mais  on  ne 
parait  pas  prendre  ces  menaces  au  serieux  et  on 
espere  que  les  mesures  de  precaution  seront  suffi- 
santes  pour  empecher  tout  incident. 

L'Empereur  et  I'lmperatrice  doivent  arriver  en 
Angleterre,  accompagnes  probablement  du  Prince 
de  Billow,  le  11  du  mois  prochain  et  logeront  a 
Windsor.  Le  13,  Leurs  Majestes  viendront  dejeu- 
ner chez  le  Lord  Maire  dans  la  Cite  pour  rentrer  en- 
suite  a  Windsor,  oii  Elles  feront  un  sejour  d'une 
huitaine  de  jours  en  tout. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

[s.]     -  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M,  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  October  11,  1907. 
Sir:— 

I  have  the  honor  to  draw  your  attention  to  the  en- 
closed editorial  article  on  the  impending  visit  of  the 
German  Emperor  which  appeared  in  yesterday's 
Times  and  is  being  much  discussed.  The  paper 
seizes  the  occasion  to  aim  a  number  of  sharp  blows 
at  Prince  von  Biilow.  It  accuses  him  of  feigning 
a  sincere  desire  for  a  rapprochement  with  England 
while  at  the  same  time,  under  hand,  encouraging 
the  attacks  of  the  reptile  press.  It  insinuates  that 
if  he  appeared  to  be  developing  more  sympathy  for 
Great  Britain,  it  was  only  because  the  entente  cor- 
diale between  London  and  Paris  and  the  Anglo- 
Russian  understanding  had  opened  the  Chancellor's 
eyes  to  England's  strong  position.  And  besides,  the 
German  fleet  was  not  ready. 

The  Times  adds  maliciously  that  it  hopes  that  the 
hostile  attitude  adopted  at  the  time  of  the  Boer 
War  was  being  regretted  at  Berlin.  The  English 
could  not  forget  but  were  ready  to  forgive  that  in- 
cident, provided  that  the  repentance  was  sincere, 
which  nothing  in  Germany's  attitude  in  Morocco 
or  at  the  Hague  had  yet  proven.  If  the  Chancellor 
wanted  to  show  his  sincerity  he  should  make  to 
Britain's  friends,  the  French,  advances  of  the  kind 
which  he  seemed  eager  to  press  in  words  upon  the 
English.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  declared  that  the 
improvement  of  the  relations  between  Germany  and 
England  was  conditional  on  good  relations  between 
Germany  and  France. 

The  liberal  press  condemns  this  language  which 
it  calls  insolent  and  bungling.  The  Tribune  and  the 
Westminster  Gazette  especially  criticize  it  se- 
verely and  affirm  that  the  Emperor  will  be  well 
received.  As  for  the  socialists,  they  have  announced 
that  they  are  going  to  show  the  Kaiser  when  he 
rides  through  the  streets  of  London,  what  the  Eng- 
lish laborer  thinks  of  his  Imperial  Majesty;  but 
these  threats  do  not  seem  to  be  taken  seriously  and 
it  is  hoped  that  sufficient  precautions  will  be  taken 
to  preclude  incidents. 

The  Emperor  and  the  Empress  are  to  arrive  in 
England,  probably  accompanied  by  Prince  von 
Biilow,  on  the  11th  of  next  month  and  they  will 
stay  at  Windsor.  On  the  13th,  their  Majesties  will 
take  luncheon  with  the  Lord  Mayor  in  the  city  and 
will  then  return  to  Windsor  where  they  will  remain 
for  about  a  week  altogether. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  39. 


No.  39. 


X.e  Baron  de  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 


Berlin,  le  27  Janvier  1908 


C'est  ce  matin  seulement  que  j'ai  eu  sous  les 
yeux  le  discours  prononce  a  la  chambre  des  deputes 
frangaise  par  M.  Delcasse.  Je  n'avais  pas  voulu 
vous  en  ecrire  aussi  longtemps  que  je  ne  le  connais- 
sais  que  par  des  resumes  telegraphiques  qui  n'en 
■donnaient  peut-etre  pas  une  idee  exacte.  Ce  dis- 
cours m'a  cause  une  impression  penible,  non  parce 
qu'apres  trois  ans  de  silence  M.  Delcasse  a  fait  I'e- 
loge  de  sa  propre  politique  (il  fallait  s'y  attendre), 
mais  a  cause  des  applaudissements  dont  il  a  ete  con- 
vert et  de  I'accueil  que  lui  a  fait  la  presse,  surtout 
celle  de  Londres.  Le  discours  fourmiUe  d'allusions 
blessantes  pour  I'Allemagne.  II  y  est  dit  que  le 
gouvernement  Imperial  n'ayant  pas  de  pretexte  pour 
une  intervention  dans  les  afifaires  marocaines  devait 
avoir  ses  raisons.  II  y  avait  que  I'Europe  echap- 
pait  a  une  sorte  d'hegemonie  et  dans  I'Europe  libe- 
ree,  il  y  avait  la  France  autour  de  qui  se  serraient 
tous  les  peuples  qui  avaient  a  coeur  I'independance 
de  I'Europe  et  voulaient  consolider  cette  indepen- 
dance. 

Ovi  M.  Delcasse  a-t-il  vu  que  I'Allemagne  tentat 
d'imposer  sa  suprematie  aux  autres  peuples  euro- 
peens?  Nous  sommes  ses  tres  proches  voisins  et  de- 
puis  vingt  ans  je  n'ai  jamais  constate  chez  le  gou- 
vernement Imperial  la  moindre  velleite  d'abuser  de 
sa  force  et  de  notre  faiblesse.  Je  souhaiterais  que 
toutes  les  autres  grandes  puissances  eussent  use  des 
memes  menagements  envers  nous. 

M.  Delcasse  dit  que  I'Allemagne  n'a  jamais  eu  le 
projet  de  faire  la  guerre  a  propos  du  Maroc.  C'est 
vrai;  mais  au  lieu  d'attribuer  cette  moderation  aux 
sentiments  pacifiques  de  I'Empereur,  il  en  voit  la 
cause  dans  ce  que  la  France  avait  pour  elle  la  ma- 
jorite  des  grandes  puissances,  I'opinion  du  monde, 
des  amities  puissantes,  une  alliance  fidele  et  tout 
d'abord  la  confiance  en  soi. 

En  d'autres  termes,  M.  Delcasse  se  vante  d'avoir 
preserve  la  paix  du  monde  grace  a  la  campagne  me- 
nee  par  lui  de  concert  avec  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  pour 
isoler  I'Allemagne. 

M.  Delcasse  dit  qu'il  ne  faut  pas  laisser  defigurer 
une  politique  etrangere  (la  sienne)  qui  a  par  deux 
fois  conserve  la  paix  a  I'Europe. 

Dans  quelles  circonstances?  Quand  le  repos  de 
I'Europe  a-t-il  ete  menace  sinon  par  les  idees  de  re- 
vanche frangaises? 

Dans  son  numero  90  d'hier  la  "Gazette  de  Colo- 
gne" a  public  un  telegramme  de  Berlin  d'origine  evi- 
demment  officieuse  dans  lequel  je  vous  prie  de  re- 
marquer  le  passage  oii  il  est  dit  qu'on  laisse  au  gou- 
vernement frangais  et  aux  Frangais  eux-memes  le 
soin  de  juger  si  le  moment  est  bien  choisi  pour  ra- 
viver  d'anciennes  querelles.  Le  correspondant  offi- 
cieux  eut  prefere  n'y  pas  toucher,  lorsque  la  ques- 
tion marocaine  est  encore  au  centre  de  I'actualite 
et  peut  de  nouveau  donner  lieu  a  bien  des  pourpar- 
lers entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  qui  ne  seront 
pas  facilites  par  le  fait  qu'un  homme  politique  aussi 
eminent  que  M.  Delcasse  met  en  vibration  des  cor- 
des  franchement  chauvines. 

Le  langage  du  telegramme  oflfiicieux  est  aussi 
calme  que  possible.  II  est  d'autant  plus  significatif 
que  M.  Delcasse  reproche  au  gouvernement  fran- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  January  27,  1908. 

Sir:— 

Only  this  morning  I  saw^  for  the  first  time  the 
speech  which  M.  Delcasse  made  in  the  French 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  I  did  not  want  to  write  to 
you  about  it  as  long  as  I  was  only  acquainted  with 
it  through  telegraphic  resumes  which  might  not  per- 
haps give  a  correct  idea  of  it.  This  speech  has  made 
a  painful  impression  on  me,  not  because  after  three 
years  of  silence  M.  Delcasse  praised  his  own  policy 
(that  was  to  be  expected),  but  because  of  the 
plaudits  which  he  received  and  the  reception  which 
he  was  given  by  the  press,  above  all  that  of  Lon- 
don. The  speech  is  full  of  allusions  offensive  to 
Germany.  M.  Delcasse  .says  in  it  that  while  the 
Imperial  Government  had  had  no  pretext  to  offer 
for  its  intervention  in  the  Moroccan  affairs  it  surely 
had  had  its  reasons:  it  feared  that  Europe  was  go- 
ing to  escape  from  a  kind  of  [German]  hegemony 
and  that  in  a  liberated  Europe  the  nations  which 
had  her  independence  at  heart  and  wished  to  see  it 
strengthened  would  rally  around  France. 

Where  has  M.  Delcasse  seen  Germany  endeavor- 
ing to  impose  her  supremacy  on  other  nations? 
We  are  her  close  neighbors,  but  for  twenty  years  I 
have  never  observed  in  the  Imperial  Government 
the  slightest  desire  to  abuse  its  strength  and  our 
weakness.  I  wish  that  all  the  other  Great  Powers 
had  used  the  same  consideration  towards  us. 

M.  Delcasse  said  that  Germany  never  had  any 
intention  of  waging  war  on  account  of  Morocco. 
That  is  true ;  but  instead  of  attributing  this  moder- 
ation to  the  peaceful  sentiments  of  the  Emperor, 
he  sees  the  reason  for  it  in  the  fact  that  France 
had  in  her  favor  the  majority  of  the  Great  Powers, 
the  opinion  of  the  world,  powerful  friendships,  a 
faithful  ally,  and  above  all,  confidence  in  herself. 

In  other  words,  M.  Delcasse  boasts  that  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  peace  of  the  world  is  due  to  the  cam- 
paign conducted  by  himself  together  with  the  King 
of  England  with  the  aim  of  isolating  Germany. 

M.  Delcasse  said  that  one  ought  not  to  permit  the 
condemnation  of  a  foreign  policy  (his  own)  which 
had  twice  preserved  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Under  what  circumstances  ?  When  was  the  peace 
of  Europe  menaced  except  by  the  French  ideas  of 
revenge  ? 

In  its  issue  of  yesterday,  No.  90,  the  Cologne  Ga- 
zette published  a  telegram  from  Berlin,  evidently  of 
semi-official  origin,  in  which  I  ask  you  to  note  the 
passage  which  says  that  it  must  be  left  to  the 
French  Government  and  to  the  French  people  to 
judge  whether  the  moment  for  reviving  old  quarrels 
was  well  chosen.  The  semi-official  correspondent 
thinks  it  would  have  been  better  not  to  touch  on 
them  at  a  time  when  the  Moroccan  question  was 
still  in  the  centre  of  interest  and  might  again  lead 
to  all  kinds  of  pourparlers  between  France  and 
Germany:  these  would  not  be  made  easier  if  so 
prominent  a  politician  as  M.  Delcasse  struck  notes 
plainly  chauvinistic  in  tone. 

The  language  of  the  semi-official  telegram  is  as 
controlled  as  it  can  possibly  be.  This  is  all  the 
more  significant  because  M.  Delcasse  reproaches  the 


49 


Qais  de  n'avoir  pas  suffisamment  tire  parti  des  proto- 
coles  d'Algesiras  et  demande  qui  comprendrait  les 
defaillances  de  la  France  en  presence  de  la  position 
reconquise  par  ce  pays  et  lorsqu'il  s'agit  de  son  ave- 
nir  comme  grande  puissance. 

Le  discours  de  M.  Delcasse  equivaut  a  une  exhor- 
tation de  reprendre  sa  politique  dont  son  successeur 
ne  s'est  pourtant  ecarte  que  par  des  nuances  de 
forme  et  a  lui  en  confier  de  nouveau  la  direction. 

Les  deputes  qui  I'ont  applaudi  sont  les  memes 
qui  I'ont  laisse  tomber  il  y  a  trois  ans  parce  qu'ils 
le  trouvaient  temeraire.  S'imaginent-ils  qu'il  y  a 
quelque  chose  de  change  en  Allemagne?  Croient-ils 
la  Russie  suffisamment  guerie  pour  leur  venir  effi- 
cacement  en  aide?  Speculent-ils  sur  la  faiblesse  de 
la  majorite  gouvernementale  au  Reichstag,  sur  le 
mauvais  etat  des  finances  de  i'Empire  et  de  la 
Prusse,  sur  le  malaise  cause  par  la  crise  financiere 
et  la  cherte  des  vivres,  sur  les  recriminations  contre 
la  Prusse  qui  se  produisent  dans  la  presse  et  parfois 
dans  les  parlements  des  etats  du  midi,  specialement 
en  Baviere? 

S'il  en  est  ainsi,  ils  se  livrent  aux  illusions  les 
plus  dangereuses.  J'etais  en  Baviere  en  1870. 
L'hostilite  contre  la  Prusse  y  etait  bien  autrement 
intense  qu'aujourd'hui,  on  etait  encore  tout  meurtri 
de  la  defaite  de  1866.  Tout  a  ete  oublie  le  jour  ou  il 
a  fallu  tenir  tete  a  I'ennemi  commun.  II  en  serait 
encore  de  meme  a  plus  forte  raison.  Le  particu- 
larisrae  est  toujours  tres  vivace  et  le  restera;  mais 
il  n'y  a  pas  un  seul  Allemand  qui  voudrait  revenir 
a  I'isolement  et  a  I'impuissance  d'autrefois. 

En  terminant,  je  dois  encore  faire  remarquer  que 
les  eloges  prodigues  par  les  journaux  anglais  a  M. 
Delcasse  montrent  ce  qu'il  faut  penser  du  recent 
rapprochement  entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre. 

La  politique  dirigee  par  le  Roi  Edouard  VII  sous 
le  pretexte  de  garantir  I'Europe  du  peril  allemzind 
imaginaire  a  cree  un  danger  frangais  trop  r6el  et  qui 
nous  menace  en  premiere  ligne. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


French  Government  for  not  having  taken  sufficient 
advantage  of  the  protocols  of  Algeciras  and  asks, 
who  would  understand  how  France,  now  that  she 
had  recovered  her  position,  could  take  such  a  weak 
stand  in  a  matter  involving  her  future  as  a  Great 
Power. 

M.  Delcasse's  speech  is  tantamount  to  an  exhorta- 
tion to  revert  to  his  policy — from  which  that  of  his 
successor  has  not  deviated  except  in  slight  differ- 
ences of  form — and  to  put  the  direction  of  this 
policy  again  in  his  hands. 

The  deputies  who  applauded  him  are  the  same 
who  dropped  him  three  years  ago  because  they  con- 
sidered him  too  rash.  Do  they  imagine  that  there 
has  been  any  change  in  Germany?  Do  they  believe 
that  Russia  has  recovered  sufficiently  to  give  them 
eflfectual  aid?  Are  they  counting  on  the  weakness 
of  the  Government  majority  in  the  Reichstag,  on 
the  poor  state  of  the  finances  of  the  Empire  and  of 
Prussia,  on  the  uneasiness  caused  by  the  financial 
crisis  and  high  food-prices,  on  the  recriminations 
against  Prussia  which  are  sometimes  made  in  the 
press  and  in  the  parliaments  of  the  Southern  States 
of  Germany,  especially  in  Bavaria? 

If  that  is  the  case,  they  are  indulging  in  the  most 
dangerous  illusions.  I  was  in  Bavaria  in  1870.  The 
hostility  against  Prussia  was  much  more  intense 
at  that  time  than  it  is  to-day ;  they  were  still  smart- 
ing from  the  defeat  of  186(5.  Yet  everything  was 
forgotten  on  the  day  when  it  was  necessary  to  face 
the  common  enemy.  This  still  holds  good  to-day 
and  to  a  far  greater  degree.  Particularism  is  still 
very  strong  and  will  remain  so ;  but  there  is  no 
longer  a  single  German  who  would  like  to  return 
to  the  isolation  and  impotence  of  former  times. 

In  conclusion  I  would  like  to  remark  that  the 
praises  showered  on  M.  Delcasse  by  the  English 
papers  show  what  is  to  be  thought  of  the  recent 
rapprochement  between  Germany  and  England. 

The  policy  directed  by  King  Edward  VII  under 
the  pretext  of  guarding  Europe  from  the  imaginary 
German  peril  has  created  a  French  danger  which  is 
only  too  real  and  which  is  a  menace,  above  all,  to  us. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  27-30  Janvier  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Les  evenements  qui  se  succedent  au  Maroc  tien- 
nent  I'opinion  publique  en  eveil  et  fournissent  aux 
membres  de  I'opposition  I'occasion  de  harceler  le 
Gouvernement  de  reproches.  La  Chambre  a  com- 
mence vendredi  dernier  et  terminera  lundi  ou  mardi 
prochain  I'examen  des  interpellations  sur  les  affaires 
marocaines.  M.  Jaures,  qui  avait  suspendu  depuis 
quelques  mois  ses  attaques  contre  M.  Clemenceau, 
a  pris  le  premier  la  parole  pour  critiquer  la  politique 
marocaine  du  Gouvernement  et  pour  proposer  I'a- 
bandon  de  toute  action  au  Maroc,  c'est-a-dire  I'abdi- 
cation  de  la  France.  M.  Jaures  ne  semble  tenir  au- 
cun  compte  de  la  dignite  nationale,  tandis  que  I'opi- 
nion publique  et  la  majorite  de  la  Chambre,  qui  ne 
sont  pourtant  ni  I'une  ni  I'autre  favorables  a  une 
aventure  marocaine,  sont  nettement  hostiles  a  une 


Paris,  January  27-30,  1908. 
Sir  :— 

The  events  which  are  following  one  another  at 
Morocco  are  keeping  public  opinion  on  the  alert  and 
are  furnishing  the  members  of  the  opposition  with 
the  opportunity  of  harassing  the  Government  with 
reproaches.  The  Chamber  began  the  examination 
of  the  interpellations  on  the  Moroccan  affairs  last 
Friday  and  will  finish  it  next  Monday  or  Tuesday. 
M.  Jaures,  who  has  refrained  from  attacks  on  M. 
Clemenceau  for  several  months,  was  the  first  to 
seize  the  opportunity  of  criticizing  the  Moroccan 
policy  of  the  Government  and  of  proposing  the 
abandonment  of  all  action  at  Morocco,  that  is  to 
say  the  abdication  of  France.  M.  Jaures  does  not 
seem  to  take  national  dignity  into  consideration, 
whereas  public  opinion  and  the  majority  in  the 
Chamber,  though  not  in  favor  of  a  Moroccan  ad- 


politique  d'abdication.  M.  Ribot  dans  une  mordante 
et  energique  replique  aux  arguments  du  leader  so- 
cialiste  a  expose  les  raisons  de  dignite,  d'interet  et 
d'honneur  national  qui  obligent  la  France  a  pour- 
suivre  I'oeuvre  marocaine.  M.  Ribot,  en  y  ajoutant 
quelques  conseils  de  prudence,  approuve  au  fond 
I'attitude  du  Gouvernement  au  Maroc. 

Le  fait  le  plus  important  et  le  plus  inattendu  de 
la  seance  de  vendredi  a  ete  I'intervention  de  M.  Del- 
casse.  L'ancien  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres, 
tombe  en  juin  1905  dans  les  circonstances  tragiques 
qui  sont  encore  a  la  memoire  de  tous,  s'etait  abstenu 
jusqu'  ici  avec  autant  de  tact  que  de  patriotisme  de 
chercher  a  se  justifier  et  son  silence  avait  ete  appre- 
cie  autant  ici  qu'au  dela  des  frontieres  de  I'Est. 

On  se  demande  si  c'est  fortuitement  ou  avec  pre- 
meditation que  M.  Delcasse  est  intervenu  dans  le 
debat.  Le  fait  est  que,  sur  une  allusion  faite  par 
M.  Jaures,  il  a  demande  la  parole  et  a  prononce  un 
discours  qui  a  fait  sensation.  Certes,  bien  des  rai- 
sons personnelles  pouvaient  engager  M.  Delcasse  a 
profiter  d'une  occasion  pour  parler  a  tous  ceux  qui 
poursuivent  encore  aujourd'hui  sa  politique  generale 
apres  I'avoir  abandonne  et  maltraite  depuis  le  jour 
ou  sa  retraite  avait  ete  decretee  comme  un  sacrifice 
national.  En  faisant  I'historique  des  amities  qui  se 
sont  groupees  autour  de  la  France  sous  son  admi- 
nistration, il  s'est  attribue  tout  le  merite  d'une  situa- 
tion nouvelle  qui,  d'apres  lui,  rendait  la  guerre  avec 
I'Allemagne  impossible.  Le  Frangais  chauvin  s'est 
rallie  avec  enthousiasme  a  cette  affirmation  sans  se 
demander  1.)  si  le  groupement  nouveau  des  Puis- 
sances n'est  pas  le  resultat  d'un  vaste  programme 
admirablement  congu  a  Londres  et  dans  I'execution 
duquel  M.  Delcasse  a  beaucoup  plus  ete  un  instru- 
ment qu'un  initiateur?  2.)  si  son  affirmation  que  la 
resistance  aux  pretentions  de  I'Allemagne  en  1905 
et  le  refus  d'aller  a  Algesiras  n'eussent  pas  amene 
la  guerre  est  fondee?  C'est  la  une  opinion  qu'il  est 
facile  pour  I'ex-ministre  d'avancer  aujourd'hui  pour 
soulever  en  sa  faveur  les  sentiments  patriotiques  de 
ceux  qui  ont  soufifert  de  I'humiliation  subie  en  1905. 
Mais  cela  n'empeche  que  tous  ceux  qui  ont  acclame 
hier  M.  Delcasse  avaient  au  moment  de  sa  chute 
une  appreciation  bien  dififerente  du  resultat  de  sa 
politique  et  aucun  d'eux  ne  lui  a  tendu  la  main  ou 
n'a  ose  proferer  une  parole  pour  sa  defense  lorsqu'il 
a  ete  immole. 

Si  M.  Delcasse  a  reussi  en  faisant  habilement  vi- 
brer  la  note  patriotique  a  obtenir  un  succes  person- 
nel notoire,  on  se  demande  s'il  n'a  pas  commis  une 
grosse  faute  politique  en  ravivant  des  incidents  de- 
Hcats  et  en  risquant  de  provoquer  de  nouvelles  et 
dangereuses  polemiques  dans  la  presse  etrangere. 
On  voit  du  reste  deja  combien  son  discours  est  ap- 
precie  en  Angleterre  et  combien  il  est  critique  en 
Allemagne. 

La  note  officieuse  de  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  est 
une  riposte  qui  a  deja  fait  comprendre  ici  combien 
etait  deplace  I'elan  d'enthousiasme  qui  s'est  mani- 
feste  vendredi  a  la  suite  des  paroles  de  M.  Delcasse. 
On  estime  done  que  M.  Delcasse  eOit  agi  sagement 
en  continuant  a  se  renfermer  dans  un  prudent  si- 
lence. 

M.  Pichon  en  repondant  mardi  aux  diverses  in- 
terpellations se  bornera  sans  doute  a  indiquer  la  po- 
litique que  le  Gouvernement  compte  suivre  au  Ma- 
roc, et  sans  vouloir  s'engager  a  la  suite  de  M.  Del- 
casse dans  la  discussion  du  passe  il  jugera  peut-etre 
utile  d'attenuer  I'impression  produite  a  I'etranger 
par  certaines  de  ses  affirmations. 


Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 
[s.] 


Leghait. 


venture,  are  decidedly  opposed  to  a  policy  of  abdi- 
cation. M.  Ribot  in  a  biting  and  powerful  reply  to 
the  arguments  of  the  Socialist  leader  set  forth  that 
considerations  of  dignity,  interest,  and  national 
honor  were  obliging  France  to  continue  her  Mo- 
roccan task.  Aside  from  a  few  admonitions  to  be 
prudent,  M.  Ribot  on  the  whole  endorsed  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Government  in  regard  to  Morocco. 

The  most  important  and  the  most  unexpected 
incident  at  Friday's  session  was  the  intervention 
of  M.  Delcasse.  Ever  since  his  fall  in  June,  1905, 
the  tragic  circumstances  of  which  are  still  remem- 
bered by  everyone,  the  former  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  has  abstained  with  as  much  tact  as  patriot- 
ism from  attempting  to  justify  himself,  and  his  si- 
lence has  been  appreciated  here  as  well  as  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Eastern  frontier. 

It  may  be  questioned  as  to  whether  M.  Delcasse 
intervened  in  the  debate  spontaneously  or  with  pre- 
meditation. The  fact  is  that  he  asked  for  permis- 
sion to  speak  after  an  allusion  made  by  M.  Jaures 
and  he  made  a  speech  which  created  a  sensation. 
There  certainly  are  quite  a  number  of  personal  rea- 
sons which  may  have  caused  M.  Delcasse  to  seize 
the  opportunity  to  address  all  those  who  are  still 
follovrtng  his  general  policy  after  abandoning  and 
maltreating  him  from  the  day  on  which  his  resigna- 
tion was  decided  on  as  a  national  sacrifice.  In  giv- 
ing an  account  of  the  friendships  which  France  ac- 
quired during  his  administration,  he  took  all  the 
credit  to  himself  for  a  new  situation  which,  accord- 
ing to  him,  made  war  with  Germany  impossible. 
The  French  chauvinists  received  this  statement 
with  enthusiasm  without  asking  themselves:  (1) 
whether  the  new  grouping  of  the  Powers  is  not  the 
result  of  a  vast  programme  admirably  conceived  at 
London  and  in  the  execution  of  which  M.  Delcasse 
was  much  more  a  tool  than  an  initiator;  (2) 
whether  he  is  right  when  he  says  that  resistance 
to  the  German  demands  in  1905  and  refusal  to  go  to 
Algeciras  would  not  have  led  to  war.  This  is  an 
opinion  which  it  is  easy  for  the  ex-Minister  to  ad- 
vance to-day  in  order  to  arouse  in  his  favor  the 
patriotic  sentiments  of  those  who  suffered  under 
the  humiliation  of  1905.  But  that  changes  nothing 
in  the  fact  that  all  those  who  acclaimed  M.  Delcasse 
yesterday  had  at  the  moment  of  his  fall  a  very  dif- 
ferent conception  of  the  results  of  his  policy.  Not 
one  of  them  lent  him  a  helping  hand  or  said  a  word 
in  his  defence  when  he  was  sacrificed. 

Though  M.  Delcasse  has  succeeded  by  skillfully 
sounding  the  patriotic  note  in  scoring  a  decided  per- 
sonal success,  it  may  be  asked  whether  he  has  not 
committed  a  great  political  mistake  in  reviving 
delicate  incidents  and  in  running  the  risk  of  calling 
forth  new  and  dangerous  polemics  in  the  foreign 
press.  It  may  already  be  seen  how  much  his  speech 
is  appreciated  in  England  and  how  much  it  is  criti- 
cized in  Germany. 

The  semi-official  notice  in  the  Cologne  Gazette 
is  a  retort  which  has  already  made  people  realize 
here  how  out  of  place  the  outburst  of  enthusiasm 
was  which  was  evoked  by  M.  Delcasse's  speech' on 
Friday;  and  it  is  thought  that  M.  Delcasse  would 
have  been  better  advised  if  he  had  continued  to 
wrap  himself  in  discreet  silence. 

In  his  reply  on  Tuesday  to  the  various  inter- 
pellations, M.  Pichon  will  doubtless  confine  him- 
self to  indicating  the  policy  which  the  Government 
intends  to  follow  in  Morocco  and,  without  allowing 
himself  to  be  drawn  into  a  discussion  of  the  past, 
he  will  perhaps  see  fit  to  mitigate  the  impression 
produced  abroad  by  some  of  M.  Delcasse's  state- 
ments. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  A.  Leghait. 


No.  41. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  29  Janvier  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Comme  suite  a  men  rapport  d'avant-hier  j'ai 
rhonneur  d'appeler  votre  attention  sur  un  nouveau 
telegramme  de  Berlin  insere  dans  le  numero  98  de 
la  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  d'hier  et  dont  I'origine  oflft- 
cieuse  n'est  pas  douteuse. 

La  Gazette  constate  que  le  deuxieme  jour  du  de- 
bat  sur  le  Maroc,  a  la  chambre  frangaise,  n'a  pas  eu 
le  caractere  orageux  que  M.  Delcasse  avait  imprime 
au  premier.  Tous  les  orateurs  se  sont  exprimes 
avec  moderation  et  il  semble  que  les  deputes  qui 
avaient  frenetiquement  applaudi  I'ancien  Ministre 
des  affaires  etrangeres  dans  la  seance  de  vendredi 
eprouvaient  une  certaine  gene  de  la  violence  a  la- 
quelle  celui-ci  s'etait  livre. 

La  Gazette  dit  que  M.  Pichon  a  evite  d'attaquer 
M.  Delcasse  plus  qu'il  n'etait  necessaire.  II  s'est 
borne  a  desavouer  la  politique  de  sabreur  preconisee 
par  son  predecesseur  et  a  afifirmer,  comme  il  I'a  deja 
fait  souvent,  que  la  France  veut  se  renfermer  stric- 
tement  dans  les  limites  tracees  par  I'acte  d'Algesi- 
ras. 

Je  ne  peux  pas  m'associer  a  ce  jugement.  II  me 
parait  au  contraire  que  M.  Pichon  a  tres  durement 
fait  la  legon  a  M.  Delcasse. 

Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  le  telegramme  offlcieux  cons- 
tate avec  satisfaction  que  le  discours  de  M.  Pichon 
a  aussi  ete  convert  d'applaudissements  provenant 
en  partie  des  memes  bancs  d'oii  Ton  avait  acclame 
M.  Delcasse. 

La  Gazette  dit  que  le  ton  provocateur  de  M.  Del- 
casse n'avait  pas  pu  passer  inapergu  en  Allemagne. 
Elle  se  felicite  d'autant  plus  du  calme  dont  ont  fait 
preuve  -les  journaux  allemands  que  la  presse  fran- 
qaise  revient  aussi  a  des  appreciations  plus  mode- 
rees.  Des  organes  de  plus  en  plus  nombreux  ma- 
nifestent  leurs  objections  centre  la  politique  d'aven- 
tures  preconisee  par  M.  Delcasse.  II  est  done  a 
esperer  qu'il  n'aura  pas  cause  un  mal  durable. 

Le  telegramme  officieux  note  encore  que  les  jour- 
naux des  pays  qui  ont  les  relations  les  plus  amicales 
avec  la  France  sont  loin  d'etre  enchantes  des  sorties 
de  M.  Delcasse.  Deja  en  Angleterre  des  journaux 
les  condamnent.  La  presse  italienne  et  espagnole 
est  encore  plus  severe.  On  a  declare  dans  les  deux 
pays  qu'on  n'est  pas  dispose  a  suivre  la  France  dans 
la  politique  d'aventures  ou  M.  Delcasse  voudrait  la 
pousser.  On  I'a  dit  avec  une  nettete  qui  a  peut-etre 
aussi  contribue  au  triomphe  d'une  appreciation  plus 
calme  de  la  situation. 

Cette  conclusion  du  telegramme  ofificieux  est  re- 
digee  en  termes  tres  concis;  a  dessein  sans  doute 
pour  lui  enlever  tout  caractere  blessant.  Que  peut- 
elle  signifier  sinon  que  le  discours  de  M.  Delcasse 
a  ete  applaudi  parce  qu'il  repond  aux  aspirations  in- 
times  des  Frangais  tous  assoiffes  de  revanche  qu'ils 
I'avouent  ou  non  et  que  les  paroles  de  M.  Pichon 
ont  ete  acclamees  par  les  memes  deputes  parce  que 
du  vendredi  au  lundi  ils  ont  eu,  avec  I'aide  de  la 
presse  etrangere,  le  temps  de  reflechir  au  danger  de 
manifester  de  pareils  sentiments  quand  on  n'est  pas 
pret  a  passer  immediatement  a  Taction. 


Berlin,  January  29,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  pursuance  of  my  report  of  the  day  before  yes- 
terday I  have  the  honor  to  call  your  attention  to 
another  telegram  from  Berlin  in  issue  98  of  the 
Cologne  Gazette  of  yesterday,  the  official  origin  of 
which  is  unquestionable. 

The  Gazette  states  that  the  second  day  of  the 
Moroccan  debate  in  the  French  Chamber  did  not 
have  the  stormy  character  which  M.  Delcasse  had 
given  to  the  first.  All  the  speakers  expressed  them- 
selves with  moderation,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the 
deputies  who  had  frantically  applauded  the  former 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Friday's  session  were 
feeling  a  certain  amount  of  shame  at  the  violence 
in  which  M.  Delcasse  had  indulged. 

The  Gazette  says  that  M.  Pichon  avoided  attack- 
ing M.  Delcasse  any  more  than  was  necessary.  He 
confined  himself  to  disavowing  the  swashbuckling 
policy  recommended  by  his  predecessor  and  to  af- 
firming, as  he  had  frequently  done,  that  France 
wished  to  keep  strictly  within  the  limits  defined  by 
the  act  of  Algeciras. 

I  cannot  share  this  opinion.  It  seems  to  me  on 
the  contrary  that  M.  Pichon  rebuked  M.  Delcasse 
very  severely. 

However  that  may  be,  the  semi-official  telegram 
states  with  satisfaction  that  M.  Pichon's  speech  was 
also  received  with  applause,  coming  in  part  from  the 
same  benches  from  which  M.  Delcasse  had  been 
acclaimed. 

The  Gazette  says  that  M.  Delcasse's  challenging 
tone  could  not  pass  unnoticed  in  Germany.  It  con- 
gratulates itself  all  the  more  on  the  calmness  which 
the  German  papers  had  manifested  because  the 
the  French  press  was  likewise  reverting  to  a  more 
moderate  point  of  view.  An  increasing  number  of 
organs  were  objecting  to  the  adventurous  policy  re- 
commended by  M.  Delcasse.  It  was,  therefore,  to 
be  hoped  that  he  had  not  caused  any  lasting  harm. 

The  semi-official  telegram  also  notes  that  the 
papers  of  the  countries  which  were  on  the  most 
friendly  terms  with  France  were  far  from  delighted 
with  M.  Delcasse's  outbursts.  Several  papers  in 
England  were  already  condemning  it.  The  Italian 
and  the  Spanish  press  were  even  more  severe.  It 
had  been  declared  in  both  of  these  countries  that  no 
one  was  disposed  to  follow  France  in  the  adventur- 
ous policy  into  which  M.  Delcasse  wished  to  force 
her.  This  had  been  said  with  a  distinctness  which 
had  perhaps  also  contributed  to  the  triumph  of  a 
calmer  view  of  the  situation. 

This  conclusion  of  the  semi-official  telegram  is 
couched  in  very  concise  terms,  doubtless  with  the 
purpose  of  eliminating  everything  offensive.  What 
could  it  mean  but  that  M.  Delcasse's  speech  was 
applauded  because  it  corresponds  with  the  secret 
aspirations  of  the  French  who  are  filled  with  desires 
of  revenge  whether  they  acknowledge  it  or  not,  and 
that  the  words  of  M.  Pichon  were  acclaimed  by  the 
same  deputies  because  from  Friday  to  Monday  they 
had  the  opportunity,  with  the  aid  of  the  foreign 
press,  to  reflect  on  the  danger  of  manifesting  such 
sentiments  without  being  ready  to  take  action  im- 
mediately. 


Meme  si  Ton  n'admet  pas  que  la  prudence  ait  in- 
fluence le  revirement  de  la  chambre  frangaise,  il  n'est 
pas  rassurant  de  constater  que  la  paix  du  monde 
est  a  la  merci  de  deputes  incapables  et  versatiles 
au  point  de  se  dejuger  en  matiere  aussi  grave,  d'une 
seance  a  I'autre. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


If  one  does  not  admit  that  prudence  influenced 
the  sudden  change  in  the  French  Chamber  it  is  any- 
thing but  reassuring  to  note  that  the  peace  of  the 
world  is  at  the  mercy  of  deputies  so  incapable  and 
vacillating  as  to  change  their  opinion  in  such  a 
grave  matter  from  one  meeting  to  another. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  42. 


No.  42. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  2  Fevrier  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Par  mon  rapport  du  19  novembre  dernier  j'ai  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  envoyer  le  projet  de  loi  reduisant 
la  duree  du  service  des  navires  de  guerre.  Les  jour- 
naux  vous  auront  appris  que  ce  projet  a  ete  vote 
il  y  a  deux  jours  par  le  Reichstag  et  que  seul  M.  Be- 
bel  I'a  combattu. 

Cette  unanimite  confirme  les  conclusions  de  mon 
rapport  precite  et  fait  voir  mieux  que  toutes  les  en- 
trevues  de  souverains  et  tous  les  discours  officiels 
quel  est  I'etat  veritable  des  relations  entre  I'Alle- 
magne  et  I'Angleterre.  Personne  n'a  jamais  eu  ici 
I'idee  absurde  et  irrealisable  d'une  agression  contra 
I'Angleterre;  mais  tout  le  monde  eprouve  la  crainte 
d'une  agression  anglaise.  C'est  la  raison  pour  la- 
quelle  le  Reichstag  a  vote  sans  sourciller  une  enorme 
augmentation  de  depenses  pour  la  marine  de  guerre 
quoique  le  budget  de  I'Empire  souffre  d'un  deficit 
qu'on  ne  sait  pas  comment  combler  et  que  les  finan- 
ces de  la  Prusse  soient  en  tout  aussi  mauvais  etat. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  February  2,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  my  report  of  November  19th  I  had  the  honor 
to  send  you.  the  draft  of  the  law  reducing  the  term 
of  service  of  battle-ships.  The  papers  will  have  in- 
formed you  that  this  plan  was  accepted  by  the 
Reichstag  two  days  ago  and  that  only  Mr.  Bebel 
opposed  it. 

This  unanimity  confirms  the  conclusions  drawn 
in  the  above-mentioned  report  and  shows  better 
than  all  the  rneetings  of  sovereigns  and  officials 
speeches  what  is  the  true  state  of  the  relations  be- 
tween Germany  and  England.  No  one  ever  cher- 
ished the  absurd  and  impracticable  idea  here  of  an 
attack  against  England;  but  everybody  fears  an 
English  attack.  That  is  the  reason  why  the  Reich- 
stag voted  without  wincing  the  enormous  increase 
in  the  naval  estimates  although  the  budget  of  the 
Empire  is  sufifering  from  a  deficit  which  no  one 
knows  how  to  cover,  and  although  the  Prussian 
finances  are  in  quite  as  poor  a  condition. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  43. 


No.  43. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  28  Mars  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Par  mon  rapport  du  2  fevrier  dernier  j'ai  eu  I'hon- 
neur de  vous  ecrire  que  I'accueil  fait  par  le  Reichstag 
au  projet  reduisant  la  duree  du  service  des  navires 
de  guerre  montrait  mieux  que  tous  les  discours  offi- 
ciels et  toutes  les  entrevues  de  souverains  quel  est 
I'etat  veritable  des  relations  entre  TAlIemagne  et 
I'Angleterre.  Le  projet  constitue  une  augmentation 
du  materiel  de  la  marine  militaire,  accompagnee 
d'une  nouvelle  charge  financiere  des  plus  difficiles  a 
supporter  dans  un  moment  oii  le  budget  de  I'Empire 
souflfre  d'un  deficit  que  personne  ne  sait  comment 
combler.  On  ne  s'y  resigne  que  parce  qu'on  se  croit 
oblige  de  mettre  tout  en  oeuvre  pour  se  preserver 
d'une  agression  possible  de  la  part  de  I'Angleterre. 
II  y  a  quelques  annees  encore  le  developpement  de 
la  marine  de  guerre  rencontrait  de  nombreux  adver- 
saires.  II  n'en  a  plus  aujourd'hui  que  parmi  les  so- 
cialistes. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 

Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  March  28,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  my  report  of  February  2nd,  I  had  the  honor 
to  write  to  you  that  the  reception  given  by  the 
Reichstag  to  the  plan  of  reducing  the  term  of  ser- 
vice of  the  warships  showed  better  than  all  official 
speeches  and  all  meetings  of  sovereigns  what  is  the 
real  state  of  the  relations  between  Germany  and 
England.  The  plan  involves  an  increase  in  the  ma- 
terial of  the  fleet,  accompanied  by  a  new  financial 
burden  which  is  especially  difficult  to  carry  at  a 
moment  when  the  budget  of  the  Empire  is  suffer- 
ing from  a  deficit  which  no  one  knows  how  to  cover. 
It  is  accepted  because  it  is  believed  necessary  to 
do  everything  possible  to  guard  against  a  possible 
attack  on  the  part  of  England.  Only  a  few  years 
ago  the  development  of  the  fleet  had  numerous  op- 
ponents. To-day  there  are  such  only  among  the 
sociaHsts. 


Hier  encore  le  Reichstag  a  donne  une  nouvelle 
preuve  de  ces  sentiments.  II  a  precede  en  une  seule 
seance  a  la  troisieme  lecture  du  budget  de  I'Empire. 
La  discussion  a  roule  presque  entierement  sur  la  de- 
tresse  des  finances  et  n'a  produit  que  des  resultats 
negatifs.  Chacun  reconnait  qu'il  faut_  creer  de  nou- 
velles  ressources  et  indique  les  impots  dont  il  ne 
veut  pas  sans  en  nommer  d'autres  auxquels  on  pour- 
rait  recourir.  Les  credits  concernant  la  marine  ont 
pourtant  ete  votes  tels  que  les  avait  presentes  le 
gouvernement  sans  la  moindre  difficulte  par  tons  les 
partis,  sauf  les  socialistes.  Le  centre  lui-meme  a 
montre  la  meme  bonne  volonte  que  les  autres  frac- 
tions de  la  chambre  malgre  I'attitude  d'opposition 
systematique  qu'il  a  prise  depuis  que  le  chancelier 
a  rompu  avec  lui. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


Only  yesterday  the  Reichstag  gave  a  new  proof 
of  these  sentiments.  At  a  single  session  it  pro- 
ceeded to  the  third  reading  of  the  budget.  The 
discussion  revolved  almost  entirely  around  the 
financial  distress  and  only  produced  negative  re- 
sults. Everyone  recognizes  that  it  is  necessary  to 
create  new  resources  and  mentions  the  duties  which 
he  does  not  want  introduced  without  naming  others 
to  which  recourse  could  be  taken.  The  credits 
in  regard  to  the  navy  were,  however,  voted  with- 
out the  slightest  difficulty  by  all  parties  except  the 
socialists  in  the  form  presented  by  the  Government. 
Even  the  centre  showed  the  same  willingness  as 
the  other  factions,  despite  the  systematic  attitude 
of  oposition  which  it  assumed  since  the  Chancellor 
broke  with  it. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  6  Mai  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Ce  qu'il  y  a  de  plus  intereosant  a  remarquer  dans 
le  livre  blanc  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  adresser 
par  mon  rapport  d'hier  est  la  longanimite  avec  la- 
quelle  le  gouvernement  allemand  feint  de  ne  pas 
s'apercevoir  de  la  contradiction  flagrante  qu'il  y  a 
entre  les  declarations  absolument  correctes  du  gou- 
vernement frangais  et  la  conquete  du  Maroc  auquel 
precede  la  France  en  vertu  d'un  soi-disant  mandat 
europeen  que  personne  ne  lui  a  donne  et  en  se  pre- 
tendant  entraine  par  des  circonstances  qu'elle  qua- 
lifie  de  fortuites  et  qu'elle  a  au  contraire  soigneuse- 
ment  provoquees. 

Immediatement  apres  I'assassinat  de  ses  ressor- 
tissants  a  Casablanca  et  sans  avoir  aucune  raison 
de  croire  que  le  gouvernement  marocain  negligerait 
de  rechercher  et  de  punir  les  coupables,  le  gouver- 
nement franqais  a  riposte  par  un  precede  plus 
odieux  encore  que  celui  des  assassins,  bombardant 
une  ville  ouverte,  massacrant  des  femmes  et  des  en- 
fants,  ruinant  des  commer<;ants  inoflfensifs,  au  mo- 
ment meme  ou  ses  delegues  a  la  Haye  prononqaient 
vertueusement  de  beaux  discours  humanitaires. 

On  n'a  pas  pu  manquer  de  prevoir  a  Paris  que 
cette  brutalite  produirait  non  seulement  au  Maroc, 
mais  encore  dans  tout  le  monde  musulman,  un  mou- 
vement  xenophobe  et  surtout  anti-frangais,  fournis- 
sant  le  pretexte  desire  pour  proceder  k  une  occupa- 
tion qualifiee  ofRciellement  de  temporaire,  mais 
qu'on  se  propose  evidemment  de  rendre  eternelle. 
Au  quai  d'Orsay  on  en  est  revenu  a  la  politique 
de  M.  Delcasse  avec  I'hypocrisie  de  la  forme  en  plus. 
On  commence  meme  a  se  passer  de  celle-ci.  II  n'est 
deja  plus  question  d'impartialite  entre  les  deux  pre- 
tendants.  Le  gouvernement  frangais  s'est  range  ou- 
vertement  du  cote  d'Abdul  Azis,  qui,  abandonne  par 
son  peuple,  accepte  la  protection  franqaise  pour  sau- 
ver  un  semblant  de  souverainete  et  peut-etre  sa  vie. 

L'Allemagne  tolere.  Elle  ne  pent  pas  faire  autre- 
ment.  Le  temps  des  negociations  diplomatiques  est 
passe.  Elle  n'a  plus  a  choisir  qu'entre  I'ignorance 
volontaire  et  la  guerre  dont  I'Empereur  ne  veut  pas 


Sir: 


Berlin,  May  6,  1908. 


The  most  interesting  point  to  be  noted  in  the 
White  Book,  which  I  had  the  honor  to  send  youin 
my  report  of  yesterday,  is  the  forbearance  with 
which  the  German  Government  feigns  not  to  have 
perceived  the  flagrant  contradiction  which  exists 
between  the  absolutely  correct  declarations  of  the 
French  Government  and  the  conquest  of  Morocco 
with  which  France  is  proceeding  in  virtue,  as  she 
says,  of  a  European  mandate  which  no  one  gave 
her,  and  under  the  pretext  of  being  forced  by  cir- 
cumstances which  she  calls  accidental  but  which, 
on  the  contrary,  she  purposely  provoked. 

Immediately  after  the  assassination  of  her  sub- 
jects at  Casablanca,  and  without  having  any  ground 
whatsoever  for  believing  that  a  Moroccan  Govern- 
ment would  neglect  to  search  for  and  to  punish 
the  culprits,  the  French  Government  proceeded  in 
an  even  more  odious  way  than  the  assassins  did, 
bombarding  an  open  town,  massacring  women  and 
children,  ruining  inoflfensive  merchants  at  the  very 
moment  when  her  delegates  at  the  Hague  were 
making  high-sounding  humanitarian  speeches. 

Doubtless  it  was  foreseen  in  Paris  that  this 
brutality  would  produce  not  only  in  Morocco  but 
also  in  th^  entire  Mohammedan  world  an  anti-for- 
eign and  above  all  an  anti-French  movement,  which 
would  furnish  the  desired  pretext  for  an  occupation, 
officially  called  temporary,  but  which  it  is  evidently 
intended  to  make  permanent.  The  Quai  d'Orsay 
has  returned  to  the  policy  of  M.  Delcasse,  covering 
it  with  the  cloak  of  hypocrisy.  But  now  it  is  com- 
mencing to  dispense  even  with  this.  There  is  no 
longer  any  question  of  impartiality  in  the  treatment 
of  the  two  pretenders.  The  French  Government 
has  openly  sided  with  Abdul  Azis  who,  abandoned 
by  his  people,  has  accepted  French  protection  in 
order  to  save  a  semblance  of  sovereignty  and  per- 
haps his  life. 

Germany  tolerates  this.  She  cannot  do  other- 
wise. The  time  for  diplomatic  negotiations  is  past. 
She  has  now  only  the  choice  between  pretending 
ignorance  and  engaging  in  a  war  which  the  Em- 


et  qui  serait  condamnee  par  I'opinion  allemande. 
L'interet  de  rAllemagne  est  trop  minime  pour  jus- 
tifier  les  risques  d'une  conflagration  europeenne. 
Beaucoup  de  gens  le  croient  meme  nul.  L'aventure 
marocaine  coutera  a  la  France  beaucoup  de  sang 
ct  beaucoup  d'argent.  Pourquoi  la  detournerait-on 
d'une  entreprise  qui  la  paralysera  pour  longtemps 
du  cote  des  Vosges? 

L'inaction  de  I'AUemagne  fait  qu'au  quai  d'Orsay 
on  ose  de  plus  en  plus.  Vous  aurez  lu  que  deux  en- 
voyes  de  Maula  Hafith  se  sont  embarques  charges 
d'une  mission  aupres  du  gouvernement  allemand. 
Le  journal  officieux  du  ministere  des  affaires  etran- 
geres  frangais  intime  en  quelque  sorte  au  gouverne- 
ment Imperial  I'ordre  de  ne  pas  les  recevoir. 

Dans  sa  revue  hebdomadaire  de  la  politique  ex- 
terieure,  publiee  ce  matin,  la  "Kreuz-Zeitung"  re- 
pousse vertement  la  pretention  de  controler  les  re- 
lations de  I'Allemagne.  Vous  savez  que  le  redac- 
teur  de  cette  revue,  M.  Schiemann,  est  persona  grata 
aupres  de  I'Empereur  et  tres  bien  vu  au  departe- 
ment  des  affaires  etrangeres,  ou  il  va  chercher  ses 
informations,  et  souvent,  sans  etre  a  aucun  degre 
officieux,  ses  inspirations. 

La  replique  de  M.  Schiemann  est  done  a  noter 
comme  un  symptome  prouvant  que  la  patience  de 
I'AUemagne  commence  a  se  lasser. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


peror  does  not  wish  and  which  would  be  condemned 
by  German  public  opinion.  Germany's  interest  [in 
Morocco]  is  is  too  small  to  justify  the  risk  of  a  Eu- 
ropean conflict;  many  people  regard  it  even  as  nil. 
The  Moroccan  adventure  will  cost  France  much  in 
blood  and  money.  Why  should  Germany  turn  her 
away  from  an  enterprise  which  will  paralyze  her 
for  a  long  time  on  the  Vosges  front? 

Germany's  inaction  encourages  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
to  proceed  with  ever  increasing  boldness.  You  will 
have  read  that  two  envoys  from  Mulai  Hafid  have 
embarked  on  a  mission  to  the  German  Government. 
The  semi-official  paper  of  the  French  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  almost  orders  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment not  to  receive  them. 

In  its  weekly  review  of  foreign  politics  published 
this  morning,  the  Kreuz  Zeitung  vigorously  pro- 
tests against  any  such  control  over  Germany's  for- 
eign relations.  As  you  know,  the  editor  of  that  re- 
view, Mr.  Schiemann,  is  persona  grata  with  the  Em- 
peror and  is  held  in  high  esteem  at  the  Department 
of  Foreign  Affairs  where  he  obtains  his  information 
and  often  receives  inspirations,  though  he  is  by 
no  means  to  be  considered  a  semi-ofticial  writer. 

Mr.  Schiemann's  reply  is  therefore,  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  symptom  showing  that  Germany's  pa- 
tience is  begining  to  wear  out. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  45. 


No.  45. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  10  Mai  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Comme  suite  a  mon  rapport  du  6  mai  j'ai  I'hon- 
neur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  les  delegues  de  Maula 
Hafith  sont  arrives  avant-hier  a  Hambourg  par  mer 
et  hier  a  Berlin.  Les  journaux  annoncent  qu'ils  se- 
ront  regus  demain  et  ecoutes  par  le  conseiller  de 
legation  Baron  Langwerth  de  Simmern,  qui  a  deja 
rempli  les  fonctions  de  charge  d'affaires  ad  interim 
a  Tanger  et  qui  a  ete  appele  maintenant  au  depar- 
tement  des  affaires  etrangeres.  Le  communique 
d'allure  officieuse  ajoute  que  les  delegues  de  Maula 
Hafith  comptent  quitter  Berlin  le  17  ou  le  18  mai 
et  s'embarquer  le  20  a  Hambourg  pour  retourner  au 
Maroc. 

L'information  est  redigee  de  fagon  a  faire  enten- 
dre qu'ils  n'auront  pas  d'autre  audience.  C'est  peu 
que  de  les  faire  recevoir  par  un  jeune  homme  qui 
occupe  un  emploi  tres  inferieur  au  departement  des 
affaires  etrangeres.  II  y  avait  des  chances  pour 
qu'ils  ne  fussent  pas  regus  du  tout :  le  livre  blanc  te- 
moigne  d'un  bout  a  I'autre  de  I'anxiete  avec  laquelle 
le  gouvernement  Imperial  feint  d'aj  outer  foi  aux  as- 
sertions les  plus  invraisemblables  de  M.  Pichon  et 
de  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  pour  n'avoir 
pas  a  rouvrir  la  question  marocaine.  Le  Sultan 
Abdul  Aziz  est  le  souverain  avec  lequel  I'AUemagne 
est  en  relations  diplomatiques.  II  eut  ete  tres  aise 
de  refuser  d'entrer  en  pourparlers  avec  les  envoyes 
d'un  rebelle,  sans  I'arrogance  avec  laquelle  le  jour- 
nal officieux  du  quai  d'Orsay  a  intime  au  gouverne- 
ment Imperial  I'ordre  de  leur  fermer  la  porte. 


Sir: 


Berlin,  May  10,  1908. 


In  continuation  of  my  report  of  May  6th  I  have 
the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  delegates  of  Mulai 
Hafid  arrived  at  Hamburg  by  water  the  day  before 
yesterday  and  at  Berlin  yesterday.  The  papers  an- 
nounce that  they  will  be  received  to-morrow  and 
heard  by  Councillor  of  Legation,  Baron  Langwerth 
von  Simmern,  who  has  acted  as  Charge  d'affaires 
ad  interim  at  Tangiers  and  who  has  now  been  called 
to  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  This  appar- 
ently semi-official  information  adds  that  the  dele- 
. gates  of  Mulai  Hafid  intend  to  leave  Berlin  on  the 
17th  or  18th  of  May,  to  embark  at  Hamburg  on  the 
20th  for  their  return  to  Morocco. 

The  information  is  so  worded  as  to  make  it  under- 
stood that  there  will  be  not  other  audience.  It  is 
little  enough  to  have  them  received  by  a  young  man 
who  occupies  a  very  inferior  position  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Foreign  Affairs.  There  were  chances  that 
they  would  not  be  received  at  all :  the  White  Book 
shows  from  beginning  to  end  how  anxious  the  Im- 
perial Government  is  to  cause  the  impression  that  it 
has  faith  in  the  most  incredible  statements  of  M. 
Pichon  and  of  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  in 
order  not  to  have  to  reopen  the  Moroccan  question. 
Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  is  the  Sovereign  with  whom  Ger- 
many is  maintaining  diplomatic  relations.  It 
would,  therefore,  have  been  very  easy  to  refuse  to 
enter  into  pourparlers  with  the  envoys  of  the  rebel, 
if  it  had  not  been  for  the  arrogance  with  which  the 
semi-official  paper  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay  had  intim- 
ated to  the  Imperial  Government  that  it  should 
close  its  door  to  them. 


—    55    — 


Le  ministere  des  affaires  etrangeres  frangais  ne 
s'est  pas  borne  a  faire  manifester  sa  mauvaise  hu- 
meur  par  un  organe  qu'il  peut  desavouer  au  besoin. 
Comme  s'il  avait  le  propos  delibere  de  blesser  I'Al- 
lemagne  il  a  charge  son  ambassadeur  a  Berlin  d'en- 
tretenir  M.  de  Schoen  de  la  visite  des  envoyes  de 
Maula  Hafith.  La  conversation  a  tourne  a  I'aigre 
et  M.  Cambon  est  sorti  tres  peu  satisfait  de  chez  le 
secretaire  d'etat.  M.  Cambon  a  quitte  Berlin  et  n'y 
reviendra  qu'apres  le  depart  des  delegues  marocains. 
M.  Cambon  a  fait  connaitre  le  motif  de  son  voyage 
a  assez  de  monde  pour  que,  selon  toute  probabilite, 
le  departement  Imperial  arrive  a  savoir  d'une  faqon 
certaine  que  son  absence  a  le  caractere  d'une  bou- 
derie. 

La  reception  des  envoyes  marocains  n'a  pas  ete 
le  seul  incident  desagreable  qui  ait  surgi  dans  ces 
derniers  temps  entre  I'Allemagne  et  la  France.  Les 
negociants  allemands  de  Safi  se  sont  adresses  au  de- 
partement Imperial  des  affaires  etrangeres  disant 
que  la  France  a  I'intention  d'occuper  le  port  de  Safi 
et  le  priant  de  mettre  obstacle  a  la  realisation  d'un 
projet  qui  aurait  pour  eux  les  memes  consequences 
desastreuses  que  I'occupation  de  Casablanca.  Le 
gouvernement  franqais  repond  qu'il  n'a  nul  desir  de 
s'emparer  de  Safi,  mais  qu'il  ignore  a  quoi  les  cir- 
constances  pourront  I'obliger.  D'apres  lui,  cette 
ville  est  dans  un  etat  d'anarchie  complete.  II  n'y  a 
plus  de  douane  et  les  negociants  allemands  en  pro- 
fitent  pour  pratiquer  la  contrebande  des  armes  et 
des  m.unitions  sur  une  grande  echelle,  au  profit  des 
adversaires  de  la  France.  Le  gouvernement  Impe- 
rial n'a  aucune  information  semblable.  A  Paris  Ton 
replique  que  c'est  parce  que  I'Allemagne  est  repre- 
sentee a  Safi  par  un  consul  marchand  au  lieu  d'y 
avoir  un  agent  capable  de  faire  connaitre  la  situation 
telle  qu'elle  est. 

On  fondait  de  grandes  esperances  pour  I'ameHo- 
ration  des  relations  avec  la  France  sur  M.  Cambon 
qui  etait  arrive  a  Berlin  precede  d'une  reputation 
de  moderation  acquise  dans  ses  postes  precedents. 
II  se  montre  au  contraire  defiant,  soupgonneux, 
voyant  des  arriere-pensees  partout,  mal  informe, 
comme  du  reste  tous  les  diplomates  qui  emploient 
des  espions.  Sa  tache  n'est  pas  facilitee  par  I'atti- 
tude  adoptee  par  le  gouvernement  frangais  depuis 
que  la  politique  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  notablement 
diminue  la  securite  europeenne. 

II  etait  tout  naturel  qu'a  I'occasion  du  jubile  de 
I'Empereur  d'Autriche,  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne 
parlat  de  I'alliance  des  deux  empires,  mais  je  me 
demande  si  I'emphase  avec  laquelle  on  en  a  celebre 
les  bienfaits  et  la  presence  a  Vienne  de  tous  les  sou- 
verains  allemands  n'ont  pas  ete  motivees  par  I'in- 
quietude  causee  par  le  cynisme  avec  lequel  la  France 
viole  le  traite  d'Algesiras,  les  etrangcs  propositions 
de  I'Angleterre  au  sujet  de  la  Macedoine,  I'agitation 
serbe  en  Croatie  et  les  fausses  nouvelles  propagees 
par  la  presse  russe  au  sujet  de  pretendus  armements 
de  la  Turquie,  comme  si  elle  aspirait  a  rehabiliter 
son  armee  encore  sous  le  coup  des  revers  essuyes  en 
Mandchourie. 


Agreez,  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


The  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  did  not 
confine  itself  to  showing  its  ill-humor  in  a  paper 
which  it  can  disavow  if  need  be.  Just  as  if  it  had 
the  deliberate  intention  of  offending  Germany,  it 
ordered  its  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  converse  with 
Mr.  von  Schoen  in  regard  to  the  visit  of  the  envoys 
of  Mulai  Hafid.  The  conversation  took  a  sharp 
turn  and  M.  Cambon  left  the  office  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  very  little  satisfied.  M.  Cambon  has  left 
Berlin  and  will  not  return  until  after  the  departure 
of  the  Moroccan  delegates.  M.  Cambon  made  the 
motive  for  his  journey  known  to  a  number  of  peo- 
ple so  as  to  make  sure  that  the  Imperial  Depart- 
ment will  learn  that  his  absence  is  meant  to  show 
his  displeasure. 

The  reception  of  the  Moroccan  envoys  is  not 
the  only  disagreeable  incident  which-  has  recently 
happened  between  Germany  and  France.  The  Ger- 
man merchants  at  Safi  'addressed  the  Imperial  De- 
partment of  Foreign  Affairs,  stating  that  France 
intended  to  occupy  the  harbor  of  Safi  and  begging 
the  department  to  prevent  the  realization  of  this 
plan  which  would  have  the  same  disastrous  conse- 
quences for  them  as  the  occupation  of  Casablanca. 
The  French  Government  replies  that  it  has  no  in- 
tention whatever  of  seizing  Safi ;  but  that  it  does 
not  know  what  circumstances  may  compel  her  to 
do.  It  maintains  that  that  city  is  in  a  state  of  com- 
plete anarchy  and  says  there  is  no  longer  a  custom- 
house and  that  the  German  merchants  are  profiting 
by  this  in  order  to  smuggle  arms  and  ammunition 
on  a  large  scale,  to  the  advantage  of  France's  ad- 
versaries. The  Imperial  Government  has  received 
no  information  to  that  effect.  Paris  retorts  that  this 
is  because  Germany  is  represented  in  Safi  by  a  mer- 
chant-consul instead  of  having  an  agent  there  cap- 
able of  representing  the  situation  at  it  really  is. 

Great  hope  for  the  improvement  of  the  relations 
with  France  was  placed  in  M.  Cambon,  who  came  to 
Berlin  with  a  reputation  for  moderation  acquired  at 
his  previous  posts.  He  is  proving,  on  the  contrary, 
to  be  defiant,  suspicious,  always  scenting  ulterior 
motives,  and  badly  informed,  like  all  diplomats  who 
employ  spies.  His  task  is  not  facilitated  by  the  at- 
titude adopted  by  the  French  Government  since  the 
policy  of  the  King  of  England  seriously  impaired 
European  security. 

While  it  was  quite  natural  that  on  the  occasion 
of  the  jubilee  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  should  have  spoken  of  the  alliance 
between  the  two  Empires,  yet  I  ask  myself  whether 
the  emphasis  with  which  its  beneficent  effect  was 
celebrated  and  the  presence  at  Vienna  of  all  the 
German  Sovereigns  were  not  motivated  by  the  un- 
easiness caused  by  the  cynicism  with  which  France 
is  violating  the  treaty  of  Algeciras,  the  strange  pro- 
posals of  England  in  regard  to  Macedonia,  the  Ser- 
vian agitation  in  Croatia,  and  the  false  reports 
spread  by  the  Russian  press  in  regard  to  the  al- 
leged armament  of  Turkey,  which  give  the  impres- 
sion that  Russia  desires  to  rehabilitate  her  army 
which  is  still  suffering  under  the  reverses  sustained 
in  Manchuria. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


—    56 


No.  46. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  13  Mai  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Comme  suite  a  men  rapport  du  10  mai  j'ai  I'hon- 
neur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  les  envoyes  de  Maula 
Hafith  n'ont  ete  rcQus  par  le  Baron  de  Simmern  que 
dans  la  journee  d'hier.  lis  avaient  adresse  au  de- 
partement  des  affaires  etrangeres  une  lettre  deman- 
dant une  audience  chez  le  chancelier  et  annongant 
qu'ils  etaient-  charges  d'une  communication  auto- 
graphe  de  leur  maitre  pour  I'Empereur.  La  lettre 
etait  en  arabe ;  il  a  done  fallu  la  traduire ;  c'est  la 
cause  du  retard. 

En  donnant  cette  nouvelle,  les  journaux  ont 
ajoute,  sans  doute  apres  avoir  pris  langue  au  depar- 
tement  des  affaires  etrangeres,  que  comme  les  en- 
voyes de  Maula  Hafith  n'ont  pas  de  caractere  officiel 
il  est  invraisemblable  qu'ils  soient  admis  a  se  pre- 
senter chez  Sa  Majeste  ou  chez  le  Prince  de  Biilow. 

D'apres  la  "National-Zeitung,"  qui  ne  public  ja- 
mais aucune  information  relative  a  la  politique  exte- 
rieure  sans  en  avoir  soigneusement  controle  I'exacti- 
tude,  M.  de  Simmern  aurait  demande  aux  envoyes 
de  Maula  Hafith  si,  dans  le  cas  ou  leur  maitre  serait 
reconnu  comme  Sultan,  il  pourrait  garantir  la  secu- 
rite  des  Europeens. 

Les  envoyes  auraient  repondu  que  Maula  Hafith 
le  ferait  assurement  et  empecherait  le  renouvelle- 
ment  d'incidents  comme  celui  de  Casablanca  qui  a 
ete  un  malheur  pour  le  Maroc.  Maula  Hafith  sera 
le  Sultan  de  la  civilisation  et  du  progres.  II  aurait 
volontiers  recours  aux  Europeens  pour  construire  au 
Maroc  des  routes,  des  ponts  et  des  chemins  de  fer. 
II  ouvrira  les  mines  et  favorisera  I'industrie  et  le 
commerce.  II  se  feliciterait  que  I'Allemagne  et  les 
autres  puissances  I'aidassent  a  elever  le  peuple  ma- 
rocain  a  la  hauteur  de  la  civilisation  europeenne ; 
mais  pour  cela  il  est  indispensable  que  la  France 
retire  ses  troupes  du  Maroc.  Autrement  le  peuple 
marocain  ne  se  tranquillisera  jamais.  Maula  Hafith 
serait  heureux  que  I'Allemagne  et  les  autres  puis- 
sances signataires  de  I'acte  d'Algesiras  voulussent 
intervenir  pour  que  la  France  retirat  ses  troupes  le 
plus  tot  possible.  L'expiation  que  la  France  a  in- 
fligee  au  malheureux  Maroc  pour  I'assassinat  de 
trois  de  ses  ouvriers  est  absolument  demesuree.  Des 
milliers  de  Marocains,  parmi  lesquels  des  femmes  et 
des  enfants,  ont  ete  massacres.  Toute  une  ville  a 
ete  bombardee  et  detruite.  L'interieur  est  ravage. 
Les  fermes  des  paysans,  parmi  lesquels  il  y  a  des 
proteges  allemands,  sont  reduites  en  cendres.  C'en 
est  trop.  Ces  envoyes  ont  exprime  le  voeu  que  I'Al- 
lemagne aide  a  detourner  ces  malheurs. 

Des  le  debut  de  leur  declaration  les  envoyes  ont 
dit  que  Maula  Hafith  ouvrirait  son  royaume  a  tous 
les  Europeens  qui  ont  tous  des  droits  egaux.  Je 
me  demande  s'ils  sont  assez  ignorants  de  la  poli- 
tique europeenne  pour  ne  pas  savoir  que  la  France 
ne  veut  pas  de  droits  egaux  pour  tous  (nous  I'avons 
appris  a  nos  depens,  lors  de  la  nomination  du  di- 
recteur  des  travaux  publics)  et  redoute  au  lieu  de 
la  souhaiter  une  pacification  du  pays  qui  lui  enleve- 
rait  le  pretexte  cherche  pour  la  realisation  de  ses 
projets  de  conquete. 

D'autres  incidents  viennent  malheureusement  en- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  May  13,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  continuance  of  my  report  of  May  10th  I  have 
the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  envoys  of  Mulai 
Hafid  were  not  received  by  Baron  von  Simmern 
until  yesterday.  They  had  addressed  a  letter  to 
the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  asking  for  an 
audience  with  the  Chancellor  and  announcing  that 
they  were  the  bearers  of  an  autograph  letter  from 
their  Sovereign  to  the  Emperor.  The  letter  was  in 
Arabic,  it  was  therefore  necessary  to  translate  it; 
that  was  the  cause  of  the  delay. 

In  publishing  this  information,  the  papers  added, 
doubtless  after  having  made  inquiries  at  the  De- 
partment of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  as  the  envoys  of 
Mulai  Hafid  had  no  official  standing  it  was  not 
likely  that  they  would  be  permitted  to  present 
themselves  before  His  Majesty  or  Prince  von  Bii- 
low. 

According  to  the  National  Zeitung,  which  never 
publishes  any  information  relative  to  foreign  policy 
without  first  carefully  verifying  its  correctness,  Mr. 
von  Simmern  asked  the  envoys  of  Mulai  Hafid  if,  in 
case  their  Sovereign  were  recognized  as  Sultan,  he 
could  guarantee  the  safety  of  the  Europeans. 

The  envoys  repHed  that  Mulai  Hafid  would  cer- 
tainly do  so  and  would  prevent  the  recurrence  of 
incidents  like  that  of  Casablanca  which  had  been  a 
misfortune  for  Morocco.  Mufai  Hafid  would  be  the 
Sultan  of  civilization  and  progress.  He  would 
gladly  turn  to  the  Europeans  in  order  to  construct 
roads,  bridges,  and  railroads  in  Morocco.  He  would 
open  mines  and  promote  industry  and  commerce. 
He  would  congratulate  himself  if  Germany  and  the 
other  Powers  would  aid  him  in  raising  the  Moroc- 
can people  to  the  level  of  European  civilization; 
but  in  order  to  do  this  it  was  indispensible  that 
France  withdraw  her  troops  from  Morocco.  In  no 
other  way  could  the  Moroccan  people  be  pacified. 
Mulai  Hafid  would  be  happy  if  Germany  and  the 
Powers  signatory  to  the  act  of  Algeciras  would  in- 
tervene and  cause  France  to  withdraw  her  troops 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  expiation  which  France 
had  inflicted  on  unhappy  Morocco  for  the  assas- 
sination of  three  of  her  laborers  was  entirely  out  of 
proportion.  Thousands  of  Moroccans,  women  and 
children  among  them,  had  been  massacred.  An 
entire  city  had  been  destroyed  by  bombardment. 
The  interior  had  been  ravaged.  The  farms  of  the 
peasants,  among  whom  there  were  German  pro- 
teges, were  reduced  to  ashes.  That  was  too  much. 
The  envoys  had  expressed  the  wish  that  Germany 
would  help  to  put  an  end  to  these  misfortunes. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  their  statement  the  en- 
voys said  that  Mulai  Hafid  would  open  his  kingdom 
to  all  Europeans,  all  of  whom  had  equal  rights.  I 
ask  myself  whether  they  are  so  ignorant  of  Euro- 
pean politics  as  not  to  know  that  France  does  not 
want  equal  rights  for  all  (we  learned  this  at  our 
cost  at  the  nomination  of  the  director  of  public 
works)  and  that  she  fears,  instead  of  desires,  a  paci- 
fication of  the  country  which  would  deprive  her  of 
the  pretext  she  is  seeking  for  the  realization  of  her 
schemes  of  conquest.  Other  incidents  are  unfortu- 
nately increasing  the  ill-humor  caused  by  the  un- 


57    — 


tretenir  la  mauvaise  humeur  causee  par  les  observa- 
tions intempestives  du  gouvernment  frangais  au  su- 
jet  de  la  visite  des  envoyes  de  Maula  Hafith.  Vous 
aurez  lu  dans  les  journaux  comme  moi  qu'a  Casa- 
blanca des  officiers  franqais  ont  enleve  les  papiers  de 
legitimation  de  proteges  allemands,  les  ont  declares 
sans  valeur  et  les  ont  jetes  dans  les  champs,  apres 
les  avoir  souilles  de  crachats.  Jusqu'a  present  la 
presse  allemande  s'est  bornee  a  inserer  ces  informa- 
tions sans  les  commenter. 

Par  men  rapport  du  6  mai  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de 
vous  dire  pour  quelles  raisons  les  articles  de  M. 
Schiemann  sont  a  prendre  en  serieuse  consideration, 
quoique  ce  journaliste  ne  soit  officieux  a  aucun  de- 
gre.  Sa  revue  hebdomadaire  de  la  politique  exte- 
rieure  publiee  ce  matin  dans  le  numero  223  de  la 
"Kreuz-Zeitung"  prouve  de  nouveau  que  la  patience 
allemande  commence  a  se  lasser.  II  y  est  dit,  a  pro- 
pos  de  nouvelles  attaques  du  "Temps"  contre  I'Al- 
lemagne  qu'il  faudrait  enfin  tirer  au  clair  la  situa- 
tion de  ce  journal.  Quiconque  le  lit  regulierement 
doit  avoir  le  sentiment  que  c'est  I'organe  du  gou- 
vernement  frangais.  M.  Pichon  I'a  desavoue  plu- 
sieurs  fois  et  Ton  ne  met  pas  en  doute  la  sincerite 
du  ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres  frangais.  Ce- 
pendant  le  "Temps"  continue  a  publier  des  articles 
dont  le  caractere  officieux  n'est  pas  meconnaissable 
.  et  Ton  a  I'impression  qu'il  y  a  en  France  deux  poli- 
tiques,  celle  de  M..  Pichon  et  celle  d'une  autre  per- 
sonnalite  plus  puissante  qui  prend  a  coeur  d'aigrir 
les  relations  entre  I'Allemagne  et  la  France. 

Sans  le  nommer  M.  Schiemann  designe  clairement 
M.  Clemenceau,  qui  depuis  longtemps  passe  ici  pour 
etre  a  la  solde  de  I'Angleterre. 

M.  Schiemann  fait  remarquer  que  M.  Pichon  pro- 
digue  des  declarations  solennelles  qui  ne  sont  nulle- 
ment  d'accord  avec  les  faits,  comme  en  temoigne  le 
recent  livre  blanc  allemand,  quoique  les  documents 
publics  par  ce  recueil  aient  ete  soumis  a,  la  censure 
du  gouvernement  frangais,  a  la  demande  duquel  on 
aura  vraisemblablement  supprime  des  correspon- 
dances  mettant  plus  clairement  encore  le  contraste 
en  evidence. 

M.  Schiemann  continue  en  enregistrant  avec  une 
satisfaction  manifeste  les  symptomes  du  meconten- 
tement  que  la  politique  de  M.  Clemenceau  suscite 
en  France. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


timely  remarks  of  the  French  Government  in  regard 
to  the  visit  of  the  envoys  of  Mulai  Hafid.  You  will 
have  read  in  the  papers,  as  I  did,  that  French  offi- 
cers at  Casablanca  took  the  papers  of  identification 
away  from  German  proteges,  declared  them  to  be 
valueless,  and  threw  them  away  after  spitting  on 
them.  Until  now  the  German  press  has  confined 
itself  to  publishing  the  news  without  commenting 
on  it. 

In  my  report  of  May  6th,  I  had  the  honor  to  tell 
you  the  reasons  why  the  articles  of  Mr.  Schiemann 
deserve  serious  attention,  although  he  is  by  no 
means  a  semi-official  journalist.  His  weekly  re- 
view of  foreign  politics  published  this  morning  in 
issue  no  223  of  the  Kreuz  Zeitung  proves  again  that 
German  patience  is  coming  to  an  end.  In  the  re- 
view it  is  said  in  regard  to  new  attacks  of  the 
Temps  on  Germany  that  it  was  necessary  to  in- 
vestigate the  relations  of  this  paper.  Whoever  read 
it  regularly  must  have  received  the  impression  that 
it  was  the  organ  of  the  French  Government.  M. 
Pichon  had  disavowed  it  several  times  and  the  sin- 
cerity of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  could  not 
be  questioned.  Nevertheless,  the  Temps  was  con- 
tinuing to  publish  articles  the  semi-official  character 
of  which  was  unmistakable,  and  these  gave  the  im- 
pression that  there  were  two  policies  in  France, 
that  of  M.  Pichon  and  that  of  another  more  power- 
ful personality  whose  aim  was  to  embitter  the  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  France. 

Without  naming  him,  Mr.  Schiemann  clearly 
points  to  M.  Clemenceau  who  has  for  a  long  time 
been  considered  here  to  be  in  England's  pay. 

Mr.  Schiemann  points  out  that  M.  Pichon  was 
lavish  with  solemn  declarations  which  were,  how- 
ever, by  no  means  in  accord  with  the  facts,  as  was 
testified  by  the  recent  German  White  Book,  al- 
though the  documents  published  in  that  collection 
had  been  submitted  to  the  censorship  of  the  French 
Government  which  probably  had  demanded  the 
suppression  of  such  correspondence  as  would  have 
made  the  discrepancy  even  more  pronounced. 

Mr.  Schiemann  in  continuation  notes  with  mani- 
fest satisfaction  the  symptoms  of  discontent  which 
M.  Clemenceau's  policy  is  arousing  in  France. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  47. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  30  Mai  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  president  Fallieres  est  maintenant  rentre  a 
Paris  et  a  sans  doute  lieu  de  se  declarer  tres  satis- 
fait  de  I'accueil  particulierement  chaleureux  que  lui 
ont  reserve  le  Roi  Edouard  VII,  le  gouvernement 
britannique  et  le  peuple  anglais.  Comme  il  est  de- 
venu  de  style  en  pareille  circonstance,  on  a  solen- 
nellement  declare  que  le  rapprochement  entre  les 
deux  nations  ne  menace  personne  et  n'a  pas  d'autre 
but  que  le  maintien  de  la  paix  universelle.  Les  jour- 
naux anglais  expriment  presque  a  I'unisson  I'opinion 


Berlin,  May  30,   1908. 
Sir:— 

President  Fallieres  has  now  returned  to  Paris  and 
without  doubt  has  reason  to  express  his  great  sat- 
isfaction with  the  particularly  warm  reception 
which  King  Edward  VII,  the  British  Government, 
and  the  English  people  gave  him.  As  has  become 
the  custom  on  such  occasions,  it  was  solemnly  de- 
clared that  the  rapprochement  between  the  two  na- 
tions was  menacing  np  one  and  had  no  other  end  in 
vievy  but  the  preservation  of  universal  peace.  The 
English   papers   almost   unanimously   express   the 


que  la  transformation  de  I'entente  cordiale  en  une  al- 
liance ne  presenterait  aucun  avantage  et  pourrait 
constituer  un  serieux  danger.  Le  "Temps"  de  Pa- 
ris se  prononce  dans  le  meme  sens  et  dit  qu'il  serait 
imprudent  de  contracter  des  engagements  en  vue 
d'une  guerre  (sans  doute  la  guerre  de  revanche  dont 
tout  Frangais  conserve  I'espoir)  aussi  longtemps 
que  I'Angleterre  n'aura  pas  transforme  son  systeme 
militaire  de  fagon  a  se  mettre  en  mesure  de  donner 
a  la  France  un  appui  efficace  sur  le  continent.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  a  declare  a  la  chambre  des  communes 
que  le  voyage  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  en  Russie  sera 
une  visite  officielle  commes  celles  que  Sa  Majeste 
a  deja  faites  et  qu'il  n'y  a  nul  dessein  de  contracter 
un  nouveau  traite  avec  la  Russie,  dont  les  rapports 
avec  I'Angleterre  sont  regies  par  la  convention  exis- 
tante.  Le  ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres  anglais 
a  ainsi  coupe  court  aux  bruits  d'une  nouvelle  triple 
alliance  en  voie  de  formation  entre  I'Angleterre,  la 
France  et  la  Russie  qui  ont  ete  lances  par  certains 
organes  de  la  presse  de  Paris  et  de  St.  Petersbourg. 
Tout  est  done  correct,  et,  dans  le  cas  peu  probable 
ou  le  gouvernement  Imperial  aurait  a  manifester 
une  opinion  officielle  pendant  les  vacances  des  cham- 
bres,  il  ne  pourra  que  se  declarer  satisfait  de  I'ame- 
lioration  des  relations  entre  les  puissances  euro- 
peennes,  qui  contribue  a  assurer  le  repos  du  monde. 
En  diplomatic  il  faut  savoir  feindre  de  se  payer  de 
mots.  C'est  ainsi  que  M.  de  Schoen,  lors  de  sa  der- 
niere  reception,  s'est  montre  tres  content  des  ins- 
tructions donnees  au  general  d'Amade  et  n'a  pas  eu 
I'air  de  mettre  en  doute  que  les  promesses  donnees 
ne  soient  religieusement  tenues.  Les  journaux  offi- 
cieux  se  sont  bornes  a  relater  les  incidents  de  I'en- 
trevue  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  et  du  president  de  la 
republique  frangaise,  sans  y  ajouter  de  reflexions. 


La  presse  independante,  qui  n'est  pas  tenue  aux 
memes  menagements,  ne  se  fait  pas  faute  de  mani- 
fester ses  inquietudes.  Qu'on  I'appelle  alliance,  en- 
tente ou  comme  Ton  voudra,  le  groupement  des 
puissances  prepare  personnellement  par  le  Roi  d'An- 
gleterre existe,  et  s'il  n'est  pas  une  menace  directe 
et  prochaine  de  guerre  pour  I'Allemagne  (ce  qui 
serait  trop  dire),  il  n'en  constitue  pas  moins  une 
diminution  de  securite. 

Les  declarations  pacifistes  obligees  et  qui  seront 
sans  doute  repetees  a  Reval  signifient  bien  peu  de 
chose  emanant  de  trois  puissances  qui  comme  la 
Russie  et  I'Angleterre  viennent  avec  des  succes  di- 
vers d'entreprendre  sans  autre  raison  que  le  desir 
de  s'agrandir  et  meme  sans  pretexte  plausible,  les 
guerres  de  conquete  de  la  Mandchourie  et  du  Trans- 
vaal, ou  qui  comme  la  France  procede  en  ce  mo- 
ment meme  a  I'envahissement  du  Maroc  au  mepris 
de  promesses  solennelles  et  sans  autre  titre  que  la 
cession  des  droits  de  I'Angleterre  qui  n'en  possedait 
aucun.  Ce  sont  les  memes  puissances  qui  en  com- 
pagnie  des  Etats-Unis  sortant  a  peine  de  la  guerre 
de  spoliation  contre  I'Espagne  se  sont  montrees 
ultra-pacifistes  a  la  Haye. 

La  triple  alliance  a  garanti  pendant  trente  ans 
la  paix  du  monde,  parce  qu'elle  etait  dirigee  par 
I'Allemagne  satisfaite  du  partage  politique  de  I'Eu- 
rope.  Le  nouveau  groupement  la  menace  parce 
qu'il  se  compose  des  puissances  qui  aspirent  ^  une 
revision  du  status  quo,  au  point  d'avoir  fait  taire 
des  haines  seculaires  pour  preparer  la  realisation  de 
ce  desir. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  .  Greindl. 


opinion  that  the  transformation  of  the  entente  cor- 
diale into  an  alliance,  while  offering  no  advantages, 
would  constitute  a  serious  danger.  The  Paris 
Temps  expresses  itself  in  the  same  sense,  saying 
that  it  would  be  imprudent  to  contract  obligations 
in  view  of  a  war  (doubtless  the  war  of  revenge  for 
which  all  France  is  still  hoping),  as  long  as  Eng- 
land had  not  changed  her  military  system  in  such  a 
way  as  to  enable  her  to  give  France  efficient  support 
on  the  continent.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  in  the 
House  of  Commons  that  the  journey  of  the  King  of 
England  to  Russia  would  be  an  official  visit,  like 
those  which  His  Majesty  had  already  made,  and 
that  there  was  no  intention  whatsoever  of  conclud- 
ing a  new  treaty  with  Russia  whose  relations  with 
England  were  regulated  by  the  existing  convention. 
The  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  thus 
cut  short  the  rumors  of  a  new  Triple  Alliance  to  be 
formed  between  England,  France,  and  Russia,  which 
have  been  circulated  by  certain  organs  of  the  press 
in  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg. 

Everything  is,  therefore,  perfectly  correct  and  in 
the  rather  improbable  case  that  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment would  have  to  manifest  an  official  opinion 
during  the  recess  of  the  Reichstag,  it  could  only  ex- 
press its  satisfaction  with  the  improvement  in  the 
relations  between  the  European  Powers,  which  con- 
tributed towards  ensuring  the  peace  of  the  world. 
In  diplomacy  it  is  necessary  to  know  how  to  feign 
to  be  satisfied  with  words.  Thus  Mr.  von  Schoen  at 
his  last  reception  showed  himself  very  well  satis- 
fied with  the  instructions  given  to  General  Amade 
and  did  not  seem  to  doubt  that  the  promises  given 
would  be  religiously  kept.  The  semi-official  papers 
confined  themselves  to  giving  an  account  of  the  in- 
cidents of  the  meeting  between  the  King  of  Eng- 
land and  the  President  of  the  French  Republic,  with- 
out adding  any  comments. 

The  independent  press,  which  is  not  restricted  by 
the  same  considerations,  does  not  refrain,  from 
manifesting  its  uneasiness.  One  may  call  it  al- 
liance, entente,  or  as  one  likes,  the  grouping  of  the 
Powers  personally  brought  about  by  the  King  of 
England  exists  and  if  it  does  not  mean  a  direct  and 
imminent  menace  of  war  for  Germany  (that  would 
be  saying  too  much),  it  constitutes  none  the  less  a 
diminution  of  her  security. 

The  usual  pacifist  declarations,  which  will  doubt- 
less be  repeated  at  Reval,  signify  very  little  when 
coming  from  three  Powers  which,  like  Russia  and 
England,  have  lately  undertaken,  with  different  suc- 
cess, wars  of  conquest  in  Manchuria  and  in  the 
Transvaal  for  which  there  was  no  other  reason  than 
their  desire  for  expansion  and  for  which  not  even  a 
plausible  pretext  existed;  or  which  like  France  are 
proceeding  at  this  very  moment  to  invade  Morocco 
in  defiance  of  solemn  promises  and  without  any 
other  title  than  the  rights  which  England,  without 
possessing  them  ceded  to  her.  Those  are  the  same 
Powers  which  together  with  the  United  States — 
its  war  of  plunder  against  Spain  scarcely  at  an  end 
— have  shown  themselves  at  the  Hague  as  ultra- 
pacifists. 

The  Triple  Alliance  has  guarded  the  peace  of  the 
world  for  thirty  years,  because  it  was  directed  by 
Germany,  who  was  content  with  the  political  par- 
tition of  Europe.  The  new  grouping  menaces  peace 
because  it  is  composed  of  Powers  which  desire  a 
revision  of  the  status  quo  so  much  that  they  have 
quelled  the  hatred  of  centuries  in  order  to  bring 
about  the  realization  of  that  desire. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


—    59    — 


No.  48. 


No.  48. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  12  Juin  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Dans  les  toasts  echanges  a  Reval  entre  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre  et  FEmpereur  de  Russie,  les  deux  sou- 
verains  ont  afifirme  le  desir  de  regler  amicalement  les 
questions  pendantes  entre  eux,  de  rapprocher  leurs 
deux  peuples  et  de  contribuer  ainsi  a  la  consolida- 
tion de  la  paix  universelle. 

Nul  n'a  le  droit  d'etre  officiellement  ou  officieuse- 
ment  offusque  d'un  langage  d'une  correction  aussi 
parfaite.  La  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  'Zeitung" 
ecrivait  hier  soir  que  ces  paroles  sont  d'accord  avec 
la  partie  la  plus  serieuse  de  la  presse  anglaise  et 
russe  qui  combat  les  tentatives  faites  pour  donner  a 
I'entrevue  de  Reval  un  caractere  peu  amical  pour 
rAllemagne. 

II  s'en  faut  de  beaucoup  que  cet  entrefilet  ofificieux 
corresponde  au  jugement  que  Ton  porte  ici  sur  le 
recent  voyage  du  president  de  la  republique  fran- 
Qaise  a  Londres,  sur  I'entrevue  de  Reval  et  sur  la 
prochaine  visite  de  M.  Fallieres  a  I'Empereur  de 
Russie  et  aux  trois  cours  scandinaves.  Sans  doute 
dans  la  confiance  que  je  ferais  de  ses  paroles  un 
usage  strictement  confidentiel,  M.  de  Schoen  dans 
une  conversation  que  j'ai  eue  avec  lui  avant-hier,  ne 
m'a  pas  dissimule  I'impression  penible  que  lui 
causent  les  arrangements  conclus  sous  le  pretexte 
de  se  mettre  en  garde  contre  une  agression  a  la- 
quelle  I'AlIemagne  n'a  jamais  songe.  11  a  ete  jusqu'a 
qualifier  cette  politique  de  deloyale  et  s'attend  a  ce 
qu'on  utilise  le  nouveau  groupement  des  puissances 
pour  exercer  une  pression  sur  I'AlIemagne  dans  la 
question  d'Orient  et  dans  les  autres  affaires  qui  sont 
a  regler.  II  repete  que. I'Empereur  et  le  peuple  alle- 
mand  ont  donne  depuis  vingt  ans  tant  de  gages  de 
leurs  intentions  pacifiques,  que  celles-ci  devraient 
etre  a  I'abri  du  soupcon. 

On  pourrait  aj outer  a  ce  qu'a  bien  voulu  me  dire 
le  secretaire  d'Etat  que  Ton  ressent  deja  les  effets 
de  I'isolement  de  I'AlIemagne  dans  la  politique  euro- 
peenne.  Vous  aurez  remarque,  Monsieur  le  Mi- 
nistre, que  dans  son  recent  discours,  M.  Tittoni  par- 
lant  de  la  question  macedonienne  a  dit  qu'elle  serait 
prochainement  reg'ee  par  une  entente  entre  I'An- 
gletere  et  la  Russie.  II  n'a  pas  dit  un  mot  de  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie,  comme  s'il  n'y  avait  pas  eu  entre 
cette  puissance  et  la  Russie,  pendant  dix  ans,  une 
entente  maintenant  detruite  par  la  malencontreuse 
initiative  du  Baron  d'Aehrenthal  dans  I'affaire  du 
chemin  de  fer  de  Mitrowitza.  L'alliee  de  I'AlIe- 
magne est  traitee  en  quantite  negligeable,  comme  si 
parmi  les  grandes  puissances  elle  n'etait  pas  la  prin- 
cipal interessee  dans  la  question  des  Balkans. 

Le  seul  symptome  quelque  peu  rassurant  que  I'on 
puisse  noter,  est  le  manque  de  confiance  entre  les 
nouveaux  amis  et  les  anciens  allies  revele  par  les 
evenements  recents. 

Malgre  les  denegations  posterieures  il  a  du  exister 
quelque  projet  de  resserrer  les  liens  entre  les  puis- 
sances groupees  par  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  dans  une 
pensee  hostile  a  I'AlIemagne.  Le  journal  "Le 
Temps"  bien  place  pour  etre  exactement  informe, 
puisque  c'est  I'organe  officieux  du  gouvernement 
frangais,  paraissait  si  sur  qu'a  Londres  on  aspirait  a 
transformer  I'entente  cordiale  en  alliance  qu'il  y  met- 


Berlin,  June  12,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  the  toasts  exchanged  at  Reval  between  the 
King  of  England  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  the 
two  Sovereigns  gave  expression  to  the  desire  to 
regulate  in  a  friendly  way  the  questions  pending 
between  them,  to  bring  their  peoples  closer  to- 
gether, and  thus  to  contribute  to  the  strengthening 
of  universal  peace. 

No  one  has  the  right  to  be  officially  or  semi-offi- 
cially  offended  with  statements  as  correct  as  these. 
The  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  wrote  yes- 
terday evening  that  these  words  were  in  accord 
with  the  most  serious  papers  of  the  French  and 
Russian  press  which  were  combating  the  attempts 
made  to  attribute  to  the  meeting  at  Reval  an  anti- 
German  character. 

This  semi-official  notice  is  very  different  from  the 
opinion  really  held  here  concerning  the  recent  jour- 
ney of  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  to 
London,  the  meeting  at  Reval,  and  the  impending 
visit  of  M.  Fallieres  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and 
to  the  three  Scandinavian  courts.  Confident,  no 
doubt,  that  the  use  I  would  make  of  his  words 
would  be  strictly  confidential,  Mr.  von  Schoen  in  a 
conversation  which  I  had  with  him  the  day  before 
yesterday  did  not  conceal  from  me  the  painful  im- 
pression which  the  agreements  had  made  on  him, 
agreements  concluded  under  the  pretext  of  guard- 
ing against  an  aggression  of  which  Germany  had 
never  thought.  He  went  so  far  as  to  call  this  policy 
disloyal,  and  expects  that  the  new  grouping  of 
Powers  will  be  utilized  in  order  to  bring  pressure 
to  bear  on  Germany  in  the  Orient  question  and  in 
the  other  affairs  which  are  to  be  regulated.  He  re- 
peats that  the  Emperor  and  the  German  people  had 
for  twenty  years  given  so  many  proofs  of  their  pa- 
cific intentions  that  they  ought  to  be  above  all  sus- 
picion. 

It  might  be  added  to  what  the  Secretary  of  State 
told  me  that  the  effects  of  the  isolation  of  Germany 
in  European  politics  is  already  being  felt.  You  will 
have  noticed,  Sir,  that  in  his  recent  speech,  in  touch- 
ing upon  the  Macedonian  question,  M.  Tittoni  said 
that  it  would  soon  be  settled  by  an  understanding 
between  England  and  Russia.  He  did  not  say  any- 
thing about  Austria-Hungary,  as  if  an  understand- 
ing had  not  existed  for  ten  years  between  that 
Power  and  Russia,  an  understanding  now  destroyed 
by  the  unfortunate  action  of  Baron  von  Aehrenthal 
in  the  matter  of  the  Mitrowitza  Railway.  Ger- 
many's ally  is  treated  as  of  no  account,  as  if  among 
the  Great  Powers  she  were  not  the  one  most  inter- 
ested in  the  Balkan  question. 

The  only  symptom  to  be  noted  which  is  a  little 
reassuring  is  the  lack  of  confidence  between  the 
new  friends  and  the  old  allies,  which  has  been  re- 
vealed by  recent  events. 

Despite  subsequent  denials  some  plan  must  have 
existed  to  strengthen  the  bonds  between  the  Powers 
banded  together  by  the  Kirrg  of  England  against 
Germany.  The  paper  Le  Temps,  which  is  in  a 
position  to  receive  exact  information  because  it  is 
the  semi-official  organ  of  the  French  Government, 
seemed  to  be  so  sure  that  London  was  aspiring  at  a 
transformation  of  the  entente  cordiale  into  an  al- 


tait  deja  ses  conditions.  II  lui  fallait  une  reforme 
de  I'armee  anglaise,  permettant  a  I'Angleterre  de 
fournir  un  contingent  pour  une  guerre  continentale. 
Cela  signifiait  qu'a  Paris  on  ne  se  souciait  pas  d'etre 
engage  dans  un  conflit  dont  I'Angleterre  pourrait  se 
retirer,  apres  avoir  detruit  la  marine  de  guerre  et  de 
commerce  de  I'Allemagne  et  annexe  les  colonies  al- 
lemandes,  hors  d'etat  de  proteger  la  France  et  d'em- 
pecher  I'Allemagne  de  s'indemniser  aux  depens  de 
celle-ci  des  desastres  maritimes  certains. 

Mise  en  demeure  de  creer  une  armee  de  terre  dont 
elle  estime  n'avoir  pas  besoin  pour  elle-meme,  sim- 
plement  pour  aider  la  France  a  la  conquete  de  I'Al- 
sace-Lorraine  dont  I'Angleterre  n'a  cure,  celle-ci  a 
reponda  par  ses  journaux  a  I'unisson,  en  declinant 
I'idee  suggeree  par  I'organe  officieux  frangais.  C'est 
seulement  alors  que  "Le  Temps"  a  declare  qu'il 
n'avait  voulu  faire  que  de  la  theorie  pure.  Si  c'est 
vrai,  il  faut  avouer  que  le  moment  etait  singuliere- 
ment  choisi  pour  discuter  une  pareille  question  de 
doctrine. 

A  St.  Petersbourg  aussi  il  faut  qu'on  ait,  malgre 
les  declarations  de  Sir  E.  Grey  au  parlement,  craint 
une  proposition  d'alliance  exposant  la  Russie  a  un 
conflit  qu'elle  est  hors  d'etat  de  supporter.  Si  ce 
n'est  pas  pour  prevenir  toute  demarche  semblable, 
on  ne  comprend  pas  I'article  par  lequel  I'officieuse 
"Rossija"  a,  a  la  veille  de  I'entrevue  de  Reval,  in- 
siste  sur  I'amitie  seculaire  de  I'Allemagne  et  de  la 
Russie,  en  termes  beaucoup  plus  chaleureux  que  ne 
le  comporte  la  situation  veritable.  La  Russie  ne 
veut  pas  se  laisser  exploiter  par  I'Angleterre,  comme 
elle-meme  elle  a  exploite  la  France,  en  lui  emprun- 
tant  des  milliards,  non  pour  la  revanche  comme  on 
I'esperait  a  Paris,  mais  pour  ses  entreprises  en  ex- 
treme Orient. 

La  vraie  pensee  des  puissances  groupees  par 
I'Angleterre  pour  isoler  TAllemagne,  ne  se  trouve  ni 
dans  les  discours  des  Souverains  ni  dans  les  articles 
des  journaux  officieux  ou  inspires.  Leur  tendance 
veritable  est  si  eloignee  de  leur  langage  convenu 
qu'ils  ne  peuvent  pas  s'empecher  de  la  trahir  par  des 
imprudences.  Si  on  veut  la  connaitre,  il  n'y  a  qu'a 
lire  I'admonestation  adressee  par  "Le  Temps"  au 
Roi  de  Suede.  Le  journal  parisien  considere  les 
sentiments  amicaux  pour  I'Allemagne  manifestes  par 
Sa  Majeste  comme  une  offense  pour  la  Russie  dont 
la  France  ressent  le  contrecoup. 

De  la  defiance  qui  regne  entre  la  France,  I'Angle- 
terre et  la  Russie,  il  serait  temeraire  de  conclure  que 
la  nouvelle  triple-alliance  ne  se  realisera  pas.  Elles 
sent  unies  par  la  haine  commune  centre  I'Allemagne 
et  peuvent  trouver  des  garanties  reelles  ou  imagi- 
naires  contre  le  danger  d'etre  entrainees  a  la  guerre 
pour  des  interets  etrangers. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


liance  that  it  already  prescribed  the  conditions  for 
it.  It  demanded  a  reform  of  the  British  army, 
\ivhich  would  permit  England  to  furnish  a  conti- 
gent  for  a  continental  war.  That  meant  that  in 
Paris  there  was  no  desire  to  be  involved  in  a  con- 
flict from  which  England  might  retire  after  having 
destroyed  Germany's  fleet  and  merchant  marine 
and  annexed  the  German  colonies,  without  being  in 
a  position  to  protect  France  and  to  prevent  Ger- 
many from  indemnifying  herself  at  the  cost  of 
France  for  her  certain  disasters  on  sea. 

Asked  to  create  a  land  army  which  she  believes 
she  will  not  have  to  use  for  herself,  simply  in  order 
to  aid  France  to  conquer  Alsace-Lorraine  which 
does  not  interest  her,  England  replied  by  rejecting 
through  her  unanimous  press  the  idea  suggested  by 
the  semi-oflicial  French  organ.  It  was  only  then 
that  Le  Temps  declared  that  it  had  only  expressed 
a  mere  theory.  If  this  is  true,  it  must  be  said  that 
the  moment  was  strangely  chosen  for  the  theoreti- 
cal discussion  of  such  a  question. 

In  St.  Petersburg,  also,  it  must  have  been  feared, 
despite  the  declarations  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  in 
Parliament,  that  a  proposal  for  an  alliance  would  be 
made  which  would  expose  Russia  to  a  conflict  in 
which  she  could  not  hold  her  ground.  If  its  pur- 
pose was  not  to  forestall  any  such  steps,  one  cannot 
understand  the  article  in  which  the  semi-official 
Rossiya,  on  the  eve  of  the  meeting  at  Reval,  pointed 
out  in  much  warmer  terms  than  the  actual  situation 
merits,  the  century  old  friendship  between  Germany 
and  Russia.  Russia  does  not  wish  to  be  exploited 
by  England,  as  she  herself  has  exploited  France  by 
borrowing  billions  from  her,  not  for  revenge  as  was 
hoped  at  Paris,  but  for  her  enterprises  in  the  Far 
East. 

The  real  thoughts  of  the  Powers  banded  together 
by  England  in  order  to  isolate  Germany  is  not  be 
be  found  either  in  the  speeches  of  the  Sovereigns 
nor  in  the  articles  of  the  semi-official  or  inspired 
papers.  Their  real  aims  are  so  far  removed  from 
their  conventional  language  that  they  cannot  avoid 
betraying  them  by  indiscretions.  If  one  wishes  to 
know  them  it  is  only  necessary  to  read  the  admoni- 
tion addressed  by  Le  Temps  to  the  King  of  Sweden. 
The  Paris  paper  considers  the  friendly  sentiments 
manifested  by  His  Majesty  for  Germany  as  an 
offense  against  Russia,  of  which  France  has  to 
bear  the  consequences. 

It  would  be  rash  to  conclude  from  the  distrust 
which  exists  between  France,  England,  and  Russia 
that  the  new  triple  alliance  will  not  be  realized. 
They  are  united  by  their  common  hatred  of  Ger- 
many, and  can  find  real  or  imaginary  guarantees 
against  the  danger  of  being  involved  in  war  for 
the  sake  of  foreign  interests. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  49. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  4  Juillet  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

J'ai  demande  hier  a  M.  le  secretaire  d'Etat  au  de- 
partement    Imperial    des    Affaires    Etrangeres    s'il 


Sir: 


Berlin,  July  4,  1908. 


I  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  yesterday  at  the 
Imperial  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  if  he  had 


—    61    — 


n'avait  pas  encore  regu  les  propositions  russo-an- 
glaises  au  sujet  des  reformes  a  introduire  en  Mace- 
doine  qui  nous  interessent  au  point  de  vue  du  main- 
tien  des  relations  correctes  entre  les  grandes  puis- 
sances ;  mais  sous  ce  rapport  seulement. 

M.  de  Schoen  m'a  repondu  que  I'accord  ne  parait 
pas  encore  tout  a  fait  etabli  entre  la  Russie  et  I'An- 
gleterre  et  que  vraisemblablement  les  propositions  a 
soumettre  aux  grandes  puissances  ne  leur  parvien- 
dront  que  dans  une  quinzaine  de  jours  au  plus  tot. 
Le  gouvernement  Imperial  les  attend  sans  impa- 
tience. II  a  la  confiance  que  ces  propositions  seront 
de  nature  a  ne  pas  troubler  la  bonne  harmonie  entre 
les  grandes  puissances. 

J'ai  replique  que  je  le  souhaite;  mais  que  je  ne 
puis  pas  me  defendre  d'une  certaine  inquietude  si, 
comme  I'a  annonce  I'agence  Reuter,  on  propose 
d'augmenter  les  gardes  nationales. 

M.  de  Schoen  a  repondu  que  ce  serait  en  effet  un 
danger.  Au  premier  abord  I'idee  n'avait  pas  deplu  a 
Vienne  et  a  Berlin ;  mais  qu'  un  examen  plus  appro- 
fondi  avait  fait  reconnaitre  que  c'etait  organiser  et 
armer  la  revolution.  La  Sublime  Porte  commencera 
evidemment  par  rejeter  tout  le  programme  des  puis- 
sances. Comme  il  contient  cependant  de  bonnes 
propositions,  en  negociant  avec  le  gouvernement  ot- 
toman on  pourra  arriver  a  une  transaction  consistant 
a  accepter  les  reformes  utiles  et  a  ecarter  les  projets 
perilleux. 

J'ai  dit  qu'un  autre  point  encore  me  paraissait  iii- 
quietant ;  c'est  la  fagon  dont  les  pourparlers  prelimi- 
naires  sont  conduits  entre  Londres  et  Saint-Peters- 
bourg  a  I'exclusion  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  qui  a  pour- 
tant  un  interet  de  premier  ordre  dans  les  affaires  des 
Balkans. 

M.  de  Schoen  ne  m'a  pas  contredit.  II  m'  a  re- 
pondu brievement  qu'  il  ne  reste  evidemment  plus 
rien  de  I'entente  de  Miirzsteigg.  Je  me  suis  naturel- 
lement  abstenu  d'insister  davantage  sur  un  sujet 
aussi  delicat. 

Agreez  etc. 
'  [s.]  Greindl. 


not  yet  received  the  Russo-English  proposals  in 
regards  to  the  reforms  to  be  introduced  in  Mace- 
donia which  interest  us  from  one  point  of  view 
only:  that  of  the  maintenance  of  correct  relations 
between  the  Great  Powers. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  replied  that  Russia  and  England 
did  not  seem  to  have  arrived  at  a  complete  under- 
standing, and  that  the  proposals  to  be  submitted  to 
the  Great  Powers  would  probably  not  reach  them 
before  two  weeks  at  the  earliest.  The  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment was  awaiting  them  without  impatience. 
It  was  confident  that  the  proposals  would  be  such 
as  not  to  disturb  the  good  harmony  between  the 
Great  Powers. 

I  replied  that  I  hoped  so,  but  that  I  could  not 
rid  myself  of  a  certain  uneasiness  if,  as  the  Reuter 
agency  announced,  it  was  proposed  to  increase  the 
national  guards. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  replied  that  would,  indeed,  be 
a  danger.  At  first  the  idea  had  not  caused  dis- 
pleasure in  Vienna  and  in  Berlin,  but  a  closer  ex- 
amination had  shown  that  this  would  mean  organ- 
izing and  arming  the  revolution.  The  Porte  would 
doubtless  at  first  reject  the  entire  programme  of  the 
Powers.  However,  since  it  contained  some  good 
proposals,  negotiations  with  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment might  lead  to  a  compromise  consisting  in  the 
acceptance  of  useful  reforms  and  the  rejection  of 
perilous  schemes. 

I  said  that  still  another  point  seemed  disquieting 
to  me,  viz.,  the  way  in  which  the  preliminary  pour- 
parlers were  conducted  between  London  and  St. 
Petersburg  to  the  exclusion  of  Austria-Hungary 
whose  interests  were  of  most  importance  in  the 
Balkan  affairs. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  did  not  contradict  me.  He  re- 
plied briefly  that  of  the  understanding  of  Miirz- 
steigg nothing  evidently  longer  existed.  I  naturally 
refrained  from  insisting  any  further  on  such  a  deli- 
cate subject. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  50. 


No.  50. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  18  Juillet  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Un  de  mes  collegues  a  demande  hier  au  secretaire 
d'Etat  du  departement  des  affaires  etrangeres  ce 
qu'il  faut  penser  de  la  prochaine  visite  du  president 
de  la  Republique  Franqaise  a  I'Empereur  de  Russie. 
M.  de  Schoen  a  repondu  que  cette  entrevue  n'a  au- 
cune  importance  politique;  c'est  celle  de  Reval  qui 
en  avait.  La  visite  de  M.  Fallieres  n'en  est  que  le 
corollaire  pour  ainsi  dire  oblige. 

Mon  collegue  a  fait  observer  qu'on  avait  pourtant 
considere  a  Berlin  la  visite  du  president  de  la  re- 
publique frangaise  au  Roi  d'Angleterre  comme  un 
evenement  grave. 

M.  de  Schoen  a  replique  que  e'en  etait  un  en  effet ; 
mais  qu'alors  les  circonstances  etaient  tout  autres. 
C'etait  la  premiere  des  entrevues  projetees.  La  po- 
litique personnelle  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  est  franche- 
ment  hostile  a  I'Allemagne.  D'apres  des  renseigne- 
ments  regus  par  le  gouvernement  Imperial,  I'Angle- 


Berlin,  July  18,  1908. 
Sir:— 

One  of  my  colleagues  asked  the  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  yesterday 
what  was  to  be  thought  of  the  approaching  visit  of 
the  President  of  the  French  Republic  to  the  Em- 
peror of  Russia.  Mr.  von  Schoen  replied  that  this 
meeting  had  no  political  importance;  it  was  that 
at  Reval  which  was  significant.  The  visit  of  M. 
Fallieres  was  only  the  necessary  corollary,  as  it 
were. 

My  colleague  observed  that  the  visit  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  French  Republic  to  the  King  of  Eng- 
land had,  however,  been  considered  in  Berlin  as  an 
event  of  grave  importance. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  replied  that  it  had  indeed  been 
such,  but  that  circumstances  had  been  very  different 
then,  since  that  meeting  had  been  the  first  of  those 
planned.  The  personal  policy  of  the  King  of  Eng- 
land was  openly  hostile  to  Germany.  According 
to  information  received  by  the  Imperial  Govern- 


62 


terre  aurait  voulu  aller  beaucoup  plus  loin  dans  la 
voie  de  I'entente  avec  la  France  et  la  Russie  qu'elle 
n'a  reussi  a  le  faire.  C'est  la  France  qui  a  refuse. 
Avant  que  les  bruits  d'alliance  n'aient  ete  mis  en 
circulation  et  pendant  le  sejour  de  M.  Fallieres  a 
Londres,  M.  Cambon  est  venu  dire  a  M.  de  Schoen 
que  le  gouvernement  frangais  se  trouvait  dans  une 
position  delicate.  II  a  prie  le  secretaire  d'Etat,  sans 
s'expliquer  davantage,  de  ne  pas  ajouter  foi  aux  in- 
formations alarmantes  qui  pourraient  lui  parvenir  et 
de  croire  que  la  France  veut  sincerement  la  paix. 

M.  de  Schoen  a  conclu  en  disant  qu'actuellement 
c'est  la  France  qui  exerce  une  action  pacifique. 

Puis-je  vous  prier  de  rapprocher  le  present  rapport 
de  celui  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  sous 
la  date  du  12  Juin  dernier.  Vous  vous  souviendrez 
que  dans  I'entretien  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous 
rapporter,  M.  de  Schoen  qualifiait  la  politique  de 
I'Angleterre  de  deloyale.  Par  le  meme  rapport  je 
vous  ecrivais  que  la  campagne  de  presse  des  deux 
journaux  officieux  des  ministeres  des  affaires  etran- 
geres  de  Paris  et  de  Saint-Petersbourg  me  portait  a 
croire  que,  malgre  les  denegations  posterieures,  il  y 
avait  eu  un  projet  de  resserrer  les  liens  entre  les 
puissances  groupees  par  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  dans 
une  pensee  hostile  a  I'AUemagne  et  que  le  plan  avait 
echoue  parce  que  la  France  et  la  Russie  I'avaient 
repousse.  Ce  n'etait  il  y  a  un  mois  qu'une  conjecture 
de  ma  part ;  maintenant  c'est  une  information  posi- 
tive. 

Mon  collegue  a  aussi  parle  au  secretaire  d'Etat  des 
manoeuvres  de  la  flotte  anglaise  dans  la  region  des 
detroits  danois  qui  ont  I'apparence  d'une  repetition 
generale  d'operations  de  guerre  dont  I'execution  est 
prevue. 

M.  de  Schoen  a  repondu  que  le  precede  n'etait  en 
tout  cas  pas  amical ;  mais  que  de  la  part  de  I'Angle- 
terre on  ne  pent  pas  s'attendre  a  autre  chose.  Du 
reste  le  secretaire  d'Etat  dit  qu'il  y  a  eu  plutot  une 
certaine  detente  dans  ces  derniers  jours.  II  I'at- 
tribue  non  seulement  a  I'attitude  de  la  France  et  de 
la  Russie;  mais  aussi  a  ce  que  le  Roi  d'Angleterre 
sent  qu'il  n'a  pas  la  city  derriere  lui  et  qu'en  dehors 
du  monde  du  haut  commerce  il  y  a  un  groupe  anglais 
grandissant  qui  ne  veut  pas  pousser  les  choses  a 
I'extreme. 

Je  ne  vous  adresse  pas  le  texte  des  deux  discours 
que  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  a  adresses  le 
12  Juillet  a  la  colonie  frangaise,  parce  que  les  jour- 
naux beiges  les  auront  sans  doute  reproduits.  Je  me 
borne  a  faire  remarquer  que  le  langage  de  M,  Cam- 
bon est  en  accord  avec  le  jugement  porte  par  M.  de 
Schoen  sur  I'attitude  actuelle  de  la  France. 

Je  dois  encore  vous  parler.  Monsieur  le  Ministre. 
de  la  prochaine  retraite  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angle- 
terre qui  a  deja  quitte  Berlin  depuis  quelque  temps 
et  qui  n'y  reviendra  qu'  en  automne  pour  presenter 
ses  lettres  de  rappel.  Cette  retraite  n'est  Volontaire 
que  dans  la  forme.  Elle  a  ete  imposee  par  le  gou- 
vernement britannique  a  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  qui  au- 
rait beaucoup  desire  rester  a  Berlin  et  dont  le  main- 
tien  a  ete  demande,  sans  succes,  a  Londres  par  le 
gouvernement  Imperial. 

Sir  Frank  Lascelles  est  un  diplomate  d'une  rare 
intelligence,  d'un  jugement  tres  sur,  d'une  loyaute 
parfaite,  qui  ni  physiquement  ni  intellectuellement 
n'a  pas  encore  ressenti  les  attaques  de  la  vieillesse  et 
qui  jouit  de  la  confiance  hautement  meritee  de  I'Em- 
pereur,  du  gouvernement  Imperial  et  de  tons  ses  col- 
legues.  Si  le  gouvernement  britannique  se  prive  des 
services  d'un  diplomate  d'une  pareille  valeur  et  qui 
n'est  pas  encore  arrive  a  la  limite  d'age,  ce  ne  peut 


ment,  England  would  have  liked  to  go  much 
further  towards  an  entente  with  France  and  Russia 
than  she  had  succeeded  in  doing.  It  was  France 
that  had  refused.  Even  before  the  rumors  of  an 
alliance  had  been  put  in  circulation  and  while  M. 
Fallieres  was  still  in  London,  M.  Cambon  had  told 
Mr.  von  Schoen  that  the  French  Government  was 
in  a  delicate  position.  He  begged  the  Secretary  of 
State,  though  without  making  any  further  explana- 
tion, not  to  give  credit  to  any  alarming  reports 
which  might  reach  him  but  to  believe  that  France 
sincerely  wished  peace. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  concluded  by  saying  that  at  pres- 
ent it  was  France  that  was  exercising  a  pacific  in- 
fluence. 

May  I  ask  you  to  compare  the  present  report 
with  one  which  I  had  the  honor  to  send  you  on  June 
12th.  You  will  remember  that  in  the  conversation 
which  I  then  had  the  honor  to  report  to  you,  Mr. 
von  Schoen  qualified  England's  policy  as  disloyal. 
In  the  same  report  I  wrote  to  you  that  the  press 
campaign  of  the  two  semi-official  papers  of  the  Min- 
isters of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris  and  at  St.  Peters- 
burg led  me  to  believe  that,  in  spite  of  later  denials, 
there  had  been  a  plan  to  strengthen  the  ties  between 
the  Powers  banded  together  by  the  King  of  Eng- 
land against  Germany  and  that  the  plan  had  failed 
because  France  and  Russia  rejected  it.  A  month 
ago  that  was  only  a  conjecture  on  my  part;  now  it 
is  positive  information. 


My  colleague  also  spoke  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
concerning  the  manoeuvres  of  the  British  fleet  in 
the  region  of  the  Danish  narrows  which  had  the 
appearance  of  a  general  rehearsal  of  warlike  opera- 
tions the  execution  of  which  was  anticipated. 

Mr.  von  Schoen  replied  that  this  procedure  was 
certainly  not  a  friendly  one,  but  that  nothing  else 
could  be  expected  from  England.  The  Secretary 
of  State  said,  morever,  that  a  certain  relaxation 
had  taken  place  recently.  He  attributes  it  not  only 
to  the  attitude  of  France  and  Russia,  but  also  to 
a  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  King  of  England  that 
the  city  was  not  backing  him,  and  to  the  fact  that 
outside  the  circles  of  high  commerce  there  was  a 
constantly  growing  group  in  England  which  did  not 
wish  to  push  matters  to  the  extreme. 

I  am  not  sending  you  the  text  of  the  two  speeches 
which  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  addressed 
on  July  12th  to  the  French  colony,  because  the 
Belgian  papers  have  doubtless  printed  them.  I 
will  merely  remark  that  the  language  used  by  M. 
Cambon  agrees  with  the  opinion  formed  by  Mr.  von 
Schoen  on  the  present  attitude  of  France. 

I  must  still  speak  to  you.  Sir,  of  the  approaching 
retirement  of  the  British  Ambassador  who  left  Ber- 
lin some  time  ago  and  who  will  only  return  here  in 
autumn  in  order  to  present  his  letters  of  recall. 
His  retirement  is  voluntary  only  in  form.  It  was 
forced  by  the  British  Government  on  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles,  who  had  a  great  desire  to  remain  at  Berlin 
and  in  favor  of  whose  stay  an  unsuccessful  request 
was  also  made  in  London  by  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment. Sir  Frank  Lascelles  is  a  diplomat  of  rare 
intelligence,  very  sound  judgment,  and  perfect  loy- 
alty, who  has  neither  physically  nor  intellectually 
felt  the  signs  of  age  and  who  enjoys  the  highly 
merited  confidence  of  the  Emperor,  the  Imperial 
Government,  and  all  his  colleagues.  If  the  British 
Government  deprives  itself  of  the  services  of  a  dip- 
lomat of  such  merit  and  who  has  not  yet  reached  the 
age  limit,  it  is  only  because  Sir  Frank  Lascelles 
worked  for  fifteen  years,  without  permitting  himself 


etre  que  parce  que  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  a  travaille 
pendant  quinze  ans  et  sans  se  laisser  decourager  par 
de  nombreux  echecs,  a  amener  un  rapprochement 
entre  TAllemagne  et  I'Angleterre.  Le  zele  qu'il  a 
deploye  pour  dissiper  des  malentcndus  qu'il  trouve 
absurdes  et  prejudiciables  a  un  haut  degre,  aux  deux 
pays,  ne  correspond  pas  aux  vues  politiques  de  son 
souverain. 
Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


to  be  discouraged  by  numerous  checks,  to  bring 
about  a  rapprochement  between  Germany  and  Eng- 
land. The  zeal  which  he  displayed  in  order  to  dissi- 
pate the  misunderstandings  which  he  considered  ab- 
surd and  detrimental  in  a  high  degree  to  the  two 
countries  does  not  correspond  with  the  political 
views  of  his  sovereign. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Greindl. 


No.  51. 


No.  51. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres, 


M.  A.   Leghait,   Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  20  Juillet  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  President  de  la  Republique  a  quitte  la  France 
le  18  de  ce  mois  pour  rendre  officiellement  visite  a 
I'Empereur  de  Russie  et  aux  Rois  de  Suede ,  de 
Danemark  et  de  Norvege.  Monsieur  Fallieres,  s'in- 
spirant  de  I'idee  essentielle  de  la  politique  exterieure 
de  la  France  et  des  voeux  de  I'opinion  publique, 
avait  a  coeur  de  saluer  le  Chef  de  la  nation  amie  et 
alliee.  En  meme  temps  le  President  rendra  aux 
Souverains  de  Danemark  et  de  Norvege  la  visite 
qu'ils  lui  ont  faite  et  profitant  de  sa  presence  dans 
ces  regions,  il  ira  saluer  le  Souverain  de  la  Suede. 

Le  voyage  de  Mr.  Fallieres,  base  sur  des  motifs  de 
courtoisie,  a  en  meme  temps  un  caractere  politique 
qui  ne  manque  pas  d'importance  en  ce  moment  ou  le 
groupement  des  Puissances  est  I'objet  de  toutes  les 
preoccupations. 

La  France  infeodee  a  la  politique  anglaise  a  voulu 
preter  a  celle-ci  un  solide  concours  aupres  des  Puis- 
sances du  Nord.  S'il  n'est  peut-etre  pas  question 
pour  le  moment  d'une  nouvelle  triple  alliance,  on 
voudrait  du  moins  empecher  un  groupement  trop  in- 
time  de  ces  pays  sous  I'egide  de  I'Allemagne.  Ap- 
puyee  sur  cette  base,  la  France  proclame  hautement 
que  le  maintien  de  la  paix  est  le  but  de  sa  politique 
et  Mr.  Pichon,  aux  cours  qu'il  va  visiter,  comme  il 
I'a  fait  ici,  ne  cessera  de  le  repeter  en  affirmant 
que  la  diplomatie  franqaise  pratiquera,  fidele  a  ses 
alliances,  amities  et  engagements,  une  politique 
d'entente  entre  tous  et  de  conciliation  generale  des 
interets.  II  cherchera  a  demontrer  que  cette  politi- 
que n'a  pas  pour  but  d'opposer  les  Puissances  les 
unes  aux  autres  ni  d'opposer  la  France  a  aucune 
d'elle. 

II  est  certain  que  la  politique  frangaise  est  inspiree 
par  des  idees  pacifiques,  mais,  entrainee  dans  I'orbite 
de  I'Angleterre,  la  France  pourra-t-elle  toujours 
maitriser  les  evenements  et  eviter  que  des  froisse- 
ments  dangereux  se  manifestent  au  dela  du  Rhin? 

Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Leghait. 


Paris,  July  20,  1908. 
Sir:— 

The  President  of  the  Republic  left  France  on  the 
18th  of  this  month  in  order  to  pay  an  official  visit 
to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  Kings  of  Sweden, 
Denmark,  and  Norway.  In  view  of  the  funda- 
mental idea  of  France's  foreign  policy  and  of  the 
wishes  of  public  opinion,  M.  Fallieres  was  anxious 
to  greet  the  head  of  the  friendly  and  allied  nation. 
At  the  same  time  the  President  will  return  to  the 
Sovereigns  of  Denmark  and  Norway  the  visit  which 
they  paid  to  him  and,  profiting  by  his  presence  in 
these  regions,  he  will  greet  the  Sovereign  of 
Sweden. 

The  journey  of  M.  Fallieres,  while  based  on  mo- 
tives of  courtesy,  has  at  the  same  time  a  political 
character  which  is  not  without  importance  at  this 
moment  when  the  grouping  of  the  Powers  is  engag- 
ing all  minds. 

France,  the  liege  of  England,  wants  to  use  her 
influence  with  the  Northern  Powers  in  support  of 
the  British  policy.  If  at  the  moment  there  is  per- 
haps no  question  of  a  new  triple  alliance,  it  is  at 
least  desired  to  prevent  a  too  intimate  grouping  of 
these  Powers  under  Germany's  leadership.  With 
this  idea  as  a  basis  France  is  loudly  proclaiming 
that  the  preservation  of  peace  is  the  goal  of  her 
policy,  and  at  the  courts  which  he  is  going  to  visit 
M.  Pichon  will  not  cease  to  reiterate,  as  he  is  wont 
to  do  here,  his  affirmation  that  French  diplomacy, 
faithful  to  its  alliances,  friendships,  and  obligations, 
will  follow  a  policy  of  general  harmony  and  concil- 
iation of  interests.  He  will  endeavor  to  show  that 
the  aim  of  this  policy  is  not  to  cause  antagonism 
among  the  other  Powers  nor  to  bring  France  into 
opposition  to  any  one  of  them. 

It  is  certain  that  the  French  policy  is  inspired  by 
pacific  ideas,  but,  under  England's  sway  will  France 
always  be  able  to  control  the  situation  and  prevent 
dangerous  ill-feeling  from  arising  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Rhine? 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Leghait. 


No.  52. 


A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  AiTairs. 


Paris,  le  8  Octobre  1908. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Pour  faire  suite  aux  renseignements  que  j'ai  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  par  ma  lettre  d'hier,  je 
m'empresse  de  vous  transmettre  ci-joint  divers  art- 
icles du  journal  le  "Temps"  de  ce  jour  relatifs  a  I'in- 
cident  des  Balkans.  La  declaration  de  M.  Isvolsky 
est  tout  particulierement  interessante,  vu  surtout 
qu'il  en  a  lui-meme  affirme  I'exactitude.  II  ressort 
de  cette  declaration  que  les  informations  que  je  vous 
ai  donnees  hier  au  sujet.  du  but  poursuivi  par  la 
Russie  en  proposant  la  reunion  d'une  Conference 
etaient  bien  fondees.  La  Russie  veut  dechirer  le 
traite  de  Berlin  qui  a  ete  dirige  centre  elle  et  elle 
compte  etre  appuyee  en  cela  par  la  France  et  I'An- 
gleterre,  mais  on  se  demande  si  I'Allemagne  laissera 
detruire  impunement  I'oeuvre  du  Prince  de  Bis- 
rfiarck. 

II  resulte  des  entretiens  que  j'ai  eus  avec  divers 
Ambassadeurs  que  Ton  considere  la  question  actuelle 
comme  tres  delicate,  tres  compliquee  et  tres  difficile 
a  resoudre. 

II  ne  sera  pas  aise  d'arriver  a  reunir  une  confe- 
rence et  on  ignore  quel  sera  I'accueil  qui  sera  reserve 
a  I'invitation  lancee  par  la  Russie.  Cet  accueil  de- 
pendra  du  programme  et  I'accord  sur  celui-ci  sera 
fort  laborieux  a  cause  du  fait  accompli  en  presence 
duquel  on  se  trouve  et  des  "compensations"  que  Ton 
reclame  de  toute  part.  Toutefois  on  semble  esperer 
que  toutes  les  Puissances  accepteront  la  conference, 
car,  me  disait-on,  le  desir  du  maintien  de  la  paix  est 
si  unanime  et  si  profond  qu'il  dominera  tout. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Leghait. 


Paris,  October  8,  1908. 
Sir:— 

In  continuance  of  the  information  which  I  had 
the  honor  to  send  you  in  my  report  of  yesterday,  I 
hasten  to  send  herevsrith  several  articles  from  the 
Temps  of  to-day  relative  to  the  Balkan  incident. 
The  declaration  of  M.  Iswolski  is  particularly  in- 
teresting because  he  himself  affirmed  its  correct- 
ness. From  this  declaration  it  may  be  seen  that 
the  information  which  I  gave  you  yesterday  in  re- 
gard to  the  aim  pursued  by  Russia  in  proposing  the 
calling  of  a  Conference  was  well-founded.  Russia 
virishes  to  destroy  the  treaty  of  Berlin  which  was 
directed  against  her,  and  is  counting  on  being  sup- 
ported in  this  by  France  and  England ;  but  it  is  to 
be  questioned  whether  Germany  will  permit  the 
work  of  Prince  Bismarck  to  be  destroyed  with 
impunity. 

From  the  conversations  which  I  have  had  with 
several  Ambassadors  it  seems  that  the  present  sit- 
uation is  considered  very  delicate,  very  complicated, 
and  very  difficult  to  solve. 

It  will  not  be  easy  to  call  a  conference  and  it  is 
not  known  what  reception  will  be  given  to  the  invi- 
tation issued  by  Russia.  Its  reception  will  depend 
on  the  programme  concerning  which  it  will  be  very 
difficult  to  come  to  an  agreement  in  face  of  the  ac- 
complished fact  with  which  one  is  confronted  and 
of  the  "compensations"  which  are  being  demanded 
on  all  sides.  Nevertheless  it  seems  that  hopes  are 
being  entertained  that  all  Powers  will  accept  the 
conference  for,  so  I  am  told,  the  desire  to  maintain 
peace  is  so  unanimous  and  so  profound  that  it  will 
prevail. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Leghait. 


No.  53. 


No.  53. 


M.  A.  Leghait,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


M.  A.   Leghait,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  19  Janvier  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Hier  s'est  terminee  a  la  Chambre  des  Deputes  la 
discussion  sur  le  Maroc  qui  avait  ete  commencee 
vendredi  dernier.  Apres  I'expression  de  quelques 
vains  regrets,  applaudis  par  I'extreme-gauche,  sur 
la  neutralite  que  le  Gouvernement  eut  du  observer 
plus  rigoureusement,  d'apres  elle,  entre  les  deux  sul- 
tans luttant  pour  le  pouvoir,  Mr.  Jaures  a  repris  ses 
attaques  contre  la  politique  marocaine  du  Gouverne- 
ment et  I'expose  de  ses  sophismes  qui  concluent  a 
I'evacuation  immediate  et,  par  consequent,  a  I'aban- 
don  de  tous  les  avantages  acquis  par  les  conventions 
successives  depuis  1901  jusqu'a  I'acte  d'Algesiras. 
Comme  consequence,  il  critique  les  instructions  don- 
nees au  General  d'Amade  et  au  General  Lyautey,  et 
qui,  selon  lui,  dissimulent  des  projets  d'occupation 
definitive.  II  reclamait  la  publication  des  rapports 
du  General  Lyautey,  mais  Mr.  Pichon  la  refuse  en 
declarant  que  I'objet  de  ces  rapports  n'est  nulle- 


Sir: 


Paris,  January  19,  1909. 


Yesterday  the  Morocco  debate  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  which  began  last  Friday,  came  to  an  end. 
After  expressing  vain  regrets,  applauded  by  the  Ex- 
treme Left,  in  regard  to  the  neutrality  which  in  the 
latter's  opinion  the  Government  should  have  ob- 
served more  rigorously  towards  the  two  Sultans 
struggling  for  power,  M.  Jaures  resumed  his  at- 
tacks against  the  Moroccan  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment by  a  recital  of  his  fallacies,  the  outcome  of 
which  would  be  immediate  evacuation  and  conse- 
quently the  abandonment  of  all  the  advantages 
gained  by  the  successive  agreements  from  1901  up 
to  the  act  of  Algeciras.  Accordingly,  he  critisizes 
the  instructions  given  to  General  Amade  and  Gen- 
eral Lyautey  which,  in  his  opinion,  conceal  plans 
of  ultimate  occupation.  He  demanded  the  publi- 
cation of  the  reports  of  General  Lyautey,  but  M. 
Pichon  refused,  declaring  that  the  object  of  these 


ment  une  occupation,  mais  I'organisation  d'une 
police  franco-marocaine  prevue  par  les  traites. 
Dans  la  seconde  partie  de  son  discours  Mr.  Jaures 
a  cherche  a  elargir  la  base  de  son  interpellation  et  a 
englober  la  question  marocaine  dans  la  situation  ge- 
nerale  qui  resulte  des  derniers  evenements  dans  les 
Balkans.  II  dit  qu'il  ne  fa,ut  pas  heurter  les  interets 
allemands  au  Maroc  afin  que  la  France  et  I'Alle- 
magne  puissent  arriver  a  un  accord  qui  garantirait 
la  paix  de  I'Europe. 

Mr.  Denys  Cochin  a  succede  a  Mr.  Jaures  a  la  tri- 
bune et  s'est  fait  le  porte-voix  des  griefs  de  la  droite 
centre  la  politique  marocaine  du  Gouvernement.  II 
ne  croit  pas  que  ce  soit  le  moment  de  se  rapprocher 
de  I'Allemagne  qui  n'a  cesse  de  proteger  I'lslam  dans 
ses  elements  fanatiques  diriges  centre  la  France.  II 
est  d'avis  que  I'evacuation  projetee  du  Chaouia  se- 
rait  une  faute  et  il  conseille  une  politique  d'action 
energique  au  Maroc. 


Mr.  Pichon  n'a  pas  eu  de  peine  a  repondre  a  ces 
discours  spirituels  et  idealistes  sans  base  serieuse. 
Le  Ministre  des  Afifaires  Etrangeres  a  expose  de 
nouveau  avec  encore  plus  de  nettete,  de  clarte  et 
d'eloquence  que  de  coutume,  quelle  a  ete  et  con- 
tinuera  a  etre  la  ligne  de  conduite  du  Gouvernement 
au  Maroc.  Nous  ne  voulons,  dit-il,  ni  protectorat  ni 
conquete  mais  le  respect  des  conventions  intema- 
tionales  et  les  avantages  auxquels  elles  nous  donnent 
droit.  Nous  continuerons  a  observer  d^ns  les  luttes 
interieures  du  pays  la  neutralite  la  plus  absolue.  Le 
Ministre  a  expose  les  principes,  les  resultats  acquis 
et  le  programme  ulterieur  de  sa  politique. 


Les  principes:  c'est  qu'une  politique  de  noninter- 
vention serait  fatale  pour  la  dignite,  les  interets  et  les 
droits  de  la  France,  qui  doit,  au  prix  meme  de  lourds 
sacrifices,  remplir  le  mandat  qu'elle  a  sollicite  con- 
curremment  avec  I'Espagne  et  qu'elle  ne  peut  laisser 
a  d'autres  le  pretexte  d'intervenir  sur  les  confins  de 
ses  possessions  africaines.  Et  enfin  qu'elle  doit  as- 
surer I'execution  de  tous  ses  accords  avec  le  Gou- 
vernement marocain.  On  ne  saurait  voir  la  le  prin- 
cipe  d'une  liquidation  marocaine,  mais  bien  plutot 
une  execution  methodique  d'accords  et  d'engage- 
ments. 

Les  resultats  obtenus  jusqu'ici  par  I'application  de 
ces  principes,  Mr.  Pichon  les  signale  comme  suit: 
"Grace  a  nous  I'ordre  n'a  ete  trouble  nulle  part,  la 
securite  des  colonies  etrangeres  a  ete  garantie,  les 
transactions  commerciales  se  sont  librement  de- 
veloppees,  nous  avons  organise  la  police  qui  fonc- 
tionne  partout.  Nous  avons  regie  par  des  ententes 
economiques  les  rivalites  d'interet  qui  existaient  en- 
tre  nous  et  d'autres  pays.  Nous  avons  commence 
la  mise  en  pratique  de  nos  accords  sur  la  frontiere 
ou  la  situation  de  I'Algerie  n'a  jamais  ete  mieux  as- 
suree." 

Quant  a  ce  qui  concerne  le  programme,  Mr. 
Pichon  a  resume  les  instructions  donnees  a  Mr. 
Regnault  qui  va  en  mission  a  Fez.  L'evacuation  du 
Chaouia  est  commencee  et  elle  se  poursuivra  gra- 
duellement  des  que  la  securite  sera  assuree  par  les 
soins  du  sultan.  La  France  a  droit  a  une  indemnite 
et  elle  la  reclamera,  mais  en  se  montrant  aussi  con- 
ciliante  que  possible  sur  les  modalites.  En  ce  qui 
concerne  la  zone  limitrophe  algero-marocaine,  le  Ge- 
neral Lyautey  n'a  pour  mission  que  d'executer  les 
accords  de  1902  sans  arriere-pensee. 

En  resume,  on  peut  dire  que  la  France  veut  as- 


reports  was  by  no  means  an  occupation,  but  the 
organization  of  a  Franco-Moroccan  police  provided 
for  by  the  treaties.  In  the  second  part  of  his  speech 
M.  Jaures  endeavored  to  enlarge  the  basis  of  his 
interpellation  and  to  enclose  the  Moroccan  question 
in  the  general  situation  which  has  resulted  from  the 
latest  events  in  the  Balkans.  He  said  that  the  in- 
terests of  Germany  in  Morocco  must  be  respected 
so  as  not  to  destroy  the  chances  for  an  understand- 
ing between  France  and  Germany  which  would 
guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe. 

M.  Denys  Cochin  followed  M.  Jaures  on  the 
tribune,  making  himself  the  spokesman  of  the 
complaints  of  the  Right  against  the  Moroccan  pol- 
icy of  the  Government.  He  does  not  believe  that 
this  is  the  moment  for  a  rapprochement  with  Ger- 
many because  she  had  never  ceased  to  protect  the 
fanatic  elements  of  Islam  whose  efforts  were  di- 
rected against  France.  He  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
intended  evacuation  of  Chaouia  would  be  a  mistake 
and  he  advised  a  policy  of  energetic  action  in 
Morocco. 

M.  Pichon  had  no  difficulty  in  replying  to  these 
speeches  which,  although  highly  intellectual  and 
idealistic,  are  without  any  serious  foundation.  The 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  again  explained  with 
even  more  than  his  customary  precision,  clearness, 
and  eloquence,  what  has  been  and  will  continue  to 
be  the  line  of  conduct  of  the  Government  in  Moroc- 
co. We  do  not  wish,  he  said,  either  a  protectorate 
or  a  conquest,  but  we  want  respect  for  international 
agreements  and  the  advantages  to  which  they  give 
us  a  right;  We  will  continue  to  observe  absolute 
neutrality  in  the  inner  struggles  of  the  country. 
The  Minister  then  explained  the  principles,  the  re- 
sults obtained,  and  the  subsequent  programme  of 
his  policy. 

The  principles :  that  a  policy  of  non-intervention 
would  be  fatal  to  the  dignity,  the  interests,  and  the 
rights  of  France  who,  even  at  the  price  of  heavy 
sacrifices,  must  carry  out  the  mandate  which  she 
had  solicited  together  with  Spain ;  that  she  must 
not  give  others  a  pretext  for  intervening  on  the 
borders  of  her  African  possessions ;  and,  finally,  that 
she  must  ensure  the  observance  of  all  her  agree- 
ments with  the  Moroccan  Government.  This  should 
not  be  regarded  as  a  liquidation  of  Morocco,  but 
rather  as  a  methodical  execution  of  agreements 
and  obligations. 

The  results  obtained  so  far  by  the  application 
of  these  principles  are  represented  by  M.  Pichon  as 
follows:  "Thanks  to  us,  order  has  not  been  dis- 
turbed, the  security  of  the  foreign  colonies  has  been 
guaranteed,  commerce  has  fully  developed,  and  we 
have  organized  the  police  which  is  working  satis- 
factorily everywhere.  By  commercial  agreements 
we  have  removed  the  differences  of  interest  which 
existed  between  us  and  other  countries.  We  have 
commenced  to  put  our  agreements  in  practice  at 
the  frontier  where  the  situation  of  Algiers  has  never 
been  so  secure." 

As  far  as  the  programme  is  concerned,  M.  Pichon 
summed  up  the  instructions  given  to  M.  Regnault 
who  is  to  be  sent  to  Fez.  The  evacuation  of 
Chaouia  had  commenced  and  it  would  be  continued 
gradually  as  soon  as  security  had  been  assured  by 
the  Sultan's  measures.  France  was  entitled  to  an 
indemnity  and  she  would  claim  it,  byt  would  at  the 
same  time  be  as  conciliating  as  possible  in  regard 
to  its  modalities.  As  to  the  Algero-Moroccan  bor- 
der district.  General  Lyautey's  mission  was  to  exe- 
cute the  agreements  of  1902  without  any  mental 
reservations. 

In  summing  up  it  may  be  said   that   France 


surer  sa  situation  privilegiee  au  Maroc,  y  maintenir 
avec  fermete  ses  droits  et  rester  scrupuleusement 
fidele  aux  engagement  d'Algesiras,  mais  il  est  a  pre- 
voir  qu'elle  ne  tiendra  pas  compte  des  conseils  de 
Mr.  Jaures  et  que  ce  n'est  pas  sur  le  terrain  marocain 
qu'elle  fera  des  concessions  en  vue  de  faciliter  une 
entente  avec  I'Allemagne  dans  les  Balkans. 

La  politique  marocaine  de  Mr.  Pichon  a  ete  ap- 
prouvee  par  un  vote  donnant  au  Gouvernement  une 
majorite  de  249  voix. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Leghait. 


wishes  to  make  her  privileged  position  in  Morocco 
secure,  firmly  maintaining  her  rights  there,  and 
remaining  scrupulously  faithful  to  the  agreement 
of  Algeciras;  but  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  she 
will  heed  the  counsels  of  M.  Jaures,  nor  that  she 
will  make  concessions  on  Moroccan  territory  in 
order  to  facilitate  an  understanding  with  Germany 
in  the  Balkans. 

M.  Pichon's  Moroccan  policy  was  approved  by  a 
majority  of  249  votes  for  the  Government. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Leghait. 


No.  54. 


No.  54. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Berlin,  le  13  Fevrier  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Le  Roi  et  la  Reine  d'Angleterre  ont  quitte  Berlin 
hier  soir,  apres  une  visite  qui  a  dure  quatre  jours. 
Rien  n'a  ete  epargne  de  la  part  de  la  cour  et  de  I'ad- 
ministration  communale  de  Berlin  pour  rendre  I'ac- 
cueil  fait  a  Leurs  Majestes  aussi  splendide  et  aussi 
cordial  que  possible. 

Le  Roi  d'Angleterre  regne  depuis  huit  ans,  a  plu- 
sieurs  reprises  il  a  eu  des  entrevues  avec  I'Empereur 
d'Allemagne ;  mais  il  n'avait  pas  encore  fait  a  Berlin 
sa  visite  officielle,  tandis  qu'il  avait  rempli  ce  devoir 
de  courtoisie  dans  la  plupart  des  capitales  de 
I'Europe.  On  interpretait  ici,  non  sans  raison,  le 
peu  d'empressement  du  Roi  d'Angleterre,  comme 
I'un  des  symptomes  de  la  froideur  des  rapports  des 
deux  souverains  et  de  la  tension  de  relations  entre 
les  deux  pays.  II  n'y  a  personne  ici  a  qui  cette  si- 
tuation ne  pese,  parce  qu'elle  constitue  un  danger 
permanent  pour  I'empire.  II  y  a  longtemps  qu'un 
rapprochement  aurait  ete  opere,  si  la  chose  ne  de- 
pendait  que  de  I'Empereur,  du  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial ou  du  peuple  allemand.  On  a  prodigue  les 
avances  et  toujours  sans  succes.  On  aime  a  croire 
que  la  demarche  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  indique  une 
disposition  a  temperer  la  politique  franchement  hos- 
tile a  I'Allemagne  qu'il  dirige  personnellement.  Le 
ton  amical  des  toasts  echanges  au  diner  de  gala  et 
les  intentions  pacifiques  manifestees  par  les  deux 
souverains  ont  cause  une  heureuse  impression.  Ne- 
anmoins  le  ton  de  la  presse  est  courtois,  mais  re- 
serve. Deja  avant  I'arrivee  du  Roi  d'Angleterre,  les 
journaux  avaient  premuni  leurs  lecteurs  centre  la 
tentation  d'exagerer  les  resultats  possibles  de  I'en- 
trevue.  On  attend,  pour  voir  si  les  actes  repondront 
aux  paroles  et  Ton  a  eprouve  trop  de  deceptions, 
pour  s'abandonner  a  la  confiance. 


Le  Roi  d'Angleterre  affirme  que  la  conservation 
de  la  paix  a  toujours  ete  le  but  de  ses  efforts ;  c'est 
ce  qu'il  n'a  pas  cesse  de  dire  depuis  le  debut  de  la 
campagne  diplomatique  qu'il  a  menee  a  bonne  fin, 
dans  le  but  d'isoler  I'Allemagne ;  mais  on  ne  peut  pas 
s'empecher  de  remarquer,  que  la  paix  du  monde  n'a 
jamais  ete  plus  compromise  que  depuis  que  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre  se  mele  de  la  consolider. 

L'attitude  de  I'Angleterre  dans  la  question  des 
Balkans  a  ete  de  nature  a  retarder  au  moins  la  solu- 
tion du  conflit  qui  place  I'Allemagne  dans  la  posi- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  February  13,  1909. 
Sir:— 

The  King  and  the  Queen  of  England  left  Berlin 
last  evening  after  a  visit  which  lasted  four  days. 
Nothing  was  spared  on  the  part  of  the  court  and 
the  municipal  administration  of  Berlin  in  order  to 
make  the  reception  given  to  their  Majesties  as 
splendid  and  as  cordial  as  possible. 

The  King  of  England  has  reigned  for  eight  years, 
and  on  several  occasions  had  meetings  with  the 
Emperor  of  Germany;  but  he  had  not  yet  paid  his 
official  visit  to  Berlin,  although  he  had  fulfilled  this 
duty  of  courtesy  in  most  of  the  capitals  of  Europe. 
The  King  of  England's  tardiness  was  regarded  here 
not  without  reason  as  one  of  the  symptoms  of  the 
coldness  in  the  relations  between  the  two  Sover- 
eigns and  of  the  tension  in  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries.  There  is  no  one  here  on  whom 
this  situation  does  not  weigh,  because  it  constitutes 
a  permanent  danger  for  the  Empire.  A  rapproche- 
ment would  have  been  brought  about  long  ago  if 
the  matter  depended  only  on  the  Emperor,  the  Im- 
perial Government,  and  the  German  people.  They 
have  been  lavish  with  advances  and  always  without 
success.  It  is  fondly  believed  here  that  the  step  of 
the  King  of  England  indicates  a  desire  to  temper 
the  frankly  hostile  policy  towards  Germany  which 
he  is  personally  directing.  The  friendly  tone  of 
the  toasts  exchanged  at  the  gala-dinner  and  the 
pacific  intentions  expressed  by  the  two  Sovereigns 
have  caused  a  pleasant  impression.  Nevertheless 
the  tone  of  the  press,  while  courteous,  is  reserved. 
Even  before  the  arrival  of  the  King  of  England, 
the  papers  had  warned  their  readers  against  the 
temptation  to  entertain  exaggerated  expectations 
as  to  the  possible  results  of  the  meeting.  Time 
should  be  taken  to  see  whether  the  actions  will 
correspond  to  the  words.  There  have  been  too 
many  disappointments  to  indulge  in  confidence. 

The  King  of  England  affirms  that  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace  has  always  been  the  goal  of  his  efforts ; 
he  has  not  stopped  saying  that  since  the  beginning 
of  the  diplomatic  campaign  which  he  has  success- 
fully conducted  for  the  purpose  of  isolating  Ger- 
many. But  one  cannot  help  noticing  that  the  peace 
of  the  world  has  never  been  more  compromised  than 
since  the  King  of  England  has  been  trying  to  ensure 
it. 

The  attitude  of  England  in  the  Balkan  question 
has  been  such  as  to  delay,  at  least,  the  solution  of 
the  conflict  which  is  placing  Germany  in  the  most 


tion  la  plus  penible  et  la  plus  delicate.  EUe  ressem- 
ble  fort  a  celle  qu'a  prise  le  gouvernement  britan- 
nique  dans  la  question  du  Congo,  dont  il  pretendait 
desirer  vivement  I'annexion  a  la  Belgique,  tout  en 
se  livrant  a  une  action  diplomatique  qui  a  failli  la 
faire  avorter.    Est-ce  pure  maladresse? 

La  visite  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  coincide  avec  une 
augmentation  considerable  du  budget  de  la  marine, 
avec  la  construction  de  nouveaux  cuirasses  du  type 
Dreadnought  et  avec  la  formation  de  la  plus  formida- 
ble escadre  qui  ait  jamais  existe  et  dont  le  port  d'at- 
tache  est  dans  la  mer  du  Nord,  a  I'endroit  le  plus 
rapproche  possible  des  cotes  allemandes.  Est-ce  uni- 
quement  pour  se  mettre  a  I'abri  d'une  attaque 
eventuelle  que  I'Allemagne  est  incapable  d'effectuer? 

L'agitation  pour  la  creation  d'une  armee  territo- 
riale  continue.  L'Angleterre  n'en  a  nul  besoin  pour 
sa  defense.  Qu'en  veut-elle  faire,  si  elle  n'entretient 
aucune  arriere  pensee  d'agression  sur  le  continent? 


painful  and  delicate  position.  England's  attitude 
strongly  resembles  that  which  the  British  Gov- 
ernment took  in  the  Congo  question,  pretending  to 
desire  the  annexation  of  the  Congo  to  Belgium 
while  at  the  same  time  carrying  on  a  diplomatic 
action  which  almost  caused  the  plan  to  miscarry. 
Is  that  merely  bungling? 

The  visit  of  the  King  of  England  coincides  with 
a  considerable  increase  in  the  naval  budget,  with 
the  construction  of  cruisers  of  the  dreadnought 
type,  and  with  the  formation  of  the  most  formidable 
squadron  which  has  ever  existed  and  the  base  of 
which  is  in  the  North  Sea  at  the  point  nearest  to 
the  German  coast.  Is  all  that  done  only  to  protect 
England  against  the  contingency  of  an  attack  which 
Germany  is  incapable  of  carrying  out? 

The  agitation  for  the  creation  of  a  territorial  army 
is  continuing.  England  has  not  the  slightest  need 
of  it  for  her  defense.  What  use  does  she  want  to 
make  of  it  if  she  does  not  entertain  any  secret 
thought  of  aggression  on  the  continent? 


Ces  reflexions  sautent  aux  yeux  et  expliquent  I'he- 
sitation  des  Allemands  a  considerer  la  detente  com- 
me  un  fait  acquis. 

Une  information  donnee  aux  journaux  dit  que  M. 
Hardinge  le  sous-secretaire  d'Etat  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres,  qui  a  accompagne  le  Roi  d'Angleterre  a 
Berlin,  a  fait  une  longue  visite  au  chancelier  de 
I'empire  et  qu'il  y  a  ete  naturellement  parle  de  po- 
litique. Les  questions  a  I'ordre  du  jour  ont  ete 
passees  en  revue  et  sur  aucune  il  n'y  a  de  contradic- 
tion entre  les  interets  des  deux  pays.  Aucun  ar- 
rangement concret  n'a  ete  conclu. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


These  reflections  are  very  apparent  and  explain 
Germany's  hesitation  to  consider  the  relaxation  of 
the  tension  as  an  accomplished  fact. 

An  item  of  information  given  to  the  newspapers 
states  that  Mr.  Hardinge,  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  accompanied  the 
King  of  England  to  Berlin,  paid  a  long  visit  to  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  and  that  politics  were  naturally 
discussed.  The  questions  of  the  day  were  reviewed 
and  in  none  of  them  were  the  interests  of  the  two 
countries  found  to  conflict.  No  concrete  agreement 
was  concluded. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  55. 


No.  55. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  17  Fevrier  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Par  mon  rapport  du  13  Fevrier,  j'ai  eu  I'honneur 
de  vous  ecrire  quelle  a  ete  I'impression  produite  sur 
I'opinion  publique  allemande  par  la  visite  du  Roi  et 
de  la  Reine  d'Angleterre  a  Berlin.  Celle  du  gou- 
vernement Imperial  est  identique. 

Le  Roi  d'Angleterre  atteint  d'un  refroidissement 
et  visiblement  fatigue  par  les  fetes  qui  lui  ont  ete 
oflfertes,  a  ete  tres  silencieux.  Sa  Majeste  n'a  eu 
aucun  entretien  politique  avec  le  chancelier  de  I'em- 
pire. Elle  n'a  parle  au  Prince  de  Biilow  que  pendant 
quelques  minutes  apres  le  dejeuner  chez  I'ambassa- 
deur  d'Angleterre,  en  presence  de  tiers  et  de  choses 
indifferentes.  C'est  tout  juste  ce  qu'exigeait  la 
courtoisie. 

Les  conversations  de  Sir  C.  Hardinge  avec  le 
chancelier  et  avec  le  secretaire  d'Etat  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres  ne  sont  pas  sorties  des  generalites.  On 
a  reconnu  de  part  et  d'autre  qu'il  fallait  faire  les 
plus  grands  efforts  pour  empecher  que  la  question 
des  Balkans  n'aboutisse  a  la  guerre.  Une  declaration 
dans  ce  sens  etait  pour  ainsi  dire  obligatoire.  Elle 
n'a  done  pas  grande  portee.  Ce  qui  est  plus  signifi- 
catif  est  qu'on  s'est  trouve  d'accord  sur  la  necessite 
de  reunir  une  conference,  non  pour  reviser  mais  pour 


Berlin,  February  17,  1909. 
Sir:— 

In  my  report  of  February  13th,  I  had  the  honor 
to  describe  to  you  the  impression  produced  on  Ger- 
man public  opinion  by  the  visit  of  the  King  and 
Queen  of  England  to  Berlin.  That  of  the  Imperial 
Government  is  the  same. 

The  King  of  England,  who  was  suffering  from 
chill  and  was  evidently  fatigued  from  the  festivi- 
ties given  in  his  honor,  was  very  taciturn.  His 
Majesty  did  not  have  any  political  conversation 
with  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  He  only  spoke  to 
Prince  von  Biilow  for  a  few  moments,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  others  and  about  immaterial  matters,  after 
the  luncheon  given  by  the  British  Ambassador. 
This  merely  fulfilled  the  requirements  of  courtesy. 

The  conversations  of  Sir  C.  Hardinge  with  the 
Chancellor  and  with  the  Secretary  of  State  of  For- 
eign Affairs  did  not  go  beyond  generalities.  It  was 
recognized  on  both  sides  that  the  greatest  efforts 
would  have  to  be  made  in  order  to  prevent  the  Bal- 
kan question  from  leading  to  war.  A  declaration 
in  this  sense  was  obligatory,  so  to  speak.  It  is 
therefore  not  of  great  import.  What  is  more  signi- 
ficant is  that  it  was  agreed  that  it  was  necessary  to 
call  a  conference,  not  to  revise  but  to  register  the 


enregistrer  le  resultat  des  negociations  pendantes 
entre  les  puissances  les  plus  directement  interessees. 
Sir  C.  Hardinge  s'est  done  plaee  au  point  de  vue 
autriehien. 

II  a  ete  convenu  que  de  part  et  d'autre  on  se 
declarerait  satisfait  du  resultat  de  I'entrevue  de  Ber- 
lin. C'est  dans  ce  sens  qu'ont  ete  redigees  les  com- 
munications adressees  aux  journaux. 

Jusqu'a  un  certain  point,  du  cote  allemand,  cette 
satisfaction  est  reelle.  On  a  gre  a  Sir  C.  Hardinge 
de  n'avoir  fait  aucune  allusion  aux  questions  brii- 
lantes.  II  n'a  parle  ni  de  la  limitation  des  armements 
maritimes  ni  du  chemin  de  fer  de  Bagdad. 

Le  gouvernement  Imperial  a  fait  le  necessaire 
pour  que  le  public  d'un  cote  ne  croie  pas  a  un  echec 
et  de  I'autre  ne  se  fasse  pas  d'illusions  sur  les  re- 
sultats  obtenus.  II  est  de  style,  apres  chaque  visite 
de  souverain,  d'inserer  en  tete  de  la  Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung  un  article  hautement  ofificieux 
dans  lequel  on  se  felicite  en  termes  plutot  dithyram- 
biques  de  I'identite  des  vues  politiques  constatee. 
Cette  fois  on  s'est  abstenu  et  les  communiques  a  la 
presse  ont  revetu  une  forme  moins  bruyante. 


La  situation  a  ete  tres  exactement  caracterisee 
dans  la  revue  hebdomadaire  de  la  politique  exteri- 
eure  publiee  par  la  "Kreuz-Zeitung"  de  ce  matin  No. 
79.  M.  Schiemann  dont  vous  connaissez  la  grande 
autorite  comme  journaliste  et  les  relations  avec  la 
chancellerie,  constate  que  le  sejour  du  Roi  Edouard 
s'est  bien  passe  et  que  la  presse  ainsi  que  le  public 
ont  temoigne  le  respect  du  a  Sa  Majeste.  II  ajoute 
que  "pour  repondre  a  la  question  de  savoir  s'il  faut 
signaler  la  visite  du  Roi  Edouard  comme  un  evene- 
ment  d'une  portee  politique,  on  devra  attendre  5  ou 
6  semaines.  Nous  voulons,  dit-il,  attendre  si  d'ici  la, 
I'opinion  publique  en  Angleterre  se  sera  calmee  au 
sujet  du  peril  allemand;  car  tout  est  possible  aussi 
longtemps  que  ce  fantome  pesera  comme  un  cauche- 
mar  sur  les  Anglais.  II  faudra  done  observer  I'atti- 
tude  du  "Times,"  du  "Standard,"  de  la  "National 
Review"  et  consorts  pour  constater  si  la  campagne 
d'excitation  contre  I'Allemagne  continuera  ou  si  elle 
sera  enfin  terminee;  au  surplus  il  est  avere  qu'il  y 
a  eu  des  entretiens  politiques  amicaux,  mais  aucun 
arrangement." 

On  ne  peut  pas  mieux  dire  que  meme  si  le  Roi 
d' Angleterre  a  un  desir  sincere  de  se  rapprocher  de 
I'Allemagne,  il  est  malgre  sa  grande  influence  per- 
sonnelle  incapable  de  le  realiser,  aussi  longternps 
qu'un  revirement  nc  se  sera  pas  opere  dans  I'opinion 
publique  anglaise. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


results  of  the  negotiations  pending  between  the 
Powers  most  directly  interested.  Sir  C.  Hardinge 
thus  took  the  Austrian  point  of  view. 

It  was  agreed  to  express  satisfaction  on  both 
sides  with  the  result  of  the  meeting  of  Berlin.  The 
communications  given  to  the  newspapers  were 
worded  accordingly. 

Up  to  a  certain  point,  on  the  German  side,  this 
satisfaction  is  genuine.  Gratitude  was  felt  to  Sir 
C.  Hardinge  for  not  having  alluded  in  any  way  to 
the  burning  questions.  He  spoke  neither  of  the 
limitation  of  naval  armaments,  nor  of  the  Bagdad 
railway. 

The  Imperial  Government  has  taken  the  neces- 
sary measures  to  prevent  the  public  from  believing, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  meeting  was  a  failure,  and, 
on  the  other,  from  cherishing  illusions  on  the  re- 
sults obtained.  It  is  the  custom  after  every  visit 
of  a  Sovereign  to  insert  in  a  prominent  place  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  a  semi-official 
article  in  which  satisfaction  is  expressed  in  rather 
dithyrambic  terms  at  the  identity  of  the  political 
views  which  has  been  established.  This  time  this 
course  was  refrained  from  and  the  communications 
to  the  press  are  couched  in  less  clamorous  terms. 

The  situation  has  been  very  aptly  sketched  in  the 
weekly  review  of  foreign  policy  published  by  the 
Kreuz  Zeitung  of  this  morning,  issue  No.  79.  Mr. 
Schiemann,  whose  position  as  a  journaHst  and  whose 
relations  with  the  Chancellery  you  know,  states  that 
the  sojourn  of  the  King  of  England  passed  oflf  well 
and  that  the  press  as  well  as  the  public  manifested 
the  respect  due  His  Majesty.  He  adds  that  "in 
order  to  reply  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  visit 
of  King  Edward  is  to  be  considered  an  event  of 
political  importance  one  will  have  to  wait  five  or 
six  weeks.  We  wish  to  see  if  by  that  time  public 
opinion  in  England  has  been  pacified  on  the  subject 
of  the  German  peril;  for  everything  is  possible  as 
long  as  this  phantom  weighs  like  an  incubus  on  the 
English.  It  will,  therefore,  be  necesary  to  observe 
the  attitude  of  the  Times,  of  the  Standard,  of  the 
National  Review  and  other  journals,  in  order  to 
discover  whether  the  anti-German  campaign  will 
continue  or  whether  it  will  at  last  come  to  an  end. 
Besides  this,  it  is  averred  that  friendly  political  con- 
versations have  taken  place,  but  no  agreement  was 
made. 

It  could  not  be  expressed  any  more  clearly  that 
even  if  the  King  of  England  has  a  sincere  desire 
for  a  rapprochement  with  Germany,  he  is,  despite 
his  great  personal  influence,  incapable  of  effecting 
it  as  long  as  a  change  does  not  take  place  in  English 
public  opinion. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  56. 


•  Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  22  Mars  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Je  n'ai  pas  a  vous  donner  d'informations  sur  les 
debats  relatifs  a  la  marine  de  guerre  qui  ont  eu  lieu  a 
la  commission  du  budget  du  Reichstag  en  meme 
temps  qu'a  la  chambre  des  communes  anglaise.  Les 
journaux  en  sont  pleins  et  je  ne  pourrais  rien  ajouter 


Berlin,  March  22,  1909. 
Sir:— 

It  will  not  be  necessary  for  me  to  give  you  any 
information  on  the  naval  debates  which  took  place 
in  the  Budget  Commission  of  the  Reichstag  at  the 
same  time  as  in  the  British  House  of  Commons. 
The  papers  are  full  of  it  and  I  can  add  nothing  to 


a  ce  qu'ils  rapportent.  Je  me  borne  a  noter  qu'a  en- 
tendre les  orateurs  qui  ont  discute  a  Londres  la  ques- 
tion de  savoir  ce  que  doivent  etre  les  forces  navales 
de  I'Angleterre  pour  parer  a  tout  danger,  il  semble- 
rait  qu'en  dehors  de  la  Grande-Bretagne,  I'AUe- 
magne  soit  la  seule  puissance  entretenant  une  ma- 
rine de  guerre.  On  n'a  parle  que  d'elle  comme  si  les 
autres  n'existaient  pas ;  cela  se  passe  un  mois  apres 
I'echange  des  toasts  chaleureux  prononces  a  Tocca- 
sion  de  la  visite  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  Berlin.  Cette 
preoccupation  exclusive  tenant  de  Thypnose  en  dit 
plus  long  que  les  courtoisies  officielles  obligees  dont 
I'omission  est  a  coup  sur  un  symptome  alarmant, 
mais  dont  I'accomplissement  ne  signifie  rien  du 
tout.  Avant  comme  apres  le  pretendu  rapproche- 
ment ce  qui  domine  les  relations  des  deux  pays  est 
une  profonde  defiance  mutuelle. 
Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


what  they  report.  I  will  only  remark  that  to  hear 
the  speakers  in  London  who  discussed  the  question 
of  what  the  naval  forces  of  England  ought  to  be  in 
order  to  provide  against  all  danger,  it  would  seem 
that  aside  from  Great  Britain,  Germany  were  the 
only  Power  maintaining  a  navy.  Only  the  German 
navy  was  spoken  of,  as  if  no  others  existed ;  this 
is  taking  place  one  month  after  the  exchange  of  the 
cordial  toasts  pronounced  on  the  occasion  of  the 
visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  Berlin.  This  dom- 
inating, almost  hypnotic,  fear  says  much  more  than 
the  customary  official  courtesies,  the  omission  of 
which  is  certainly  an  alarming  symptom  but  the 
observance  of  which  signifies  nothing  at  all.  Since 
the  supposed  rapprochement  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries  are  dominated  by  the  same  pro- 
found distrust  as  before. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  57. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  AiTaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  31  Mars  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  i 

Lorsque  j'ai  eu  rhonneur  de  vous  adresser  mon 
rapport  d'hier,  vous  disant  que  le  Prince  de  Biilow 
n'avait  pas  parle  dans  son  discours  sur  la  politique 
exterieure,  de  la  limitation  des  armaments  maritimes, 
je  n'etais  pas  encore  en  possession  du  compte-rendu 
du  deuxieme  discours  prononce  par  le  chancelier 
dans  la  seance  de  la  veille. 

Dans  ce  deuxieme  discours,  le  Prince  de  Biilow 
oblige  par  les  questions  qui  lui  avaient  ete  adressees 
au  cours  du  debat,  de  s'expliquer  sur  la  proposition 
ou  si  Ton  veut  sur  la  suggestion  anglaise,  I'a  fait 
aussi  brievement  que  possible.  II  s'est  borne  a  re- 
produire  la  declaration  faite  par  M.  le  Baron  de 
Schoen  a  la  commission  du  budget,  dont  je  vous  ai 
envoye  le  texte  par  mon  rapport  du  25  Mars,  en  y 
ajoutant  que  le  programme  du  developpement  de  la 
flotte  allemande  a  ete  uniquement  inspire  par  les 
besoins  de  defense  des  cotes  et  de  protection  du  com- 
merce ;  qu'il  ne  contient  rien  de  secret  et  que  le  gou- 
vernement  Imperial  n'a  nul  ddisein  d'en  accelerer 
I'execution.  En  1912  I'Allemagne  aura  treize  grands 
navires  du  nouveau  type  dont  trois  croiseurs,  tous 
les  bruits  contraires  sont  inexacts. 

Le  Reichstag  n'a  pas  demande  d'informations  plus 
explicites.  II  a  bien  accueilli  ce  passage  du  discours 
de  Biilow  comme  les  autres.  Quoique  le  chancelier 
compte  beaucoup  d'adversaires  et  meme  beaucoup 
d'ennemis,  la  politique  exterieure  de  I'Allemagne  a, 
sauf  bien  entendu  les  socialistes,  ete  approuvee  par 
tous  les  partis,  y  compris  le  Centre.  Le  Baron  de 
Hertling  qui  a  pris  la  parole  au  nom  de  ce  dernier 
groupe,  y  a  applaudi  tout  en  declarant  que  I'appui 
donne  a  la  politique  exterieure  de  I'Empire,  n'im- 
plique  pas  un  vote  de  confiance,  qu'au  surplus  le 
chancelier  ne  desire  sans  doute  pas. 

Par  une  curieuse  coincidence,  au  moment  meme  ou 
au  Reichstag  Ton  s'efforgait  de  parler  le  moins  pos- 
sible de  la  question  de  la  limitation  des  armements 
maritimes,  le  parlement  anglais  la  soumettait  a  un 
debat  approfondi.  L'opposition  I'avait  provoquee  par 
une  proposition  de  blame  et  le  gouvernement  britan- 


Berlin,  March  31,  1909. 
Sir:— 

When  I  had  the  honor  to  send  you  my  report 
of  yesterday  telling  you  that  Prince  von  Bulow  had 
in  his  speech  on  the  foreign  policy  not  mentioned 
the  limitation  of  naval  armament,  I  was  not  yet  in 
possession  of  the  report  on  the  second  speech  made 
by  the  Chancellor  in  the  session  of  the  preceding 
day. 

In  this  second  speech.  Prince  von  Biilow,  obliged 
by  the  questions  which  had  been  addressed  to  him 
in  the  course  of  the  debate,  to  give  an  explanation 
of  the  British  proposal  or,  if  one  wishes  to  call  it 
that,  suggestion,  made  it  as  brief  as  possible.  He 
confined  himself  to  repeating  the  declaration  made 
by  Baron  von  Schoen  to  the  Budget  Commission, 
the  text  of  which  I  sent  to  you  in  my  report  of 
March  25,  adding  to  it  that  the  programme  for  the 
development  of  the  German  fleet  was  formulated 
only  according  to  requirements  of  coast  defense 
and  protection  of  commerce ;  that  it  contained  noth- 
ing secret,  and  that  the  Imperial  Government  had 
no  intention  of  accelerating  its  execution.  In  1912 
Germany  would  have  thirteen  large  ships  of  the 
new  type,  three  of  which  would  be  cruisers;  all 
rumors  to  the  contrary  were  incorrect. 

The  Reichstag  did  not  ask  for  more  explicit  in- 
formation. It  received  this  passage  of  Billow's 
speech  as  well  as  it  had  the  others.  Although  the 
Chancellor  has  many  opponents  and  even  many 
enemies,  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany  has  been 
approved,  with  of  course  the  exception  of  the  Soc- 
ialists, by  all  factions,  including  the  Centre.  Baron 
von  Hertling,  who  spoke  in  the  name  of  this  last- 
mentioned  group,  quahfied  his  approval  by  declar- 
ing that  the  support  given  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Empire  did  not  imply  a  vote  of  confidence  which 
the  Chancellor,  moreover,  doubtless  did  not  wish. 

By  a  curious  coincidence  it  happened  that  at  the 
same  moment  when  the  Reichstag  was  endeavoring 
to  say  as  little  as  possible  on  the  question  of  the 
limitation  of  naval  armament,  the  British  Parlia- 
ment was  submitting  it  to  a  heated  debate.  This 
was  provoked  by  a  vote  of  censure,  and  the  British 


nique  s'est  prete  a  la  discussion  par  une  reponse  des 
plus  explicites.  Sir  Edward  Grey  tout  en  declarant 
qu'il  n'y  avait  pas  lieu  de  faire  un  grief  a  I'Allemagne 
de  n'etre  pas  entree  dans  les  vues  de  I'Angleterre,  a 
exprime  les  plus  vifs  regrets  de  ce  que  la  proposition 
anglaise  ait  ete  repoussee.  II  a  dit  qu'il  ajoute  une 
foi  enticre  'aux  communications  que  lui  a  faites  le 
gouvernement  allemand  au  sujet  du  programme  de 
la  flotte  (le  guerre ;  mais  il  a  ajoute  que  ces  com- 
munications ne  constituent  pas  un  engagement  at 
que  de  plus  il  s'y  trouve  des  lacunes  qui  autorisent 
I'Angleterre  a  se  croire  menacee  dans  ses  interets 
vitaux. 

La  presse  anglaise  qui  n'est  pas  tenue  aux  memes 
managements  que  le  gouvernement  britannique,  te- 
moigne  plus  vivement  encore  sa  mauvaise  humeur. 
•  L'etat  d'esprit  qui  regne  en  Angleterre  rappelle 
celui  oii  se  trouvait  la  France  de  1866  a  1870.  A  cette 
epoque  les  Frangais  se  croyaient  le  droit  d'empecher 
I'Allemagne  de  reconstituer  son  unite,  parce  qu'ils 
y  voyaient  une  menace  pour  la  preponderance  con- 
tinentale  dont  la  France  avait  joui  qusque  la.  De 
meme  aujourd'hui  a  Londres  on  considere  comme  un 
mauvais  precede  et  une  menace  pour  la  paix,  le  refus 
de  s'engager  par  traite  a  rester  a  la  merci  de  I'Angle- 
terre. 


Agreez   etc. 
"[s.] 


Greindl. 


Government  took  up  the  discussion  in  a  detailed 
reply.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  while  declaring  that  there 
was  no  occasion  for  reproaching  Germany  for  not 
entering  into  the  views  of  England,  expressed  the 
deepest  regrets  that  the  English  proposal  had  been 
rejected.  He  said  that  he  placed  absolute  faith  in 
the  communications  made  to  him  by  the  German 
Government  in  regard  to  the  naval  programme; 
but  he  added  that  these  communications  did  not 
constitute  an  obligation  and  that,  moreover,  there 
were  gaps  in  the  programme  which  would  justify 
England  in  believing  that  her  vital  interests  were 
menaced. 

The  English  press,  which  is  not  restricted  by  the 
same  considerations  as  the  British  Government, 
shows  its  ill-humor  even  more  plainly. 

The  state  of  mind  which  prevails  in  England  re- 
calls that  which  existed  in  France  from  1866  to  1870. 
At  that  period  the  French  believed  that  they  had 
the  right  to  prevent  Germany  from  reestablishing 
her  unity,  because  they  believed  that  it  constituted 
a  menace  to  the  preponderance  on  the  Continent 
which  France  had  been  enjoying  until  then.  In 
the  same  way  the  refusal  [of  Germany]  to  bind  her- 
self by  treaty  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  England  is  con- 
sidered in  London  to-day  an  unfriendly  act  and  a 
menace  to  peace. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  58. 


No.  58. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  1  Avril  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Plus  d'un  point  reste  encore  a  regler  pour  que  la 
crise  des  Balkans  soit  tout  a  fait  terminee.  Le  par- 
lement  ottoman  n'a  pas  encore  approuve  I'arrange- 
ment  intervenu  entre  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  la  Tur- 
quie.  Vous  m'avez  appris  par  la  communication  du 
tres  interessant  rapport  de  M.  le  Baron  Beyens,  du 
13  Mars  dernier,  que  le  Prince  de  Bulgarie  s'im- 
patiente  et  menace  de  marcher  sur  Constantinople, 
si  les  negociations  de  son  gouvernement  avec  la  Tur- 
quie  ne  prennent  pas  une  allure  plus  vive.  Puis  il  y 
a  la  question  de  la  conference,  ou  il  faut  eviter  deux 
ecueils.  Convoquer  un  congres  europeen  dont  I'uni- 
que  mission  serait  d'enregistrer  des  resolutions  deja 
prises,  ne  varietur,  serait  passablement  ridicule. 
D'un  autre  cote,  si  a  la  conference  il  se  produisait 
quelque  velleite  de  les  modifier,  nous  irions  tout 
droit  a  la  guerre. 

Quoique  I'imbroglio  des  Balkans  plus  que  medio- 
crement  traite  par  la  diplomatic  europeenne  ait  ete 
fecond  en  revirements  et  en  surprises,  on  s'accorde 
neanmoins  a  le  considerer  comme  virtuellement  ter- 
mine  par  la  demarche  que  la  Serbia  a  faita  hiar  a 
Vienne. 

Le  gouvernement  serbe  raconnait  que  I'annexion 
da  la  Bosnia  ne  porte  pas  atteinte  a  ses  droits;  il 
promet  de  renoncer  a  son  attitude  de  protestation; 
de  mettra  son  armea  sur  pied  de  paix,  de  licencier  ses 
volontaires  et  ses  bandes  et  de  s'efforcer  de  vivre 
en  bonne  harmonic  avec  I'Autriche-Hongrie.  A 
Vienna  on  s'etait  engage  a  se  declarer  satisfait  de 
cette  communication  dont  les  tarmes  avaient  ete  ar- 
retes  d'accord  avec  le  Baron  d'Aehrenthal.     S'il  n'y 


Sir: 


Berlin,  April    1,   1909. 


Mora  than  one  point  must  still  be  settled  before 
the  Balkan  crisis  will  be  at  an  end.  The  Turkish 
Parliament  has  not  yet  approved  the  agreement 
made  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey.  You 
have  informed  me  through  the  very  interesting  re- 
port of  Baron  Beyens,  of  March  13th,  that  the 
Prince  of  Bulgaria  is. growing  impatient  and  is 
threatening  to  march  on  Constantinople,  if  the  ne- 
gotiations of  his  conntry  with  Turkey  do  not  make 
quicker  progress.  •Then  there  is  the  question  of 
the  Conference,  in  which  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  two 
reefs.  To  call  a  European  conference  with  only  the 
function  of  registering,  ne  varietur,  resolutions  al- 
ready taken,  would  be  somewhat  ridiculous.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  any  inclination  to  modify  them 
ware  to  arise  at  the  conference,  we  would  be  head- 
ing straight  for  war. 

Although  the  treatment  of  the  Balkan  imbroglio 
by  European  diplimacy  was  even  more  than  medi- 
ocre and  was,  therefore,  full  of  sudden  changes  and 
surprises,  it  is,  nevertheless,  generally  considered  as 
virtually  terminated  by  the  damarch  which  Sarvia 
made  yesterday  at  Vienna. 

The  Servian  Government  recognizes  that  the  an- 
nexation of  Bosnia  does  not  injure  Servia's  rights; 
it  promises  to  give  up  its  attitude  of  protest,  to  place 
its  army  on  peace  footing,  to  discharge  its  volun- 
teers and  its  bands,  and  to  endeavor  to  live  in  har- 
mony with  Austria-Hungary.  Vienna  had  prom- 
ised to  be  satisfied  with  this  communication,  the' 
terms  of  which  were  drawn  up  in  cooperation  with 
Baron  Aehrenthal.    As  long  as  there  was  no  mental 


avait  pas  eu  d'arriere-pensee,  on  eut  du  I'etre  aussi 
partout  puisque  c'est  sur  les  conseils  pressants  et 
unanimes  des  puissances  que  le  gouvernement  serbe 
s'est  resigne  a  la  demarche  qu'il  vient  d'accomplir. 

Le  "Temps"  de  Paris,  dont  les  relations  avec  le 
Quai  d'Orsay  sont  notoires,  s'exprime  cependant  en 
termes  dont  on  pourrait  induire  qu'il  ressent  une 
certaine  deception  de  ce  qu'a  Saint-Petersbourg  et  a 
Belgrade,  on  ait  trop  docilement  suivi  les  conseils 
franqais.  Le  "Times"  marque  de  meme  sa  mauvaise 
humeur ;  comme  toujours  lorsque  tout  ne  marche  pas 
au  gre  des  politiques  franqais,  anglais  ou  russes,  c'est 
I'Allemagne  qui  est  le  bouc  emissaire. 

II  n'est  pas  douteux  a  mon  avis  que  la  Russie  et  la 
France  ne  fussent  animees  d'un  desir  sincere  de 
prevenir  une  conflagration  europeenne.  La  Russie 
n'a  rien  de  ce  qu'il  faut  pour  faire  la  guerre  et  aussi 
longtemps  que  leurs  amis  anglais  ne  seront  pas  en 
mesure  de  leur  venir  en  aide  sur  le  continent,  les 
Frangais  sont  loin  d'avoir  la  certitude  du  succes. 

Mais  tout  en  souhaitant  la  paix,  on  eut  voulu 
qu'elle  fut  garantie  autrement  qu'elle  ne  I'a  ete.  Le 
projet  de  conference  elabore  par  M.  Isvolski  et  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  les  pourparlers  au  sujet  d'une  de- 
marche collective  a  faire  a  Vienne  et  tous  les 
echanges  d'idees  qui  ont  eu  lieu  entre  Londres, 
Paris  et  Saint-Petersbourg  tendaient  invariablement 
a  obliger  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  une  transaction  qui 
aurait  fort  ressemble  a  une  humiliation  atteignant 
I'Allemagne  tout  aussi  directement  et  aussi  sensible- 
ment  que  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  qui  aurait  porte  une 
tres  rude  atteinte  a  la  confiance  qu'inspire  a  Vienne 
I'alliance  allemande.  Les  manoeuvres  ont  ete  de- 
jouees  par  I'attitude  tres  nette  et  tres  resolue  qu'a 
prise  FAllemagne  et  dont  elle  n'a  jamais  devie  mal- 
gre  les  sollicitations  dont  elle  a  ete  harcelee.  C'est 
I'Allemagne  seule  qui  a  impose  la  paix.  Le  nouveau 
groupement  des  puissances  organise  par  le  Roi 
d'Ang'cterre.  a  fait  I'epreuve  de  ses  forces  contre 
I'union  de  I'Europe  centrale.  et  s'est  trouve  incapable 
de  I'entamer.    C'est  de  la  que  vient  le  depit. 


Agreez  etc. 


Gr^indl. 


reservation  everybody  had  to  be  satisfied,  since 
the  Servian  Government  resigned  itself  to  the  step 
which  it  has  just  taken  at  the  urgent  and  unanimous 
advice  of  the  Powers. 

The  Paris  Temps,  the  relations  of  which  with  the 
Quai  d'Orsay  are  notorious,  expresses  itself,  how- 
ever, in  terms  from  which  one  might  deduce  that 
it  was  disappointed  at  the  excessive  docility  with 
which  the  French  advice  was  followed  at  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Belgrade.  The  Temps  shows  its  ill-humor 
in  the  usual  way;  as  always  when  everything  does 
not  go  to  the  liking  of  the  French,  English  or  Rus- 
sian politicians,  it  is  Germany  who  is  the  scape-goat. 

In  my  opinion  it  cannot  be  doubted  that, Russia 
and  France  were  animated  by  a  sincere  desire  to 
prevent  a  European  conflagration.  Russia  has  none 
of  the  things  that  are  needed  for  war,  and  as  long 
as  their  EngHsh  friends  will  not  be  in  a  position  to 
come  to  their  aid  on  the  continent,  the  French  are 
far  from  feeling  sure  of  success. 

But  although  desiring  peace,  it  would  have  been 
preferable  to  see  it  guaranteed  in  a  different  way. 
The  conference  plan  elaborated  by  M.  Iswolski  and 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  pourparlers  in  regard  to  a 
concerted  step  to  be  taken  at  Vienna,  and  the  whole 
exchange  of  ideas  which  took  place  between  Lon- 
don, Paris,  and  St.  Petei-sburg;  all  this  aimed  at 
forcing  Austria-Hungary  to  make  a  compromise 
which  would  have  strongly  resembled  a  humilia- 
tion, afifecting  Germany  as  directly  and  as  painfully 
as  Austria-Hungary,  and  which  would  have  dealt 
a  very  heavy  blow  to  the  confidence  which  the  Ger- 
man alliance  is  inspiring  at  Vienna.  These  manoeu- 
vres were  thwarted  by  the  very  clear  and  resolute 
attitude  assumed  by  Germany,  and  from  which  she 
never  deviated  despite  the  urgent  requests  with 
which  she  was  harassed.  It  was  Germany  alone 
who  imposed  peace.  The  new  grouping  of  Powers 
organized  by  the  King  of  England  has  measured  its 
strength  with  the  union  of  central  Europe,  and  it 
found  that  it  was  unable  to  break  it.  It  is  that 
which  has  caused  the  ill-feeling. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  59. 


No.  59. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  17  Avril  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

II  y  a  quelques  jours  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  a 
public  un  tres  bref  article  ofificieux  disant  qu'il  n'est 
pas  exact  que  dans  la  reCente  entrevue  du  Prince  de 
Billow  et  de  M.  Tittoni  a  Venise,  il  ait  ete  question 
du  renouvellement  anticipe  de  la  triple  alliance  qui 
n'est  pas  necessaire.  Le  telegramme  ajbutait  que  le 
resultat  de  I'entretien  avait  ete  des  plus  satisfaisants. 

Je  ne  vous  en  ai  pas  ecrit  parce  que  les  communi- 
cations de  ce  genre  ne  signifient  rien  du  tout.  Elles 
sont  la  suite  obligee  de  toute  rencontre  entre  des 
souverains  ou  entre  des  hommes  d'Etat  dirigeants. 

La  verite  est  que  le  Prince  de  Biilow  a  rendu 
compte  de  I'entrevue  par  un  telegramme  de  quelques 
lignes.  II  y  est  dit  en  substance  que  comme  I'ltalie 
a  obtenu  ce  qu'elle  demandait  d'ans  I'affaire  des  Bal- 
kans, par  la  suppression  de  I'article  29  du  traite  de 


Berlin,  April   17,   1909. 
Sir:— 

A  few  days  ago,  the  Cologne  Gazette  published 
a  brief  semi-official  article  stating  that  it  was  not 
correct  that  at  the  recent  meeting  of  Prince  von 
Biilow  and  M.  Tittoni  at  Venice,  the  question  had 
been  brought  up  as  to  the  anticipated  renewal  of 
the  Triple  Alliance,  for  which  there  was  no  neces- 
sity. The  telegram  added  that  the  result  of  the 
conversation  had  been  highly  satisfactory. 

I  did  not  write  to  you  about  it  because  communi- 
cations of  this  kind  mean  nothing  at  all.  They  are 
the  necessary  sequel  of  all  meetings  between  Sov- 
ereigns or  between   leading  statesmen. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  Prince  von  Biilow 
has  given  account  of  the  interview  in  a  telegram 
of  a  few  lines.  In  it  he  says  in  substance  that  as 
Italy  had  obtained  what  she  asked  for  in  the  Balkan 
affair,  by  the  abolition  of  Article  29  of  the  treaty 


Berlin,  il  n'y  avait  rien  a  discuter  et  que  tout  s'est 
borne  a  une  conversation  generale  sans  objet  con- 
cret. 

Depuis  bien  longtemps  on  ne  se  fait  plus  aucune 
illusion  a  Berlin  ni  a  Vienna  sur  le  concours  eventuel 
de  ritalie.  Le  gouvernement  du  Quirinal  a  contracte 
des  engagements  avec  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  et 
reste  en  coquetterie  avec  Londres  et  Paris.  II  tient 
cependant  a  la  triple-alliance  comme  garantie  de  la 
fidelite  de  ses  nouveaux  amis  qui  ne  lui  inspirent 
qu'une  confiance  limitee,  se  reservant  de  se  tourner 
du  cote  du  plus  fort  comme  a  Algesiras  oii  il  s'est 
range  derriere  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  et  tout  re- 
cemment  dans  la  question  d'Orient  ou  il  s'est  finale- 
ment  uni  a  I'Allemagne  et  a  I'Autriche-Hongrie  apres 
avoir  garde  une  attitude  equivoque,  jusqu'  au  mo- 
ment oii  le  succes  s'est  dessine. 

L'Allemagne  et  rAutriche-Hongrie  conservent  ou 
tolerent  I'ltalie  dans  la  triple  alliance,  parce  que  sa 
defection  officielle  serait  une  diminution  de  prestige 
et  aussi  parce  qu'on  y  voit  une  chance  de  ne  I'avoir 
pas  pour  adversaire  en  cas  de  conflit ;  mais  c'est  tout 
ce  qu'on  en  espere. 

D'un  autre  cote  on  ne  s'engagerait  pas  a  fond  pour 
elle  comme  I'Allemagne  vient  de  le  faire  pour  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie;  ni  a  Vienne  ni  a  Berlin  on  ne  se 
compromettrait  pour  une  alliee  aussi  douteuse. 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


of  Berlin,  there  had  been  nothing  to  discuss  and 
that  the  conversation  had  been  on  general  subjects 
not  bearing  on  any  concrete  matter. 

For  quite  a  long  time  no  illusions  have  been  cher- 
ished at  Berlin  or  at  Vienna  about  Italy's  possible 
support.  The  Government  of  the  Quirinal  entered 
into  obligations  with  France  and  England,  and  is 
incessantly  flirting  with  London  and  Paris.  Never- 
theless, it  holds  on  to  the  Triple  Alliance  as  a  safe- 
guard for  the  fidelity  of  its  new  friends  in  whom  it 
places  only  a  limited  amount  of  confidence.  Thus 
it  reserves  for  itself  the  chance  to  side  with  the 
strongest  as  it  did  at  Algerciras  where  it  supported 
France  and  England,  or  very  recently  in  the  Orien- 
tal question  in  which  it  finally  joined  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  after  having  observed  an  equivo- 
cal attitude  until  the  moment  when  success  was 
decided. 

Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  are  retaining,  or 
rather  tolerating,  Italy  in  the  Triple  Alliance  be- 
cause her  official  withdrawal  would  mean  a  loss  of 
prestige,  and  also  because  in  it  is  seen  the  chance  of 
not  having  her  for  an  adversary  in  case  of  a  con- 
flict.   But  that  is  all  that  is  hoped  of  her. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  would  not  engage 
herself  so  deeply  on  Italy's  account  as  she  has  just 
been  doing  for  Austria-Hungary;  neither  Vienna 
nor  Berlin  would  compromise  themselves  for  such 
a  doubtful  ally. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  60. 


No.  60. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  21  Juin  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

L'Empereur  d'AUemagne  revenant  de  sa  visite  a 
I'Empereur  de  Russie  est  rentre  avant-hier  a  Pots- 
dam. 

Les  toasts  echanges  a  bord  du  Standart  ont  ete  ce 
qu'ils  devaient  etre.  Les  deux  Souverains  ont  mani- 
feste  I'intention  de  maintenir  I'amitie  et  la  confiance 
traditionnelles  entre  leurs  deux  maisons  qui  est  un 
gage  des  bonnes  relations  entre  les  deux  pays  en 
meme  temps  que  de  la  conservation  de  la  paix. 

La  note  officieuse  qui  a  ete  inseree  dans  le  nu- 
mero  142  de  la  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung" 
d'hier  matin,  ne  s'ecarte  guere  non  plus  de  ce  qui  est 
de  style  en  pareille  circonstance.  II  y  est  dit  que  les 
hommes  d'Etat  qui  accompagnaient  les  deux  Em- 
pereurs  se  sont  naturellement  entretenus  des  ques- 
tions politiques  pendantes.  II  a  ete  constate  qu'il 
n'existe  pas  d'opposition  entre  la  maniere  dont  elles 
sont  considerees  dans  les  deux  pays.  "II  a  de  plus 
ete  reconnu  que  les  arrangements  internationaux  en 
vigueur  auxquels  participent  la  Russie  et  I'Alle- 
magne n'empechent  nuUement  ces  bonnes  relations." 

C'est  ainsi  qu'a  toujours  ete  comprise  a  Berlin  la 
triple  alliance  conclue  dans  un  but  purement  de- 
fensif.  D'apres  la  note  officieuse  c'est  dans  le  meme 
sens  qn'on  vent,  du  moins  maintenant,  interpreter  a 
Saint-Petersbourg  les  arrangements  qui  ont  fonde 
la  triple  entente;  mais  ce  n'est  certes  pas  dans  le 
meme  esprit  que  ce  dernier  groupement  a  ete  conqu 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  June  21,   1909. 


The  German  Emperor  has  returned  from  his  visit 
to  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  arriving  at  Potsdam  the 
day  before  yesterday. 

The  toasts  exchanged  on  board  the  "Standart" 
were  as  they  had  to  be.  The  two  Sovereigns  ex- 
pressed the  intention  of  preserving  the  traditional 
friendship  and  confidence  between  their  two  houses, 
which  was  a  guarantee  for  the  good  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  as  well  as  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace. 

The  semi-official  note  which  was  inserted  in  issue 
No.  142  of  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung 
of  yesterday  morning  does  not  go  far  beyond  what 
is  the  custom  in  such  cases.  It  is  stated  that  the 
statesmen  who  accompanied  the  two  Emperors  nat- 
urally conversed  about  the  pending  political  ques- 
tions. It  was  established  that  there  was  no  con- 
tradiction between  the  points  of  view  from  which 
they  were  being  considered  in  the  two  countries. 
"It  was,  moreover,  recognized  that  the  existing  in- 
ternational agreernents  of  which  Russia  and  Ger- 
many are  parties  do  not  hamper  these  good  rela- 
tions in  any  way." 

That  is  how  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  was  con- 
cluded for  a  purely  defensive  purpose,  has  always 
been  regarded  at  Berlin.  It  would  seem  from  the 
semi-official  notice  that  it  is  desired  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, for  the  present  moment  at  least,  to  put  the 
same  interpretation  on  the  agreements  which  form 
the  basis  of  the  Triple  Entente ;  but  it  is  certainly 


a  Paris  et  surtout  a  Londres  par  son  principal  au- 
teur,  le  Roi  d'Angleterre.  La  mauvaise  humeur 
manifestee  en  France  et  en  Angleterre  des  que  le 
projet  d'entrevue  a  ete  connu,  est  la  preuve  que  dans 
ces  deux  pays  on  regardait  la  triple  entente  comme 
tout  autre  chose  qu'une  ligue  ne  mettant  aucun  ob- 
stacle au  maintien  de  I'amitie  et  de  la  confiance  tra- 
ditionnelles  entre  I'Allemagne  et  la  Russie. 


A  en  juger  par  le  langage  des  journaux  officieux 
franqais,  la  mauvaise  humeur  a  ete  promptement  dis- 
sipee  a  Paris  par  les  declarations  simultanees  des 
cabinets  de  Berlin  et  de  Saint-Petersbourg  donnant 
I'assurance  que  la  rencontre  des  deux  Empereurs  a 
la  cote  finlandaise  n'avait  ete  inspiree  de  part  ni 
d'autre  par  le  desir  de  changer  quelque  chose  au 
groupement  actuel  des  puissances. 

A  Londres  la  rancune  est  plus  tenace,  comme  en 
temoigne  la  faQon  discourtoise  dont  la  prochaine 
visite  de  I'Empereur  de  Russie  en  Angleterre  a  ete 
appreciee  dans  les  journaux  anglais  et  jusque  dans 
le  parlement.  C'est  la  suite  du  depit  qu'on  a  ressenti 
en  voyant  que  la  machine  construite  par  le  Roi  d'An- 
gleterre pour  exercer  une  pression  sur  I'Allemagne, 
si  pas  davantage,  s'est  detraquee  lorsqu'on  a  voulu 
I'employer  dans  I'affaire  du  conflit  austro-serbe ;  c'est 
a  dire  au  premier  essai. 

Ici,  comme  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  par 
mon  rapport  du  7  Juin,  on  ne  s'est  pas  fait  d'illusion 
sur  I'etendue  du  resultat  possible  de  I'entrevue. 
L'initiative  prise  par  la  cour  et  le  gouvernement 
russes  montre  seulement  qu'a  Saint-Petersbourg  de 
recents  evenements  ont  laisse  I'impression  que  la 
triple  entente  ne  fournit  pas  a  la  Russie  un  appui 
suffisant  pour  se  passer  de  relations  au  moins  nor- 
males  avec  I'Allemagne. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


not  in  that  spirit  that  the  Entente  was  conceived  at 
Paris  and  above  all  at  London  by  its  chief  sponsor, 
the  King  of  England.  The  ill-humor  manifested  in 
France  and  in  England  ever  since  the  plan  of  the 
meeting  became  known  proves  that  in  these  two 
countries  the  Triple  Entente  is  regarded  as  some- 
thing very  different  from  a  league  which  would 
place  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  maintenance  of 
the  traditional  friendship  and  confidence  between 
Germany  and  Russia. 

To  judge  by  the  language  of  the  semi-official 
French  papers,  the  ill-humor  was  promptly  dissi- 
pated at  Paris  by  the  simultaneous  declaration  of 
the  cabinets  of  Berlin  and  of  St.  Petersburg,  giving 
assurance  that  the  meeting  of  the  two  Emperors  on 
the  Finnish  coast  was  not  inspired  on  either  side 
by  the  desire  to  make  any  change  in  the  present 
grouping  of  the  Powers. 

At  London  the  ill-will  is  even  stronger,  as  is 
shown  by  the  discourteous  way  in  which  the  im- 
pending visit  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  has  been 
discussed  in  the  English  papers  and  even  in  Parlia- 
ment. That  is  the  consequence  of  the  disappoint- 
ment which  is  felt  that  the  machine  constructed  by 
the  King  of  England  in  order  to  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  Germany — if  not  more — got  out  of  gear 
when  it  was  tried  out  in  the  matter  of  the  Austro- 
Servian  conflict,  that  is  to  say,  at  the  first  trial. 

As  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  in  my  report 
of  June  7th,  no  illusions  have  been  entertained  here 
about  the  possible  results,  of  the  meeting.  The 
initiative  taken  by  the  Russian  court  and  Govern- 
ment only  shows  that  recent  events  have  left  the 
impression  at  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Triple  En- 
tente does  not  furnish  Russia  with  a  support  suffi- 
cient to  permit  her  to  dispense  with  at  least  normal 
relations  with  Germany. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  61. 


No.  6L 


Comte  d'Arschot  Schoonhoven,  Charge  d'AfFaires  de 
Belgique  a  Paris,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Count  d'Arschot  Schoonhoven,  Belgian  Charge 
d'AfFaires  at  Paris,  to  M.  Davignon,  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  3  Aout  1909. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  1 

Ainsi  qu'il  avait  ete  annonce  depuis  longtemps, 
M.  le  President  de  la  Republique  s'est  rencontre 
avec  I'Empereur  de  Russie  a  Cherbourg  le  31  juillet 
dernier. 

Quand  on  se  reporte  au  temps  du  premier  voyage 
du  Czar  a  Paris,  de  la  visite  de  Felix  Faure  a  Pe- 
tersbourg,  de  la  venue  en  France  de  I'Amiral  Ave- 
lane,  on  ne  pent  que  s'etonner  du  peu  de  retentisse- 
ment  qu'a  eu  dans  le  pays  I'entrevue  des  deux  chefs 
d'Etat.  Les  journaux  s'en  occupent,  mais  comme  de 
n'importe  quel  autre  evenement,  et  il  ne  reste  vrai- 
ment  plus  rien  de  I'enthousiasme  frenetique  qui  se- 
coua  toute  la  France  aux  beaux  jours  de  I'alliance 
russe. 

Deux  grands  facteurs  ont  amene  ce  revirement 
de  I'opinion  publique:  la  guerre  avec  le  Japon,  qui 
a  montre  qu'il  ne  fallait  pas  trop  compter  sur  ses 
amis,  et  les  emprunts  repetes.  M.  Caillaux  me  disait 
cependant  tout  dernierement  qu'il  y  avait  infiniment 
moins  de  fonds  russes  en  France  qu'on  le  supposait 
generalement. 


Paris,  August  3,  1909. 
Sir:— 

As  had  been  announced  for  a  long  time,  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  Republic  had  a  meeting  with  the  Em- 
peror of  Russia  at  Cherbourg  on  July  31st. 

If  one  looks  back  to  the  time  of  the  first  journey 
of  the  Czar  to  Paris,  of  the  visit  of  Felix  Faure  to 
St.  Petersburg,  of  that  of  Admiral  Avelane  to 
France,  one  cannot  but  be  astonished  at  the  little 
interest  which  the  meeting  of  the  two  heads  of  State 
has  aroused  in  the  country.  The  papers  speak  of 
it,  but  as  they  do  of  any  other  event,  and  there  is 
really  no  longer  any  of  the  frenetic  enthusiasm 
which  inspired  all  France  in  the  palmy  days  of  the 
Russian  Alliance. 

Two  great  factors  have  led  to  this  change  in  pub- 
lic opinion :  the  war  with  Japan,  which  showed  that 
one  could  not  count  too  much  on  one's  friends,  and 
furthermore  the  repeated  loans.  M.  Caillaux  told 
me  quite  recently,  however,  that  there  was  far  less 
Russian  stock  in  France  than  was  generally  sup- 
posed. 


Le  "Temps,"  dans  son  numero  du  2  courant,  a 
ecrit,  a  propos  de  toasts  prononces  a  Cherbourg,  et 
dont  vous  trouverez  sous  ce  pli-le  texte  officiel,  qu'ils 
etaient  "une  consecration  nouvelle  de  I'alliance  a 
laquelle  les  deux  gouvernements  et  les  deux  nations 
restent  fermement  attaches,"  et  il  ajoutait:  "Notre 
alliance  est  aujourd'hui  aussi  etroite  qu'elle  etait 
hier." 

Cette  alliance,  on  en  park,  mais  il  semble  qu'il 
faille  pour  en  parler  que  quelque  chose  en  reveille  le 
souvenir  et  qu'on  ne  se  la  rappelle  que  comme  une 
chose  agreable,  mais  sur  laquelle  on  ne  compterait 
plus  guere  si  on  venait  a  en  avoir  besoin. 

Si  la  presse  serieuse  a  ete  assez  sobre  de  commen- 
taires,  la  presse  avancee  a,  comme  d'habitude,  public 
des  articles  d'assez  mauvais  gout.  Vous  pourrez  en 
juger  par  ceux  que  je  vous  transmets. 

Les  "socialistes  unifies"  ont  voulu  manifester  a 
Cherbourg,  mais  la  municipalite  "socialiste  indepen- 
dante"  a  pris  des  mesures  pour  qu'aucune  salle  ne 
soit  mise  a  leur  disposition.  Ces  mesures  ont  valu 
des  protestations  diverses ;  on  n'a  pas  non  plus  man- 
que d'ergoter  au  sujet  de  I'absence  de  M.  Briand 
dans  la  suite  de  M.  Fallieres.  Le  President  du  Con- 
seil  a,  sans  doiite,  ete  heureux  de  ne  pas  devoir  sui- 
vre  le  President  de  la  Republique,  mais  ses  opinions 
personnelles  n'y  ont  ete  pour  rien  et  on  n'a  fait  que 
se  conformer  a  un  protocole  d'apres  lequel  les  Mi- 
nistres  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  de  la  Guerre  et  de 
la  Marine  sont  les  seuls  a  accompagner  le  chef  de 
I'Etat  en  pareille  circonstance. 

Le  Czar  a  quitte  Cherbourg  hier  matin. 
Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

[s.]  Arschot. 


The  Temps,  in  its  issue  of  the  2nd  of  the  month, 
wrote  apropos  of  the  toasts  given  at  Cherbourg, 
the  official  text  of  which  you  will  find  here  ap- 
pended, that  they  were  "a  new  consecration  of  the 
alliance  to  which  the  two  Governments  and  the  two 
nations  remain  firmly  attached,"  and  it  added  that 
"our  alliance  is  to-day  as  close  as  it  was  yesterday." 

This  alliance  is  indeed  spoken  of  but  it  seems 
that  in  order  to  speak  of  it  something  must  first  call 
it  to  mind,  and  that  it  is  remembered  as  something 
pleasant,  but  something  on  which  one  would  no 
longer  count  if  one  should  happen  to  need  it. 

While  the  serious  papers  were  fairly  moderate  in 
their  comments,  the  progressive  part  of  the  press 
as  usual  published  articles  which  were  in  rather  bad 
taste.  You  can  judge  of  this  by  the  articles  which 
I  am  sending  you. 

The  "United  Socialists"  wanted  to  hold  a  demon- 
stration at  Cherbourg,  but  the  municipality  which 
belongs  to  the  "Independent  Socialists"  took  meas- 
ures so  that  no  hall  was  put  at  their  disposal.  These 
measures  called  forth  various  protests;  nor  was  crit- 
icism lacking  on  the  absence  of  M.  Briand  in  the 
following  of  M.  Fallieres.  The  Prime  Minister  was 
doubtless  glad  that  he  did  not  have  to  accompany 
the  President  of  the  Republic,  but  his  personal 
opinion  was  not  of  any  weight  in  the  matter.  For 
all  that  was  done  was  to  conform  to  the  "protocole," 
according  to  which  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
of  War,  and  of  the  Navy  are  the  only  ones  who 
accompany  the  head  of  the  State  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  Czar  left  Cherbourg  yesterday  morning. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Arschot. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  7  Novembre  1910. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Vous  aurez  remarque  les  articles  inspires  par  les- 
quels  la  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung"  a  fait 
connaitre  au  public  que  la  recente  visite  rendue  par 
I'Empereur  de  Russie  a  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  a 
Potsdam  est  plus  qu'une  simple  demarche  de  cour- 
toisie.  La  "Rossija,"  organe  du  ministere  des  affai- 
res etrangere  russe,  ecrivait  en  meme  temps  que 
I'entrevue  des  deux  souverains  avait  une  haute  por- 
tee  politique.  Le  "Fremdenblatt"  de  Vienne  s'ex- 
primait  dans  le  meme  sens.  Les  deux  premiers  de 
ces  journaux  officieux  disaient  qu'il  ne  s'agissait  nul- 
lement  d'introduire  dans  le  systeme  politique  de 
I'Europe  des  innovations  qui  ne  sont  desirees  ni  en 
Allemagne  ni  en  Russie.  Tous  les  trois  etaient  d'ac- 
cord  pour  exprimer  I'espoir  que  I'echange  de  vues 
entre  les  souverains  et  leurs  ministres  aiderait  a  dis- 
siper  les  malentendus  qui  surgissent  forcement  en- 
tre des  Etats  limitrophes  qui  ont  des  interets  paral- 
leles  mais  conciliables  et  dont  les  rivalites  sont  sans 
influence  sur  la  politique  generale.  Plus  encore  qua 
par  les  commentaires  officieux,  le  caractere  de  la  vi- 
site du  Czar  a  ete  marque  par  le  fait  que  Sa  Majeste 
avait  appele  en  Hesse  son  nouveau  ministre  des  af- 
faires etrangeres,  M.  Sasonow,  et  s'etait  fait  accom- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  Nov.  7th,  1910. 
Sir:— 

You  will  have  seen  the  inspired  articles  through 
which  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  in- 
formed the  public  that  the  recent  visit  paid  by  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  to  the  Emperor  of  Germany  at 
Potsdam  was  more  than  a  mere  mark  of  courtesy. 
The  Rossiya,  which  is  the  organ  of  the  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  wrote  at  the  same  time 
that  the  meeting  of  the  two  sovereigns  was  of  great 
political  importance.  The  Vienna  Fremdenblatt  ex- 
pressed itself  in  the  same  sense.  The  two  first 
mentioned  of  these  semi-official  papers  said  that 
there  was  no  question  of  introducing  innovations 
into  the  political  system  of  Europe,  for  which  nei- 
ther Germany  nor  Russia  had  any  desire.  All  three 
of  the  papers  were  unanimous  in  expressing  the 
hope  that  the  exchange  of  views  between  the  Sover- 
eigns and  their  Ministers  would  help  to  dissipate  the 
misunderstanding  arising  of  necessity  between  con- 
tiguous states,  which  had  parallel  but  reconcilable 
interests  and  the  rivalry  of  which  had  no  bearing  on 
the  general  policy.  Even  more  than  by  the  semi-offi- 
cial comments  the  character  of  the  Czar's  visit  was 
marked  by  the  fact  that  His  Majesty  called  his  new 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  M.  Sassonov,  to  Hesse 


76    — 


pagner  par  lui  pendant  son  sejour  a  Potsdam.  M. 
Sasonow  a  ete  rcQU  par  I'Empereur  et  par  le  Chan- 
celier,  ainsi  que  par  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter.  Les 
sujets  de  conversation  n'ont  pas  du  manquer.  Ce 
qui  se  passe  en  Perse  et  en  Extreme-Orient  est  de 
nature  a  eveiller  en  Allemagne  la  crainte  que  les 
evenements,  dont  le  cote  politique  pourrait  laisser 
{'Empire  indifferent,  n'aient  pour  consequence  de  fer- 
mer  ces  contrees  au  commerce  allemand.  En  Rus- 
sie  le  projet  de  chemin  de  fer  allemand  en  Mesopo- 
tamie  a  toujours  ete  vu  de  mauvais  ceil,  quoique  I'Al- 
lemagne  ait  pour  principe  de  ne  pas  se  meler  des 
questions  politiques  de  la  peninsule  des  Balkans ;  il 
est  impossible  qu'on  ne  se  preoccupe  pas  a  Berlin 
comme  a  Saint-Petersbourg  de  la  turbulence  de  la 
Grece,  de  I'impossibilite  oil  sont  les  puissances  pro- 
tectrices  de  trouver  la  solution  de  la  question  cre- 
toise,  des  troubles  de  la  Macedoine  et  des  ambitions 
du  Czar  des  Bulgares ;  mais  tous  ces  problemes  sont 
bien  compliques,  et  il  n'est  pas  a  penser  qu'on  soit 
parvenu  a  les  resoudre  dans  le  court  espace  de  deux 
journees,  dont  la  plus  grande  partie  a  ete  absorbee 
par  des  ceremonies  officielles  et  des  banquets.  C'est 
a  peine  le  necessaire  pour  echanger  des  assurances 
de  bonne  volonte  forcement  congues  en  termes  va- 
gues  et  d'une  portee  praticjue  douteuse.  Ce  qui  est 
plus  important  que  les  conversations  entre  les  hom- 
mes  d'Etat,  c'est  que  la  visite  a  eu  lieu. 

Pendant  les  trois  premiers  quarts  du  19e  siecle 
I'union  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  Prusse  etait  un  facteur 
constant  et  assure  de  la  politique  europeenne.  EUe 
etait  basee  non  seulement  sur  les  interets  communs 
des  deux  nations,  mais  aussi  sur  I'amitie  etroite  des 
deux  families  regnantes  cimentee  par  des  liens  de 
parente.  II  en  etait  ainsi  du  temps  de  I'Empereur 
Nicolas  ler.  La  premiere  atteinte  a  ete  portee  a  ces 
relations  par  le  congres  de  Berlin  oil  le  Prince  de 
Bismarck  a  essaye  de  rapprocher  la  Russie  et  I'An- 
gleterre  et  oil  il  a  eu  le  sort  generalement  reserve 
aux  conciliateurs,  c'est-a-dire  qu'il  a  ete  accuse  par 
chacun  des  deux  adversaires  de  partialite  en  faveur 
de  I'autre.  Le  peuple  russc,  se  croyant  frustre  par 
la  faute  de  I'Allemagne  du  fruit  de  ses  victoires,  a 
congu  pour  sa  voisine  de  I'Ouest  une  haine  encore 
avivee  par  I'envie  qu'a  suscitee  le  rapide  developpe- 
ment  de  la  puissance  allemande.  Dans  I'union  entre 
la  Russie  et  la  Prusse  celle-ci  jouait  un  role  quelque 
peu  froisse.  On  a  ete  froisse  a  Saint-Petersbourg 
et  surtout  a  Moscou  lorsque  Berlin  est  devenu  le  cen- 
tre principal  de  la  politique  europeenne.  Les  etapes 
du  refroidissement  progressif  des  relations  entre  les 
deux  pays  ont  ete  marquees  par  I'alliance  de  la  Rus- 
sie avec  la  France,  par  I'etablissement  de  la  triple 
entente  et  en  dernier  lieu  par  I'intervention  de  I'Al- 
lemagne dans  I'affaire  de  I'annexion  de  la  Bosnie. 
On  se  defend  ici  d'avoir  exerce  une  pression  sur  la 
Russie.  C'est  jouer  sur  les  mots.  Sans  la  declara- 
tion du  Prince  de  Bulow  au  sujet  de  la  solidarite  de 
I'Allemagne  et  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  sans  I'aver- 
tissement  donne  par  le  Comte  de  Pourtales  a  Saint- 
Petersbourg,  la  Russie  n'aurait  pas  brusquement  mis 
fin  a  Tagitaticn  qu'elle  entretenait  dans  les  petits 
etats  slaves  et  surtout  a  Belgrade  centre  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie.  La  solution  de  la  question  de  la  Bosnie  a 
ete  a  la  fois  pour  la  Russie  une  humiliation  et  une 
deception.  Elle  a  dii  laisser  entamer  son  prestige  en 
retirant  sur  une  injonction  de  I'etranger  la  protection 
qu'elle  accordait  aux  convoitises  serbes.  L'expe- 
rience  lui  a  montre  I'inefficacite  de  la  coalition  for- 
mee  par  le  feu  Roi  d'Angleterre  la  premiere  fois 
qu'elle  a  ete  mise  a  I'epreuve. 

Si  I'antipathie  des  peuples  russe  et  allemand  n'a 
pas  eu  de  consequences  plus  graves,  c'est  parce  que 


and  had  him  in  his  company  during  his  brief  stay 
at  Potsdam.  M.  Sassonov  was  received  by  the  Em- 
peror and  the  Chancellor  as  well  as  Mr.  von  Kider- 
len-Waechter. There  can  have  been  no  lack  of 
topics  for  conversation.  What  is  happening  in  Per- 
sia and  in  the  Far  East  is  apt  to  arouse  in  Germany 
a  fear  that  the  events,  though  their  political  side 
may  be  indifferent  to  her,  might  result  in  closing 
these  countries  to  German  commerce.  In  Russia 
the  German  railway  scheme  in  Mesopotamia  has 
always  been  looked  at  askance.  Although  Germany 
followed  the  principle  of  non-interference  in  the 
political  questions  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  it  is  as 
impossible  for  Berlin  as  it  is  for  St.  Petersburg  not 
to  be  concerned  about  turbulent  Greece,  about  the 
quandary  in  which  the  protector  Powers  are  in 
finding  a  solution  of  the  Cretan  question,  about 
the  Macedonian  troubles  and  the  ambitions  of  the 
Czar  of  the  Bulgarians.  But  all  these  questions  are 
highly  complicated  and  it  cannot  be  assumed  that 
there  has  been  complete  success  in  solving  them  in 
the  short  space  of  two  days,  which  for  the  greater 
part  were  occupied  by  official  ceremonies  and  ban- 
quets. That  time  is  hardly  sufficient  to  exchange 
assurances  of  good  will  which  of  necessity  are 
couched  in  vague  terms  and  are  of  dubious  practi- 
cal value.  What  is  more  important  than  the  con- 
versations between  the  statesmen  is  the  fact  that 
the  visit  has  taken  place. 

During  the  first  three  quarters  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  unity  of  Russia  and  Prussia  was  a  con- 
stant and  reliable  factor  in  European  politics.  It 
was  based  not  only  on  the  common  interests  of  the 
two  nations,  but  also  on  the  close  friendship  of  the 
two  reigning  families  cemented  by  family  bonds. 
This  was  the  case  particularly  at  the  time  of  Em- 
peror Nicholas  I.  These  relations  were  first  im- 
paired by  the  Congress  of  Berlin  when  Prince  von 
Bismarck  tried  to  bring  Russia  and  England  to- 
gether and  met  the  fate  of  all  mediators,  viz.,  that 
he  was  accused  by  each  of  the  two  adversaries  of 
partiality  in  favor  of  the  other.  The  Russian  peo- 
ple, believing  themselves  deprived  by  Germany's 
fault  of  the  fruit  of  their  victories,  conceived  for 
their  western  neighbor  a  hate  still  heightened  by 
envy  at  the  rapid  development  of  Germany's  power. 
During  the  union  between  Russia  and  Prussia  the 
Letter  played  a  somewhat  subordinate  part  and  of- 
fense was  taken  io  St.  Petersburg,  and  more  in 
Moscow,  when  Berlin  became  the  centre  of  Euro- 
pean politics.  The  progressive  stages  of  the  cool- 
ness developing  in  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries  were  marked  by  the  alliance  of  Russia 
with  France,  the  birth  of  the  Triple  Entente,  and 
lastly  the  annexation  of  Bosnia.  It  is  maintained 
in  this  connection  that  no  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  on  Russia.  That  is  juggling  with  words.  With- 
out the  declaration  of  Prince  von  Biilow  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  solidarity  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  without  the  warning  given  by  Count 
Pourtales  at  St.  Petersburg,  Russia  would  not  have 
suddenly  dropped  the  agitation  which  she  was  keep- 
ing up  in  the  little  Slav  States,  and  chiefly  at  Bel- 
grade, against  Austria-Hungary.  The  solution  of  the 
Bosnian  question  was  a  humiliation  as  well  as  a 
disappointment  for  Russia.  She  suffered  in  pres- 
tige when,  in  obedience  to  foreign  injunctions,  she 
withdrew  the  protection  she  had  accorded  to  Ser- 
vian covetousness.  That  experience  has  shown  to 
Russia  the  inefficacy  of  the  coalition  formed  by  the 
late  King  of  England  the  first  time  that  it  was  put 
to  the  test. 

If  the  antipathy  between  the  Russian  and  the 
German  nation  has  not  had  any  more  grave  conse- 


les  rapports  entre  les  souverains,  quoique  alteres,  ont 
toujours  ete  meilleurs  qu'entre  les  nations  et  meme 
entre  les  deux  gouvernements.  II  semble  qu'il  en 
coutait  aux  deux  maisons  regnantes  de  rompre  avec 
une  tradition  seculaire  et  la  demarche  de  I'Empereur 
Nicholas  parait  indiquer  qu'il  veut  la  reprendre. 
C'est  lui  qui  a  exprime  le  desir  d'une  entrevue  avec 
I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  accueilli  au  debut  avec  as- 
sez  peu  d'empressement  a  Berlin.  Le  moment  choisi 
a  ete  celui  ou  le  terrain  etait  deblaye  par  la  retraite 
de  M.  Iswolski.  L'inimitie  personnelle  de  I'ancien 
ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres  russe  et  du  Comte 
d'Aehrenthal  a  ete  I'un  des  principaux  obstacles  qu'il 
a  fallu  surmonter  pour  arriver  a  une  solution  paci- 
fique  de  la  question  bosniaque.  J'ai  lieu  de  croire 
aussi  que  M.  Iswolski  n'inspirait  a  Berlin  qu'une 
confiance  tres  mediocre.  M.  Sasonow  a  produit  au 
contraire  sur  I'Empereur,  le  Chancelier  et  le  secre- 
taire d'etat  des  affaires  etrangeres  une  tres  bonne 
impression. 


La  presence  a  Potsdam  est  done  un  evenement 
dont  il  faut  se  feliciter  comme  de  nature  a  ameliorer 
les  relations  entre  les  deux  Empires  et  peut-etre 
aussi  par  contre-coup  entre  Vienne  et  Saint-Peters- 
bourg,  mais  c'est  une  exageration  que  de  lui  attri- 
buer,  comme  I'a  fait  la  "Rossija,"  une  haute  portee 
politique.  Les  groupements  des  grandes  puissances 
europeennes  resteront  ce  qu'ils  etaient  auparavant, 
et  les  sentiments  du  peuple  russe  pour  I'Allemagne 
n'en  deviendront  pas  plus  cordiaux.  Le  langage  des 
journaux  russes  le  demontre  deja. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


quences,  it  is  because  the  relations  between  the 
Sovereigns,  though  changed,  were  always  better 
than  those  between  the  nations  and  even  those  be- 
tween the  two  Governments.  It  seems  that  the  two 
reigning  houses  were  loath  to  break  with  the  tradi- 
tion of  centuries  and  the  step  taken  by  Emperor 
Nicholas  seems  to  indicate  that  he  wants  to  take 
it  up  again.  It  was  he  who  expressed  the  desire 
for  a  meeting  with  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  which 
was  at  first  received  at  Berlin  with  only  scant  en- 
thusiasm. Moreover,  a  moment  was  chosen  when 
the  ground  was  clear,  thanks  to  the  retirement  of 
M.  Iswolski.  The  personal  enmity  between  the  for- 
mer Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Count 
Aehrenthal  was  one  of  the  principal  obstacles  which 
had  to  be  surmounted  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  peace- 
ful solution  of  the  Bosnian  question.  I  have  also 
reason  to  believe  that  M.  Iswolski  inspired  but  little 
confidence  at  Berlin.  M.  Sassonov,  on  the  contrary, 
has  made  a  very  good  impression  on  the  Emperor, 
the  Chancellor  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs. 

The  visit  at  Potsdam  is  thus  an  event  which  gives 
cause  for  congratulation,  as  it  is  likely  to  improve 
the  relations  between  the  two  Empires  and  by  coun- 
ter-effect perhaps  also  between  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg.  But  it  is  an  exaggeration  to  attribute 
to  it,  as  the  Rossiya  does,  a  high  political  import- 
ance. The  groupings  of  the  great  European  Powers 
will  remain  what  they  were  before,  and  the  senti- 
ment of  the  Russian  people  for  Germany  will  not 
become  any  more  cordial.  Of  that,  the  language  of 
the  Russian  journals  is  already  giving  evidence. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  63. 


No.  63. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  3  Mars  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Comme  il  fallait  s'y  attendre;  on  a  d'autant  plus 
mal  accueilli  la  nomination  de  M.  Delcasse  au  mi- 
nistere  de  la  marine  que  le  portefeuille  de  la  guerre 
a  ete  confie  a  M.  Berteaux  dans  le  nouveau  cabinet 
peniblement  forme  par  M.  Monis.  Le-gouvernement 
Imperial  ne  fera  vraisemblablement  pas  connaitre,  au 
moins  publiquement,  son  impression,  afin  d'eviter 
toute  apparence  d'intervention  dans  les  affaires  in- 
terieures  de  la  France,  mais  elle  ne  differe  evidem- 
ment  pas  de  celle  des  journaux.  Ainsi  que  je  I'ai 
ecrit  a  M.  le  Baron  de  Favereau,  M.  le  Baron  de 
Richthofen  m'avait  dit  au  moment  de  la  retraite  de 
M.  Delcasse  en  1905  que  I'ancien  ministre  des  affai- 
res etrangeres  frangais  avait  depuis  des  annees  af- 
fecte  de  traiter  I'Allemagne  en  quantite  negligeable. 
On  considerait  ici  la  longue  administration  de  M. 
Delcasse  comme  ayant  cree  une  situation  tres  grave. 
Ce  n'etait  pas  sans  raison,  puisque  la  premiere  fois 
que  M.  Delcasse  a  pris  la  parole  apres  sa  chute  il 
I'a  fait  pour  se  vanter  d'avoir  organise  une  ligue 
agressive  contre  I'Allemagne. 

On  ne  prend  pas  toutefois  tres  au  tragique  le  re- 
tour  au  pouvoir  de  M.  Delcasse.  Ce  n'est  plus  le 
ministere  des  affaires  etrangeres  qui  lui  est  confie. 
II  n'a  plus  a  cote  de  lui  le  Roi  Edouard  VII,  dont  il 
se  croyait*  le  coUaborateur  et  dont  il  etait  I'instru- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  March  3rd,  1911. 

Sir:— 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  nomination  of  M.  Del- 
casse as  Minister  of  Navy  has  been  received  all 
the  less  favorably,  because  the  portfolio  of  War 
was  given  to  M.  Berteaux  in  the  cabinet  which  M. 
Monis  has  formed  with  difficulty.  The  Imperial 
Government  will  probably  not  divulge  its  impres- 
sion, at  least  not  publicly,  in  order  to  avoid  all  ap- 
pearance of  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
France;  but  that  impression  seems  not  to  differ 
from  that  of  the  papers.  As  I  wrote  to  Baron  de 
Favereau,  Baron  von  Richthofen  told  me  at  the  time 
of  M.  Delcasse's  retirement  in  1905  that  the  former 
French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  for  years 
affected  to  treat  Germany  as  a  negligible  quantity. 
It  was  considered  here  that  the  long  administration 
of  M.  Delcasse  had  created  a  very  grave  situation. 
That  is  not  without  reason,  for  on  the  first  occasion 
when  M.  Delcasse  spoke  after  his  fall  it  was  to 
boast  that  he  had  organized  a  league  of  aggression 
against  Germany. 

Nevertheless,  the  return  to  power  of  M.  Delcasse 
is  not  taken  very  tragically.  It  is  no  longer  the 
.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  which  he  is  in  charge. 
He  has  no  longer  at  his  side  King  Edward  VII, 
whose  collaborator  he  considered  himself  and  whose 


ment.  L'entrevue  de  Potsdam  a  diminue  la  con- 
fiance  des  Frangais  dans  I'alliance  russe,  parce  qu'a 
Paris  et  a  Londres  on  persiste  a  lui  attribuer  une 
portee  qu'elle  n'a  pas.  Enfin  le  ministere  Monis  a 
ete  si  mal  accueilli  en  France  meme  qu'il  n'aura  pro- 
bablement  qu'une  duree  ephemere. 

II  faut  ajouter  qu'aucun  changement  de  personnes 
ne  pent  amener  de  modification  serieuse  dans  les  re- 
lations entre  TAIlemagne  et  la  France.  EUes  reste- 
ront  pour  bien  longtemps  encore  quant  au  fond  ce 
que  commandent  les  sentiments  des  deux  peuples. 
II  ne  peut  y  avoir  de  difference  que  dans  la  forme 
courtoise  ou  brutale.  M.  Pichon  ne  s'est  jamais  de- 
parti  d'une  correction  parfaite  envers  I'AUemagne. 
Les  paroles  que  m'a  adressees  I'Empereur  le  ler  fe- 
vrier  et  que  je  vous  ai  transmises  par  mon  rapport 
du  lendemain  montrent  suffisamment  ce  que  Ton  pen- 
sait  ici  des  veritables  sentiments  de  I'ancien  ministre 
des  affaires  etrangeres  frangais. 

S'il  n'y  a  pas  lieu  de  s'alarmer  outre  mesure  de 
la  composition  du  nouveau  ministere  frangais,  ce  se- 
rait  cependant  tomber  dans  une  exageration  en  sens 
contraire  que  de  lui  denier  toute  signification  au 
point  de  vue  de  la  politique  exterieure. 

M.  Delcasse  n'a  pas  a  s'en  occuper  officiellement 
d'une  maniere  directe,  mais  il  est  trop  ambitieux  et 
trop  remuant  pour  ne  pas  s'efforcer  d'inculquer  ses 
idees  a  ses  collegues.  II  semble  meme  avoir  ete  in- 
vite a  le  faire,  puisque,  d'apres  I'Agence  Havas,  il 
aurait  ete  prie  par  M.  Monis  de  s'entendre  avec  M. 
Berteaux  sur  le  choix  des  autres  membres  du  minis- 
tere. .       - 

L'opinion  en  France  parait  aussi  pousser  a  une 
politique  exterieure  plus  active.  M.  Pichon,  qui  a 
sans  contredit  remporte  de  reels  succes,  etait  encore 
fort  populaire  il  y  a  peu  de  temps.  II  a  cesse  de 
I'etre.  On  lui  salt  mauvais  gre  du  resultat  de  l'en- 
trevue de  Potsdam  qu'il  n'avait  pas  le  moyen  d'em- 
pecher  et  qui  d'ailleurs  ne  devrait  pas  inquieter  si, 
comme  on  le  pretend,  la  triple  entente  n'avait  en  vue 
que  le  maintien  de  la  paix.  Puisque  rien  n'a  ete 
change  au  groupement  des  grandes  puissances,  on 
devrait  se  feliciter  d'un  rapprochement  qui  ameliore 
les  relations  de  I'Allemagne  et  de  la  Russie ;  mais  a 
Paris  et  a  Londres  on  les  veut  mauvaises. 

Tout  recemment  le  president  du  senat  frangais  en 
remettant  a  M.  d'Estournelles  de  Constant  le  prix  de 
la  paix  a,  devant  un  nombreux  public  et  dans  cette 
circonstance  solennelle,  parle  plus  ouvertement  de 
la  revanche  qu'on  ne  I'avait  fait  depuis  des  annees. 

La  presse  frangaise  a  chaudement  applaudi  a  Tac- 
tion entamee  dans  I'affaire  des  fortifications  de  Fles- 
singue.  Ce  que  Ton  reproche  a  M.  Pichon  n'est  pas 
de  s'etre  lance  assez  etourdiment  dans  cette  aven- 
ture,  mais  d'y  avoir  echoue. 

Les  journaux  frangais  decouvrent  tous  les  jours 
quelque  raison  d'imputer  un  grief  a  I'Allemagne. 
C'est  accoutume,  mais  recemment  le  mouvement  a 
redouble  d'intensite. 

On  dirait  que  c'est  pour  tenir  compte  de  cet  etat 
de  l'opinion  que  M.  Delcasse  a  ete  appele  au  minis- 
tere. On  ne  lui  a  pas  confie  les  affaires  etrangeres. 
C'eut  ete  une  provocation,  mais  on  a  fait  ce  que  Ton 
a  pu  sans  casser  les  vitres. 

Je  me  demande  si  en  France  on  ne  specule  pas 
sur  les  embarras  interieurs  de  I'Allemagne.  lis  sont 
malheureusement  encore  tels  que  je  les  ai  depeints 
par  mon  rapport  du  ler  octobre  dernier.  Les  partis 
sont  mal  diriges  et  separes  non  par  des  divergences 
d'opinion  mais  par  la  rancune  et  la  haine.    Le  gou- 


tool  he  was.  The  meeting  of  Potsdam  has  decreased 
the  confidence  of  the  French  in  the  Russian  alliance, 
because  at  Paris  and  at  London  that  meeting  is 
credited  with  an  importance  which  it  does  not  pos- 
sess. Finally,  the  Ministry  of  M.  Monis,  has  been 
received  so  badly  even  in  France  that  its  stay  will 
probably  only  be  ephemeral. 

It  should  be  added  that  no  change  of  persons  can 
cause  a  serious  modification  in  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  France.  They  will  remain  essentially 
as  the  sentiments  of  the  two  nations  dictate.  The 
only  difference  will  be  in  the  form,  either  courteous 
or  brutal.  M.  Pichon  has  never  deviated  from  an 
attitude  of  a  perfect  correctness  towards  Germany.. 
The  words  which  the  Emperor  addressed  to  me  on 
February  1st  and  which  I  had  the  honor  to  com- 
municate to  you  in  my  report  of  the  following  day, 
show  vvith  sufficient  clearness  what  was  thought 
here  of  the  real  sentiments  of  the  former  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Although  there  is  no  occasion  to  take  exaggerated 
alarm  at  the  composition  of  the  new  French  Cabi- 
net, still  it  would  mean  going  too  far  in  the  other 
direction  were  one  to  deny  it  all  significance  from 
the  point  of  view  of  foreign  politics. 

M.  Delcasse  is  not  to  occupy  himself  with  the 
foreign  policy  officially  in  a  direct  manner,  but  he 
is  too  ambitious  and  too  restless  not  to  try  to  im- 
press his  ideas  upon  his  colleagues.  It  would  even 
seem  that  he  was  invited  to  do  so,  since  according 
to  the  Agence  Havas  he  was  asked  by  M.  Monis 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  M.  Berteaux  as 
to  the  choice  of  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet. 

Public  opinion  in  France  seems  also  to  be  urging 
a  more  active  foreign  policy.  M.  Pichon,  who  un- 
deniably has  had  some  real  successes,  was  still  very 
popular  a  short  time  ago.  He  has  ceased  to  be  so. 
He  is  blamed  for  the  result  of  the  meeting  of  Pots- 
dam, which  he  could  not  have  prevented  and  which, 
moreover,  need  not  be  disquieting  if,  as  is  pretended, 
the  Triple  Entente  had  no  other  aim  than  the  main- 
tenance of  peace.  Since  nothing  has  been  changed 
in  the  grouping  of  the  Great  Powers,  congratula- 
tions are  in  order  for  the  creation  of  a  rapproche- 
ment which  improve  the  relations  between  Ger- 
many and  Russia,  but  in  Paris  and  London  it  is 
desired  that  they  be  bad. 

Quite  recently,  the  President  of  the.  French  Sen- 
ate, when  handing  the  peace  prize  to  M.  d'Estour- 
nelles de  Constant  in  the  presence  of  a  numerous 
audience  and  under  solemn  circumstances,  spoke 
more  openly  of  the  "revanche"  than  has  been  done 
for  years. 

The  French  press  warmly  applauded  the  measures 
taken  in  the  matter  of  the  Flushing  fortifications. 
What  M.  Pichon  is  blamed  for  is  not  that  he  em- 
barked rather  thoughtlessly  on  this  adventure,  but 
that  he  failed  in  it. 

The  French  papers  daily  discover  reasons  for  im- 
puting some  wrong  or  other  to  Germany.  That  has 
become  a  habit,  but  recently  the  movement  has 
doubled  its  energy. 

It  would  seem  that  M.  Delcasse  was  called  into 
the  Cabinet  in  consideration  of  this  state  of  the 
public  mind.  The  Foreign  Affairs  were  not  en- 
trusted to  him;  that  would  have  been  a  provocation, 
but  everything  was  done  that  was  possible  without 
smashing  the  windows. 

I  ask  myself,  whether  people  in  France  are  not 
speculating  on  the  internal  troubles  of  Germany. 
They  are  unfortunately  still  the  same  as  I  described 
them  in  my  report  of  October  1st.  The  parties 
are  badly  led  and  are  opposed  to  each  other  not 
because  of  differences  of  opinion,  but  because  of 


vernement  est  sans  influence  sur  le  Reichstag,  qui 
encore  tout  recemment  lui  a  inflige  un  echec  retentis- 
sant  dans  I'affaire  de  la  constitution  de  I'Alsace-Lor- 
raine ;  mais  ce  serait  une  dangereuse  illusion  que 
d'en  croire  I'empire  affaibli  a  I'exterieur.  Nous  avons 
eu  la  preuve  du  contraire  par  la  facilite  avec  laquelle 
le  nouveau  quinquennat  militaire  et  le  budget  de  la 
marine  ont  ete  votes.  Le  Reichstag,  divise  sur  tout, 
les  a  adoptes  presque  sans  discussion,  a  I'unanimite, 
moins  les  voix  des  socialistes;  meme  ceux-ci  sont 
obliges  de  mitiger  leur  opposition  en  declarant  qu'en 
cas  de  guerre  ils  feraient  leur  devoir  comme  les  au- 
tres  Allemands.  Pourtant  les  impots  sont  des  plus 
lourds  et  c'est  une  charge  ecrasante  pour  rAllema- 
gne  que  d'entretenir  a  la  fois  une  armee  de  terre  et 
une  flotte  de  premier  ordre. 

Ce  fait  n'a  pas  ete  assez  remarque  a  I'etranger. 
On  en  devrait  tirer  la  legon  qu'en  cas  de  peril  exte- 
rieur  les  choses  se  passeraient  comme  en  1870.  La 
discorde  etait  alors  pire  qu'aujourd'hui.  Elle  a  dis- 
paru  comme  si  elle  n'avait  jamais  existe  le  jour  de  la 
declaration  de  la  guerre. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


spite  and  hatred.  The  Government  has  no  power 
over  the  Reichstag,  which  only  recently  dealt  the 
former  a  ringing  blow  in  the  matter  of  the  constitu- 
tion for  Alsace-Lorraine ;  but  it  would  be  a  danger- 
ous illusion  to  believe  the  Empire  to  be  externally 
weakened  for  this  reason.  We  have  had  proof  of 
the  contrary  in  the  ease  with  which  the  new  quin- 
quennial army  programme  and  the  naval  budget 
were  voted.  The  Reichstag,  divided  on  everything, 
carried  them  almost  without  discussion  and  unani- 
mously with  the  exception  of  the  socialists;  and 
even  these  have  been  obliged  to  mitigate  their  oppo- 
sition by  declaring  that  in  case  of  war  they  would 
do  their  duty  like  the  other  Germans.  Yet  the 
taxes  are  exceedingly  high  and  it  is  an  oppressive 
burden  for  Germany  to  maintain  at  the  same  time 
an   army  on  land  and  a   first  class  navy. 

This  fact  has  not  been  sufficiently  remarked 
abroad.  From  it  the  lesson  should  be  drawn  that 
in  case  of  external  danger  things  would  go  as  in 
1870.  The  discord  was  worse  then  than  it  is  to-day. 
It  disappeared,  as  if  it  had  never  existed,  the  day 
of  the  declaration  of  war. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  64. 


No.  64. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  4  Mars  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Vous  aurez  remarque  I'accueil  que  la  presse  alle- 
mande  fait  au  nouveau  ministere  frangais  et  I'insis- 
tance  avec  laquelle  elle  soutient  que  la  personnalite 
de  M.  Delcasse  est  trop  accentuee  pour  ne  pas  do- 
miner  la  combinaison  ministerielle  dans  laquelle  il 
a  consenti  a  entrer.  On  fait  volontiers  abstraction 
de  M.  Cruppi;  c'est  M.  Delcasse  qui  presidera  a  la 
politique  exterieure  de  la  Republique,  et  Ton  n'oublie 
pas  dans  quelles  conditions  il  a  du  renoncer  naguere 
a  son  portefueille. 

II  faudra  faire  preuve  ici  d'une  grande  prudence 
vis-a-vis  de  I'Allemagne,  a  laquelle  je  ne  prete  cartes 
aucun  projet  belliqueux  ni  aucune  arriere-pensee 
guerriere,  mais  qui  va  certainement  se  tenir  politi- 
quement  sur  la  defensive. 

L'incident  de  la  Legion  Etrangere,  dont  vous  au- 
rez certes  suivi  les  developpements,  dans  la  presse 
des  deux  pays,  doit  etre  surveille.  Le  ministre  de 
la  guerre  de  I'empire  s'est  exprime  de  fagon  assez 
nette  sur  ce  corps  de  mercenaires ;  des  journaux  alle- 
mands ont  notablement  accentue  les  reproches  faits 
au  recrutement  et  au  traitement  des  legionnaires,  et 
la  presse  frangaise  s'en  est  emue ;  depuis  quelques 
jours  son  langage  est  devenu  plus  acerbe;  le  chau- 
vinisme  s'en  mele,  on  interview  des  autorites  mili- 
taires  et  d'anciens  chefs  de  la  Legion,  et  la  note  que 
vient  de  publier  la  "Gazette  de  Cologne"  n'est  guere 
faite  pour  calmer  I'emotion  produite. 


Je  ne  pense  pas  que  cette  emotion  s'etende  bien 
profondement  en  France  et  que  I'opinion  publique 
dans  la  veritable  acception  du  mot  soit  touchee ;  mais 
la  presse  fait  du  chauvinisme  et  peut  prononcer  des 
paroles  malheureuses  qui  aggraveraient  la  situation. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir: 


Paris,  March  4th,  1911. 


You  will  have  noticed  the  reception  which  the 
German  papers  are  giving  to  the  new  French  Cabi- 
net and  the  insistence  with  which  they  maintain 
that  the  personality  of  M.  Delcasse  is  too  prominent 
not  to  dominate  the  ministerial  combination  which 
he  has  consented  to  join.  M.  Cruppi  may  be  left 
out  of  consideration ;  it  is  M.  Delcasse  who  will  pre- 
side over  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Republic  and  it 
has  not  been  forgotten  under  what  circumstances 
he  recently  had  to  give  up  his  portfolio. 

Great  prudence  will  have  to  be  observed  here 
towards  Germany  to  whom  I  surely  attribute  no 
warlike  plans  nor  any  secret  bellicose  thoughts,  but 
who  will  certainly  hold  herself  politically  on  the 
defensive. 

The  incident  of  the  Foreign  Legion,  the  develop- 
ment of  which  you  will  have  followed  in  the  press 
of  the  two  countries,  will .  need  attention.  The 
Minister  of  War  of  the  German  Empire  has  ex- 
pressed himself  with  sufficient  frankness  concern- 
ing that  body  of  mercenaries.  German  papers 
pointed  out  with  special  emphasis  the  complaints 
made  with  regard  to  the  recruiting  and  the  treat- 
ment of  the  legionaries  and  the  French  press  be- 
came excited  about  it.  For  some  days  its  language 
has  increased  in  bitterness;  chauvinism  interferes 
in  the  matter,  interviews  are  asked  of  military  ex- 
perts and  former  commanders  of  the  Legion,  and 
the  notice  which  the  Cologne  Gazette  has  just  pub- 
lished is  hardly  such  as  to  calm  the  prevailing  ex- 
citement. 

I  do  not  think  that  this  excitement  goes  very  deep 
in  France  and  that  public  opinion,  in  the  true  mean- 
ing of  the  word,  is  touched  ;  but  the  press  is  dealing 
in  chauvinism  and  may  utter  unfortunate  words 
which  would  aggravate  the  situation. 


II  est  a  esperer  qu'il  n'en  sera  rien,  mais  il  n'est 
pas  douteux  que  la  question  est  susceptible  de  s'en- 
venimer,  et  que,  si  elle  I'entend  ainsi,  rAllemagne 
peut  entretenir  cette  affaire  dans  un  etat  de  mi-acuite 
pour  le  jour  ou  elle  voudrait  trouver  une  cause  de 
brouille. 

II  me  revient  d'ailleurs  que  ron  ne  cesse  de  faire 
en  AUemagne,  le  long  de  la  frontiere  frangaise,  une 
veritable  propagande  pour  amener  dans  I'armee  Im- 
periale  des  desertions  au  profit  de  la  Legion  Etran- 
gere  frangaise. 

Je  suis,  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


It  is  to  be  hoped  that  nothing  will  happen,  but  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  question  is  apt  to  rankle 
and  that,  if  she  is  so  minded,  Germany  can  keep  this 
matter  in  a  state  of  suspense  until  the  day  when 
she  might  want  to  find  a  pretext  for  a  conflict. 

I  also  learn  that  in  Germany  along  the  French 
frontier  a  regular  propaganda  is  incessantly  being 
carried  on  in  order  to  cause  desertions  from  the 
Imperial  army  for  the  benefit  of  the  Foreign  Legion. 


I  am,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Guillaume. 


No.  65. 


No.  65. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  20  Mars  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  1 

Le  discours  sur  la  politique  exterieure  prononce 
il  y  a  huit  jours  par  Sir  Edward  Grey,  a  I'occasion 
de  la  discussion  du  budget  de  la  marine,  a  provoque 
de  nombreux  commentaires  dans  la  presse  anglaise 
et  dans  celle  de  tous  les  pays,  a  I'exception  de  I'Al- 
lemagne.  La  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung" 
a  temoigne  la  satisfaction  du  gouvernement  Impe- 
rial. De  la  part  de  I'organe  hautement  officieux,  c'e- 
tait  oblige.  Le  silence  eut  ete  a  bon  droit  considere 
a  Londres  comme  une  injure;  mais  les  autres  jour- 
naux  se  sont  bornes  a  reproduire  le  resume  du  dis- 
cours transmis  par  les  agences  telegraphiques  ou  n'y 
ont  ajoute  que  de  courtes  reflexions  insignifiantes. 
C'est  ici  cependant  que  les  paroles  du  secretaire 
d'Etat  britannique  auraient  dti  causer  le  plus  de  sen- 
sation et  produire  la  plus  agreable  impression,  si  Ton 
avait  la  confiance  qu'elles  expriment  bien  toute  la 
pensee  du  gou\ernement  anglais.  Elles  marque- 
raient  un  revirement  notable  de  la  politique  inaugu- 
ree  naguere  par  le  cabinet  unioniste  et  dont  ses  suc- 
cesseurs  liberaux  ont  continue  la  tradition.  L'evolu- 
tion  n'indiquerait  pas  un  derangement  du  groupe- 
ment  actuel  des  grandes  puissances,  mais  elle  signi- 
fierait  que  I'Angleterre  ne  veut  plus  conserver  a  la 
triple  entente  le  caractere  agressif  que  lui  avait  im- 
prime  son  createur,  le  Roi  Edouard  VII.  A  voir 
I'indifference  du  public  allemand,  on  dirait  qu'il  est 
blase  par  les  innombrables  entrevues  et  echanges 
de  demonstrations  courtoises  qui  n'ont  jamais  pro- 
duit  aucun  resultat  positif  et  qu'il  veuille  se  mettre 
en  garde  centre  de  nouvelles  deceptions.  Cette  me- 
fiance  se  comprend,  puisque  tout  recemment  encore 
le  gouvernement  anglais  prenait  part  a  I'intrigue  de 
Flessingue.  Nous  en  avons  eu  la  preuve  par  la  de- 
marche qu'a  faite  aupres  de  vous,  Sir  A.  Hardinge 
pour  essayer  de  nous  y  entrainer. 


Toutefois  on  peut  se  demander  si  le  scepticisme 
n'est  pas  dans  le  cas  present  quelque  peu  exagere. 

Le  rapprochement  avec  la  Russie  et  I'Angleterre 
faisait  partie  du  programme  politique  trace  par  M. 
de  Kiderlen-Waechter  lorsqu'i!  a  accepte  la  direction 
du  departement  Imperial  des  affaires  etrangeres.  La 
premiere  partie  de  ce  plan  a  ete  executee  par  I'en- 
trevue  de  Potsdam.  Les  pourparlers  entre  Potsdam 
et  Saint-Petersbourg  sont  interrompus  depuis  que 
M.  Sassonow  est  malade ;  mais  auparavant  il  y  a  eu 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  March  20th,  1911. 
Sir:— 

The  speech  on  his  foreign  policy,  delivered  a 
week  ago  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the  occasion  of 
the  discussion  of  the  naval  budget,  has  evoked  num- 
erous comments  in  the  English  press  and  that  of 
all  countries,  with  the  exception  of  Germany. 

The  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  has  ex- 
pressed the  satisfaction  of  the  Imperial  Government. 
As  the  most  prominent  semi-official  organ  it  vras 
obliged  to  do  so.  Silence  would  rightly  have  been 
looked  upon  at  London  as  an  insult.  But  the  other 
papers  either  confined  themselves  to  printing  a 
resume  of  the  speech  as  transmitted  by  the  tele- 
graph agencies,  or  they  only  added  brief  and  insuffi- 
cient remarks.  Nevertheless  it  is  here  that  the 
words  of  the  British  Secretary  of  State  ought  to 
have  caused  the  greatest  sensation  and  produced 
the  most  agreeable  impression,  if  it  were  confidently 
believed  that  they  express  the  real  ideas  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government.  They  would  mean  a  remarkable 
change  in  the  policy  lately  inaugurated  by  the  Un- 
ionist Cabinet  and  the  tradition  of  which  was  con- 
tinued by  its  Liberal  successors.  The  development 
indicated  would  not  imply  a  change  in  the  present 
grouping  of  the  Great  Powers;  but  it  would  mean 
that  England  no  longer  wants  to  preserve  the  ag- 
gressive character  of  the  Triple  Entente  with  which 
its  founder,  King  Edward  VII,  stamped  it.  The 
indifference  of  the  German  public  might  be  ascribed 
to  the  fact  that  it  has  become  blase  by  the  endless 
meetings  and  exchanges  of  demonstrations  of  cour- 
tesy which  have  never  produced  any  positive  result, 
and  that  it  wants  to  be  on  its  guard  against  new  dis- 
appointments. That  mistrust  is  natural,  since  only 
quite  recently  the  British  Government  took  part  in 
the  intrigue  of  Flushing.  We  have  proof  of  it  in 
the  attempt  which  Sir  A.  Hardinge  made  with  you 
in  order  to  endeavor  to  drag  us  in. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  a  question  whether  scepticism 
in  this  case  is  not  a  little  exaggerated. 

A  rapprochement  with  Russia  and  England 
formed  part  of  the  political  programme  of  Mr. 
Kiderlen-Waechter  when  he  assumed  the  direction 
of  the  Imperial  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
The  first  part  of  this  plan  was  executed  by  the  meet- 
ing of  Potsdam.  The  pourparlers  between  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg  were  interrupted  when  M.  Sas- 
sonov  was  taken  ill ;  but  before  that  there  was  a 


80 


un  echange  d'idees  tres  actif  entre  les  deux  cabinets. 
Aucun  resultat  positif  n'a  encore  ete  obtenu,  et  peut- 
etre  n'arrivera-t-on  pas  a  grand'chose  de  concret; 
mais  les  relations  des  deux  pays  sont  redevenues 
normales.  Elles  n'ont  plus  le  caractere  de  reserve 
hargneuse  qu'elles  avaient  pris  depuis  I'affaire  de 
I'annexion  de  la  Bosnie. 

Les  circonstances  se  pretent  a  la  realisation  du 
programme  du  secretaire  d'Etat  des  affaires  etran- 
geres.  II  y  a  six  semaines  environ,  le  Roi  d'Angle- 
terre  a  ecrit  a  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  pour  I'inviter 
a  assister  a  I'inauguration  de  la  statue  de  la  Reine 
Victoria.  C'est  la  premiere  lettre  que  le  roi  George 
V  adressait  a  Sa  Majeste  depuis  qu'il  est  monte  sur 
le  trone.  Elle  etait  congue  en  termes  particuliere- 
ment  cordiaux  qui  ont  produit  la  plus  agreable  im- 
pression. Vous  vous  souviendrez  sans  doute,  Mon- 
sieur le  Ministre,  de  ce  qu'a  dit,  quelques  jours  apres, 
le  chancelier  de  I'empire  dans  son  discours  au 
Reichstag  sur  les  affaires  etrangeres  au  sujet  de  sa 
confiance  dans  la  loyaute  de  la  politique  anglaise 
envers  I'Allemagne.  On  pent  considerer  I'attitude  de 
M.  de  Bethmann  HoUweg  comme  la  consequence  du 
message  du  Roi  d'Angleterre. 

Le  discours  de  Sir  Edward  Grey  ne  s'est  pas  borne 
a  de  vaines  paroles  comme  dans  des  occasions  ante- 
rieures.  II  a  ete  accompagne,  ou  plutot  precede,  d'un 
acte.  Pendant  des  annees  la  presse  anglaise  a  emis 
Tarrogante  pretention  de  controler  et  meme  d'inter- 
dire  I'achevement  du  chemin  de  fer  de  Bagdad ;  c'est- 
a-dire  d'avoir  la  haute  main  sur  une  entreprise  qui 
ne  concerne  que  la  Turquie.la  compagnie  concession- 
naire  et  indirectement  le  gouvernement  allemand,  qui 
a  appuye  celle-ci.  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  replace  la  ques- 
tion sur  le  terrain  du  droit,  en  reconnaissant  que 
I'Angleterre  n'a  aucun  titre  Tautorisant  a  intervenir 
dans  une  affaire  interieure  ottomane  et  en  annon- 
^ant  qu'elle  se  bornerait  a  garantir  ses  interets  par 
les  moyens  legaux  dont  elle  dispose.  C'est  une  base 
sur  laquelle  on  pent  s'entendre.  Personne  ne  niera 
I'existence  de  ces  interets  anglais  et  ne  songera  a 
faire  au  gouvernement  britannique  un  grief  de  les 
defendre. 

Enfin  le  moment  est  propice  pour  une  tentative 
d'amelioration  des  relations  entre  I'Allemagne  et 
I'Angleterre.  II  n'y  a  maintenant  a  I'ordre  du  jour 
aucune  question  irritante  de  nature  a  I'entraver. 

Je  dois  vous  prier  de  noter,  Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
que  le  present  rapport  ne  signifie  pas  que  je  consi- 
dere  comme  deja  acquis  ou  imminent  un  rapproche- 
ment entre  I'Angleterre  et  I'Allemagne,  que  j'appelle 
de  tons  mes  voeux,  parce  qu'il  constituerait  une  sen- 
sible augmentation  de  securite  pour  la  Belgique. 
Tout  ce  que  je  veux  dire  est  qu'a  mon  avis  les  jour- 
naux  allemands  n'ont  pas  prete  une  attention  assez 
serieuse  au  discours  de  Sir  Edward  Grey  et  qu'il 
faut  attendre  les  evenements  pour  asseoir  un  juge- 
ment  sur  sa  veritable  portee.  Le  depit  manifeste  par 
le  journal  le  "Temps"  demontre  qu'a  Paris  I'opinion 
publique  lui  en  attache  beaucoup  plus  qu'on  ne  I'a 
fait  a  Berlin.  A  la  maniere  dont  s'exprime  le  journal 
franqais,  on  dirait  qu'il  ne  considere  plus  la  triple 
entente  que  comme  une  formule  vide  de  sens. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


very  active  exchange  of  ideas  between  the  two  cabi- 
nets. No  positive  result  has  as  yet  been  obtained 
and  perhaps  nothing  very  palpable  will  be  reached, 
but  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  have 
become  normal  again.  They  are  no  longer  marked 
by  that  surly  reserve  which  characterized  them 
after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia. 

The  situation  is  favorable  for  the  realization  of 
the  programme  of  the  Secretary  of  State  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  Six  weeks  ago  the  King  of  England  wrote 
to  the  Emperor  of  Germany  to  invite  him  to  attend 
the  unveiling  of  the  statue  of  Queen  Victoria.  That 
is  the  first  letter  which  King  George  V  has  ad- 
dressed to  His  Majesty  since  he  ascended  the  throne. 
It  was  couched  in  particularly  cordial  terms  which 
have  made  the  best  impression  here.  You  will 
doubtless  remember,  Sir,  what  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor said  some  days  later  in  his  speech  in  the 
Reichstag  on  foreign  affairs  in  regard  to  his  con- 
fidence in  the  loyalty  of  the  English  policy  towards 
Germany.  One  may  consider  Mr.  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg's  attitude  as  the  consequence  of  the  mes- 
sage of  the  King  of  England. 

The  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  confine 
itself  to  empty  phrases,  as  on  previous  occasions. 
It  was  accompanied,  or  rather  preceded,  by  action. 
For  years  the  English  press  has  made  the  arrogant 
pretension  to  control  and  even  to  interdict  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Bagdad  railway,  that  is  to  say  to  put 
her  hand  on  an  enterprise  which  concerns  only  Tur- 
key, the  company  to  which  the  concession  was 
granted,  and  indirectly  the  German  Goverrmient 
which  supported  the  latter.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has 
put  the  question  back  on  a  legal  basis  by  recogniz- 
ing that  England  had  no  title  authorizing  her  to 
interfere  in  an  internal  Ottoman  matter,  and  by  an- 
nouncing that  she  would  limit  herself  to  safeguard- 
ing her  interests  by  the  legal  means  at  her  disposal. 
That  is  a  basis  on  which  an  understanding  can  be 
reached.  Nobody  will  deny  those  English  interests, 
nor  think  of  blaming  the  British  Government  for 
defending  them. 

At  last  the  moment  is  propitious  for  an  attempt 
at  an  improvement  of  the  German-English  relations. 
There  is  now  no  irritating  question  which  could 
thwart  that  attempt. 

I  must  ask  of  you.  Sir,  to  note  that  the  present 
report  does  not  signify  that  I  consider  a  rapproche- 
ment between  England  and  Germany  as  reached 
or  imminent.  But  I  wish  for  it  with  all  my  heart, 
because  it  would  mean  that  Belgium's  security 
would  be  considerably  increased.  All  I  want  to  say 
is  that  in  my  opinion  the  German  papers  have  not 
paid  sufficiently  serious  attention  to  the  speech  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  that  we  must  wait  for  the 
events  before  we  can  fairly  judge  of  its  real  import. 
The  vexation  shown  by  the  Temps  demonstrates 
that  public  opinion  in  Paris  attaches  more  import- 
ance to  the  speech  than  that  in  Berlin  has  done. 
To  judge  from  its  manner  of  expression  it  would 
seem  that  the  French  journal  sees  in  the  Triple 
Entente  no  more  than  a  formula  devoid  of  meaning. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  66. 


No.  66. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  21  Avril  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

II  y  a  quelques  jours  deja  la  presse  fran^aise  a  mis 
en  circulation  un  bruit  d'apres  lequel  la  France  se- 
rait  assuree  de  ne  pas  etre  entravee  par  TAllemagne 
dans  les  mesures  qu'il  serait  necessaire  de  prendre 
pour  denouer  la  crise  actuelle  au  Maroc.  On  se  li- 
vrait  a  des  conjectures  sur  les  compensations  qui 
auraient  ou  pourraient  etre  accordees  au  Gouverne- 
ment  Imperial  en  echange  de  la  liberte  d'action  lais- 
see  au  Gouvernement  Frangais.  On  est  encore  bien 
eloigne  d'un  pareil  resultat.  La  verite  est  que  I'am- 
bassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  a  eu,  depuis  que  la 
situation  du  Sultan  Moulai  Haiith  est  devenue  criti- 
que, plusieurs  entretiens  avec  le  secretaire  d'Etat  des 
affaires  etrangeres ;  qu'il  est  alle  a  Paris  pour  rendre 
compte  des  demarches,  et  qu'il  les  a  continuees  de- 
puis son  retour  a  Berlin.  M.  Cambon  a  parle  de 
I'obligation  ou  pourrait  se  trouver  la  France  d'agir 
par  les  armes  pour  secourir  le  Sultan.  Avant-hier 
encore  il  a  rappele  au  chancelier  les  sanglants  repro- 
ches  adresses  a  M.  Gladstone  pour  avoir  laisse  mas- 
sacrer  Gordon  Pacha  et  les  autres  Europeens  assie- 
ges  par  le  Mahdi  a  Khartoum  sans  essayer  de  leur 
venir  en  aide.  Du  cote  allemand  on  a  attire  I'atten- 
tion  de  I'ambassadeur  de  France  sur  la  necessite  ou 
se  trouve  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  de  tenir  compte 
de  I'opinion  publique  en  AUemagne. 

Tout  est  done  encore  dans  un  etat  d'incertitude 
dont  I'ambassadeur  de  France  est  visiblement  inquiet 
et  qui  explique  les  lenteurs  et  les  tergiversations  du 
gouvernement  franqais,  ainsi  que  les  appreciations 
contradictoires  qui  se  succedent  dans  les  journaux 
de  Paris.  On  nous  dit  un  jour  que  le  Sultan  Moulai 
Hafith  est  a  bout  de  ressources ;  le  lendemain  on  af- 
firme  que  sa  situation  s'est  amelioree,  quoiqu'aucun 
changement  notable  se  soit  produit. 

Je  ne  crois  pas  qu'il  y  ait  ici  le  moindre  desir  de 
jouer  un  role  effectif  dans  I'affaire  marocaine.  On 
doit  avoir  perdu  depuis  longtemps,  si  Ton  en  a  jamais 
entretenu,  toute  illusion  sur  la  valeur  de  I'acte  d'Al- 
g6siras  que  la  France  a  signe  avec  la  ferme  intention 
de  ne  I'observer  jamais.  Elle  n'a  pas  cesse  un  ins- 
tant de  poursuivre  ses  plans  d'annexion,  soit  en 
saisissant  des  pretextes  pour  des  occupations  pro- 
visoires  destinees  a  durer  pendant  I'eternite,  soit  en 
extorquant  des  concessions  plagant  le  Sultan  sous 
la  dependance  de  la  France  en  I'abaissant  progres- 
sivement  au  niveau  du  Bey  de  Tunis.  En  s'enga- 
geant  par  I'arrangement  du  9  fevrier  1909  a  ne  pas 
entraver  les  interets  politiques  de  la  France  au  Ma- 
roc, le  Gouvernement  Imperial  savait  a  n'en  pouvoir 
douter  que  le  Gouvernement  Frangais  interpreterait 
cette  clause  comme  un  encouragement  a  perseverer 
dans  la  meme  voie  et  regarderait  la  promesse  de  res- 
pecter I'independance  du  Maroc  comme  lettre  morte. 
Reculer  serait  maintenant  pour  la  France  une  cruelle 
humiliation. 

L' AUemagne  n'a  nulle  raison  de  la  lui  infliger  et 
ne  pourrait  d'ailleurs  pas,  apres  huit  ans  de  tole- 
rance, changer  d'attitude  sans  etre  determinee  a  aller 
jusqu'a  la  guerre.  C'est  demesurement  plus  que  le 
Maroc  ne  vaut. 

Enfin  il  ne  pent  pas  deplaire  a  Berlin  que  la 
France  soit  engagee  dans  une  entreprise  coloniale 
qui  pour  bien  longtemps  I'obligera  a  immobiliser  des 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  April  21st,  1911. 


Some  days  ago  the  French  press  put  a  rumor  in 
circulation,  according  to  which  France  had  been 
assured  that  she  would  not  be  hindered  by  Germany 
in  taking  those  measures  which  would  be  necessary 
in  order  to  solve  the  present  crisis  in  Morocco. 
Conjectures  were  indulged  in  on  the  compensations 
which  had  been  or  might  be  granted  to  the  Imperial 
Government  in  exchange  for  the  liberty  of  action 
allowed  the  French  Government.  Matters  are  still 
far  removed  from  such  a  result.  The  truth  is  that, 
after  the  situation  of  Sultan  Mulai  Hafid  became 
critical,  the  French  Ambassador  had  several  con- 
versations with  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
A.ffairs,  that  he  went  to  Paris  to  give  account  of 
his  steps,  and  that  he  has  continued  them  since  his 
return  to  Berlin.  M.  Cambon  has  spoken  of  the 
obligation,  under  which  France  might  find  herself, 
to  render  armed  assistance  to  the  Sultan.  Only  the 
day  before  yesterday  he  recalled  to  the  Chancellor 
the  cutting  reproaches  which  were  addressed  to 
Mr.  Gladstone  for  having  allowed  Gordon  Pasha 
and  the  other  Europeans  besieged  by  the  Mahdi  at 
Khartoum  to  be  massacred  without  trying  to  come 
to  their  aid.  By  the  German  side  the  attention  of 
the  French  Ambassador  has  been  drawn  to  the  fact 
that  the  Imperial  Government  finds  it  necessary  to 
take  German  public  opinion  into  consideration. 

Everything  is,  therefore,  still  in  a  state  of  uncer- 
tainty which  is  making  the  French  Ambassador 
visibly  nervous  and  which  explains  the  tardiness 
and  the  evasions  of  the  French  Government  as  well 
as  the  contradictory  reports  which  follow  each  other 
in  the  Paris  papers ;  one  day  we  are  told  that  Sultan 
Mulai  Hafid  is  at  the  end  of  his  resources,  the  next 
day  we  are  assured  that  the  situation  has  improved 
although  no  noticeable  change  has  taken  place. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  slightest  desire  exists 
here  to  play  an  active  part  in  the  Moroccan  affair. 
If  ever  they  entertained  any,  they  must  have  lost 
long  ago  their  illusions  as  to  the  value  of  the 
Act  of  Algeciras  which  France  signed  vsdth  the  firm 
intention  of  never  observing  it.  She  has  not  ceased 
a  moment  to  pursue  her  plans  of  annexation,  be  it 
by  seizing  on  pretexts  for  temporary  occupations 
intended  to  last  eternally,  or  by  extorting  conces- 
sions which  placed  the  Sultan  in  dependence  on 
France  and  were  debasing  him  step  by  step  to  the 
level  of  the  Bey  of  Tunis.  When  the  German  Gov- 
ernment engaged  itself  by  the  agreement  of  Feb- 
ruary 9th,  1909,  not  to  hinder  the  French  political 
interests  in  Morocco,  it  doubtless  knew  that  the 
French  Government  would  regard  the  promise  to 
respect  the  independence  of  Morocco  as  a  dead  let- 
ter. To  have  to  retreat  now  would  be  a  cruel  hum- 
iliation for  France. 


Germany  has  no  right  to  inflict  it  and  she  could, 
moreover,  after  eight  years  of  tolerance,  not  change 
her  attitude  without  being  determined  even  to  go 
to  war.  That  would  be  doing  considerably  more 
than  Morocco  is  worth. 

Finally,  Berlin  cannot  be  displeased  to  see  France 
engaged  in  a  colonial  enterprise  which  will  oblige 
her  for  a  very  long  time  to  he  up  increasingly  large 


82 


forces  de  plus  en  plus  considerables  en  Afrique  et 
qui  detourne  ses  regards  des  provinces  perdues.  C'e- 
tait  la  politique  du  Prince  de  Bismarck.  On  s'en  est 
ecarte  il  y  a  huit  ans  parce  qu'il  s'agissait  de  prouver 
au  Roi  d'Angleterre  et  a  M.  Delcasse  que  TAUema- 
gne  ne  se  laisserait  pas  traiter  en  quantite  negligea- 
ble,  mais  il  n'y  a  plus  maintenant  de  raison  de  n'y 
pas  revenir.  Mais  il  ne  depend  pas  uniquement  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  de  pratiquer  I'abstention. 
II  faut  qu'on  I'y  aide  de  I'exterieur.  II  est  parfaite- 
ment  exact  que  I'opinion  publique  est  emue.  Comme 
j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  par  mon  rapport  du 
11  fevrier  1909  I'arrangement  du  9  fevrier  a  ete  cri- 
tique par  tous  les  journaux  allemands  qui  n'ont  pas 
d'attaches  officieuses.  Depuis  on  a  plus  d'une  fois 
reproche  au  Gouvernement  Imperial  trop  de  con- 
descendance  envers  la  France  dans  I'affaire  maro- 
caine.  On  a  remarque  dans  le  discours-programme 
de  M.  Cruppi  au  Senat  le  passage  oil  le  ministre 
frangais  se  targue  comme  ses  predecesseurs  d'un 
mandat  europeen  que  personne  n'a  jamais  songe  a 
lui  conferer.  Les  promesses  de  la  France  n'inspirent 
plus  de  confiance.  On  ne  peut  pas  oublier  que  le 
langage  de  M.  Pichon  toujours  correct  etait  invaria- 
blement  en  desaccord  avec  les  actes.  Pourquoi  M. 
Cruppi  serait-il  plus  sincere  que  ses  predecesseurs? 
On  fait  remarquer  que  toutes  les  difficultes  marocai- 
nes  ont  ete  suscitees  par  la  politique  envahissante  de 
la  France.  Les  journaux  s'obstinent  encore  a  ne  pas 
voir  que  les  stipulations  d'Algesiras  n'ont  ete  qu'un 
leurre  et  ont  la  ferme  naivete  d'en  reclamer  I'execu- 
tion. 

Si  le  Gouvernement  Frangais  a  vraiment  a  coeur 
d'ecarter  les  chances  d'un  conflit,  c'est  a  lui  qu'il  ap- 
partient  maintenant  de  se  conduire  avec  assez  de 
prudence  et  de  feinte  moderation  pour  ne  pas  forcer 
I'Allemagne  a  sortir  de  I'inaction. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


numbers  of  troops  in  Africa  and  which  takes  her 
mind  off  the  lost  provinces.  That  was  the  policy  of 
Prince  von  Bismarck.  Eight  years  ago  that  policy 
was  abandoned  because  it  was  necessary  to  prove 
to  the  King  of  England  and  to  M.  Delcasse  that 
Germany  would  not  allow  herself  to  be  treated  as  a 
negligible  quantity ;  now  there  is  no  longer  any  rea- 
son why  one  should  not  revert  to  it.  But  to  abstain 
from  doing  so  does  not  depend  alone  on  the  Impe- 
rial Government.  To  do  this  it  needs  help  from 
without.  It  is  quite  true  that  public  opinion  is  ex- 
cited. As  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  in  my  re- 
port of  February  11,  1909,  the  agreement  of  Feb- 
ruary 9th,  was  criticized  by  all  German  papers 
which  have  no  official  affiliations.  Since  then  the 
Imperial  Government  has  more  than  once  been 
blamed  for  too  much  condescension  towards  France 
in  the  Moroccan  afifair.  In  the  programmatic  speech 
of  M.  Cruppi  in  the  Senate,  the  passage  has  at- 
tracted attention  in  which  the  French  Minister,  like 
his  predecessors,  boasts  of  a  European  mandate 
which  nobody  has  ever  thought  of  conferring  on 
him.  The  promises  of  France  no  longer  inspire 
confidence.  One  cannot  forget  that  the  correct  l£in- 
guage  of  M.  Pichon  was  invariably  in  disagreement 
with  his  acts.  Why  should  M.  Cruppi  be  more  sin- 
cere than  his  predecessor?  It  is  pointed  out  that 
all  of  the  Moroccan  difficulties  were  caused  by 
France's  policy  of  conquest.  The  papers  still  re- 
fuse to  see  that  the  stipulations  of  Algeciras  were 
only  a  trap,  and  they  are  naive  enough  to  demand 
their  fulfillment. 

If  France  is  really  desirous  of  removing  the 
chances  for  a  conflict,  it  is  for  her  to  conduct  herself 
with  sufficient  prudence  and  feigned  moderation  in 
order  not  to  force  Germany  to  abandon  her  attitude 
of  inaction. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  67. 


No.  67. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  29  Avril  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Les  agences  telegraphiques  vous  mettent  aucou- 
rant,  plus  vite  que  je  ne  pourrais  le  faire,  des  divers 
incidents  qui  mettent  aujourd'hui  le  Maroc  au  pre- 
mier plan  des  preoccupations  du  Gouvernement  de 
la  Republique.  Tout  en  faisant  la  part  du  caractere 
national  qui  porte  toujours  les  Franqais  a  exagerer 
I'importance  des  faits  qui  les  touchent  et  des  actes 
auxquels  ils  contribuent,  il  n'est  pas  contestable  que 
la  situation  est  tres  embrouillee  aujourd'hui  dans  les 
regions  marocaines,  que  les  tribus  rivalisent  d'inco- 
herence  et  de  trahison  et  que  la  charge  est  lourde 
pour  la  puissance  qui  a  accepte  —  qui  s'est  attri- 
buee  —  la  mission  de  retablir  I'ordre  au  Maroc. 

Jusqu'ici  rien  ne  fait  craindre  encore  que  I'expe- 
dition  frangaise  puisse  alterer  la  politique  Internatio- 
nale. L'Allemagne  observe  avec  calme  ce  qui  se 
passe,  se  felicite  peut-etre  des  difficultes  qui  pesent 
sur  les  epaules  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
et  ne  demande  pas  mieux  que  de  ne  pas  se  meler  de 
cette  aflfaire  aussi  longtemps  que  ses  interets  econo- 
miques  ne  I'y  forceront  pas. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  April  29,  1911. 
Sir:— 

The  telegraph  agencies  are  informing  you  more 
quickly  than  I  can  of  the  various  incidents  which 
cause  Morocco  to  be  to-day  one  of  the  principal 
causes  for  anxiety  to  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic. Even  though  making  allowances  for  the  na- 
tional trait  of  the  French  to  exaggerate  the  im- 
portance of  facts  which  touch  them  and  of  actions 
in  which  they  are  actively  concerned,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  situation  in  Morocco  is  at  present 
very  complicated ;  that  the  tribes  are  outrivalling 
each  other  in  their  incoherence  and  their  treachery, 
and  that  the  burden  is  heavy  for  the  Power  which 
accepted,  or  rather  assumed  of  her  own  accord,  the 
mission  of  reestablishing  order  in  Morocco. 

So  far  nothing  justifies  a  fear  lest  the  French  ex- 
pedition change  international  policy.  Germany  is 
watching  calmly  what  is  happening;  she  is  perhaps 
congratulating  herself  on  account  of  the  difficulties 
which  rest  on  the  shoulders  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, and  asks  nothing  better  than  not  to  have 
to  mix  in  this  affair  as  long  as  her  economic  inter- 
ests do  not  compel  her  to  do  so. 


L'Angleterre,  qui  a  pousse  la  France  dans  le  bour- 
bier  marocain,  considere  son  oeuvre  avec  complai- 
sance. Reste  I'Espagne,  peu  satisfaite  naturellement 
du  developpement  que  la  France  donne  a  son  action; 
elle  souffre  de  devoir  reconnaitre  que  ses  moyens  ne 
sont  pas  a  la  hauteur  de  ses  ambitions  et  de  devoir 
faire  bonne  mine  a  mauvais  jeu. 

L'article  du  "Temps,"  de  ce  jour,  sur  lequel  j'ose 
attirer  votre  attention,  etablit  assez  justement  — 
avec  une  legere  dose  d'optimisme  —  la  position  res- 
pective de  la  France  et  de  I'Espagne  au  Maroc.  J'ai 
lieu  de  croire  qu'il  exprime  a  peu  pres  ce  que  Ton 
pense  au  Quai  d'Orsay  et  certainement  ce  que  Ton 
y  desire. 

Je  suis,  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


England,  who  has  pushed  France  into  the  Mor- 
occan mire,   regards   her   work   v^dth   satisfaction. 

And  Spain,  naturally  somewhat  dissatisfied  with 
the  course  which  France's  action  is  taking,  recog- 
nizes to  her  regret  that  her  means  fall  short  of  her 
ambitions,  and  that  she  has  to  regard  the  matter 
with  good  grace. 

To-day's  article  in  the  Temps,  to  which  I  take  the 
liberty  of  drawing  your  attention,  sketches  fairly, 
though  with  a  slight  dose  of  optimism,  the  respec- 
tive position  of  France  and  Spain  in  Morocco.  I 
have  reason  to  believe  that  it  expresses  more  or  less 
what  is  thought  and  certainly  what  is  desired  at 
the  Quai  d'Orsay. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  68. 


No.  68. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  ler  Mai  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Depuis  que  la  crise  marocaine  a  repasse  a  I'etat 
aigu,  la  presse  ofificieuse  allemande  s'etait  bornee  a 
reproduire  les  informations  apportees  par  les  agences 
telegraphiques  en  s'abstenant  de  tout  commentaire. 
Elle  a  rompu  le  silence  hier  matin  par  l'article  insere 
en  tete  de  la  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung" 
dont  la  traduction  suit : 

"Pendant  toute  la  semaine  derniere  il  s'est  mani- 
feste  de  plus  en  plus  combien  le  gouvernement  fran- 
gais  se  preoccupe  de  prendre  des  mesures  de  pro- 
tection pour  les  officiers  frangais  se  trouvant  a  Fez 
ou  dans  les  environs.  Un  danger  pour  les  colonies 
europeennes  n'est  d'apres  les  nouvelles  parvenues  a 
Berlin  heureusement  pas  a  craindre.  On  ne  pent 
pas  blamer  la  France  de  penser  a  tous  les  moyens 
qui  lui  paraissent  propres  a  proteger  la  vie  de  ses 
ofificiers.  C'est  naturellement  au  jugement  de  la 
France  qu'il  faut  laisser  le  choix  des  moyens  qui  lui 
paraissent  appropries,  puisque  c'est  elle  qui  porte  la 
responsabilite  des  suites  des  moyens  employes.  D'a- 
pres les  assurances  concluantes  du  gouvernement 
frangais  il  a  seulement  I'intention  de  prendre  les  me- 
sures necessaires  pour  la  securite  de  ses  nationaux; 
en  particulier  il  ne  se  propose  pas  de  porter  atteinte 
a  I'inteG^rite  du  Maroc  et  a  la  souverainete  du  Sultan. 
L'occupation  de  Fez  n'entre  pas  non  plus  dans  ses 
intentions.  II  est  a  esperer  que  les  evenements  per- 
mettront  au  gouvernement  frangais  d'observer  son 
programme.  Le  depasser  ne  serait  pas  d'accord  avec 
I'acte  d'Algesiras,  parce  qu'une  partie  essentielle  de 
cet  acte  est  un  souverain  marocain  independant.  Une 
violation  de  dispositions  essentielles  de  I'acte  d'Al- 
gesiras, meme  si  elle  se  produisait  sous  la  pression 
de  circonstances  exterieures  de  force  majeure  et  con- 
tre  la  volonte  de  la  puissance  agissante,  rendrait  a 
toutes  les  autres  puissances  leur  liberte  d'action  et 
pourrait  ainsi  conduire  a  des  consequences  qu'il  n'est 
pas  possible  de  prevoir  pour  le  moment,  mais  nous  ne 
pouvons  que  repeter  qu'en  presence  de  I'attitude  cir- 
conspecte  observee  jusqu'a  present  par  le  gouverne- 
ment frangais  il  n'y  a  pas  de  raison  de  presager  un 
developpement  d'une  aussi  longue  portee  des  con- 
jonctures  actuelles." 

Cet  article  ofScieux  confirme  ce  que  j'ai  eu  I'hon- 


Berlin,  May  1,  1911. 
Sir:— 

Since  the  Moroccan  crisis  has  relapsed  into  an 
acute  stage,  the  semi-official  press  of  Germany  has 
confined  itself  to  reproducing  the  information  trans- 
mitted by  the  telegraph  agencies  and  has  refrained 
from  all  comment.  Yesterday  morning  the  silence 
was  broken  by  the  article  given  prominence  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  which  I  sub- 
join a  translation: 

"During  the  entire  last  week  it  became  more 
and  more  manifest  how  anxious  the  French  Gov- 
ernment is  to  take  measures  for  the  protection  of 
the  French  officers  in  Fez  and  its  environs.  Ac- 
cording to  the  news  which  has  reached  Berlin,  no 
danger  for  the  European  settlements  need  be  feared 
for  the  moment.  France  cannot  be  blamed  for 
thinking  of  all  means  which  seem  proper  to  her  for 
the  protection  of  the  lives  of  her  officers.  The 
choice  of  the  means  which  seem  appropriate  to  her 
must,  as  a  matter  of  course,  be  left  to  France,  since 
it  is  she  who  bears  the  responsibility  for  the  conse- 
quences of  the  means  which  she  employs.  Accord- 
ing to  its  conclusive  assurances  the  French  Govern- 
ment merely  intends  to  take  such  measures  as  are 
necessary  for  the  security  of  French  nationals; 
above  all,  it  is  not  planning  any  attack  on  the  in- 
tegrity of  Morocco  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sul- 
tan. An  occupation  of  Fez  is  not  intended  either. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  events  will  permit  the 
French  Government  to  follow  its  programme.  To 
deviate  from  it  would  be  a  contravention  of  the  act 
of  Algeciras,  of  which  the  independence  of  the  Sov- 
ereign of  Morocco  forms  an  essential  part.  A  vio- 
lation of  essential  stipulations  of  the  act  of  Alge- 
ciras, even  though  it  occur  under  pressure  of  com- 
pelling external  circumstances,  would  restore  their 
liberty  of  action  to  all  the  other  Powers  and  might 
thus  lead  to  consequences  which  cannot  be  foreseen 
at  the  present.  But  we  can  only  repeat  that  the 
circumspect  attitude  so  far  observed  by  the  French 
Government  offers  no  ground  for  prophesying  that 
the  present  circumstances  are  going  to  develop  in 
such  a  far-reaching  manner." 


This  semi-official  article  goes  to  confirm  what  I 


neur  de  vous  ecrire  par  mon  rapport  du  21  avril  der- 
nier. II  en  ressort  que  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
croit  fort  exagerees  dans  un  but  facile  a  deviner  les 
nouvelles  alarmantes  repandues  par  la  presse  de  Pa- 
ris au  sujet  des  informations  revues  directement  a 
Berlin.  Ce  scepticisme  se  comprend  d'autant  mieux 
qu'il  est  partage  par  les  journaux  anglais  assurement 
pas  suspects  de  malveillance  pour  la  France  et  de 
tendresse  pour  I'Allemagne. 

Neanmoins  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  allemand 
n'a  nul  desir  de  se  creer  des  embarras  exterieurs  en 
entravant  Taction  militaire  de  la  France  au  Maroc 
et  pour  se  dispenser  d'intervenir  il  feint  d'ajouter 
foi  aux  assurances  donnees  par  le  gouvernement 
frangais  relativement  au  caractere  transitoire  de  I'oc- 
cupation  de  territoires  marocains.  II  n'a  pourtant 
aucune  raison  de  croire  que  M.  Cruppi  soit  plus  sin- 
cere que  ne  Tetait  M.  Pichon  et  sa  confiance  doit 
etre  d'autant  moindre  que  M.  Delcasse  fait  partie  du 
ministere  frangais. 

La  fin  de  I'article  officieux  est  destinee  a  donner 
satisfaction  a  I'opinion  publique  allemande,  dont  Te- 
motion  est  reelle  et  qui  depuis  longtemps  reproche 
au  Gouvernement  Imperial  de  fermer  les  yeux  sur 
I'inobservance  methodique  des  engagement  pris  par 
Tacte  d'Algesiras  et  par  I'arrangement  du  9  fevrier 
1909.  Quelle  est  la  portee  de  I'avertissement  offi- 
cieux a  I'adresse  de  Paris?  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waech- 
ter,  beaucoup  plus  energique  que  ses  predecesseurs, 
veut-il  faire  comprendre  qu'il  ne  tolerera  pas  de  nou- 
veaux  empietements  frangais?  Ou  bien  se  propose- 
t-il  seulement  de  gagner  du  temps  tout  en  evitant 
de  heurter  le  sentiment  populaire? 

Je  penche  pour  la  derniere  hypothese.  Comme  le 
fait  tres  justement  remarquer  mon  collegue  a  Tan- 
ger  par  son  rapport  du  15  avril  dernier,  la  France 
s'est  deja  emparee  des  douanes,  des  travaux  publics, 
du  service  de  I'emprunt  marocain,  des  telegraphes ; 
elle  detient  a  Test  et  a  I'ouest  des  territoires  maro- 
cains importants.  Elle  a  force  le  Sultan  a  contracter 
envers  la  France  des  dettes  dont  il  est  incapable  de 
payer  les  interets.  Le  nombre  des  instructeurs  fran- 
gais est  tellement  disproportionne  a  I'effectif  de  la 
minuscule  armee  reguliere  marocaine  qu'ils  en  sont 
les  veritables  maitres.  La  politique  exterieure  du 
Maroc  est  dictee  de  Paris.  Que  reste-t-il  a  sauver? 
Pour  rendre  au  Sultan  la  position  d'un  souverain  in- 
dependant  il  faudrait  une  guerre.  C'est  demesure- 
ment  plus  que  le  Maroc  ne  vaut. 

L'ambassadeur  d'Espagne  a  Berlin  s'agite  beau- 
coup  et  multiplie  les  demarches  au  sujet  du  Maroc, 
mais  ne  dit  rien  a  ses  collegues  du  but  qu'il  se  pro- 
pose d'atteindre.  On  s'apergoit  sans  doute  a  Madrid 
qu'en  1904  I'Espagne  a  ete  dupee  par  la  France  et 
I'Angleterre  et  Ton  cherche  un  appui  a  Berlin.  II 
est  tres  improbable  qu'on  le  trouve.  L'Allemagne, 
qui  veut  eviter  d'agir  pour  ses  propres  interets,  n'a 
pas  de  raison  de  se  compromettre  pour  ceux  de  I'Es- 
pagne, dont  I'attitude  a  Algesiras  n'a  pas  ete  de  na- 
ture a  lui  inspirer  de  reconnaissance. 

Malgre  les  dispositions  manifestees  par  I'article  of- 
ficieux, la  situation  reste  delicate.  Une  maladresse 
quelconque  peut  obliger  I'Allemagne  a  sortir  de 
I'inaction.  Beaucoup  depend  aussi  de  la  presse.  Des 
journaux  frangais  montrent  beaucoup  trop  ouverte- 
ment  qu'il  s'agit  de  faire  du  Maroc  une  seconde  Tu- 
nisie.  L'attitude  des  journaux  allemands  est  en  ge- 
neral tres  reservee,  mais  ceux  qui  sont  inspires  par 
les  pangermanistes  emettent  des  pretentions  des  plus 
genantes  pour  la  politique  Imperiale. 

Agreez,  etc. 

fs.]  Greindl. 


had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  in  my  report  of  April 
21st.  It  intends  to  show^  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment considers  that  the  alarming  reports  spread 
by  the  press  of  Paris  on  the  situation  in  Morocco, 
which  do  not  agree  with  the  information  received 
directly  at  Berlin,  are  strongly  exaggerated  for  rea- 
sons easy  to  guess.  This  scepticism  is  all  the  more 
comprehensible  as  it  is  shared  by  the  English 
papers  which  surely  cannot  be  suspected  of  ill-will 
towards  France  and  love  of  Germany. 

Nevertheless  the  Imperial  Government  has  no 
desire  to  create  external  troubles  for  itself  by  in- 
terfering with  the  military  action  of  France  in  Mor- 
occo, and  to  avoid  such  intervention  it  feigns  to 
believe  in  the  assurances  given  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment as  to  the  transitory  character  of  the  occu- 
pation of  Moroccan  territory.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment has,  however,  no  reason  to  believe  that  M. 
Cruppi  is  more  sincere  than  M.  Pichon  was,  and  its 
confidence  must  be  all  the  less  because  M.  Delcasse 
has  a  seat  in  the  French  Cabinet. 

The  final  part  of  the  semi-official  article  is  in- 
tended to  give  satisfaction  to  German  public  opin- 
ion, which  is  honestly  excited  and  which  for  a  long 
time  has  been  reproaching  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment for  closing  its  eyes  to  the  consistent  disregard 
of  the  obligations  undertaken  in  the  act  of  Algeciras 
and  the  agreement  of  February  9,  1909.  What  is 
the  import  of  the  semi-official  hint  to  Paris?  Does 
Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter,  who  is  a  man  of  greater 
energy  than  his  predecessors,  wish  to  have  it  under- 
stood that  he  is  not  going  to  tolerate  any  more 
French  encroachments?  Or  does  he  simply  want 
to  gain  time  and  simultaneously  avoid  hurting  pub- 
lic sentiment? 

I  incline  towards  the  last  hypothesis.  As  my  col- 
league at  Tangiers  has  rightly  remarked  in  his  re- 
port of  April  15th,  France  has  already  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  administration  of  the  customs,  the  pub- 
lic works,  the  Moroccan  debt,  and  the  telegraph  ; 
she  has  occupied  important  parts  of  Moroccan  terri- 
tory in  the  East  and  in  the  West.  She  has  forced 
the  Sultan  to  incur  debts  in  France,  on  which  he  is 
incapable  of  paying  the  interest.  The  number  of 
French  instructors  is  so  out  of  proportion  to  the 
effective  strength  of  the  puny  regular  army  of  Mo- 
rocco that  they  are  in  fact  its  masters.  Morocco's 
foreign  policy  is  being  dictated  at  Paris.  What  is 
there  left  that  might  be  saved?  To  give  back  to 
the  Sultan  the  position  of  an  independent  Sover- 
eign, war  would  have  to  be  waged.  That  would  be 
infinitely  more  than  Morocco  is  worth. 

The  Spanish  Ambassador  at  Berlin  is  very  much 
agitated  and  is  multiplying  his  efforts  with  regard 
to  the  Moroccan  question,  but  is  telling  his  col- 
leagues nothing  of  the  aim  he  has  in  view.  With- 
out doubt  it  is  realized  at  Madrid  that  in  1904  Spain 
was  deceived  by  France  and  England,  and  support 
is  being  sought  at  Berlin.  It  is  very  unlikely  that 
it  will  be  given.  Germany,  who  does  not  wish  to 
move  in  her  own  interests,  has  no  reason  for  com- 
promising herself  in  those  of  Spain,  whose  attitude 
at  Algeciras  was  not  such  as  to  evoke  Germany's 
gratitude. 

In  spite  of  the  intentions  displayed  in  the  semi- 
official article  the  situation  remains  delicate.  Any 
false  move  may  compel  Germany  to  abandon  her 
attitude  of  inaction.  Much  depends  on  the  press. 
French  papers  are  showing  much  too  openly  that  it 
is  a  question  of  turning  Morocco  into  another  Tunis. 
The  attitude  of  the  German  papers  is  on  the  whole 
very  reserved,  but  those  inspired  by  the  Pan-Ger- 
manists  are  making  demands  which  are  highly  em- 
barrassing for  the  policy  of  the  Empire. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


85 


No.  69. 


No.  69. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  9  Mai  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Si  Ton  suit  a  Londres  avec  interet  les  developpe- 
ments  de  la  campagne  frangaise  au  Maroc,  c'est  que 
Topinion  n'est  pas  sans  redouter  ses  effets  possibles 
sur  la  politique  europeenne.  On  semble  apprehen- 
der  de  voir  la  France  poser  quelque  acte  imprudent 
qui  donnerait  prise  a  une  reclamation  de  la  part  de 
I'Allemagne. 

Bien  entendu,  on  est  loin  de  croire  que  le  Gouver- 
nement  Imperial  veuille  la  guerre;  on  est  persuade 
que  I'Empereur  ne  la  desire  pas,  mais  on  se  de- 
mande  si  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  ne  serait  pas  tente, 
dans  certaines  eventualites,  de  s'affirmer  par  quel- 
que reclamation,  et  de  donner  ainsi  une  preuve  ecla- 
tante  de  sa  puissance  qui  serait  humiliante  pour  le 
Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  et  desagreable  pour 
I'Angleterre  et  la  Russie.  Le  Gouvernement  Alle- 
mand,  en  affichant  sa  preponderance  dans  les  con- 
seils  de  I'Europe,  justifierait  ainsi  vis-a-vis  des  par- 
tis de  I'opposition  parlementaire  allemande,  I'utilite 
du  maintien  de  ses  enormes  forces  militaires  et  na- 
vales,  dont  le  cout  est  constamment  reproche  au 
Reichstag. 

Une  occupation  de  Fez,  qui  revetirait  par  exemple 
un  aspect  trop  definitif,  ou  un  manquement  a  I'esprit, 
si  pas  a  la  lettre  des  engagements  pris  a  Algesiras, 
pourrait  fournir  a  Berlin  une  occasion  d'intervenir. 

L'ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres  a  cOnstam- 
ment  de  longs  entretiens  au  Foreign  Office  oil  il  s'ef- 
forcerait  plus  particulierement  d'insister  sur  les 
droits  preponderants  de  la  France  au  Maroc,  a  cote 
desquels  ceux  de  I'Espagne  seraient  insignifiants. 

Certains  organes  chauvins  de  la  presse  london- 
nienne  declarent  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  devrait 
soutenir  energiquement  le  Cabinet  franqais  si  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  faisait  mine  d'exercer  une 
pression.  Cette  attitude  ne  semble  pas  devoir  etre 
celle  qu'adopterait  un  Gouvernement  aussi  pacifique 
que  celui  de  M.  Asquith. 

Interpelle  tout  recemment  a  la  Chambre  sur  Tac- 
tion frangaise  au  Martoc,  Sir  Edward  Grey  s'est 
borne  a  dire  que  la  decision  du  Gouvernement  de  la 
Republique  quant  a  I'envoi  de  troupes  a  Fez  avait 
ete  notifiee  au  Gouvernement  anglais  par  une  simple 
notification  verbale,  que  la  mehalla  avait  ete  envoyee 
a  Fez  a  la  demande  expresse  du  Sultan,  et  que,  pour 
ce  qui  en  etait  du  droit  d'intervention  de  la  France, 
il  renvoyait  les  orateurs  a  I'acte  d'Algesiras  et  a  I'ar- 
rangement  franco-anglais  de  1904. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 


[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  May  9,  1911. 
Sir:— 

In  London  the  developments  of  the  French  cam- 
paign in  Morocco  are  being  followed  with  interest 
because  public  opinion  is  not  without  apprehension 
as  to  its  possible  effect  on  the  European  policy.  It 
seems  to  be  feared  that  France  might  commit  some 
imprudent  act  which  might  furnish  Germany  with  a 
reason  for  protest. 

Be  it  understood  that  anyone  is  far  from  believ- 
ing that  the  Imperial  Government  wants  war ; 
everyone  is  convinced  that  the  Emperor  does  not 
desire  it.  But  it  is  questioned  whether  the  Cabinet 
of  Berlin  might  not  feel  tempted  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances to  assert  itself  by  some  protest  and  thus 
to  give  a  striking  proof  of  its  power,  a  proof  which 
would  be  humiliating  for  the  French  Government 
and  disagreeable  for  England  and  Russia.  By  thus 
vaunting  its  preponderance  in  the  counsels  of  Eu- 
rope the  German  Government  would  demonstrate 
to  the  German  parliamentary  parties  of  the  oppo- 
sition the  justifiability  of  maintaining  the  enormous 
military  and  naval  forces,'  for  the  cost  of  which  it 
is  constantly  being  reproached  in  the  Reichstag. 

An  occupation  of  Fez,  for  instance,  which  would 
have  an  appearance  of  being  too  definite,  or  a  viola- 
tion of  the  spirit  if  not  of  the  letter  of  the  obliga- 
tions undertaken  at  Algeciras,  might  give  Berlin 
occasion  to  intervene. 

The  French  Ambassador  at  London  is  constantly 
having  long  conversations  at  the  Foreign  Office 
where  he  is  said  to  be  exerting  himself  in  pointing 
out  the  preponderant  rights  of  France  in  Morocco, 
by  the  side  of  which  those  of  Spain  were  insignifi- 
cant. 

Certain  chauvinist  organs  of  the  London  press 
declare  that  Great  Britain  ought  to  give  strong 
support  to  the  French  Cabinet  in  case  the  Imperial 
Government  should  appear  to  be  willing  to  exer- 
cise pressure.  It  does  not  seem  likely  that  a  pa- 
cific government  like  that  of  Mr.  Asquith  would 
adopt  such  an  attitude. 

When  questioned  recently  in  the  House  about 
the  French  action  in  Morocco,  Sir  Edward  Grey  con- 
fined himself  to  saying  that  the  British  Government 
had  been  notified  by  a  simple  verbal  communica- 
tion of  the  decision  of  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public in  regard  to  the  despatching  of  troops  to 
Fez,  that  the  Mehalla  had  been  sent  to  Fez  at  the 
express  request  of  the  Sultan  and  that  in  respect 
to  France's  right  of  intervention  he  referred  the 
speakers  to  the  act  of  Algeciras  and  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement  of  1904. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  70. 


No.  70. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  10  Mai  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Vous  aurez  lu  dans  certains  journaux  la  nouvelle 
mise  en  circulation  par  une  agence  d'informations  de 
creation  recente  d'apres  laquelle  le  gouvernement 
Imperial  allemand  aurait  decide  d'envoyer  trois 
croiseurs  dans  les  eaux  marocaines.  Vous  aurez  vu 
aussi  le  dementi  hautement  officieux  de  la  "Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung"  disant  qu'il  s'agit 
d'une  "malhonnetete  dangereuse,  tout  homme  capa- 
ble de  concevoir  quelque  peu  une  idee  politique  doit 
se  dire  a  lui-meme  quelle  responsabilite  il  prend  en 
langant  des  nouvelles  a  sensation  de  pure  invention 
dans  une  question  aussi  grave  que  celle  du  Maroc." 

II  y  a  un  contraste  frappant  entre  le  ton  de  ce 
communique  et  de  celui  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous 
transmettre  par  mon  rapport  du  1  Mai  ou  il  etait  dit 
in  fine  que  la  circonspection  dont  faisait  preuve  le 
gouvernement  frangais,  permettait  de  croire  que  la 
question  marocaine  ne  prendrait  pas  un  developpe- 
ment  obligeant  TAllemagne  a  considerer  le  traite 
d'Algesiras  comme  n'existant  plus  et  a  reprendre  sa 
liberte  d'action. 

La  situation  ne  s'est  en  effet  pas  amelioree  depuis 
dix  jours,  tout  au  contraire.  II  y  a  contradiction  en- 
tre les  renseignements  de  source  frangaise  depei- 
gnant  le  peril  comme  n'ayant  pas  diminue  et  ceux  de 
source  allemande  qui  en  nient  I'existence.  Quoique 
la  ville  de  Fez  ne  soit  plus  cernee  et  que  les  officiers 
frangais  en  puissent  sortir  quand  il  leur  plaira,  les 
preparatifs  militaires  continuent ;  ne  pouvant  plus 
les  motiver  par  I'obligation  morale  de  sauver  la  vie 
de  compatriotes,  on  s'est  mis  a  les  expliquer  par  la 
necessite  de  raffermir  I'autorite  du  Sultan.  Une  par- 
tie  des  journaux  franqais  pousse  a  I'occupation  de 
la  capitale  marocaine.  On  dirait  que  le  gouverne- 
ment frangais  n'ose  pas  s'affranchir  de  leur  tutelle 
et  esquive  toute  declaration  publique  et  precise  sur 
ses  intentions  definitives. 


Le  gouvernement  allemand  ne  parait  pas  nean- 
moins  enclin  a  changer  de  tactique.  II  attend  les 
evenements  pour  sortir  de  son  attitude  expectative. 

Je  sais  de  source  indirecte,  mais  tres  sure  que  I'am- 
bassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  est  inquiet  de  cette 
reserve.  II  s'irrite  de  ce  qu'on  n'ajoute  pas  ici  une 
foi  absolue  aux  declarations  de  loyaute  et  de  desin- 
teressement  qu'il  est  charge  de  donner  au  nom  du 
gouvernement  frangais.  II  se  plaint  de  ce  que  ses 
nombreuses  demarches  a  Wilhelmstrasse  n'aboutis- 
sent  a  aucun  resultat  positif. 

S'attendait-il  a  obtenir  une  sorte  de  blanc  seing 
pour  Taction  frangaise  au  maroc?  Si  a  Paris  on  a 
congu  de  pareilles  esperances,  il  faut  qu'on  ait  com- 
pletement  perdu  de  vue  les  origines  de  la  question. 
Elle  a  debute  par  les  arrangements  conclus  en  1904 
entre  I'Angleterre,  la  France  et  I'Espagne,  sans 
qu'on  ait  pris  la  peine  de  consulter  ni  meme  d'avertir 
les  autres  puissances  interessees.  Jusqu'  au  moment 
oil  I'AUemagne  a  produit  ses  objections,  on  disait 
ouvertement  que  le  Maroc  deviendrait  une  seconde 
Tunisie.  A  cote  de  I'arrangement  public  la  France 
signait  avec  I'Espagne  un  traite  secret  (secret  bien 
mal  garde)  pour  le  partage  de  I'Empire  cherifien. 


Sir: 


Berlin,  May  10,  1911. 


You  will  have  read  in  certain  papers  the  report 
put  in  circulation  by  a  newly  established  news 
agency,  according  to  which  the  Imperial  German 
Government  had  decided  to  send  three  cruisers  to 
Moroccan  waters.  You  will  also  have  noticed  the 
official  denial  of  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zei- 
tung saying  that  the  circulation  of  the  report  was 
an  act  of'dangerous  knavery;  any  person  with  the 
slightest  bit  of  political  insight  would  be  able  to 
tell  what  responsibility  he  was  assuming  in  send- 
ing out  purely  invented  sensational  news  in  so  grave 
a  question  as  that  of  Morocco.  * 

There  is  a  striking  contrast  between  the  tone  of 
this  communique  and  the  one  which  I  had  the  honor 
of  sending  you  in  my  report  of  May  1st  and  in 
which  it  was  said  at  the  end  that  the  circumspec- 
tion which  the  French  Government  was  evidencing 
permitted  a  belief  that  the  Moroccan  question 
would  not  develop  in  a  direction  which  would  com- 
pel Germany  to  consider  the  treaty  of  Algeciras  as 
no  longer  in  existence  and  to  resume  her  hberty  of 
action. 

The  situation  has,  in  fact,  not  improved  during  the. 
past  ten  days,  on  the  contrary.  There  is  a  discrep- 
ancy between  the  information  coming  from  French 
sources  which  represent  the  danger  as  not  having 
diminished,  and  that  from  German  sources  which 
deny  its  existence.  Although  the  city  of  Fez  is  not 
invested  and  the  French  officers  can  leave  the  place 
at  their  pleasure,  military  preparations  are  still  go- 
ing on.  As  they  can  no  longer  be  based  on  the 
moral  obligation  to  save  the  lives  of  compatriots 
the  effort  is  now  being  made  to  explain  them  by  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  the  authority  of  the  Sul- 
tan. Apart  of  the  French  papers  are  urging  the 
occupation  of  the  Moroccan  capital.  It  seems  as 
if  the  French  Government  does  not  dare  to  free 
itself  from  their  tutelage,  and  as  if  it  evades  all  pub- 
lic and  precise  declaration  concerning  its  ultimate 
intentions. 

Notwithstanding  this  the  German  Government 
does  not  seem  to  be  inclined  to  change  its  tactics. 
It  is  watching  events  before  emerging  from  its  at- 
titude of  waiting. 

I  know  from  an  indirect  but  very  reliable  source 
that  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  is  feeling 
concern  about  this  reserve.  He  feels  annoyed  be- 
cause no  absolute  faith  is  being  placed  in  the  declar- 
ation of  loyalty  and  disinterestedness  which  he  is 
ordered  by  his  government  to  make.  He  complains 
that  his  numerous  steps  taken  at  Wilhelmstrasse 
lead  to  no  positive  result. 

Does  he  expect  to  obtain  a  sort  of  blank  signa- 
ture for  the  French  action  in  Morocco  ?  If  those  are 
the  hopes  entertained  at  Paris  it  would  seem  that 
the  origin  of  the  question  has  been  completely  lost 
sight  of.  It  began  with  the  agreement  concluded  in 
1904  between  England,  France,  and  Spain  when  no 
trouble  was  taken  to  consult  or  even  to  inform  the 
other  interested  Powers.  Until  the  moment  when 
Germany  raised  her  objections  it  was  openly  said 
that  Morocco  was  to  become  another  Tunis.  Be- 
sides the  public  agreement,  France  signed  with 
Spain  a  secret  treaty  (the  secrecy  of  which  was 
badly  kept)  concerning  the  partition  of  the  Empire 


—    87 

L'acte  d'Algesiras  n'a  rien  change  aux  projets  fran- 
Qais.  II  a  seulement  oblige  a  realiser  lentement  et 
pas  a  pas,  ce  que  Ton  comptait  accomplir  d'un  seul 
coup  comme  le  traite  du  Bardo  a  ete  extorque  du 
Bey  de  Tunis.  Depuis  I'oeuvre  de  I'envahissement 
progressif  du  Maroc  n'a  pas  cesse  d'etre  methodique- 
ment  poursuivie.  Peu  a  peu  les  Franqais  s'y  sont 
empares  de  tout  et  ont  profite  des  occasions  qui  se 
sont  presentees  d'elles-memes,  quand  ils  ne  les  ont 
pas  fait  naitre  pour  proceder  a  des  occupations  de 
territoires. 

Les  expeditions  en  preparation  peuvent-elles  etre 
considerees  comme  autre  chose  qu'un  nouvel  acte 
de  la  meme  comedie?  Le  Sultan  Moulay  Hafith  a 
perdu  son  autorite  deja  bien  precaire  auparavant  sur 
ses  sujets,  parce  qu'il  a  du  se  resigner  a  n'etre  plus 
qu'un  instrument  entre  les  mains  de  la  France.  Une 
aide  materielle  de  la  part  des  troupes  fran^aises  ne 
peut  qu'achever  de  le  discrediter  et  rendre  de  plus 
en  plus  necessaire  pour  lui  conserver  son  trone,  une 
prolongation  indefinie  de  I'occupation  pretendue  tem- 
poraire. 

Je  teste  persuade  que  I'Allemagne  desire  eviter 
robligation  de  s'engager  a  fond  dans  I'affaire  maro- 
caine,  mais  je  dois  repeter  ce  que  j'ai  ecrit  dans  men 
rapport  du  1  Mai,  c'est-a-dire  que  la  question  est 
neanmoins  tres  delicate.  EUe  le  devient  meme  de 
plus  en  plus.  II  faut  pour  que  le  gouvemement  Im- 
perial puisse  justiiier  son  inaction  devant  I'opinion 
publique  allemande  qu'on  manoeuvre  en  France  avec 
assez  d'habilete  et  de  feinte  moderation  pour  ne  pas 
le  forcer  a  en  sortir.  Dans  ces  derniers  temps  ni  le 
gouvemement  frangais  ni  une  grande  partie  de  la 
presse  frangaise  n'en  ont  guere  fait  preuve. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


of  the  Sherif.  The  act  of  Algeciras  brought  no 
change  to  the  French  plans.  It  simply  involved  the 
obligation  for  France  to  realize  slowly  and  step  by 
step  what  she  had  been  hoping  to  accomplish  at  one 
stroke,  as  in  the  case  of  the  treaty  of  Bardo  which 
was  extorted  from  the  Bey  of  Tunis.  Since  then  the 
work  of  progressive  invasion  has  never  ceased  to 
be  methodically  pursued.  Little  by  little  the  French 
possessed  themselves  of  everything,  and  if  they 
did  not  create  occasions  for  territorial  occupation, 
they  at  least  made  use  of  each  one  that  presented 
itself. 

Can  the  expeditions  which  are  in  preparation  be 
considered  in  any  other  light  than  that  of  another 
act  of  the  same  comedy?  Sultan  Mulai  Hafid  has 
lost  his  authority  over  his  subjects,  which  even  be- 
fore was  very  precarious,  since  he  had  to  content 
himself  with  being  no  more  than  a  tool  in  the  hands 
of  France.  Material  aid  from  the  French  troops  can 
only  serve  to  discredit  him  completely  and  will,  if 
his  throne  is  to  be  saved  for  him,  render  more  and 
more  necessary  an  indefinite  prolongation  of  the 
occupation  which  was  pretended  to  be  a  temporary 
one. 

I  continue  to  be  convinced  that  Germany  desires 
to  avoid  the  necessity  of  entering  deeply  into  the 
Moroccan  question,  but  I  must  repeat  what  I  wrote 
in  my  report  of  May  1st:  that  the  question  is  never- 
theless a  very  delicate  one.  It  is  even  becoming  so 
more  and  more.  If  the  Imperial  Government  is  to 
be  able  to  justify  its  inaction  before  German  public 
opinion  the  French  will  have  to  manoeuvre  very 
adroitly  and  with  feigned  moderation  in  order  not 
to  force  it  to  abandon  it;  but  lately  neither  the 
French  Government  nor  a  great  part  of  the  French 
press  have  done  so. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  71. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  22  Mai  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Me  referant  a  mon  rapport  du  17  de.  ce  mois,  j'ai 
I'honneur  de  Vous  informer  que  le  couple  Imperial  a 
quitte  Londres,  le  20  Mai,  emportant,  a  ce  que  j'ap- 
prends  par  M.  de  Treutler,  du  Ministere  allemand 
des  aflfaires  etrangeres,  le  meilleur  souvenir  de  Leur 
visite,  qui  a  fait  une  bonne  impression.  J'ai  constate 
par  moi-meme  que  I'accueil  plutot  sympathique  qui 
a  ete,  des  le  debut,  fait  par  le  public  aux  Majestes 
Allemandes,  s'est  accentue  de  jour  en  jour,  pendant 
leur  sejour.  L'Empereur  et  I'Imperatrice  se  sont 
prodigues;  la  population,  prevenue  de  tous  leurs 
mouvements,  etait  echelonnee  sur  leur  passage  et 
passait  des  heures  a  attendre  leur  retour  de  diverses 
excursions,  pour  les  acclamer  a  la  rentree  au  Palais. 
On  ne  pouvait  se  promener  dans  la  capitale  sans  ren- 
contrer  a  toute  heure  les  equipages  de  la  Cour  avec 
les  touristes  Royaux,  parfois  seuls,  souvent  accom- 
pagnes  du  Roi  Georges,  de  la  Reine  et  des  Enfants 
d'Angleterre.  Le  couple  Imperial  a  deploye  une 
grande  activite,  s'est  interesse  a  toutes  les  attrac- 
tions de  la  ville,  a  paru  au  theatre,  a  I'hopital  alle- 
mand et  pour  finir  au  grand  bal  de  la  Cour.  La  pre- 
sence de  la  jeune  Princesse  Victoria  Louise,  qui  ac- 


count de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


London,  May  22,  1911. 
Sir:— 

With  reference  to  my  report  of  the  17th  inst.,  I 
have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Imperial  cou- 
ple left  London  on  May  20th,  carrying  away  with 
them,  as  I  learn  from  Mr.  von  Treutler  of  the  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  best  memories  of  their 
visit,  which  has  made  a  good  impression.  I  myself 
have  witnessed  how  the  fairly  sympathetic  recep- 
tion which  the  public  gave  to  the  German  Majesties 
from  the  beginning  became  daily  warmer  during 
their  stay.  The  Emperor  and  the  Empress  have  ap- 
peared much  in  public ;  the  population,  informed  of 
all  their  movements,  lined  the  streets  and  spent 
hours  waiting  for  their  return  from  their  various 
excursions  to  cheer  them  when  they  entered  the  Palace. 
One  could  not  walk  in  the  town  without  meeting 
at  all  hours  the  court  carriages  with  the  Royal 
guests,  sometimes  alone,  often  in  company  of  King 
George,  the  Queen,  and  their  children.  The  Im- 
perial couple  were  very  active,  they  showed  inter- 
est in  all  the  attractions  of  the  town,  went  to  the 
theatre,  the  German  hospital,  and  lastly  to  the 
grand  court  ball.  The  presence  of  the  young  Prin- 
cess  \^ictoria  Louise,  who  accompaned  her  August 


compagnait  partout  Ses  Augustes  Parents,  accen- 
tuait  le  caractere  familial  de  la  visite  et  contribuait 
a  accroitre  les  sympathies  populaires.  Pour  qui  a 
assiste,  comme  moi,  a  la  derniere  visite  (officielle 
celle-la)  de  I'Empereur,  en  Novembre  1907,  la  dif- 
ference dans  I'accueil  qui  a  ete  reserve  a  S.  M.  Im- 
periale  dans  les  deux  occasions  a  ete  marquee.  Une 
froide  mefiance  caracterisait  I'attitude  nationale  il  y 
a  4  ans.  Cette  fois  une  atmosphere  plus  cordiale 
etait  visible ;  I'absence  de  tout  apparat  militaire  la 
favorisait.  Pas  de  troupes,  pas  d'escorte,  vu  le  carac- 
tere prive,  qu'on  a  scrupuleusement  observe  dans  la 
reception  et  qui  a  ete  accentue  par  le  refus,  redige  en 
termes  d'ailleurs  tres  gracieux,  oppose  par  I'Empereur 
a  la  demarche  du  Doyen,  M.  Cambon,  qui  avait  de- 
mande  a  etre  admis  a  presenter  avec  ses  collegues 
les  hommages  du  Corps  Diplomatique  a  Sa  Majeste. 
La  mort  du  Roi  Edouard  semble  avoir  amene  une 
legere  detente  dans  les  relations  anglo-allemandes. 
On  dirait  qu'a  I'epoque  des  "ententes"  dont  le  de- 
funt  Souverain  etait  si  friand,  la  nation  meme  avait 
conscience  de  la  tentative  d'encerclement  a  I'egard 
de  I'Allemagne  que  favorisait  si  ouvertement  le  Cabi- 
net de  Londres  et  qui  ne  pouvait  manquer  de  frois- 
ser  celui  de  Berlin.  On  en  craignait  un  peu  les  conse- 
quences possibles  ,et,  de  la  crainte  a  la  haine,  il  n'y 
a  qu'un  pas,  que  la  presse  antigermanique  n'a  pas 
manque  de  faire  franchir.  La  panique,  dont  on  s'est 
tant  moque  en  Allemagne,  etait  humiliante  et  on  en 
souffrait  ici.  Malgre  les  Cassandres  des  milieux 
navals  et  militaires,  il  semble  que  Ton  se  soit  un  peu 
ressaisi  et,  au  moment  tres  opportun  ou  le  public 
commengait  enfin  a  faire  la  part  de  I'exageration, 
Guillaume  II  a  paru,  delaissant  I'armure  etincelante 
pour  la  redingote  bourgeoise  et  promenant  a  travers 
Londres  I'lmperatrice  et  la  Princesse  avec  les  en- 
fants  Royaux  d'Angleterre.  L'efifet,  pour  momentanc 
qu'il  puisse  etre,  a  ete  bon.  Le  petit-fils  de  la  Reine 
Victoria  n'a  pas  a  regretter  la  demarche  qu'il  a  faite 
dans  des  circonstances  propices. 

Dans  la  presse  on  annonce  que  I'Empereur  a  invite 
le  jeune  Prince  de  Galles  a  aller  Le  voir  a  Potsdam. 
On  a  meme  insinue  que  ce  voyage  pouvait  avoir  trait 
a  des  projets  matrimoniaux  entre  le  Prince  et  la 
Princesse  Victoria-Louise,  mais  celle-ci  a  deux  ans 
de  plus  que  I'heritier  du  trone  britannique.  On  a 
egalement  parle,  comme  fiance  possible  pour  la  Prin- 
cesse allemande,  du  Prince  Arthur,  fils  unique  du 
Due  de  Connaught. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


Parents  everywhere,  accentuated  the  family  char- 
acter of  the  visit  and  contributed  to  heighten  public 
sympathy.  For  a  person  w^ho  attended,  as  I  did,  the 
last  visit  (which  was  official)  of  the  Emperor  in 
November,  1907,  the  difference  in  the  reception 
given  to  His  Imperial  Majesty  on  the  two  occasions 
was  marked.  Cold  mistrust  characterized  the  pop- 
ular attitude  four  years  ago.  This  time  a  more 
cordial  atmosphere  was  to  be  observed ;  the  absence 
of  all  military  pomp  worked  in  its  favor.  There 
were  no  troops,  no  escorts  on  account  of  the  private 
character  which  was  scrupulously  observed  at  the 
reception  and  which  was  emphasized  by  the  refusal 
of  His  Majesty,  expressed  in  very  gracious  terms, 
to  request  M.  Cambon,  the  Doyen,  to  be  permitted 
together  with  his  colleagues  to  present  the  respects 
of  the  Diplomatic  Corps. 

The  death  of  King  Edward  seems  to  have  caused 
a  slight  slackening  in  the  tension  of  Anglo- 
German  relations.  It  seems  that  at  the  time  of 
the  "ententes"  to  which  His  Late  Majesty  was  so 
partial  the  nation  itself  was  conscious  of  the  at- 
tempted encircling  of  Germany  which  was  so  openly 
favored  by  the  Cabinet  of  London  and  which  could 
not  but  arouse  the  displeasure  of  that  of  Berlin. 
People  were  a  little  afraid  of  possible  consequences 
and  from  fear  to  hatred  there  is  but  one  step  which 
the  anti-German  press  did  not  fail  to  cause  to  be 
taken.  The  panic  which  amused  people  in  Ger- 
many was  humiliating  and  England  suffered  under 
it.  In  spite  of  the  Cassandras  in  naval  and  military 
circles  it  seems  that  a  slight  recovery  has  set  in  and 
at  the  very  opportune  moment  when  the  public  be- 
gan to  think  soberly,  William  II  appeared,  changing 
the  shining  armor  for  the  bourgeois  frock-coat,  and 
taking  the  Empress  and  the  Princess  together  with 
the  Royal  English  children  out  in  London.  The 
effect,  momentary  as  it  may  be,  was  good.  The 
grandson  of  Queen  Victoria  has  no  cause  to  re- 
great  the  step  he  took  under  propitious  circum- 
stances. 

In  the  press  it  is  announced  that  the  Emperor 
has  invited  the  young  Prince  of  Wales  to  visit  him 
in  Potsdam.  It  has  even  been  intimated  that  this 
journey  might  have  reference  to  matrimonial  pro- 
jects between  the  Prince  and  Princess  Victoria 
Louise,  but  the  latter  is  two  years  older  than  the 
heir  to  the  British  throne.  There  has  also  been 
talk  of  Prince  Arthur,  the  only  son  of  the  Duke 
of  Connaught,  as  a  possible  fiance  for  the  Ger- 
man Princess. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  72. 


"Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a      Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  17  Juin  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Autant  qu'on  en  peut  juger  il  n'y  a  eu  depuis  que 
j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  mon  rapport  du 
24  Mai  dernier,  aucun  changement  dans  i'attitude  ex- 
pectante  observee  par  I'Allemagne  dans  I'affaire  du 
Maroc.  On  s'est  empresse  de  dementir  le  bruit 
d'apres  lequel  I'Espagne  serait  appuyee  par  le  Gou- 
vernement  allemand  dans  son  action  militaire.  C'etait 
a  peine  necessaire.    L'Allemagne  n'a  eu  a  se  louer  du 


Berlin,  June  17,  1911. 
Sir:— 

Since  I  had  the  honor  to  send  you  my  report  of 
May  24th  there  has,  as  far  as  one  can  judge,  been 
no  change  in  the  attitude  of  expectation  observed 
by  Germany  in  the  Moroccan  affair.  The  rumor 
that  Spain  was  to  receive  the  support  of  the  Ger- 
man Government  in  its  military  action  was  promptly 
denied.  That  was  scarcely  necessary.  Germany 
had  no  reason  to  be  pleased  with  Spain,  either  when 


89 


Gouvernement  espagnol  ni  lors  de  la  conclusion  des 
traites  secrets  ni  dans  les  negociations  d'Algesiras.  II 
etait  fort  invraisembable  qu'elle  entrat  en  action 
pour  defendre  les  interets  des  Espagnols  alors  qu'elle 
p'a  pas  juge  a  propos  de  le  faire  lorsqu'il  s'agissait 
des  siens.  Si  Ton  s'est  fait  quelque  illusion  sur  ce 
point  a  Madrid  elle  n'aura  pas  tarde  a  etre  dissipee. 
On  s'est  borne  ici  a  prendre  acte  de  la  communica- 
tion faite  par  I'ambassadeur  d'Espagne,  au  sujet  de 
I'occupation  de  Larasch  et  d'Elkazar,  en  I'expliquant, 
a  I'exemple  de  la  France,  par  la  necessite  de  main- 
tenir  I'ordre  dans  le  pays  et  en  assurant,  toujours 
d'apres  le  procede  frangais,  que  I'occupation  ne  serait 
que  temporaire. 

D'un  autre  c6t6  d'apres  ce  que  me  disait  hier  M. 
Zimmermann,  M.  Cambon  s'evertue  presque  tous 
les  jours  a  lui  demontrer  qu'entre  Taction  de  I'Es- 
pagne  et  celle  de  la  France  au  Maroc,  11  y  a  une  dif- 
ference essentielle.  L'une  serait  une  violation  fla- 
grante de  I'acte  d'Algesiras,  tandis  que  I'autre  n'en 
serait  que  I'execution.  "J'ecoute  ces  explications 
d'un  air  serieux"  m'a  dit  le  sous-secretaire  d'etat  et 
pour  souligner  I'ironie  il  s'est  empresse  d'ajouter 
"qu'il  est  amusant  d'ecouter  les  plaidoiries  dans  ce 
proces  en  contrefa^on." 

J'ai  demande  a  M.  iZimmermann,  s'il  n'etait  pas  a 
craindre  que  le  diflferend  entre  la  France  et  I'Espagnc 
ne  provoque  des  complications  europeennes.  II  m'a 
repondu  qu'il  ne  le  pense  pas.  11  n'est  certainement 
pas  a  nier  que  les  affaires  du  Maroc  comme  celles  de 
I'Albanie  ne  soient  des  questions  graves;  mais  elles 
s'aplaniront.  Deja  le  Gouvernement  turc  cedant  aux 
conseils  de  moderation  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  pris 
le  parti  de  declarer  I'insurrection  albanaise  terminee. 
En  tout  cas,  dit  le  sous-secretaire  d'El;at,  I'Alle- 
magne  ne  fera  plus  d'acte  d'Algesiras.  La  preuve 
qu'il  n'y  a  pas  a  redouter  de  trop  rudes  alarmes  est 
que  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter  dont  le  conge  devait 
expirer  ces  jours-ci  prolongera  son  sejour  a  Kis- 
singen. 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  reste  done  au  meme 
point  de  vue  qu'au  debut.  II  joue  le  role  de  simple 
spectateur  reservant  sa  liberte  d'action  pour  le  cas 
ou  par  suite  de  I'intervention  frangaise  les  clauses 
essentielles  de  I'acte  d'Algesiras  c'est-a-dire  la  sou- 
verainete  du  Sultan  et  I'integrite  du  Maroc  cesserai- 
ent  d'exister. 

II  n'en  reste  deja  plus  rien.  A  quel  moment  I'Alle- 
magne  jugera-t-elle  a  propos  de  le  declarer  et  quel 
usage  fera-t-elle  de  sa  liberte  recouvree? 

Je  reste  persuade  que  son  principal  souci  est  d'evi- 
ter  une  guerre  que  le  Maroc  ne  vaut  pas  et  qu'il 
depend  de  la  France  d'epargner  a  I'Europe  en  met- 
tant  dans  la  conquete  du  Maroc  la  dose  d'hypocrisie 
necessaire  pour  ne  pas  ameuter  I'opinion  publique 
allemande. 

Tout  le  monde  n'est  pas  de  mon  avis,  quelques  uns 
de  mes  collegues  s'etonnent  de  la  longanimite  de 
rAllemagne.  L'un  d'eux  me  rapporte  que  d'apres 
un  bruit  repandu  dans  des  milieux  bien  informes  a 
Paris,  il  y  a  des  pourparlers  engages  avec  Berlin  en 
vue  de  compensations  a  accorder  a  I'Allemagne  du 
cote  du  Kameroun  ou  du  Dahomey.  Mon  collegue 
ajoute  d'ailleurs  que  cette  rumeur  est  dementie  ici. 
Elle  me  parait  tres  peu  probable.  M.  Zimmermann 
ne  m'aurait  pas  parle  comme  il  I'a  fait  hier,  si  des 
negociations  etaient  engagees  avec  le  Gouvernement 
Frangais ;  mais  ce  qui  n'existe  pas  aujourd'hui,  n'est 
pas  exclu  pour  I'avenir. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


the  secret  treaties  were  concluded,  or  at  the  nego- 
tiations of  Algeciras.  It  was  highly  improbable 
that  Germany  would  take  action  in  order  to  de- 
fend Spain's  interests  after  the  latter  had  not  seen 
fit  to  do  so  when  her  own  interests  were  in  ques- 
tion. If  there  have  been  any  illusions  on  this  point 
in  Madrid  they  will  have  been  speedily  dispelled. 
Here  the  only  action  was  simply  to  take  note  of  the 
communication  made  by  the  Ambassador  of  Spain 
on  the  subject  of  the  occupation  of  Larache  and  El- 
kazar,  which  he  explained  after  the  example  of 
France  by  the  necessity  of  maintaining  order  in  the 
country,  giving  at  the  same  time  assurances,  like- 
wise after  the  French  model,  that  the  occupation 
would  only  be  temporary. 

Mr.  Zimmerman  told  me  yesterday  that  M.  Cam- 
bon, on  the  other  hand,  is  making  almost  daily  ef- 
forts to  demonstrate  to  him  that  there  is  a  vital 
difference  between  the  action  of  Spain  in  Mo- 
rocco and  that  of  France.  The  one  is  said  to  be  a 
flagrant  violation  of  the  act  of  Algeciras  while  the 
other  is  nothing  but  its  execution.  "I  listen  to 
these  explanations  with  a  serious  face,"  said  the 
Under-Secretary  of  State,  adding  in  order  to  under- 
line the  irony  that  "it  is  amusing  to  listen  to  the 
speeches  for  the  defense  in  this  trial  for  forgery." 

I  asked  Mr.  Zimmerman  whether  it  was  not  to 
be  feared  that  the  differences  between  France  and 
Spain  might  lead  to  European  complications.  He 
replied  that  he  did  not  think  so.  It  could  certainly 
not  be  denied  that  the  affairs  of  Morocco,  as  those 
of  Albania,  were  grave  questions  but  they  would  be 
smoothed  out.  Already  the  Turkish  Government 
in  obedience  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  counsels  of 
moderation  had  decided  to  declare  the  Albanian  in- 
surrection at  an  end.  In  any  case,  said  the  Under- 
Secretary  of  State,  Germany  is  not  going  to  make 
any  more  acts  of  Algeciras.  A  proof  that  too  rude 
an  awakening  need  not  be  feared  may  be  seen  in  the 
fact  that  Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter  whose  leave 
was  to  expire  these  days  is  going  to  extend  his  stay 
at  Kissingen. 

The  Imperial  Government  is  thus  adhering  to 
its  former  point  of  view.  It  plays  the  part  of  a 
simple  spectator,  reserving  its  liberty  of  action  for 
the  case  that  in  consequence  of  the  French  inter- 
vention the  essential  clauses  of  the  act  of  Algeciras, 
that  is  to  say  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  and  the 
integrity  of  Morocco,  should  cease  to  exist. 

Already  there  is  nothing  left  of  them.  At  what 
moment  will  Germany  think  it  timely  to  pronounce 
this,  and  what  use  will  she  make  of  her  regained 
liberty  of  action? 

I  continue  in  my  conviction  that  her  principal 
anxiety  is  to  avoid  a  war,  which  Morocco  is  not 
worth  and  from  which  only  France  can  save  Europe 
by  adding  to  the  conquest  of  Morocco  the  dose  of 
hypocrisy  which  is  necessary  in  order  not  to  arouse 
German  public  opinion. 

Not  everybody  is  of  my  opinion,  some  of  my 
colleagues  are  astonished  at  the  forbearance  of  Ger- 
many. One  of  them  informs  me  that  there  is  a 
rumor  in  well-informed  circles  in  Paris  that  pour- 
parlers are  going  on  with  'Berlin  aiming  at  com- 
pensations to  be  granted  to  Germany  in  the  Cam- 
eroons  or  Dahomey.  My  colleague  adds,  however, 
that  this  rumor  is  denied  here.  To  me  it  seems 
very  improbable.  Mr.  Zimmermann  would  not  have 
spoken  to  me  as  he  did  yesterday  if  negotiations 
were  proceeding  with  the  French  Government.  But 
what  does  not  exist  to-day  is  not  excluded  for  the 
future. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed!  Greindl. 


No.  73. 


No.  73. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  2  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Je  n'ai  pas  besoin  de  vous  dire  que  la  nouvelle  de 
renvoi  d'un  navire  de  guerre  allemand  a  Agadir,  con- 
nue  ici  hier  soir,  fait  aujourd'hui  les  frais  des  articles 
de  la  presse  parisienne  tout  entiere. 

Le  fait  est  evidemment  grave;  il  peut  presenter 
meme  une  gravite  exceptionnelle  s'il  n'est  pas  le  re- 
sultat  d'une  entente  entre  les  Cabinets  de  Berlin  et 
de  Londres. 

II  fut  longtemps  considere  comme  un  axiome  que 
I'Angleterre  ne  permettrait  jamais  I'etablissement 
des  Allemands  sur  un  point  quelconque  du  terri- 
toire  marocain.  Cette  politique  est-elle  abandonnee  et 
quel  serait  alors  le  prix  de  la  commission?  Serait-il 
question  de  facilites  a  accorder  a  I'Angleterre  pour 
son  grand  chemin  de  fer  au  travers  du  continent  afri- 
cain?  Dans  cette  hypothese,  le  "marche"  serait  in- 
teressant  pour  nous. 

Dans  tous  les  cas,  le  choix  d' Agadir  est  signifi- 
catif ;  il  est  de  nature  a  comporter  des  compensations 
importantes.  Ce  port  sur  I'Ocean'est  la  clef  d'une 
region  qui  peut  constituer  une  contree  limitee, 
bornee  au  Nord  et  separee  done  des  regions  oil  s'ex- 
erce  I'activite  de  la  France,  par  les  chaines  de  1' Atlas 
qui  s'elevent  rapidement  de  la  cote,  pour  atteindre 
bientot  des  hauteurs  de  4.800  metres. 

Cette  region,  qui  forme  le  point  d'aboutissement 
de  la  grande  route  des  caravanes,  est  reputee  pour 
ses  richesses  minerales. 

Quelle  portee  faut-il  donner  a  I'acte  du  Gouverne- 
ment  allemand,  et  sur  le  moment  qu'il  a  choisi  pour 
le  mettre  a  execution?  Je  n'ai  vu  personne  encore  de- 
puis  hier ;  il  sera  d'ailleurs  tres  difificile  d'obtenir  pro- 
chainement  des  informations  a  cet  egard.  Mais  il 
est  incontestable  que  I'opinion  publique  en  France 
est  peu  favorable  a  I'expedition  marocaine ;  les  hom- 
mes  politiques  commencent  a  comprendre,  semble-t- 
il,  que  Ton  ne  veut  pas  ici  qu'un  gros  corps  d'armee 
aille  s'immobiliser  dans  ces  regions  africaines,  pour 
les  beaux  yeux  de  faiseurs  d'affaires. 

En  formant  son  cabinet,  Mr.  Caillaux  a  evite  d'of- 
frir  un  portefeuille  a  Mr.  Etienne,  partisan  interesse 
des  aventures  marocaines.  II  a  choisi,  pour  le  porte- 
feuille des  Affaires  Etrangeres  Mr.  de  Selves,  qu'on 
me  dit  desireux  de  mettre  un  terme  a  cette  affaire  et 
de  faire  sortir  les  Fran<;ais  de  Fez. 

C'est  le  moment  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand 
choisit  pour  venir  prendre  pied  au  Maroc !  Peut  on 
admettre  qu'il  ait  ete  mal  informe  sur  les  dispositions 
du  nouveau  ministere  frangais,  on  bien  faut-il  sup- 
poser  que,  desirant  prendre  pied  a  Agadir,  et  se  pro- 
posant  de  justifier  cet  acte  par  les  precedents  don- 
nes  par  la  France  et  I'Espagne,  il  ait  cru  habile  de 
precipiter  ses  mouvements,  dans  la  crainte  qu'un  re- 
cul  de  la  France  ne  lui  enleve  un  pretexte  a  in- 
voquer? 

Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  Mr.  Jaures  triomphe  aujourd'hui. 
II  avait  toujours  reproche  au  Gouvernement  de  se 
compromettre  dans  cette  mechante  affaire  du  Maroc ; 
il  avait  soutenu  que  la  necessite  d'aller  a  Fez  n'avait 
jamais  existe,  et  que  la  marche  en  avant  de  I'armee 
frangaise  pouvait  devenir  la  source  de  difficultes 
graves.  II  n'est  pas  contestable  aujourd'hui  que  I'at- 
titude  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  a  amene 
ou  permis  le  debarquement  des  Espagnols  a  Larache, 


Paris,  July  2nd,  1911. 
Sir:— 

I  need  not  tell  you  that  the  news  of  the  despatch 
of  a  German  man-of-wrar  to  Agadir,  which  became 
known  here  last  night,  is  to-day  the  topic  of  articles 
in  almost  the  entire  Parisian  press. 

The  event  is  evidently  grave;  it  may  even  be 
of  an  exceptional  gravity,  if  it  is  not  the  result  of 
an  understanding  between  the  cabinets  of  Berlin 
and  London. 

For  a  long  time  it  was  considered  an  axiom  that 
Elngland  would  never  allow  the  Germans  to  estab- 
lish themselves  at  any  point  of  the  Moroccan  terri- 
tory. Has  that  policy  been  abandoned  and  what 
may  be,  in  that  case,  the  commission  paid  ?  Should 
it  be  concessions  granted  to  England  in  her  big 
railway  scheme  across  the  African  Continent?  In 
that  case  the  "bargain"  would  be  of  interest  to  us. 

In  any  case  the  choice  of  Agadir  is  significant. 
It  is  apt  to  admit  of  important  compensations.  This 
ocean  port  is  the  key  to  a  region  which  may  form 
a  well  circumscribed  country,  bounded  in  the  North, 
and  thus  shut  off  from  the  parts  where  the  French 
are  active,  by  the  Atlas  mountains  which  rise  rapid- 
ly from  the  coast  to  a  height  of  4800  meters. 

This  region,  which  is  the  terminus  of  the  great 
caravan  road,  is  renowned  for  its  mineral  wealth. 

What  importance  is  to  be  attached  to  the  action 
of  the  German  Government  and  to  the  moment  it 
has  chosen  to  undertake  it?  I  have  not  seen  any- 
body since  yesterday  and  it  will  also  be  very  diffi- 
cult 'soon  to  obtain  information  on  this  point.  But 
it  is  certain  that  public  opinion  in  France  is  not  very- 
much  in  favor  of  the  Moroccan  expedition  ;  the  poli- 
ticians are  beginning  to  realize,  it  would  seem,  that 
the  people  do  not  care  to  see  a  big  army  force  tied 
up  in  these  African  regions  for  the  sake  of  people 
who  want  to  do  business. 

When  forming  his  Cabinet,  M.  Caillaux  avoided 
offering  a  portfolio  to  M.  Etienne,  who  is  an  inter- 
ested partisan  in  the  Moroccan  adventure.  He  chose 
M.  de  Selves  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  who, 
I  am  told,  wishes  to  put  an  end  to  that  affair  and 
wants  the  French  to  leave  Fez. 

That  is  the  moment  which  the  German  Govern- 
ment chose  to  gain  a  footing  in  Morocco!  Can  it 
be  assumed  that  the  German  Government  was  badly 
informed  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  French  Cabinet; 
or  is  it  to  be  supposed  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment, in  a  desire  to  get  a  foothold  in  Agadir  and 
with  the  idea  of  justifying  this  act  by  the  precedents 
created  by  France  and  Spain,  thought  fit  to  precipi- 
tate its  movements  from  a  fear  lest  France  draw 
back  and  thus  deprive  it  of  a  suitable  pretext? 

However  that  may  be,  M.  Jaures  is  triumphant 
to-day.  He  always  blamed  the  Government  for 
compromising  itself  in  this  vile  Moroccan  affair, 
maintaining  that  a  necessity  for  going  to  Fez  never 
existed  and  that  the  advance  of  the  French  army 
might  become  a  source  of  grave  difficulties.  It 
cannot  be  disputed  to-day  that  the  attitude  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  has  caused  or  at  least 
made  possible  the  landing  of  the  Spanish  at  Larache 


—    91    — 


et  renvoi  d'un  navire  de  guerre  allemand  a  Agadir.     and  the  despatch  of  a  German  man-of-war  to  Aga- 

dir. 

I  am,  etc. 


Je    suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Guillaume. 


[Signed] 


Guillaume. 


No.  74. 


No.  74. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  Lond<ni,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  5  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

L'envoi  d'une  canonniere  allemande  a  Agadir  a 
cause  ici  un  renouvellement  de  I'emotion  produite 
par  roccupation  de  Fez,  par  les  troupes  francjaises, 
et  par  I'apparition  des  bataillons  espagnols  a  Larache 
et  Alcazar.  Sir  E.  Grey,  absent  comme  cela  lui  ar- 
rive frequemment,  est  rentre  a  Londres  pour  con- 
ferer  avec  M.  Paul  Cambon;  les  ambassadeurs  de 
France  et  d'Espagne  n'avaient  pu  voir  jusqu'ici  que 
Sir  Arthur  Nicholson.  L'impression  premiere, 
causee  par  la  nouvelle,  s'attenue  deja  par  le  fait 
qu'aucun  debarquement  germanique  n'est  signale  sur 
la  cote  meridionale  du  Maroc  et  que  le  Cabinet 
Frangais  semble  montrer  de  la  philosophic  dans  sa 
maniere  d'envisager  I'incident.  On  considere  le 
maintien  du  plan  de  voyage  du  President  et  de  M.  de 
Selves  en  HoUande  comme  un  symptome  rassurant, 
et  on  ne  s'attend  pas  a  la  remise  d'une  note  fran- 
qaise  en  reponse  a  celle  de  Berlin  avant  le  retour  de 
M.  Fallieres.  D'ici  la  un  echange  de  vues  aura  lieu 
entre  les  Cabinets  de  Paris,  Londres  et  Petersbourg. 
La  Bourse  a  cependant  ete  affectee  et  les  consolides 
anglais  sont  tombes  a  78^f . 

La  presse  anglaise  blame  naturellement  I'attitude 
adoptee  par  I'Allemagne,  nie  I'existence  de  troubles 
quelconques  dans  la  region  du  Sus  (Agadir)  et  entre- 
voit  la  possibilite  du  partage  du  Maroc,  avec  com- 
pensation a  trouver  pour  I'Empire  Germanique  dans 
cette  region  ou  ailleurs. 

Le  Premier  Ministre,  M.  Asquith,  interpelle  au 
Parlement  sur  la  situation  politique,  a  repondu  que 
le  Gouvernement  s'occupait  de  la  question,  mais  ne 
pouvait  encore  se  prononcer.  II  est  probable  que 
Sir  E.  Grey  en  parlera  demain  a  la  Chambre  des 
.  Communes.  Sa  position  n'est  pas  exempte  de  diffi- 
cultes,  car  il  voudrait  naturellement  maintenir  avec 
I'Allemagne  des  relations,  qui  se  sont  ameliorees 
dans  les  derniers  temps,  sans  cependant  avoir  I'air 
de  ne  pas  soutenir  la  France.  L'opinion  publique  en 
Angleterre  demande,  au  nom  de  I'entente  cordiale, 
que  le  Cabinet  de  Londres  appuie  celui  de  Paris  daris 
la  situation  delicate  ou  il  se  trouve.  II  s'agit  d'avoir 
I'air  detre  un  ami  fidele  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Re- 
publique  sans  donner  prise  a  des  recriminations  de  la 
part  du  Gouvernement  Imperial,  ce  qui  grossirait 
I'incident  et  pourrait  meme  amener  des  complica- 
tions europeennes. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


London,  July  5th,  1911. 
Sir:— 

The  despatch  of  a  German  gunboat  to  Agadir  has 
caused  a  revival  here  of  the  excitement  evoked 
by  the  occupation  of  Fez  by  the  French  troops  and 
by  the  appearance  of  Spanish  battalions  at  Larache 
and  Alcazar.  Sir  Edward  Grey  returned  to  London 
after  one  of  his  frequent 'absences  in  order  to  confer 
with  M.  Paul  Cambon.  Until  then  the  French  and 
Spanish  Ambassadors  had  only  been  able  to  see 
Sir  Arthur  Nicholson.  The  first  impression  caused 
by  the  news  is  already  being  moderated  by  the  fact 
that  no  German  landing  on  the  south  coast  of  Mo- 
rocco has  been  reported  and  that  the  French  Cabinet 
seems  to  regard  the  incident  philosophically.  The 
fact  that  the  journey  of  the  President  and  M.  de 
Selves  to  Holland  has  not  been  given  up,  is  con- 
sidered a  reassuring  sign  and  it  is  not  expected  that 
a  French  note  will  be  sent  in  answer  to  that  of 
Berlin  before  the  return  of  M.  Fallieres.  In  the 
meantime  an  exchange  of  views  will  take  place  be- 
tween the  Cabinets  of  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Peters- 
burg. Exchange  was  affected,  however,  and  the 
British  consols  fell  to  78-15/16. 

The  English  press,  of  course,  reproaches  Germany 
for  her  attitude,  denies  the  existence  of  any  troubles 
in  the  region  of  the  Sus  (Agadir)  and  foresees  the 
possibility  of  a  partition  of  Morocco  when  the  Ger- 
man Empire  would  receive  compensation  either  in 
those  parts  or  elsewhere. 

The  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  when  ques- 
tioned in  Parliament  on  the  political  situation,  an- 
swered that  the  Government  w»»  concerning  itself 
with  the  question  but  could  not  yet  say  anything 
about  it.  Probably  Sir  Edward  Grey  will  speak 
about  it  to-morrow  in  the  House  of  Commons.  His 
position  is  somewhat  difficult,  for  he  would  naturally 
want  to  maintain  the  recently  improved  relations 
with  Germany  without,  however,  creating  the  im- 
pression that  he  was  not  supporting  France.  Public 
opinion  in  England  demands  in  the  name  of  th( 
entente  cordiale  that  the  Cabinet  of  London  sustain 
that  of  Paris  in  the  delicate  situation  in  which  it 
finds  itself.  The  point  is  to  appear  as  a  faithful 
friend  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  without 
giving  cause  for  any  recriminations  on  the  part  of 
the  Imperial  Government,  which  would  aggravate 
the  incident  and  might  even  lead  to  European  com- 
plications. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  75. 


No.  75. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  8  Juill'^t  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

M.  le  President  de  la  Republique,  revenant  de  la 
visite  aux  Pays-Bas,  est  rentre  hier  a  Paris,  avec  le 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Nous  ne  tarderons  sans  doute  pas  a  savoir  dans 
quels  termes  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  re- 
pondra  a  la  communication  de  la  Chancellerie  de 
Berlin  relative  a  I'intervention  allemande  au  Maroc. 

II  ne  manque  pas  de  gens  pour  trouver  que  I'atti- 
tude  du  Cabinet  de  Paris  a  manque  d'ampleur,  et  que 
I'insistance  que  Ton  a  mise  a  faire  remarquer  que 
la  France  ne  peut  prendre  de  decision  sans  consulter 
la  Russie  et  I'Angleterre,  est  peu  digne  du  role  d'une 
grande  Puissance. 

La  verite  est  que  le  Cabinet  Caillaux,  a  peine  en- 
tre  en  fonctions,  a  ete  pris  au  depourvu.  L'inex- 
perience  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  et  de 
plusieurs  de  ses  collegues,  le  desarroi  dans  lequel  se 
trouvent  tant  de  rouages  administratifs  en  France, 
une  sainte  crainte  des  complications  et  de  la  guerre, 
ont  fait  naitre  dans  les  regions  gouvernementales 
une  veritable  timidite. 

On  a  voulu  gagner  du  temps;  on  a  cherche  des 
avis  de  part  et  d'autre  et — I'anglomanie  de  M.  Del- 
casse  aidant — on  s'est  tourne  vers  la  Grande-Bre- 
tagne. 

J'ai  des  raisons  de  croire  que  Mr.  Caillaux  en  serait 
peut-etre  deja  arrive  a  regretter  I'insistance  que  Ton 
a  mise  dans  ce  geste  et  I'attitude  prise  par  le  Cabi- 
inet  de  St.  James.  On  aura  beaucoup  moins  de 
chances  de  s'entendre  avec  I'Allemagne,  si  I'Angle- 
terre fait  partie  de  la  conversation,  et  je  reste  con- 
vaincu  que  MM.  Caillaux  et  de  Selves  regrettent  la 
tournure  donnee  par  leurs  predecesseurs  a  I'affaire 
rnarocaine.  lis  etaient  tout  prets  a  reculer,  pourvu 
qu'ils  pussent  le  faire  sans  humiliation. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  July  8,  1911. 
Sir:— 

The  President  of  the  Republic  has  returned  from 
his  visit  in  Holland  and  came  back  to  Paris  yes- 
terday together  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. 

We  shall  without  doubt  soon  know  in  what  terms 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  is  going  to  answer 
the  communication  from  the  Cabinet  at  Berlin  rela- 
tive to  the  German  intervention  in  Morocco. 

There  are  people  who  find  that  the  attitude  of 
the  Cabinet  of  Paris  is  lacking  in  broadness  and 
that  the  insistence  with  which  it  has  declared  that 
it  could  not  make  any  decision  without  consulting 
Russia  and  England  is  a  little  undignified  on  the 
part  of  a  Great  Power. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Caillaux  Cabinet,  which  had 
barely  taken  up  its  functions,  was  taken  by  sur- 
prise. The  inexperience  of  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  and  of  a  number  of  his  colleagues ;  the 
disorder  prevailing  in  a  great  part  of  the  administra- 
tive machinery  in  France,  and  a  holy  fear  of  com- 
plications and  of  war,  have  created  a  veritable  scare 
in  Government  circles. 

The  purpose  was  to  gain  time ;  advice  was  sought 
here  and  there  and — thanks  to  the  anglomania  of 
M.  Delcasse — appeal  was  had  to  Great  Britain. 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  M.  Caillaux  is  per- 
haps already  regretting  the  insistence  displayed  and 
the  attitude  which  the  Cabinet  of  London  took  in 
that  matter.  The  chances  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  Germany  will  be  much  smaller  if 
England  takes  part  in  the  conversations  and  I  am 
convinced  that  MM.  Caillaux  and  de  Selves  regret 
the  turn  which  their  predecessors  gave  to  the  Mor- 
occan affair.  They  were  quite  ready  to  draw  back 
provided  that  they  could  do  so  without  humiliation. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  76. 


No.  76. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  8  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Pour  faire  suite  a  mon  rapport  du  5  de  ce  mois, 
j'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  informer  que  le  Premier  Mi- 
nistre a  fait  avant-hier  a  la  Chambre  des  Communes 
la  declaration  suivante: 

"Les  evenements  recents  ont  amene  des  discus- 
sions entre  les  Puissances  les  plus  interessees  dans 
les  affaires  du  Maroc.  Actuellement  je  ne  puis  en- 
core dire  que  peu  de  chose  au  sujet  des  negociations 
en  cours,  mais  je  desire  faire  comprendre  clairement 
que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  estime  qu'une 
situation  nouvelle  a  ete  creee  au  Maroc,  dont  les 


London,  July  8,  1911. 
Sir:— 

In  pursuance  of  my  report  of  the  5th  inst.  I  have 
the  honor  to  inform  you  that  yesterday  the  Prime 
Minister  made  the  following  declaration  in  the 
House  of  Commons : 

"Recent  events  are  causing  discussion  between 
the  Powers  most  interested  in  Morocco,  and  at  this 
stage  I  can  say  little  of  the  negotiations  which  are 
passing  between  them.  But  I  wish  it  clearly  to  be 
understood  that  His  Majesty's  Government  con- 
sider that  a  new  situation  has  arisen  in  Morocco, 
in  which  it  is  possible  that  future  developments  may 


developpements  ulterieurs  pourraient  affecter  les  in- 
terets  britanniques  d'une  fagon  plus  directe  que  par 
le  passe. 

"J'ai  laconviction  queles  discussions  diplomatiques 
trouveront  leur  solution  et,  dans  la  part  que  nous  y 
prendrons,  nous  veillerons  avec  sollicitude  a  la  pro- 
tection de  ces  interets  et  a  I'execution  des  obliga- 
tions, bien  connues  de  cette  chambre,  qui  nous  sont 
imposees  par  notre  traite  avec  la  France." 

II  est  interessant  de  noter  que  M.  Asquith  appuie 
sur  la  nouvelle  situation  qui  pourrait  affecter  d'une 
faqon  plus  directe  les  interets  de  I'Angletterre ;  I'idee 
de  voir  Agadir  devenir,  dans  certaines  eventuality, 
uns  base  navale  pour  la  flotte  allemande  est  de  nature 
k  inquieter  le  Gouvernement  du  Royaume-Uni. 

La  presse  rappelle  que  si  la  Grande-Bretagne  s'est 
desinteressee  de  la  question  marocaine  en  faveur  de 
la  France,  c'est  parce  que  la  Republique  de  son  cote 
lui  laissait  les  mains  libres  en  Egypte,  mais  que  I'An- 
gleterre  n'a  jamais  songe  a  permettre  a  I'Allemagne 
de  prendre  pied  au  Maroc. 

Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


affect  British  interests  more  directly  than  has  hith- 
erto been  the  case. 

"I  am  confident  that  diplomatic  discussion  will 
find  a  solution,  and  iti  the  part  that  we  shall  take 
in  it,  we  shall  have  due  regard  to  the  protection  of 
those  interests  and  to  the  fulfillment  of  our  treaty 
obligations  to  France,  which  are  well  known  to  the 
House." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Mr.  Asquithi  is  em- 
phasizing the  new  situation  which  might  affect  the 
interests  of  England  in  a  more  direct  manner.  The 
thought  that  Agadir  might  in  certain  contingencies 
become  a  naval  base  for  the  German  fleet  is  apt  to 
cause  anxiety  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
Kingdom. 

The  press  recalls  that  if  Great  Britain  had  waived, 
her  interests  in  Morocco  in  favor  of  France,  it  was, 
because  the  Republic  on  her  part  gave  England  a 
free  hand  in  Egypt,  but  that  England  never  thought 
of  allowing  Germany  to  get  a  footing  in  Morocco. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  77. 


No.  77. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  24  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Jusqu'ici  les  cabinets  de  Berlin  et  de  Paris  n'ont 
fait  aucune  communication  officieuse  relativement  a 
leur  "conversation";  on  doit  se  contenter  des  infor- 
mations de  la  presse.  La  plupart  sont  negligeables, 
tendancieuses ;  quelques-unes  peuvent  etre  inspirees 
a  titre  de  ballon  d'essai. 

II  est  cependant  difficile  de  ne  pas  admettre — puis- 
que  le  bruit  maintes  fois  repete,  n'a  pas  ete  dementi 
— que  I'Allemagne  demande  a  la  France  une  "com- 
pensation" sur  les  cotes  d'Afrique,  au  Congo. 

Les  journaux  frangais  protestent  mais  avec  un 
calme  tres  significatif  si  on  le  compare  au  ton  qu'ils 
avaient  pris  ces  jours  derniers  a  I'egard  du  cabinet 
de  Madrid.  II  est  penible  de  remarquer  que  I'Alle- 
magne fait  peur  et  que  Ton  ne  redoute  pas  I'Espagne 
— et  je  passe.  Les  dits  journaux  feignent  de  ne  pas 
comprendre  pourquoi  le  gouvernement  Imperial 
pourrait  reclamer  une  compensation. 

Le  fait  est  cependant  clair  pour  ceux  qui  admet- 
tent  que  la  France  a  ete  a  Fez  sans  motifs  serieux; 
qu'elle  en  sortira  difficilement  ou  se  verra  forcee  d'y 
retourner,  et  qu'elle  a  ainsi  viole  I'esprit  de  I'acte 
d'Algesiras.  Si  I'Allemagne,  en  presence  de  ces 
faits,  reclame  une  "compensation,"  c'est  qu'elle  ne 
pretend  pas  faire  reculer  la  France  et  qu'elle  n'a  pas 
pour  elle-meme  la  pretention  de  s'etablir  k  Agadir; 
mais  elle  estime  que  le  Gouvernement  de  la  R6publi- 
que  a  rompu  un  equilibre  de  forces  convenu,  et  elle 
demande  sa  part. 

II  est  impossible  d'apprecier  I'importance  des  de- 
dommagements  reclames  et  la  portee  qu'ils  pour- 
raient avoir  a  notre  point  de  vue  beige,  puisque  rien 
n'est  venu  nous  en  indiquer  la  nature  de  fagon  serieu- 
se;  mais  il  est  un  fait  qui  semble  aujourd'hui  etabli 
c'est  que  la  politique  que  poursuit  en  ce  moment  la 
Wilhelmstrasse  eveille  de  vives  susceptibilites  en 
Angleterre. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  July  24,  1911. 
Sir:— 

So  far,  the  Cabinets  of  Berlin  and  Paris  have  not 
issued  any  semi-official  communications  in  relation 
to  their  "conversation";  the  information  conveyed 
through  the  press  is  all  there  is.  Most  of  this  is 
unimportant  and  colored ;  some  may  have  been 
inspired  as  "feelers." 

It  may,  however,  be  assumed — since  the  often 
repeated  rumor  has  not  been  denied — that  Ger- 
many is  demanding  of  France  a  "compensation"  on 
the  coast  of  Africa,  in  the  Congo. 

The  French  papers  are  protesting,  but  with  very 
significant  calmness,  if  compared  with  the  tone  used 
these  last  days  with  regard  to  the  Cabinet  of  Ma- 
drid. It  is  painful  to  observe  that  Germany  evokes 
fear  while  there  is  none  of  Spain — but  I  pass  that. 
The  papers  I  mentioned  pretend  not  to  understand 
why  the  Imperial  Government  should  have  a  right 
to  demand  a  compensation. 

For  those,  however,  who  admit  that  France  went 
to  Fez  wdthout  serious  reason,  the  fact  is  clear  that 
she  will  hardly  go  out  of  Fez,  or  will  see  herself 
compelled  to  go  back  there  again  and  that  she  there- 
by has  violated  the  spirit  of  the  act  of  Algeciras.  If 
Germany  in  face  of  tiiese  facts  claims  a  "compensa- 
tion," it  means  that  she  does  not  propose  to  make 
France  draw  back  and  that  she  has  for  her  part  no 
intention  of  establishing  herself  in  Agadir  but  she 
thinks  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  has  dis- 
turbed a  balance  of  forces  which  had  been  agreed 
upon  and  that  she  is  demanding  her  share. 

It  is  impossible  to  gauge  the  importance  of  the 
claimed  indemnities  and  the  bearing  they  may  have 
from  the  Belgian  point  of  view,  since  we  have  no 
serious  indications  of  their  nature ;  but  there  is  one 
fact  which  seems  certain  to-day.  viz.,  that  the  policy 
which  Wilhelmstrasse  is  pursuing  at  present  is  caus- 
ing strong  irritation  in  England. 


Des  que  la  nouvelle  de  I'envoi  d'une  canonniere  al- 
lemande  a  Agadir  fut  connue,  j'avais  I'honneur  de 
vous  ecrire  que,  selon  moi,  le  noeud  de  la  question 
serait  de  savoir  comment  le  fait  serait  accepte  a  Lon- 
dres  et  je  rappelais  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  n'avait 
jamais  admis  I'eventualite  de  la  moindre  prise  de 
possession  germanique  sur  le  littoral  Marocziin.  Le 
Cabinet  de  St.  James  ne  tarda  pas  a  le  faire  connaitre 
a  Berlin. 

Aujourd'hui,  I'avertissement,  pour  etre  plus  large, 
plus  vague,  n'en  est  pas  moins  grave,  et  le  dis- 
cours  que  Mr.  Lloyd  George  a  prononce  avant-hier 
a  Tissue  d'un  banquet  offert  par  le  Lord  Maire  aux 
directeurs  de  la  Banque  d'Angleterre,  n'aura  pas 
echappe  a  votre  oeil  si  attentif.  Vous  aurez  certes 
particulierement  remarque  les  phrases  suivantes  du 
chancelier  de  I'Echiquier: 

"Je  ferais  de  grands  sacrifices  pour  preserver  la 
paix.  Je  ne  puis  rien  concevoir  qui  pourrait  justifier 
une  perturbation,  si  ce  n'est  des  questions  de  I'interet 
national  le  plus  grand ;  mais  si,  a  notre  corps  defen- 
dant, nous  etions  mis  en  face  d'une  situation  ou  la 
paix  ne  pourrait  etre  preservee  que  par  la  reddition 
des  positions  grandes  et  bienfaisantes  que  la  Grande- 
Bretagne  a  gagnees  par  des  siecles  d'heroisme  et 
d'exploits ;  qu'en  laissant  traiter  la  Grande-Bretagne, 
la  ou  ses  interets  vitaux  sent  engages,  comme  si 
elle  ne  comptait  plus  dans  le  concert  des  nations, 
alors,  je  le  declare  avec  toute  la  force  dont  je  suis 
capable,  la  paix  achetee  a  ce  prix  serait,  pour  un 
grand  pays  tel  que  le  notre,  une  intolerable  humilia- 
tion a  endurer.  L'honneur  national  n'est  pas  une 
question  de  parti,  la  securite  de  notre  commerce  in- 
ternational n'est  pas  une  question  de  parti." 

De  telles  paroles  se  passent  de  commentaires ;  el- 
les  constituent  un  avertissement  qui  sera  entendu; 
je  n'en  doute  pas,  car  j'ai  la  conviction  que  Ton  ne 
cherche  pas  a  Berlin  les  complications  graves ;  que 
Ton  n'y  desire  pas  la  guerre  et  que  Ton  eviterait  par 
dessus  tout  de  sembler  s'y  livrer  pour  une  question 
Marocaine.  Mais  les  affaires  exterieures  de  I'Empire 
ont  ete,  dans  les  limites  que  permettent  I'Empereur 
et  le  Chancelier,  confiees  aux  mains  d'un  homme  de 
haut  merite — que  je  connais  de  longue  date — dont  les 
manieres  sont  rudes  et  brusques,  et  qui  aurait 
eprouve  quelque  peine  a  ce  que  son  entree  au  Mi- 
nistere  ne  flit  pas  remarquee.  Je  ne  suis  pas  etonne 
qu'il  ait  voulu  commence^;  son  regne  ministeriel  par 
un  coup  de  poing  donne  sur  la  table  autour  de  la- 
quelle  se  reglent  les  grandes  affaires  internationales ; 
il  est  trop  avise,  et  sera  trop  serieusement  retenu, 
pour  que  Ton  puisse  craindre  que  I'Empire  soit  a  la 
veille  d'inaugurer  une  politique  dangereuse  et  vio- 
lente. 

Mais  la  situation  est  tendue,  on  est  insuffisamment 
edifie  sur  les  relations  entre  Berlin  et  Madrid  quant 
a  la  politique  Marocaine,  et  il  est  difficile  d'admettre 
que  les  faits  au  developpement  desquels  nous  as- 
sistons,  ne  laissent  pas — pour  quelque  temps  au 
moins — une  certaine  nervosite  malfaisante  dans 
maints  rapports  internationaux. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


When  the  news  of  the  despatch  of  a  German  gun- 
boat to  Agadir  became  known,  I  had  the  honor  to 
write  to  you  that,  according  to  my  opinion,  in  order 
to  understand  the  whole  situation  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  know  how  the  fact  would  be  accepted  in 
London ;  and  I  recalled  that  Great  Britain  had  never 
admitted  the  possibility  of  an  occupation  even  of 
the  smallest  part  of  the  Moroccan  coast  by  Ger- 
many. The  Cabinet  of  St.  James  did  not  tarry  to 
inform  Berlin  of  this. 

To-day  the  warning,  though  it  may  be  broader 
and  vaguer,  is  not  for  that  reason  less  grave,  and 
the  speech  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  delivered  the 
day  before  yesterday  at  the  end  of  a  banquet  given 
by  the  Lord  Mayor  for  the  directors  of  the  Bank  of 
England  will  not  have  escaped  your  attention.  You 
will  certainly  above  all  have  remarked  the  following 
phrases  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer: 

"I  would  make  great  sacrifices  to  preserve  peace. 
I  conceive  that  nothing  would  justify  a  disturbance 
of  international  good  will  except  questions  of  the 
gravest  national  moment.  But  if  a  situation  were 
to  be  forced  upon  us  in  which  peace  could  only  be 
preserved  by  the  surrender  of  the  great  and  benefi- 
cent position  Britain  has  won  by  centuries  of  hero- 
ism and  achievement,  by  allowing  Britain  to  be 
treated  where  her  interests  were  vitally  aflfected  as 
if  she  were  of  no  account  in  the  concert  of  nations, 
then  I  say  emphatically  that  peace  at  that  price 
would  be  a  humiliation  intolerable  for  a  great  coun- 
try Hke  ours  to  endure.  National  honor  is  no  party 
question.  The  security  of  our  great  international 
trade  is  no  party  question." 


Such  words  require  no  comment.  They  are  a 
warning  which  will  be  understood ;  I  have  no  doubts 
of  that  for  I  am  convinced  that  Berlin  is  not  anxious 
for  grave  complications;  it  does  not  want  war  and 
it  would  wish  before  all  things  to  avoid  the  impres- 
sion that  it  wanted  it  for  a  Moroccan  question. 
But  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Empire  have  been  en- 
trusted, within  the  limits  which  the  Emperor  and 
the  Chancellor  allow,  into  the  hands  of  a  man  of 
great  merits — I  have  known  him  for  a  long  time — 
yet  whose  manners  are  rude  and  brusque,  who 
would  have  great  difficulty  in  making  his  entry  into 
the  Cabinet  without  causing  it  to  be  remarked.  I 
am  not  astonished  that  he  should  begin  his  minis- 
terial regime  with  a  bang  on  the  table  around  which 
the  great  international  questions  are  settled ;  but 
he  is  too  prudent  and  will  be  held  in  check  too  well 
to  cause  fear  that  the  Empire  is  on  the  verge  of 
inaugurating  a  dangerous  and  violent  policy. 

But  the  situation  is  tense,  there  is  a  lacK  of  in- 
formation about  the  relations  between  Berlin  and 
Madrid  in  regard  to  the  Moroccan  policy  and  it  -is 
difficult  not  to  suppose  that  the  events  at  the  devel- 
opment of  which  we  are  assisting  will  not  leave — 
for  some  time  at  least — an  unhealthy  nervousness  in 
many  international  relations. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


95 


No.  78. 


No.  78. 


Le  Cotnte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  24  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Vous  avez  pu  juger  par  I'article  du  "Times"  du  20 
que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  signaler,  combien  les 
pretentions  que  Ton  prete  a  I'Allemagne  ont  paru 
extravagantes  dans  ce  pays-ci.  Aussi  ont-elles  fait 
I'objet  d'une  allusion  par  un  Membre  du  Cabinet, 
I'impulsif  Chancelier  de  I'Echiquier,  dans  un  dis- 
cours  qu'il  a  prononce  a  un  banquet  dans  la  Cite  le 
21.  Apres  avoir  exprime  sa  sympathie  pour  le  prin- 
cipe  de  I'arbitrage  et  ses  voeux  pour  le  succes  des 
negociations  entreprises  par  Sir  E.  Grey  avec  les 
Etats-Unis,  M.  Lloyd  George  a  ajoute  que  selon  lui, 
la  Grande-Bretagne  devrait  cependant  a  tout  prix 
maintenir  son  prestige  de  grande  Puissance,  qui  lui  a 
permis  dans  le  passe  de  sauver  certaines  nations  du 
continent,  parfois  d'ailleurs  oublieuses  des  services 
rendus.  Pour  maintenir  la  paix,  on  pent  faire  des 
sacrifices,  mais  s'il  s'agissait  de  laisser  traiter  I'An- 
gleterre  comme  etant  sans  importance  dans  le  Con- 
cert Europeen,  il  considererait  la  paix  comme  trop 
cherement  achetee  dans  ces  conditions. 


La  presse  de  tons  les  partis  commente  favorable- 
ment  ce  discours,  qui  pa'rait  avoir  eu  pour  but  de 
signifier  a  I'Allemagne  que  I'entente  cordiale  anglo- 
frangaise  ne  doit  pas  etre  envisagee  comme  une  quan- 
tite  negligeable.  Deux  articles  du  "Times"  du  22 
sont  ci-joints. 

Au  Foreign  Office  on  semble  croire  que  le  Gou- 
vernement  allemand  demande  beaucoup  pour  se  con- 
tenter  finalement  de  concessions  plus  moderees. 

A  la  fin  de  son  discours,  M.  Lloyd  George  a  eu 
soin  d'ajouter  qu'il  ne  prevoyait  cependant  pas  de 
graves  complications  internationales.  Malgre  cette 
phrase  rassurante,  le  speech  a  eu  un  grand  retentis- 
sement,  car  il  parait  improbable,  malgre  le  caractere 
impetueux  de  I'orateur,  qu'il  se  soit  exprime  de  la 
sorte  sans  I'assentiment  de  ses  collegues. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  24,  1911. 
Sir: — 

You  have  been  able  to  judge  from  the  article  of 
the  Times  of  the  20th  to  which  I  had  the  honor  to 
draw  your  attention,  how  extravagant  the  demands 
imputed  to  Germany  are  considered  to  be  in  this 
country.  They  have  also  been  the  subject  of  an 
allusion  by  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  the  impulsive 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  the  course  of  a 
speech  which  he  made  at  a  banquet  in  the  City  on 
the  21st.  After  expressing  his  approval  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  arbitration  and  his  wishes  for  a  success  of 
the  negotiations  undertaken  by  Sir  Edward  Grey 
with  the  United  States,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  added 
that  nevertheless  Great  Britain  ought  at  all  cost 
to  maintain  her  prestige  as  a  Great  Power  which 
enabled  her  in  the  past  to  save  certain  continental 
Powers,  though  they  were  inclined  to  forget  the 
services  rendered.  In  order  to  maintain  peace  one 
might  make  sacrifices;  but  if  it  were  a  question  of 
whether  England  should  be  allowed  to  be  treated 
as  of  no  importance  in  the  European  Concert  he 
thought  peace  was  too  dearly  bought  under  such 
conditions. 

The  press  of  all  parties  comments  favorably  on 
this  speech  which  seems  intended  to  tell  Germany 
that  the  Anglo-French  Entente  must  not  be  con- 
sidered as  a  negligible  quantity.  I  enclose  two  arti- 
cles from  the  Times  of  the  22nd. 

At  the  Foreign  Office  it  is  believed  that  Germany 
is  making  big  demands,  but  will  in  the  end  be 
contented  with  more  moderate  concessions.  At  the 
conclusion  of  his  speech  Mr.  Lloyd  George  took  care 
to  add  that  he  did  not  foresee  any  grave  interna- 
tional complications.  This  reassuring  sentence  not- 
withstanding, the  speech  has  aroused  considerable 
attention,  for  it  seems  unlikely  in  spite  of  the  im- 
petuous character  of  the  speaker  that  he  would  have 
expressed  himself  in  the  way  he  did  without  the 
consent  of  his  colleagues. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  79. 


No.  79. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  28  Juillet  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

J'ai  eu  I'occasion  de  rencontrer  hier  plusieurs  de 
mes  collegues — les  mieux  informes  generalement — 
et  ils  m'ont  avoue  qu'ils  ne  parvenaient  pas  a  se 
mettre  au  courant  de  la  marche  des  pourparlers  qui 
s'echangent  au  sujet  des  aflfaires  marocaines.  Jamais 
secret  ne  fut  aussi  bien  garde  ni  mutisme  aussi 
absolu. 

J'ai  trouve,  d'ailleurs,  chez  ces  collegues,  des  im- 
pressions conformes  aux  mienne" 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  July  28,  1911. 
Sir : — 

I  had  occasion  last  night  to  meet  several  of  my 
colleagues — those  that  are  generally  best  informed 
—and  they  confessed  that  they  could  not  obtain  any 
information  concerning  the  progress  of  the  pour- 
parlers which  are  being  exchanged  on  the  Moroccan 
question.  Never  was  a  secret  so  well  guarded, 
never  silence  so  absolute. 

Besides  that,  I  found  that  these  colleagues  of 
mine  had  very  much  the  same  impression  as  I. 


La  situation  presente,  certes,  un  certain  caractere 
de  gravite ;  des  incidents  peuvent  surgir  qui  se  gref- 
feraient  sur  un  etat  de  choses  trouble:  mais  per- 
sonne  ne  veut  la  guerre ;  on  cherchera  a  I'eviter. 

On  se  livre  a  un  "bluff"  international  tres  carac- 
terise,  un  veritable  marchandage  que  des  communi- 
,  cations  officieuses  de  la  presse  presentent  au  public 
pour  tater  ropinion. 

La  France  ne  veut  pas  et  ne  peut  pas  vouloir  que 
.  les  affaires  se  gatent  completement.  Son  Gouverne- 
ment  sait  que  la  guerre  marquerait  la  derniere  heure 
de  la  Republique.  J'ai  une  tres  grande  confiance 
dans  les  sentiments  pacifiques  de  TEmpereur  Guil- 
laume,  malgre  I'exageration  assez  frequente  de  cer- 
tains de  ses  gestes.  II  ne  se  laissera  pas  entrainer 
plus  loin  qu'il  ne  le  voudra  par  le  temperament  exu- 
berant et  la  maniere  lourde  de  son  tres  intelligent 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

II  fut  toujours  ainsi. 

L'Allemagne  ne  peut  pas  faire  la  guerre  pour  le 
Maroc,  ni  pour  forcer  I'addition  des  compensations 
qu'elle  reclame  a  raison  de  I'etablissement,  plus  ou 
moins  definitif  des  Frangais  a  Fez. 

J'6prouve,  en  general,  une  foi  moindre  dans  les 
d6sirs  de  paix  de  la  Grande-Bretagne,  qui  ne  deteste 
pas  de  voir  les  autres  s'entredevorer.  Mais,  en  cette 
circonstance,  il  lui  serait  difficile — je  dirai  impossible 
— de  ne  pas  intervenir  manu  militari. 

Or,  la  situation  politique  interieure  de  I'Angleterre 
est  aujourd'hui  fort  troublee  et  c'est  le  parti  liberal 
qui  est  au  pouvoir. 

Comme  je  I'ai  pense,  des  le  premier  jour,  c'est  a 
Londres  qu'est  le  noeud  de  la  situation.  C'est  la 
seulement  qu'elle  peut  devenir  grave.  Les  Frangais 
c^deront  sur  tous  les  points  pour  avoir  la  paix.  II 
n'en  est  pas  de  meme  des  Anglais  qui  ne  transigeront 
pas  sur  quelques  regies  et  quelques  pr6tentions.  Mais 
on  n'6prouve  nul  desir  de  les  pousser  a  bout. 

Vous  trouverez,  sous  ce  pli,  un  article  interessant 
du  "Temps"  et  un  article  assez  modere  du  "Matin." 


Je  suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Guillaume. 


The  situation  no  doubts  presents  a  certain  amount 
of  gravity.  Incidents  might  crop  up  which  would 
find  a  fertile  soil  in  the  present  state  of  unrest ;  but 
nobody  wants  war;  every  effort  will  be  made  to 
avoid  it. 

A  very  significant  international  bluff  is  going  on,  . 
a  game  of  barter  which  the  semi-official  press  re- 
veals to  the  public  in  order  to  sound  public  opinion. 

France  does  not  and  cannot  desire  that  matters 
should  be  irretrievably  spoilt.  The  French  Govern- 
ment is  awake  to  the  fact  that  war  would  mean  that 
the  last  hour  had  struck  for  the  Republic.  I  have 
great  confidence  in  the  pacific  sentiments  of  Em- 
peror William  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  at  times  he 
has  gone  too  far  in  his  actions.  He  is  not  going  to 
allow  himself  to  be  drawn  on  any  farther  than  he 
wants  by  the  exuberant  temperament  and  the  mas- 
terful manner  of  his  Foreign  Minister. 

That  has  always  been  the  case. 

Germany  cannot  make  war  on  account  of  Mor- 
occo nor  in  order  to  obtain  the  additional  compen- 
sations which  she  is  claiming  by  reason  of  France's 
acquisition  of  a  more  or  less  definite  foothold  at 
Fez. 

I  have  on  the  whole  less  confidence  in  the  desire 
for  peace  of  Great  Britain  who  rather  enjoys  seeing 
the  others  devouring  one  another.  But  in  the  pre- 
sent case  it  would  be  difficult  for  her — if  not  im- 
possible— not  to  intervene  "manu  militari." 

Yet  England's  internal  situation  is  at  present  very 
precarious  and  the  Liberal  party  is  in  power. 

As  I  have  thought  from  the  first  day  the  situation 
centers  in  London.  There  alone  can  it  become 
grave.  The  French  will  give  way  on  all  points  in 
order  to  have  peace.  It  is  different  with  the  English 
who  will  not  be  found  willing  to  compromise  on 
certain  principles  and  demands. 

Enclosed  you  will  find  an  interesting  article  from 
the  Temps  and  another  fairly  sober  one  from  the 
Matin. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  10  Aotit  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Par  mon  rapport  du  8  Juillet  dernier,  j 'avals  I'hon- 
neur  de  vous  dire  que,  selon  mes  informations,  M. 
Caillaux  aurait  regrette  a  cette  epoque  que  le  Gou- 
vernement  de  la  Republique  ait  mis  autant  d'insis- 
tance  a  prendre  le  mot  d'ordre  a  Londres  pour  de- 
terminer la  position  qu'il  avait  a  prendre  en  presence 
de  renvoi  d'un  navire  de  guerre  allemand  a  Agadir 
ct  qu'il  n'aurait  pas  approuve  I'attitude  prise  alors 
par  le  cabinet  de  St.  James. 

Ces  informations  semblent  se  confirmer.  On 
m'assure  que  le  premier  geste  de  I'Angleterre  aurait 
ete  de  proposer  a  la  France  que  les  deux  gouveme- 
ments  envoient  chacun,  sans  retard,  deux  navires  de 
guerre  dans  les  eaux  d'Agadir.  Le  Cabinet  de  Paris 
fit  a  cette  proposition  la  plus  vive  opposition,  et  Ton 
en  resta  la. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir: 


Paris,  August  10,  1911. 


In  my  report  of  July  8th  I  had  the  honor  to  tell 
you  that  according  to  my  information  at  that  time 
it  seemed  as  if  M.  Caillaux  were  regretting  that  he 
had  insisted  so  much  on  receiving  "the  word  of 
command"  from  London  in  order  to  determine  the 
stand  to  be  taken  in  face  of  the  despatch  of  a  Ger- 
man man-of-war  to  Agadir,  and  that  he  appeared 
not  to  agree  with  the  attitude  which  the  Cabinet  of 
St.  James's  took  at  that  time. 

This  information  seems  to  be  confirmed.  I  am 
told  that  at  first  England  proposed  to  France  that 
the  two  Governments  despatch  without  delay  two 
men-of-war  each  to  the  waters  of  Agadir.  The 
Cabinet  of  Paris  strongly  objected  to  this  and  there 
the  matter  stands. 


—    97    — 


11  est  interessant  de  noter  les  diverses  phases  de 
I'attitude  du  Cabinet  anglais:  d'abord,  le  projet  d'en- 
voyer  des  navires  de  guerre,  ensuite  le  discours  assez 
comminatoire  de  M.  Lloyd  George  pour  en  arriver 
aux  sages  paroles  de  M.  Asquith. 

La  France  a  la  chance  d'etre  representee  a  Ber- 
lin et  a  Londres  par  ses  deux  meilleurs  diplomates, 
les  freres  Cambon.  On  peut  se  demander  jusqu'  a 
quel  point  I'attitude  de  I'ambassadeur  frangais  en  An- 
gleterre  a  pu  determiner  et  modifier  I'attitude  du 
Cabinet  de  St.  James.  Les  deux  freres  s'entendent 
parfaitement ;  il  n'est  point  de  rivalite  entre  eux,  et 
il  est  assez  admissible  que  le  jour  oti  le  Premier  Mi- 
nistre  anglais  manifestait  le  desir  d'attendre  patiem- 
ment  le  resultat  de  la  conversation  engagee  a  Berlin, 
il  subissait  I'influence  de  M.  Cambon  qui  se  portait 
garant  de  I'habilete  de  son  frere  et  cherchait  a  lui 
menager  un  succes  personnel. 


Je  suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Guillaume. 


It  is  interesting  to  note  the  various  phases  in  the 

attitude  of  the  British  Cabinet:  first,  the  original 
project  to  despatch  warships,  then,  the  rather  threat- 
ening speech  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  finally,  the 
prudent  words  of  Mr.  Asquith. 

France  is  in  the  fortunate  position  of  being  repre- 
sented at  Berlin  and  London  by  her  two  ablest 
diplomats,  the  brothers  Cambon.  It  is  a  question 
to  what  extent  the  attitude  of  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor in  England  was  able  to  determine  and  modify 
the  attitude  of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James's.  The  two 
brothers  understand  each  other  perfectly;  there  is 
no  trace  of  rivalry  between  them ;  and  it  is  fairly 
safe  to  assume  that,  when  he  showed  a  desire  to 
await  patiently  the  result  of  the  conversation  pro- 
ceeding at  Berlin,  the  British  Prime  Minister  gave 
way  to  the  influence  of  M.  Cambon  who  vouched 
for  the  ability  of  his  brother  and  sought  to  help  him 
to  a  personal  success. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  81. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  12  Octobre  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

La  partie  de  I'arrangement  entre  I'Allemagne  et  la 
France  relative  au  Maroc  lui  meme  a  ete  paraphee 
hier  a  midi  par  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter  et  M.  Cam- 
bon. Un  communique  hautement  officieux  de  la 
"Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung"  I'a  annonce  des 
le  meme  soir.  Ainsi  se  trouve  justifie  I'optimisme 
du  secretaire  d'Etat  dont  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous 
entretenir  pour  la  derniere  fois  par  mon  rapport  du 
2  Octobre.  Esperons  qu'il  en  sera  de  meme  pour  la 
partie  de  la  negociation  qui  va  s'ouvrir  et  qui  con- 
cerne  les  compensations  territoriales  reclamees  par 
I'Allemagne.  Le  ton  de  la  presse  frangaise  m'inspire 
de  serieuses  inquietudes  a  cet  egard.  EUe  s'eleve 
avec  une  vehemence  tous  les  jours  croissante  contre 
tout  amoindrissement  du  domaine  colonial  actuel  de 
la  France  et  semble  avoir  totalement  perdu  de  vue 
quel  est  I'etat  veritable  de  la  question. 

On  a  ete  tres  sobre  ici  d'informations  au  sujet  de 
la  negociation  marocaine,  mais  nous  avons  ete  tres 
abondamment  renseignes  par  des  journaux  de  Paris. 
On  a  qualifie  a  Berlin  d'intempestives  et  de  regret- 
tables  les  communications  faites  a  la  presse  fran- 
gaise;  mais  on  ne  les  a  pas  dementies.  II  faut  done 
les  considerer  comme  exactes  au  moins  dans  les 
grandes  lignes.  L'Allemagne  aurait  obtenu  la  pro- 
messe  de  la  liberte  commerciale  au  Maroc  sur  un 
pied  d'egalite  avec  la  France  et  les  autres  pays  in- 
teresses.  C'est  ce  que  lui  donnait  deja  le  traite  d'Al- 
gesiras  confirmant  le  traite  de  Madrid.  Ces  arrange- 
ments intemationaux  lui  garantissaient  en  outre  I'in- 
dependance  du  Sultan  et  rintegrit6  du  territoire  ma- 
rocain.  Ni  I'une  ni  I'autre  n'existent  plus  en  fait, 
mais  elles  subsistent  encore  en  droit.  L'Allemagne 
donne  beaucoup  a  la  France  en  y  renongant  par  son 
consentement  a  I'etablissement  du  protectorat  fran- 
gais  sur  le  Maroc.  Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  a 
pris,  parait-il,  des  precautions  pour  que  les  promesses 
de  Berlin  soient  mieux  tenues  que  celles  <f  Algesiras 
systematiquement  violees  des  le  premier  jour.  ,  L'ac- 


Berlin,  October  12,  1911. 
Sir:— 

The  part  of  the  agreement  between  Germany  and 
France  which  refers  to  Morocco  itself  was  initialled 
yesterday  at  noon  by  Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter 
and  M.  Cambon.  An  official  communique  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  announced  it 
the  same  evening.  Thus  the  optimism  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  is  being  justified  which  I  had  the  honor 
to  mention  to  you  last  in  my  report  of  October  2nd. 
Let  it  be  hoped  that  the  same  may  be  said  of  that 
part  of  the  negotiations  which  is  about  to  commence 
and  which  concerns  itself  with  the  territorial  com- 
pensations claimed  by  Germany.  In  this  respect 
the  tone  of  the  French  press  is  causing  me  misgiv- 
ings. The  French  press  is  protesting  with  daily  in- 
creasing vehemence  against  every  diminution  of  the 
present  colonial  possessions  of  France  and  it  seems 
to  have  totally  lost  sight  of  the  real  state  of  the 
question. 

Everyone  has  been  very  reticent  here  on  the  Mo- 
roccan negotiations,  while  we  have  had  an  abund- 
ance of  information  through  the  Paris  papers.  The 
communications  made  to  the  French  press  have 
been  qualified  as  hasty  and  regrettable  at  Berlin, 
but  they  have  not  been  denied.  They  have,  therefore, 
to  be  considered  correct,  at  least  in  their  general 
outlines.  According  to  the  information  Germany 
has  been  promised  freedom  of  commerce  on  a  basis 
of  equality  with  France  and  the  other  interested 
countries.  That  much  was  granted  to  her  also  by 
the  treaty  of  Algeciras  continuing  the  treaty  of  Ma- 
drid. These  international  agreements  guaranteed, 
moreover,  the  independence  of  the  Sultan  and  the 
integrity  of  Moroccan  territory.  Neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  exist  any  longer  in  reality  but  they 
still  subsist  legally.  Germany  gives  a  great  deal 
to  France  in  renouncing  them  by  her  consent  to 
the  establishment  of  the  French  protectorate  over 
Morocco.  It  seems  that  the  Imperial  Government 
has  taken  precautions  that  the  promises  received 
in  Berlin  be  better  observed  than  those  of  Algeciras 


quiescement  a  ces  conditions  n'est  pas  comme  on  af- 
fecte  de  le  croire  a  Paris,  une  concession  frangaise; 
c'est  tout  au  plus  une  limitation  des  concessions  al- 
lemandes.    L'AUemagne  seule  en  a  fait  jusqu'ici. 


C'est  le  tour  maintenant  des  concessions  frangaises 
consistant  dans  la  cession  de  territoire  promise.  Les 
journaux  parisiens  paraissent  avoir  absolument  ou- 
blie  que  les  deux  parties  du  traite  projete  sont  in- 
dissolublement  liees ;  mais  ici  on  ne  sera  sans  doute 
pas  d'humeur  a  les  disjoindre. 

J'ai  lieu  de  penser  que  Ton  croit  ici  le  Gouverne- 
ment  Frangais  sincerement  desireux  de  tenir  la  pa- 
role donnee;  mais  il  est  faible,  dependant  des  ca- 
prices d'une  majorite  mal  assuree.  Aura-t-il  le  cou- 
rage et  la  force  de  resister  a  une  poussee  de  I'opinion 
publique  si  celle-ci  s'accentue  dans  le  sens  du  refus 
de  toute  compensation  territoriale? 

Nous  devons  nous  feliciter  de  ce  que  I'accord  soit 
conclu  sur  la  premiere  moitie  de  I'arrangement  ma- 
rocain,  mais  le  peril  ne  sera  entierement  ecarte  pour 
la  Belgique  que  quand  le  traite  tout  entier  sera  signe 
€t  approuve  par  les  parlements  des  deux  pays. 


Agreez  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


No.  82. 


which  were  systematically  violated  from  the  first 
day.  The  consent  to  these  conditions  is  not,  as  peo- 
ple in  Paris  affect  to  believe,  a  concession  made  by 
France;  it  is  at  the  most  a  restriction  of  German 
concessions,  for  so  far  concessions  have  been  made 
only  by  Germany. 

The  turn  of  French  concessions  is  coming  now; 
they  will  consist  in  the  cession  of  the  promised 
territory.  The  Parisian  papers  seem  to  have  com- 
pletely forgotten  that  the  two  parts  of  the  planned 
treaty  are  indissolubly  connected;  but  here  in  Ber- 
lin there  will  be  no  inclination  to  separate  them. 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  here  the  French 
Government  is  credited  with  a  sincere  intention  to 
keep  its  word ;  but  it  is  feeble  and  depends  on  the 
caprices  of  an  uncertain  majority.  Will  it  have  the 
courage  and  the  strength  to  resist  the  pressure  of 
pubHc  opinion  if  the  latter  grows  more  insistent  in 
its  refusal  of  any  territorial  compensation  whatever? 

We  should  congratulate  ourselves  on  the  fact  that 
an  agreement  has  been  reached  as  to  the  first  half  of 
the  Moroccan  arrangement,  but  the  danger  for  Bel- 
gium will  not  cease  until  the  treaty  is  signed  in  its 
entirety  and  approved  by  the  parliaments  of  the 
two  countries. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  18  Novembre  1911. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Lorsque  je  suis  rentre  a  mon  poste  en  septembre 
dernier,  j'ai  appris  de  divers  cotes  que  la  situation 
politique  generale  avait  ete  jugee  assez  grave,  quel- 
ques  semaines.avant,  pour  que  le  Gouvernement  An- 
glais ait  cru  devoir  prendre  des  precautions  extraor- 
^inaires.  II  m'est  revenu,  de  sources  assez  sures, 
que  les  officiers  de  I'armee  active  avaient  alors  ete 
subitement  rappeles  de  conge,  que  des  achats  de 
<:hevaux  avaient  eu  lieu  pour  la  cavalerie,  et  que 
I'escadre  de  la  mer  du  nord  avait  ete  mise  momen- 
tanement  sur  pied  de  guerre. 

Une  lettre  adressee  a  I'editeur  socialiste  du  "Vor- 
warts"  de  Berlin  par  M.  Ramsay  Macdonald,  un 
membre  socialiste  de  la  Chambre  anglaise  fournit 
des  details  interessants  sur  cette  epoque  critique. 
M.  Macdonald  declare  que  la  guerre  n'a  ete  evitee 
que  grace  a  I'intervention  personnelle  de  I'Empe- 
reur,  auquel  et  le  Tsar  et  le  Roi  Georges  auraient 
■ecrit. 

Un  autre  membre  radical  de  la  Chambre  anglaise, 
M.  Ponsonby,  a  confirme,  dans  un  speech  au  Reform 
Club,  I'exactitude  des  bruits  qui  ont  couru  au  sujet 
des  preparations  navales  et  militaires.  Le  "Daily 
News"  d'hier  public  sur  ce  qui  precede  les  deux  ar- 
ticles ci-joints. 

Plusieurs  deputes  ont  insiste  a  la  Chambre  pour 
que  le  Gouvernement  eclaire  la  nation  sur  ce  qui 
s'est  passe  cet  ete  entre  les  Cabinets  de  Londres, 
Berlin  et  Paris;  aucune  information  n'ayant  ete  don- 
nee au  Parlement  posterieurement  a  la  publication 
■du  fameux  speech  du  chancelier  de  I'echiquier,  M. 
Lloyd  George. 

On  s'attend  a  un  speech  interessant  de  Sir  E. 
Grey  sur  la  politique  exterieure  dans  le  courant  de 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


London,  November  18,  1911. 


When  I  returned  to  my  post  last  September  I 
learned  from  various  sources  that  some  weeks  be- 
fore that  time  the  political  situation  had  been  con- 
sidered so  grave  that  the  British  Government 
thought  it  necessary  to  take  extraordinary  precau- 
tions. I  was  informed  through  reliable  sources 
that  the  officers  of  the  active  army  had  suddenly 
been  called  back  from  their  furloughs,  that  horses 
had  been  bought  for  the  cavalry,  and  that  the  North 
Sea  squadron  had  immediately  been  put  on  war 
footing. 

A  letter  addressed  to  the  editor  of  the  socialist 
Vorwarts  at  Berlin  by  Mr.  Ramsay  Macdonald,  a 
socialist  member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  fur- 
nishes interesting  details  concerning  this  critical 
period.  Mr.  Macdonald  declares  that  war  was  only 
avoided  thanks  to  the  personal  intervention  of  the 
Emperor  to  whom  the  Czar  and  King  George  had 
written. 

Another  radical  member  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, Mr.  Ponsonby,  confirmed  in  a  speech  in  the 
Reform  Club  the  correctness  of  the  rumors  which 
were  current  concerning  the  naval  and  military  prep- 
arations. The  Daily  News  of  yesterday  published 
on  these  matters  the  two  articles  which  I  append. 

Several  members  insisted  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons that  the  Government  inform  the  nation  as  to 
what  had  passed  between  the  Cabinets  of  London, 
Berlin,  and  Paris,  as  no  information  had  reached 
Parliament  since  the  publication  of  the  famous 
speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  is  expected  to  deliver  an  inter- 
esting speech  on  the  foreign  policy  in  the  course 


la  semaine  prochaine.  II  est  possible  que  le  Minis- 
tre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  en  profitc  pour  eclairer 
le  public  non  seulement  sur  les  relations  anglo-alle- 
mandes,  mais  aussi  sur  I'adhesion  de  la  Grande-Bre- 
tagne  a  I'accord  marocain  franco-allemand  et  sur 
I'attitude  anglaise  dans  les  negociations  franco-espa- 
gnoles  actuellement  en  cours. 

II  semble  qu'il  y  ait  des  raisons  de  croire  que  le 
Roi  d'Espagne  a  soUicite  I'appui  officieux  du  Roi 
Georges  dans  I'espece. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


of  next  week.  It  is  possible  that  the  Minister  ol 
Foreign  Affairs  will  make  use  of  that  occasion  to 
inform  the  public  not  only  about  the  Anglo-German 
relations,  but  also  about  Great  Britain's  adhesion 
to  the  Franco-German  agreement  concerning  Mo- 
rocco and  about  the  English  attitude  in  the  Franco- 
Spanish  negotiations  which  are  at  present  proceed- 
ing. 

There  seems  to  be  reason  to  believe  that  the 
King  of  Spain  has  asked  King  George's  unofficial 
support  in  that  matter. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  28  Novembre  1911. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  discours  de  Sir  Edward  Grey,  attendu  avec  im- 
patience a  Londres,  a  Berlin  et  a  Paris,  et  avec  un 
vif  interet  dans  les  autres  capitales,  a  ete  prononce 
hier  aux  Communes,  devant  une  Chambre  bondee. 

La  nation  anglaise  esperait  apprendre,  avant  tout, 
les  veritables  causes  de  la  tension  des  rapports  an- 
glo-allemands  de  I'ete  dernier,  qui  n'a  ete  connue 
que  tres  tard  par  le  public  et,  subsidiairement,  comp- 
tait  etre  eclairee  sur  la  nature  des  engagements,  si 
tant  est  qu'il  y  en  eut,  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  avait 
pu  avoir  contractes  avec  la  Republique  Frangaise,  a 
I'insu  du  Parlement  depuis  1904.  Comme  j'ai  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  le  21  de  ce  mois,  cette  hy- 
pothese  improbable  inquietait  certains  esprits  depuis 
la  recente  alerte.  L'entente  cordiale  etait  populaire 
a  condition  de  ne  pas  devoir  entrainer  I'Angleterre 
a  des  sacrifices  inattendus  en  hommes  et  en  argent. 

La  presse  gerrftanique  de  son  cote  ne  cachait  pas 
son  impression  que  du  discours  du  Ministre  Anglais 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  dependrait  I'amelioration 
des  relations  anglo-allemandes  si  peu  cordiales  en  ce 
moment. 

A  Paris  on  se  demandait  si  l'entente,  populaire  en 
Angleterre  jusqu'ici,  sortirait  absolument  indemne 
de  cette  epreuve. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  annonce  qu'il  se  bornerait  a  traiter 
la  question  marocaine  pour  le  moment.  (II  a  cepen- 
dant  fini  par  parler  de  la  Perse  et  du  Tripoli.)  II  a  ex- 
pose la  version  anglaise,  qui  differe  un  peu,  comme 
on  pouvait  le  prevoir,  de  la  these  allemande. 

Version  allemande.  On  peut  rappeler  celle-ci  en 
quelques  mots :  le  30  juin  I'Allemagne  a  informe  les 
Puissances  signataires  de  I'Acte  d'Algesiras  de  I'en- 
voi  de  la  "Panther"  a  Agadir,  pour  y  proteger  les 
sujets  germaniques  menaces  par  les  indigenes.  Le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  n'avait  en  vue  aucune  con- 
quete  territoriale.  Le  21  juillet.  Sir  E.  Grey  a  de- 
mande  au  Comte  de  Metternich  une  explication  sur 
la  presence  persistante  du  vaisseau  dans  le  port  ma- 
rocain, en  ajoutant  que,  si  les  negociations  anglo- 
allemandes-fran^aises  venaient  a  echouer,  la  question 
d' Agadir  deviendrait  aigue,  et  demandant  que  I'An- 
gleterre participat  aux  negociations.  Les  demandes 
allemandes  semblaient  inacceptaples  pou  la  France. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  nie  que  les  exigen- 


No.  83. 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


London,  November  28,  1911. 

Sir:— 

The  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  awaited  with 
impatience  in  London,  Berlin,  and  Paris,  and  with 
lively  interest  in  the  other  capitals,  was  delivered 
yesterday  before  a  crowded  House. 

The  British  nation  hoped  to  learn  above  all  the 
real  causes  for  the  tension  in  the  Anglo-German  re- 
lations during  last  summer,  which  became  known 
to  the  public  only  very  lately.  It  furthermore  count- 
ed on  being  enlightened  on  the  nature  of  the  obliga- 
tions, if  such  existed,  which  Great  Britain  might 
have  contracted  with  the  French  Republic,  without 
the  knowledge  of  Parliament,  since  1904.  As 
I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  on  the  21st  inst.  this 
improbable  hypothesis  has  caused  anxiety  to  cer- 
tain people  since  the  recent  alarm.  The  entente 
cordiale  was  popular  as  far  as  it  did  not  involve 
England  in  unexpected  sacrifices  of  men  and  money. 

The  German  press,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not 
conceal  its  impression  that  the  improvement  of  the 
Anglo-German  relations,  so  little  cordial  at  present, 
would  depend  on  the  speech  of  the  British  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs. 

In  Paris  the  question  was  propounded  whether 
the  entente,  which  had  been  popular  in  England  up 
to  the  present,  would  emerge  absolutely  unscathed 
from  this  test. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  announced  that  he  would  for 
the  moment  confine  himself  to  the  Moroccan  ques- 
tion. (In  point  of  fact  he  also  spoke  of  Persia  and 
Tripolis.)  He  gave  the  English  version  which  dif- 
fers somewhat,  as  was  to  be  expected,  from  the 
German  arguments. 

German  version.  This  may  be  summed  up  in  a 
few  words :  on  June  30th,  Germany  informed  the 
signatory  Powers  of  the  Algeciras  Act  of  the'  des- 
patch of  the  "Panther"  to  Agadir  for  the  protection 
of  German  subjects  threatened  by  natives.  The 
Imperial  Government  aimed  at  no  territorial  con- 
quest. On  July  21st,  Sir  Edward  Grey  demanded 
of  Count  von  Metternich  an  explanation  for  the 
continued  presence  of  the  vessel  in  the  Moroccan 
port,  adding  that  if  the  Franco-German  negotiations 
should  fail,  the  Agadir  question  would  become  acute 
and  demanding  that  England  take  part  in  the  nego- 
tiations. The  German  demands  seemed  to  be  un- 
acceptable to  France. 

The   German    Ambassador   denied   that   the   de- 


ces  de  son  gouvernement  fussent  inacceptables,  a 
prie  Sir  E.  Grey  de  citer  les  interets  anglais  qui  pou- 
vaient  etre  leses.  L'Angleterre  trouvait  sa  compen- 
sation en  Egypte,  mais  TAllemagne  n'en  avait  pas 
encore.  L'Angleterre  paraissait  avoir  deux  poids  et 
deux  mesures,  selon  qu'il  s'agissait  de  la  France  ou 
de  I'Allemagne. 

Le  soir  meme  du  21  juillet,  aonc  avant  que  I'entre- 
vue  de  Sir  E.  Grey  avec  le  Comte  de  Metternich  ne 
put  etre  connue  a  Berlin,  M.  Lloyd  George  faisait 
son  fameux  discours,  qui  a  irrite  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial. 

Le  gouvernement  allemand,  le  24,  a  charge  son 
Ambassadeur  de  dire  que  I'Allemagne  ne  songeait 
pas  a  acquerir  des  territoires  au  Maroc,  mais  de 
prier  Sir  E.  Grey  de  ne  pas  en  parler  a  la  Chambre, 
pour  que  le  gouvernement  allemand  n'ait  pas  I'air 
d'avoir  cede  devant  le  ton  menagant  de  M.  Lloyd 
George. 

Or,  voici  la  version  du  Ministre  Anglais  des  Affai- 
res Etrangeres : 

Version  anglaise.  D'apres  lui,  I'expose  allemand 
est  incomplet.  II  a  compris  d'apres  une  communi- 
cation verbale  de  I'Ambassadeur  en  date  du  ler  juil- 
let, que  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  visait  un  partage  du  Ma- 
roc en  envoyant  un  navire  de  guerre  a  Agadir.  (Sir 
E.  Grey  ne  semble  pas  avoir  compris  que  le  vaisseau 
n'etait  que  temporairement  a  Agadir.)  Le  4  juillet 
Sir  E.  Grey  a  dit  au  Comte  de  Metternich  qu'on  etait 
en  presence  d'une  situation  nouvelle  aiTectant  les 
interets  de  I'Angleterre,  qui  serait  examinee  en  con- 
seil  des  ministres.  Plus  tard  la  presse  a  annonce  que 
I'Allemagne  avait  adresse  des  demandes  inaccepta- 
bles a  la  France  au  sujet  du  Congo  frangais,  et  le  21 
juillet  le  Ministre  anglais  a  dit  a  I'Ambassadeur  que 
la  presence  d'un  vaisseau  allemand  a  Agadir  etait 
inquietante,  vu  les  possibilites  d'une  rupture  des  ne- 
gociations  franco-allemandes  en  cours.  Le  meme 
jour,  le  Chancelier  de  I'Echiquier  a  prononce  son 
speech,  dans  lequel  il  disait  simplement  que  lorsque 
des  traites  britanniques  etaient  en  jeu  on  ne  pouvait 
traiter  le  Gouvernement  Anglais  comme  etant  sans 
importance.  "Le  jour  oti  un  chancelier  anglais  ne 
pourrait  pas  tenir  ce  langage,  I'Angleterre  ne  serait 
plus  une  grande  nation." 

Vu  le  ton  des  communications  germaniques.  Sir 
E.  Grey  a  trouve  qu'il  n'etait  pas  de  la  dignite  du 
Gouvernement  Britanniquededonnerdes  explications 
au  sujet  du  discours  de  M.  Lloyd  George.  Ce  n'est 
que  le  24  juillet  que  le  Comte  de  Metternich  a  nie 
toute  intention  allemande  d'etablir  une  base  navale 
a  Agadir,  et  encore  en  priant  Sir  E.  Grey  de  ne  pas 
en  parler  au  Parlement. 

II  y  avait  done  en  ce  moment  une  possibilite  de 
rupture  dans  les  negociations  franco-allemandes.  La 
situation  etait  inquietante.  Pourquoi?  Parce  qu'une 
des  Puissances  signataires  de  I'acte  d'Algesiras  au- 
rait  pu  reclamer  la  reunion  d'une  conference  et  I'Al- 
lemagne declarait  qu'elle  n'en  voulait  pas.  Position 
delicate  pour  I'Angleterre,  qui  n'aurait  pas  eu  voix 
au  chapitre  en  presence  du  Maroc  occupe  par  trois 
Puissances,  la  France,  I'Allemagne  et  I'Espagne. 

En  somme,  Sir  E.  Grey  reproche  au  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  d'avoir  attendu  le  24  juillet  pour  de- 
clarer qu'il  n'avait  pas  de  visees  sur  le  territoire 
marocain  (ce  qui  ne  parait  pas  cadrer  avec  la  ver- 
sion allemande),  et  d'avoir  voulu  exclure  I'Angle- 
terre de  tout  arrangement  en  cas  d'insucces  dans 
les  negociations  entre  Paris  et  Berlin.  Tels  etaient 
les  motifs  de  la  tension  recente  des  relations. 

Pour  le  reste.  Sir  E.  Grey  a  dit  qu'il  n'y  avait  plus 
lieu  de  s'alarmer,  aujourd'hui  il  n'etait  pas  question 
de  guerre.    II  n'existe  plus  aucun  traite  secret  avec 


mands  of  his  Government  were  inacceptable  and 
asked  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  name  the  British  inter- 
ests which  might  suffer.  England  had  her  com- 
pensation in  Egypt,  while  Germany  had  not  yet  had 
any.  England  seemed  to  use  a  different  scale  of 
measurement  for  France  and  Germany. 

On  the  same  evening,  July  21st,  that  is  to  say 
before  the  conversation  between  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  Count  von  Metternich  could  be  known  at  Ber- 
lin, Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  his  famous  speech 
which  irritated  the  Imperial  Government. 

On  the  24th,  the  German  Government  instructed 
its  Ambassador  to  say  that  Germany  had  no  thought 
of  acquiring  territory  in  Morocco,  but  to  ask  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey  not  to  mention  this  in  the  House 
in  order  to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  German 
Government  had  given  way  before  the  threatening 
tone  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

The  following  is  the  version  of  the  British  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs. 

English  version.  According  to  Sir  Edward  the 
German  expos&  is  incomplete.  He  gathered  from 
a  verbal  communication  of  the  Ambassador  on  July 
1st  that  the  Cabinet  of  BerHn  in  sending  a  warship 
to  Agadir  was  aiming  at  a  partition  of  Morocco. 
(Sir  Edward  Grey  does  not  seem  to  have  under- 
stood that  the  vessel  was  only  at  Agadir  tempor- 
arily.) On  July  4th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  Count 
von  Metternich  that  the  situation  had  now  assumed 
a  new  aspect  which  affected  the  interests  of  England 
and  would  be  examined  by  the  Cabinet.  Later  the 
press  announced  that  Germany  had  addressed  un- 
acceptable demands  to  France  with  regard  to  the 
French  Congo  and  on  July  21st  the  British  Minister 
told  the  Ambassador  that  the  presence  of  a  German 
man-of-war  was  disquieting  in  the  face  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  rupture  of  the  pending  Franco-German 
negotiations.  On  the  same  day  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer  delivered  his  speech  in  which  he 
simply  said  that  when  British  interests  were  in- 
volved, the  British  Government  could  not  be  treated 
as  of  no  importance.  "On  the  day  when  a  British 
Chancellor  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  use  such 
language  England  would  cease  to  be  a  great  na- 
tion." Considering  the  tone  of  the  German  com- 
munications. Sir  Edward  Grey  thought  it  beneath 
the  dignity  of  the  British  Government  to  give 
explanations  concerning  the  speech  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George.  Not  before  July  24th  did  Count  Metternich 
deny  all  intention  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  estab- 
lish a  naval  base  at  Agadir,  and  even  then  he  asked 
Sir  Edward  Grey  not  to  speak  of  it  in  Parliament. 

In  this  moment  there  was  therefore  a  possibility 
of  a  rupture  of  the  Franco-German  negotiations. 
The  situation  was  disquieting.  Why?  Because 
one  of  the  signatory  Powers  of  Algeciras  could  have 
demanded  that  a  conference  be  called  and  Germany 
declared  that  it  did  not  want  a  conference.  A  deli- 
cate position  for  England  who  would  have  had  no 
voice  in  the  matter  considering  that  Morocco  was 
occupied  by  three  Powers :  France,  Germany,  and 
Spain. 

In  short  Sir  Edward  Grey  accuses  the  Imperial 
Government  of  having  deferred  until  July  24th  its 
declaration  that  it  had  no  intentions  on  Moroccan 
territory  (this  does  not  seem  to  fit  in  with  the  Ger- 
man version),  and  of  having  wished  to  exclude 
England  from  any  arrangement  to  be  made  in  case 
the  negotiations  between  Paris  and  Berlin  should 
fail.  These  were  the  causes  of  the  recent  tension  in 
the  relations. 

For  the  rest,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  that  there  was 
no  longer  any  cause  for  alarm ;  to-day  there  was 
no  question  of  war.     There  was  no  secret  treaty 


la  France.  L'Angleterre  ne  demande  qu'a  vivre  en 
bons  termes  avec  TAUemagne,  sans  sacrifier  ses  au- 
tres  amities.  Elle  ne  desire  aucun  accroissement 
territorial  en  Afrique. 

Le  discours  du  Ministre  a  ete  bien  regu  et  a  cal- 
me  bien  des  apprehensions.  On  en  deduit  que  la 
crise  est  passee,  que  I'entente  cordiale  n'est  pas  une 
alliance  deguisee  et  que  I'Angleterre  a  loyalement 
soutenu  la  France  (d'autant  plus  que  c'etait  son 
interet),  et  est  disposee  a  se  montrer  conciliante 
pour  TAllemagne. 

Le  nouveau  chef  de  I'opposition,  M.  Bonar  Law, 
a  soutenu  le  Gouvernement  et  a  approuve,  au  nom 
des  conservateurs,  la  politique  de  Sir  E.  Grey,  qui 
n'a  ete  attaque  que  par  le  parti  ouvrier.  Le  Pre- 
mier Ministre  a  pris  aussi  la  parole  pour  declarer 
que  la  Grande-Bretagne  etait  pacifique,  et  ne  refu- 
sait  a  aucune  autre  Puissance  sa  place  au  soleil. 

II  semble  resulter  de  la  polemique  sur  les  deux 
versions,  allemande  et  anglaise,  relativement  aux 
conversations  entre  le  Comte  de  Metternich  et  Sir 
E.  Grey,  que  celui-ci  n'a  pas  compris  des  le  debut, 
ler  juillet,  que  I'AUemagne  promettait  de  rappeler 
son  vaisseau  de  guerre  aussitot  que  tout  serait  ren- 
tre  dans  I'ordre  au  Marco,  et  que  ceci  equivalait, 
dans  la  pensee  allemande,  a  dire  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  ne  visait  pas  I'etablissement  d'une 
base  navale  a  Agadir.  Sir  E.  Grey  pretend  qu'il  n'a 
regu  cette  assurance  que  le  24  juillet. 

Plus  tard,  dans  la  soiree  d'hier,  en  reponse  a  des 
interpellations,  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
a  parle  de  la  Perse  et  de  Tripoli.  II  a  defendu  I'ar- 
rangement  Anglo-Russe  en  Perse,  a  declare  que  I'at- 
titude  actuelle  du  Gouvernement  de  Saint-Peters- 
bourg  etait  comprehensible,  que  la  Perse  doit  tenir 
compte  des  interets  russes  et  anglais,  et  ne  pas  espe- 
rer  se  liberer  de  toute  influence  russe. 

Passant  a  Tripoli,  Sir  E.  Grey  a  dit  qu'il  n'etait 
pas  a  meme  de  connaitre  la  verite  sur  ce  qui  s'etait 
passe.  Les  Turcs  et  les  Italiens  s'accusaient  mu- 
tuellement,  le  Gouvernement  Anglais  maintenait 
son  point  de  vue  de  neutralite  et  de  non-interven- 
tion. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


with  France.  Engkiid'oiily'Tvishieif  to  li\«' on  good 
terms  with  Germany  without  sacrificing  her  other 
friendships.  She  desired  no  territorial  aggrandise- 
ments in  Africa. 

The  speech  of  the  Minister  was  well  received  and 
dispelled  many  apprehensions.  The  conclusions  to 
be  drawn  from  it  are  that  the  crisis  is  past,  that  the 
entente  cordiale  is  not  an  alliance  in  disguise,  that 
England  has  loyally  supported  France  (all  the  more 
so,  as  it  was  to  her  interest)  and  that  she  is  inclined 
to  show  herself  conciliatory  towards  Germany. 

The  new  leader  of  the  opposition,  Mr.  Bonar  Law, 
supported  the  Government  and  expressed  in  the 
name  of  the  Conservatives  his  approval  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey's  policy,  which  was  only  attacked  by  the 
labor  party.  The  Prime  Minister,  too,  rose  to  de- 
clare that  Great  Britain  was  pacific  and  did  not 
refuse  to  any  Power  its  place  in  the  sun. 

It  seems  from  the  polemic  about  the  two  ver- 
sions, German  and  English,  relative  to  the  conversa- 
tions between  Count  von  Metternich  and  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  that  the  latter  did  not  understand  from 
the  beginning,  the  1st  of  July,  that  Germany  prom- 
ised to  recall  her  warship  as  soon  as  order  would 
have  been  restored  in  Morocco  and  that  this  was 
equivalent,  in  the  German  mind,  to  saying  that  the 
Imperial  Government  did  not  intend  to  establish  a 
naval  base  at  Agadir.  Sir  Edward  Grey  maintains 
that  he  did  not  receive  that  assurance  before  Tuly 
24th.  ^    ' 

Later  last  night,  in  answer  to  questions,  the  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  spoke  of  Persia  and  Tri- 
polis.  He  defended  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement 
in  Persia,  declared  that  the  present  attitude  of  the 
Government  of  St.  Petersburg  could  be  understood, 
that  Persia  had  to  take  Russian  and  English  inter- 
ests into  consideration,  and  could  not  hope  to  free 
herself  entirely  froin  Russian  influence. 

Passing  on  to  Tripolis,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said 
that  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  know  what  had 
really  happened.  The  Turks  and  the  Italians  were 
accusing  each  other;  the  British  Government  was 
maintaining  its  standpoint  of  neutrality  and  non- 
intervention. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  84. 


No.  84. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  30  Novembre  19U. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Lord  Lansdowne,  en  sa  qualite  de  chef  de  I'oppo- 
sition conservatrice  a  la  Chambre  des  Lords,  a  ap- 
prouve le  discours  de  Sir  E.  Grey,  dont  j'ai  eu  I'hon- 
neur  de  vous  entretenir  le  28  de  ce  mois.  II  a  ex- 
prime  seulement  son  regret  de  ce  que  M.  Lloyd 
George,  au  lieu  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
bien  mieux  qualifie,  ait  prononce  le  fameux  discours 
elabore  en  conseil  des  Ministres  et  qui  a  cause  a 
Berlin  I'emotion  que  Ton  sait.  II  a  ajoute  qu'a  son 
avis,  I'entente  cordiale  etait  sortie  fortifiee  de  la  der- 
niere  crise  et  etait  destinee,  ainsi  que  I'entente  anglo- 
russe,  a  etre  permanente. 

Lord  Courtney  of  Penrith,  liberal  et  ami  de  I'Al- 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  November  30.   191L 

Sir;— 

Lord  Lansdowne,  in  his  capacity  of  leader  of  the 
Conservative  opposition  in  the  House  of  Lords,  ap- 
proved of  the  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  which 
I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  on  the  28th  inst. 
He  only  expressed  regret  at  the  fact  that  instead 
of  the  much  better  qualified  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  delivered  the  famous 
speech,  elaborated  by  the  Ministers  in  Council, 
which  was  known  to  have  caused  irritation  in  Ber- 
lin. He  added  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  entente 
cordiale  had  emerged  from  the  last  crisis  strength- 
ened and  was  destined,  as  was  the  Anglo-Russian 
entente,  to  be  permanent. 

Lord  Courtney  of  Penrith,  a  Liberal  and  friend 


102 


lemagne,  a' att'a'qiie' la' fyblifi'qu's'du  Gouvernement 
parce  qu'elle  avait  vise  I'isolement  de  rAUemagne 
(il  est  rare  d'entendre  cette  verite  au  Parlement  Bri- 
tannique)  et  parce  qu'elle  n'avait  pas  soutenu  I'acte 
d'Algesiras.  Sir  E.  Grey  aurait  dii  decourager  le 
Cabinet  de  Paris,  lorsqu'il  a  fait  bon  marche  des  sti- 
pulations de  cet  acte  international.  II  aurait  em- 
peche  ainsi  les  froissements  avec  Berlin  et  I'expe- 
dition  italienne  a  Tripoli  n'aurait  probablement  ja- 
mais eu  lieu. 

Une  condescendance  aveugle  pour  les  visees  fran- 
gaises  avait  amene  cette  deplorable  tension  avec  I'Al- 
lemagne. 

Ces  verites  desagreables  n'ont  pas  ete  du  gout  de 
la  Chambre  Haute. 

Un  passage  du  discours  de  Lord  Lansdowne  est 
a  noter.  C'est  celui  ou  il  a  parle  des  articles  secrets 
de  1914,  recemment  publics.  II  a  admis  que,  dans 
un  cas  de  ce  genre,  la  promesse  de  donner  simple- 
ment  un  appui  diplomatique  a  une  autre  Puissance 
peut  amener  I'obligation  de  lui  fournir  une  assis- 
tance d'un  autre  genre  (lisez  militaire  et  navale). 
Une  entente  cordiale  amene  d'etroites  relations  en- 
tre  les  deux  pays  et  ils  ne  peuvent  rester  indiffe- 
rents.  Si  I'un  des  deux  se  trouve  dans  une  situation 
difficile  sans  que  ce  soit  de  sa  faute,  il  s'attendra  a 
etre  soutenu  par  son  ami. 

II  suffit  de  lire  entre  les  lignes  pour  voir  que 
d'apres  Lord  Lansdowne,  un  des  auteurs  de  I'en- 
tente  cordiale,  celle-ci,  sans  etre  une  alliance,  pour- 
rait  produire,  dans  certaines  eventualites,  tous  les 
effets  d'un  traite  defensif  entre  les  deux  nations. 

Lord  Weardale  et  Lord  Newton  ont  approuve  les 
critiques  de  Lord  Courtney.  L'Angleterre  avait 
soutenu  la  France  contre  I'Allemagne,  de  la  I'irrita- 
tion  de  cette  derniere  Puissance  et  la  difficulte  d'a- 
meliorer  les  relations  avec  Berlin. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  85. 


of  Germany,  attacked  the  policy  of  the  Government, 
because  it  had  been  aiming  at  the  isolation  of  Ger- 
many (it  is  rare  to  hear  that  truth  expressed  in  the 
British  Parliament)  and  because  it  had  not  upheld 
the  Act  of  Algeciras.  Sir  Edward  Grey  should  have 
discouraged  the  Cabinet  of  Paris  when  it  disre- 
garded the  stipulations  of  that  international  act. 


Blind  subservience  to  the  French  plans  had  led 
to  the  present  deplorable  tension  with  Germany. 

These  disagreeable  truths  have  not  been  to  the 
liking  of  the  House  of  Lords. 

A  passage  in  the  speech  of  Lord  Lansdowne  is 
worthy  of  notice.  It  is  the  one  in  which  he  speaks 
of  the  secret  clauses  of  1904,  recently  made  public. 
He  admitted  that  in  such  a  case  the  promise  simply 
to  give  diplomatic  support  to  another  Power  might 
lead  to  the  obligation  to  furnish  assistance  of  an- 
other kind  (videlicet,  military  and  naval).  An  en- 
tente cordiale  established  close  relations  between 
two  countries  and  they  could  not  remain  indifferent. 
If  the  one  found  itself  in  a  difficult  position  without 
any  fault  of  its  own,  it  would  expect  to  receive 
assistance  from  its  friend. 

You  only  have  to  read  between  the  lines  in  order 
to  see  that  according  to  Lord  Lansdowne,  one  of 
the  originators  of  the  entente  cordiale,  the  latter 
can,  without  being  an  alliance,  produce  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  all  the  effects  of  a  defensive 
treaty  between  the  two  nations. 

Lord  Weardale  and  Lord  Newton  sustained  the 
criticisms  of  Lord  Courtney.  England  had  sup- 
ported France  against  Germany,  hence  the  irritation 
of  the  latter  and  the  difficulty  of  improving  the  rela- 
tions with  Berlin. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  6  Decembre  1911. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Par  mon  rapport  du  30  novembre  dernier  j'ai  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  ecrire  que  le  discours  prononce 
le  27  novembre  a  la  Chambre  des  Communes  par 
Sir  E.  Grey  avait  cause  une  mauvaise  impression 
en  Allemagne.  Elle  persiste.  Les  journaux  ont  a 
peine  mentionne  ce  qui  dans  les  debats  parlemen- 
taires  pouvait  non  amener  un  retour  immediat  a  des 
relations  normales  impossible  a  esperer  dans  I'etat 
d'irritation  actuelle,  mais  au  moins  aplanir  la  voie 
pour  une  detente  dans  I'avenir. 

Dans  ses  discours  du  9  et  du  10  novembre  au 
Reichstag  le  chancelier  de  I'Empire  avait  fait  preuve 
des  dispositions  les  plus  conciliantes.  Ainsi  que  I'a 
reconnu  Sir  E.  Grey  lui-meme,  M.  de  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  avait  reussi  a  eviter  tout  ce  qui  aurait  pu 
blesser  I'opinion  publique  anglaise.  Parlant  de  ce 
qu'avait  gagne  I'Allemagne  par  les  traites  du  21  no- 
vembre, le  chancelier  a  dit  que  I'arrangement  conclu 
avec  la  France  aurait  aussi  un  heureux  effet  sur  les 
relations  de  I'Allemagne  avec  I'Angleterre.     Dans 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

BerHn,  December  6,  1911. 

Sir:— 

In  my  report  of  November  30th  I  had  the  honor 
to  write  to  you  that  the  speech  delivered  on  Novem- 
ber 27th  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  caused  a  bad  impression  in  Germany. 
That  impression  still  prevails.  The  papers  scarcely 
mentioned  those  phases  of  the  parliamentary  debate 
which,  if  they  cannot  lead  to  an  immediate  return 
to  normal  relations — not  to  be  hoped  for  in  the 
present  state  of  irritation — might  at  least  pave  the 
way  for  a  future  relaxation  in  the  existing  tension. 

In  his  speeches,  which  he  made  in  the  Reichstag 
on  November  9th  and  10th,  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
gave  proof  of  the  most  conciliatory  intentions.  As 
Sir  Edward  Grey  himself  admitted,  Mr.  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg  succeeded  in  avoiding  everything 
that  might  have  hurt  public  opinion  in  England. 
Speaking  of  what  Germany  had  gained  by  the  treat- 
ies of  November  21st,  the  Chancellor  said  that  the 
arrangement  made  with  France  would  also  have  a 
fortunate  effect  on  the  relations  of  Germany  with 


toute  I'affaire  marocaine  le  Gouvernement  Britanni- 
que,  lie  par  des  engagements  contractes  par  traite 
s'etait  toujours  range  du  cote  de  la  France,  au  moins 
diplomatiquement,  le  reglement  de  la  question  fait 
table  rase. 

C'etait  sous  une  forme  breve  et  discrete  I'ex- 
pression  tres  claire  du  desir  de  mettre  un  terme  aux 
recriminations  sur  le  passe,  a  inaugurer  une  ere  nou- 
velle  de  bons  rapports  entre  les  deux  pays. 

II  n'eut  pas  ete  possible  sans  casser  les  vitres  de 
repousser  les  avances  de  M.  de  Bethmann  HoUweg. 
M.  Asquith  et  le  chef  de  I'opposition  M.  Bonar  Law 
les  ont  accueillies  en  fort  bons  termes.  Sir  E.  Grey 
s'est  efforce  aussi  d'etre  correct,  mais  avec  une  froi- 
deur  marquee.  Sir  E.  Grey  a  dit  a  la  verite  qu'il 
est  dispose  a  faire  tout  ce  qui  sera  en  son  pouvoir 
dans  le  but  d'ameliorer  les  relations  de  I'Allemagne 
avec  I'Angleterre.  Les  amities  actuelles  de  la 
Grande-Bretagne  auxquelles  il  entend  rester  fidele 
ne  I'empechent  pas  d'en  contractor  d'autres.  Loin 
de  chercher  a  troubler  les  recentes  negociations  en- 
tre I'Allemagne  et  la  France,  il  s'est  sincerement  fe- 
licite  de  I'accord  intervenu.  II  comprend  le  besoin 
d'expansion  de  I'Allemagne  et  n'a  nul  dessein  de 
I'entraver.  II  indique  meme  le  terrain  sur  lequel 
pourra  s'exercer  Taction  coloniale  allemande.  C'est 
I'Afrique  bu  I'Angleterre  n'a  pas  le  projet  d'etendre 
ses  possessions.  (Est-ce  des  notres  qu'il  entend 
trafiquer  suivant  le  principe  du  droit  international 
nouveau  tel  qu'on  le  pratique  a  Londres  et  malheu- 
reusement  ailleurs  aussi?  Le  Maroc,  Tripoli,  la 
Perse.)  Sir  E.  Grey  ne  croit  pas,  dit-il,  a  des  plans 
allemands  hostiles  a  I'Angleterre.  Celle-ci  non  plus 
n'entretient  aucun  dessein  hostile  a  I'Allemagne  et 
n'accorderait  pas  son  appui  a  une  puissance  tierce 
dont  I'attitude  serait  hostile  ou  provocatrice. 

C'eut  ete  parfait  si  Sir  E.  Grey  se  fut  arrete  la; 
mais  tout  son  discours  est  penetre  d'un  sentiment 
de  defiance  non  deguise  envers  I'Allemagne  et  ses 
assertions  amicales  sont  attenuees  par  des  restric- 
tions qui  en  detruisent  completement  la  portee. 
C'est  ainsi  qu'il  met  pour  condition  a  un  rapproche- 
ment avec  I'Allemagne  que  ses  amis  frangais  et  rus- 
ses  y  soient  aussi  compris  comme  s'il  n'etait  pas 
notoire  qu'aucun  Gouvernement  frangais  n'oserait  se 
livrer  a  une  tentative  de  ce  genre  qui  serait  reprou- 
vee  par  I'opinion  publique  en  France. 

Les  commentaires  des  journaux  allemands  ont 
presque  exclusivement  porte  sur  les  restrictions. 
Les  declarations  d'ou  il  faudrait  deduire  des  aspira- 
tions conciliantes  sont  restees  inapergues,  ou  si  elles 
ont  ete  mentionnees,  ce  n'est  qu'en  passant  et  de 
fagon  a  laisser  entendre  que  les  Allemands  sont  bia- 
ses sur  les  assurances  de  ce  genre  prodiguees  a 
I'occasion  de  chacune  des  nombreuses  tentatives  de 
rapprochement  entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre  et 
dont  I'effet  a  toujours  ete  des  plus  ephemeres. 

L'attention  s'est  presque  exclusivement  concen- 
tree  sur  les  passages  du  discours  par  lesquels  le  chef 
du  Foreign  Office  a  proclame  son  inebranlable  reso- 
lution de  continuer  la  politique  de  I'entente  cordiale 
devenue  plus  tard  la  triple  entente  inauguree  par  le 
Roi  Edouard  VII  avec  I'aide  du  parti  conservateur 
et  dont  les  liberaux  ont  recueilli  I'heritage.  Sir  E. 
Grey  a  declare  qu'il  n'y  a  pas  entre  I'Angleterre  et 
la  France  d'autre  traite  secret  que  celui  qui  a  ete 
public.  Je  ne  mets  pas  sa  sincerite  en  doute;  mais 
il  n'en  est  pas  moins  vrai  qu'avec  ou  sans  engage- 
ment ecrit  ou  verbal,  tout  le  monde  en  Angleterre 
et  en  France  considere  I'entente  cordiale  comme  une 
alliance  d6fensive  et  offensive  centre  I'Allemagne. 
C'est  bien  le  caractere  qu'a  voulu  lui  imprimer  le 
feu  Roi  d' Angleterre.  L'entente  cordiale  a  ete  fon- 
dee  non  sur  la  base  positive  de  la  defense  d'int6rets 


England.  In  the  entire  Moroccan  question  Great 
Britain,  bound  by  the  obligations  contracted  by 
treaty,  had  always  placed  herself  by  the  side  of 
France,  at  least  diplomatically.  The  settlement  of 
the  question  was  clearing  the  board. 

This  clearly  expressed  in  short  and  discreet  form 
the  wish  to  put  an  end  to  recriminations  about  the 
past  and  to  begin  a  new  era  of  good  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  Without  smashing  the 
windows  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  reject 
the  advances  made  by  Mr.  von  Bethmann  HoUweg. 
Mr.  Asquith  and  the  leader  of  the  opposition,  Mr. 
Bonar  Law,  received  them  very  favorably.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  also  took  pains  to  be  correct,  but  with 
a  marked  'coolness.  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  the 
truth  when  he  said  that  he  was  willing  to  do  every- 
thing in  his  power  in  order  to  improve  the  relations 
between  Gerrriany  and  England.  The  present  friend- 
ships of  Great  Britain  to  which  he  intended  to  re- 
main faithful  did  not  prevent  him  from  contracting 
new  ones.  Far  from  trying  to  disturb  the  recent 
negotiations  between  Germany  and  France  he  was 
very  glad  of  the  success  attained.  He  understood 
Germany's  need  of  expansion  and  had  no  intention 
to  thwart  her.  He  even  indicated  the  region  in 
which  Germany's  colonial  activity  could  take  place. 
England  had  no  plans  for  extending  her  possessions 
in  Africa.  (Is  it  proposed  to  barter  our  colonies 
away  according  to  the  principles  of  the  new  inter- 
national law  as  practised  at  London  and  unfortu- 
nately elsewhere  too?  Morocco,  Tripolis,  Persia.) 
Sir  Edward  Grey  said  he  did  not  believe  in  anti- 
English  plans  on  the  part  of  Germany.  Neither  did 
England  entertain  any  hostile  schemes  against  Ger- 
many nor  would  she  lend  her  help  to  any  third 
Power  whose  attitude  was  hostile  or  provocative. 
It  would  have  been  perfect  if  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  stopped  here ;  but  his  entire  speech  is  permeated 
with  an  undisguised  sentiment  of  mistrust  towards 
Germany  and  his  assertions  of  friendship  are  weak- 
ened by  restrictions  which  completely  destroy  their 
value.  Thus  he  makes  a  rapprochement  with  Ger- 
many conditional  on  the  inclusion  of  his  French 
and  Russian  friends,  as  if  it  were  not  notorious  that 
no  French  Government  would  dare  to  lend  itself  to 
such  an  attempt  which  public  opinion  in  France 
would  repudiate. 

The  German  papers  refer  almost  exclusively  to 
the  restrictions.  The  declarations  from  which  con- 
ciliatory intentions  may  be  inferred  remained  un- 
observed, or  if  they  were  mentioned  it  was  done  in 
a  casual  manner  which  showed  that  the  Germans 
have  ceased  to  place  much  faith  in  this  kind  of 
assurances  lavished  at  every  one  of  the  numerous 
attempts  at  a  rapprochement  between  Germany  and 
England,  and  the  effect  of  which  has  always  been 
ephemeral. 

Attention  has  been  almost  exclusively  concen- 
trated on  the  passages  of  the  speech  in  which  the 
head  of  the  Foreign  Office  proclaimed  his  unswerv- 
ing resolution  to  continue  the  policy  of  the  Entente 
Cordiale,  later  enlarged  to  the  Triple  Entente,  which 
was  inaugurated  by  King  Edward  VII  with  the 
aid  of  the  Conservative  party  and  inherited  by  the 
Liberals.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  that  no  secret 
treaty  existed  between  England  and  France  besides 
the  treaty  which  had  been  made  public.  I  do  not 
doubt  his  sincerity,  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that 
with  or  without  written  or  verbal  engagement 
everybody  in  England  and  France  considers  the 
entente  cordiale  as  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance 
against  Germany.  That  is  the  character  which  the 
late  King  of  England  wanted  to  impart  to  it.  The 
entente  cordiale  was  founded  not  on  the  positive 


104 


communs,  mais  sur  la  base  negative  de  la  haine  cen- 
tre I'Empire  allemaind.  Si  elle  avail  ete  comprise 
autrement  a  Paris,  elle  n'y  eut  pas  ete  accueillie 
comme  un  succes  "diplomatique  si  eclatant  que  I'hu- 
miliation  de  Fachoda  en  etait  effacee.  C'est  I'en- 
tente  cordiale  qui  a  reveille  en  France  I'idee  de  la 
revanche  fort  assoupie  auparavant.  C'est  d'elle  aussi 
que  derive  I'etat  d'inquietude  et  de  malaise  dans  le- 
quel  I'Europe  se  debat  depuis  sept  ans. 

Sir  E.  Grey  adopte  cette  trac^tion  sans  reserve. 
II  la  croit  conforme  aux  interets  de  I'Angleterre:  II 
estime  que  I'ancien  systeme  de  I'isolement  splendide 
n'est  plus  possible  et  il  est  appuye  par  la  grande 
majorite  du  peuple  anglais.  Les  journaux  conserva- 
teurs  I'approuvent  comme  les  journaux  liberaux. 
Seuls  le  parti  ouvrier  et  les  radicaux  ont  formule 
des  critiques;  mais  ils  ne  sont  pas  assez  nombreux 
pour  exercer  une  influence  sur  la  marche  des  affaires. 

On  pouvait  d'autant  moins  esperer  une  orientation 
nouvelle  de  la  politique  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  que 
depuis  I'avenement  du  ministere  liberal  et  speciale- 
ment  pendant  ces  derniers  mois,  la  politique  exte- 
rieure  de  I'Angleterre  s'est  inspiree  des  idees  que 
lui  a  inculquees  le  Roi  Edouard  VII. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  qualifie  d'alcoolisme  politique  les 
alarmes  qui  se  sont  manifestees  sur  le  continent  et 
il  a  essaye  de  se  debarrasser  par  un  bon  mot  de  la 
gene  que  lui  causent  les  revelations  du  capitaine 
Faber;  mais  il  n'en  a  pas  nie  I'exactitude  comme  il 
n'eut  certes  pas  manque  de  le  faire  s'il  en  avait  eu 
la  possibilite.  Son  silence  equivaut  a  une  confirma- 
tion. Jusqu'a  nouvel  ordre  il  faut  done  tenir  pour 
avere  qu'a  Londres  on  a  discute  le  projet  d'aider  la 
France  dans  une  guerre  avec  I'AUemagne  par  le  de- 
barquement  d'un  corps  de  150,000  Anglais.  II  n'y 
a  rien  la  qui  doive  nous  surprendre.  C'est  la  con- 
tinuation des  propositions  singulieres  qui  ont  ete 
faites,  il  y  a  quelques  annees,  au  general  Ducarne 
par  le  colonel  Barnardiston,  ainsi  que  de  I'intrigue 
de  Flessingue. 

Sir  E.  Grey  n'a  pas  reussi  non  plus  a  demontrer 
que  le  toast  de  M.  Lloyd  George  au  Mansion  House 
n'a  pas  ete  une  provocation  et  une  menace.  S'il 
s'etait  propose  de  prouver  la  these  contraire,  il  n'au- 
rait  pas  pu  s'exprimer  autrement  qu'il  ne  I'a  fait. 

Dans  son  discours  du  9  novembre  M.  de  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg  lui  avait  facilite  la  tache  en  parlant 
de  ce  discours  comme  d'un  propos  de  table  qui  n'a- 
vait  acquis  d'importance  que  par  les  commentaires 
de  la  presse  anglaise  et  frangaise. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  tenu  a  faire  savoir  que  le  toast  n'e- 
tait  ni  une  improvisation  intempestive  ni  I'expres- 
sion  d'une  opinion  personnelle  du  Chancelier  de 
I'Echiquier,  mais  que  le  texte  en  avait  ete  discute 
et  arrete  entre  le  chef  du  cabinet,  M.  Lloyd  George, 
et  lui. 

Etait-ce  faciliter  I'entente  que  de  pretendre  s'im- 
miscer  dans  une  negociation  relative  au  Maroc  ou 
I'Angleterre  avait  fait  I'abandon  de  ses  pretentions 
politiques  ou  une  tentative  d'intervention  en  faveur 
de  la  France? 

N'etait-ce  pas  aussi  s'arroger  un  droit  de  veto  sur 
les  entreprises  allemandes  que  de  jeter  feu  et  flamme 
parce  qu'un  croiseur  allemand  avait  jete  I'ancre  dans 
la  rade  d'Agadir,  tandis  que  I'Angleterre  avait  as- 
siste  sans  sourciller  a  la  conquete  progressive  du 
territoire  marocain  operee  par  la  France  et  I'Espa- 
gne  et  a  I'aneantissement  de  I'independance  du"  Sul- 
tan. 

L'Angleterre  ne  pouvait  pas  faire  autrement.  Elle 
etait  liee  par  son  traite  secret  avec  la  France.  L'ex- 
plication  est  des  plus  simples,  mais  nullement  de 


basis  of  defense  of  common  interests,  but  on  the 
negative  basis  of  hatred  against  the  German  Em- 
pire. If  it  had  been  regarded  differently  in  Paris 
it  would  not  have  been  received  as  a  diplomatic  suc- 
cess of  such  magnitude  as  to  efface  the  humiliation 
of  Fashoda.  It  is  the  entente  cordiale  that  revived 
in  France  the  idea  of  revenge  which  had  already 
abated  considerably.  It  is  the  entente  cordiale  that 
causes  the  state  of  unrest  and  uneasiness  in  which 
Europe  has  been  writhing  for  seven  years. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  adopts  this  tradition  without 
reserve.  He  believes  that  it  conforms  to  the  inter- 
ests of  England  and  he  considers  that  the  old  sys- 
tem of  splendid  isolation  is  no  longer  possible.  In 
this  he  is  supported  by  the  great  majority  of  the 
English  people.  The  Conservative  as  well  as  the 
Liberal  press  express  their  approval.  Only  the 
Labor  party  and  the  Radicals  made  criticisms ;  but 
they  are  not  numerous  enough  to  exert  any  influence 
on  the  progress  of  events. 

A  new  departure  was  all  the  less  to  be  expected 
in  the  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  because  since 
the  accession  of  the  Liberal  Cabinet  to  power,  and 
especially  during  the  last  few  months,  the  foreign 
policy  of  England  has  been  dominated  by  the  ideas 
inculcated  by  King  Edward  VII. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  in  qualifying  the  alarm  shown 
on  the  continent  as  "political  alcoholism"  tried  with 
a  word  play  to  pass  over  the  embarrassment  which 
the  revelations  of  Captain  Faber  are  causing  him; 
but  he  did  not  deny  their  correctness  as  he  would 
certainly  not  have  failed  to  do  if  he  had  been  able 
to.  His  silence  is  equivalent  to  a  confirmation. 
In  default  of  other  information  it  must  be  consid- 
ered as  an  established  fact  that  the  plan  has  been 
discussed  in  London  of  aiding  France  in  a  war  with 
Germany  by  landing  an  English  corps  of  150,000 
men.  There  is  nothing  in  this  which  ought  to  sur- 
prise us.  It  is  the  continuation  of  the  singular  pro- 
posals which  were  made  a  few  years  ago  to  General 
Ducarne  by  Colonel  Barnardiston,  as  well  as  of  the 
Flushing  intrigue. 

Nor  has  Sir  Edward  Grey  succeeded  in  showing 
that  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  toast  at  the  Mansion  House 
was  not  a  challenge  and  a  threat.  If  he  had  intended 
to  prove  the  contrary  he  could  not  have  expressed 
himself   otherwise   than   he   did. 

In  his  speech  of  November  9th,  Mr.  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg  had  made  Sir  Edward  Grey's  task 
easier  by  qualifying  this  speech  as  table-talk  which 
only  had  acquired  importance  through  the  com- 
ments of  the  English  and  French  press.  But  Sir 
Edward  Grey  saw  fit  to  make  it  known  that  the 
toast  was  neither  an  untimely  improvisation  nor  the 
expression  of  the  personal  opinion  of  the  Chancel- 
lor of  the  Exchequer,  but  that  the  text  of  it  had  been 
discussed  and  agreed  upon  between  the  Premier, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  himself. 

When  England  took  it  upon  herself  to  interfere 
in  negotiations  relative  to  Morocco  where  she  had 
abandoned  her  political  pretensions,  was  it  in  order 
to  facilitate  an  understanding  or  was  it  not  rather 
that  she  was  trying  to  intervene  in  favor  of  France? 

Was  it  not  also  claiming  a  right  of  veto  against 
Germany's  enterprises  when  a  hue  and  cry  was 
raised  because  a  German  cruiser  had  cast  anchor 
on  the  roadstead  of  Agadir,  whereas  England  had 
not  moved  a  muscle  when  watching  the  progressing 
conquest  of  Moroccan  territory  by  France  and 
Spain  and  the  overthrow  of  the  Sultan's  independ- 
ence? 

England  could  not  do  otherwise.  She  was  bound 
by  her  secret  treaty  with  France.  The  explana- 
tion is  very  simple  but  is  not  such  as  to  assuage 


nature  a  calmer  I'irritation  allemande.  II  s'ensuit 
en  effet  qu'au  moment  meme  ou  Ton  signait  I'acte 
d'Algesiras,  trois  des  puissances  au  moins  qui  y  ont 
participe  contractaient  entre  elles  des  engagements 
incompatibles  avec  leurs  promesses  publiques. 

Tels  sont  les  griefs  du  peuple  allemand  centre 
I'Angleterre  formules  par  la  voie  de  la  presse. 

Vous  aurez  remarque,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  que 
le  chancelier  en  a  passe  la  plus  grande  partie  sous 
silence  dans  le  discours  qu'il  a  prononce  hier  au 
Reichstag  et  qui  etait  la  replique  obligee  a  Sir  E. 
Grey.  Voulant,  comme  il  I'a  dit,  eviter  les  recrimi- 
nation steriles  sur  le  passe,  M.  de  Bethmann  Holl- 
weg  n'en  a  mentionne  que  ce  qu'il  fallait,  pour  de- 
cHner  en  termes  moderes,  mais  tres  clairs  et  tres 
energiques,  la  responsabilite  de  la  tension  des  re- 
lations entre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre  que  Sir  E. 
Grey  a  cherche  a  rejeter  sur  le  gouvernement  Im- 
perial. Le  chancelier  ne  comprend  pas  comment 
le  gouvernement  britannique  tenu  journellement  au 
courant  de  la  negociation  par  les  soins  du  gouver- 
nement franqais  et  qui  aurait  obtenu  des  explica- 
tions complementaires  s'il  les  avait  demandees  a 
Berlin,  a  pu  concevoir  I'idee  que  le  gouvernement 
Imperial  avait  le  projet  d'acquerir  une  base  navale 
dans  I'ocean  atlantique  ou  de  porter  atteinte  aux  in- 
terets  britanniques.  Le  Foreign  Office  avait  tous 
les  moyens  de  savoir  que  I'Allemagne  ne  visait  qu'a 
mieux  assurer  le  regime  de  la  porte  ouverte  dans 
I'interet  de  toutes  les  puissances,  I'Angleterre  com- 
prise, et  une  compensation  territoriale  dans  I'Afri- 
que  equatoriale  que  Sir  E.  Grey  a  declare  lui  etre 
indifferente.  Le  secretaire  d'etat  anglais  se  serait 
epargne  les  inquietudes  dont  il  a  parle,  s'il  avait  eu 
plus  de  confiance  dans  la  communication  qui  lui  a 
ete  faite  au  moment  de  I'envoi  de  la  "Panther"  a 
Agadir.  Le  silence  qui  s'en  est  suivi  et  dont  se 
plaint  Sir  E.  Grey  a  ete  mutuel.  II  n'aurait  pas  cause 
tant  d'emotion,  s'il  n'avait  pas  ete  rompu  par  le  toast 
sensationnel  d'un  membre  en  vue  du  cabinet  anglais. 


Sir  E.  Grey  dit  que  I'Angleterre  ne  pent  pas  tole- 
rer  qu'on  regie  en  dehors  d'elle  une  question  qui 
touche  ses  interets.  M.  de  Bethmann  Hollweg  a 
replique  que  I'Allemagne  n'a  jamais  songe  a  le  con- 
tester,  mais  qu'elle  reclame  les  memes  egards  envers 
elle.  Les  difficultes  de  I'affaire  marocaine  provien- 
nent  de  ce  qu'en  1904  I'Angleterre  et  la  France  ont 
voulu  la  resoudre  entre  elles  sans  se  preoccuper  des 
interets  allemands.  Maintenant  la  crise  est  passee 
et  le  chancelier  s'associe  aux  voeux  exprimes  par  les 
ministres  anglais  de  voir  s'etablir  des  relations  ami- 
cales  entre  les  deux  pays.  Pour  cela  il  est  neces- 
saire  que  I'Angleterre  conforme  sa  politique  a  ce  de- 
sir.  L'expansion  de  I'Allemagne  est  un  fait  dont  les 
autres  nations  doivent  tenir  compte.  Rien  ne  pent 
I'arreter.  Une  experience  de  quarante  ans  a  montre 
ce  qu'est  la  politique  allemande.  La  force  de  I'Em- 
pire  est  une  garantie  de  paix  parce  qu'elle  ecarte 
I'envie  de  lui  chercher  querelle. 

Le  chancelier  a  conclu  en  exhortant  ses  compa- 
triotes  a  ne  se  laisser  entrainer  ni  a  I'abattement  ni 
a  I'arrogance;  mais  a  garder  leur  sang-froid  et  a 
etre  unis  sur  les  grandes  questions  nationales. 

Le  discours  du  chancelier  a  ete  bien  accueilli  par 
le  Reichstag  et  frequemment  interrompu  par  des  ap- 
plaudissements. 

Agreez,  etc. 

[s,]  Greindl. 


German  irritation.  From  this  it  follows  that  at  the 
same  moment  when  the  act  of  Algcciras  was  being 
signed,  at  least  three  of  the  Powers  who  participated 
were  contracting  obligations  among  themselves 
which  were  incompatible  with  their  public  promises. 

These  are  the  complaints  of  the  German  people 
against  England  as  formulated  by  the  press. 

You  will  have  noticed,  Sir,  that  the  Chancellor 
passed  over  the  greater  part  of  them  in  silence  in 
the  speech  which  he  delivered  yesterday  in  the 
Reichstag  in  reply  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  Wishing, 
as  he  said,  to  avoid  useless  recriminations  in  regard 
to  the  past,  Mr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  only  said 
what  was  absolutely  necessary,  in  order  to  decline 
in  moderate  but  very  clear  and  energetic  terms  the 
responsibility  for  the  tension  in  the  relations  be- 
tween Germany  and  England  which  Sir  Edward 
Grey  sought  to  throw  on  the  Imperial  Government. 
The  Chancellor  could  not  understand  how  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  which  was  being  daily  informed 
of  the  negotiations  by  the  French  Government  and 
which  could  have  obtained  supplementary  explan- 
ations if  it  had  asked  for  them  at  Berlin,  could  pos- 
sibly have  conceived  the  idea  that  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment had  any  intention  of  acquiring  a  naval  base 
on  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  or  of  impairing  British  inter- 
ests. The  Foreign  Office  had  all  the  means  of  know- 
ing that  Germany's  only  aim  was  to  secure  better 
guarantees  for  the  principle  of  the  open  door  in  the 
interest  of  all  the  Powers,  England  included,  and 
to  obtain  a  territorial  compensation  in  equatorial 
Africa  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  to  be  a 
matter  of  indifference  to  him.  The  British  Secre- 
tary of  State  would  have  saved  himself  the  uneasi- 
ness of  which  he  spoke  if  he  had  placed  greater  con- 
fidence in  the  communication  made  to  him  at  the 
moment  when  the  "Panther"  was  sent  to  Agadir. 
The  silence  which  followed  this  event  and  of  which 
Sir  Edward  Grey  complains  was  mutual.  It  would 
not  have  caused  so  much  agitation  if  it  had  not  been 
broken  by  the  sensational  toast  of  a  prominent  mem- 
ber of  the  British  Cabinet. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  says  that  England  could  not 
tolerate  a  question  touching  her  interests  to  be 
settled  without  her.  Mr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg 
replied  that  Germany  never  thought  of  contesting 
this  but  that  she  claimed  the  same  rights  for  her- 
self. The  difficulties  of  the  Moroccan  affair  were 
due  to  the  fact  that  in  1904  England  and  France 
had  wished  to  solve  it  between  themselves  without 
considering  the  German  interests.  Now  the  crisis 
was  past  and  the  Chancellor  was  endorsing  the 
wishes  expressed  by  the  British  Ministers  to  see 
friendly  relations  established  between  the  two 
countries.  For  this  purpose  it  was  necessary  that 
England  adapt  her  policy  to  this  desire.  The  expan- 
sion of  Germany  was  a  fact  with  which  the  other 
nations  had  to  reckon.  Nothing  could  stop  it.  The 
experience  of  forty  years  had  shown  what  the  Ger- 
man policy  was.  The  strength  of  the  Empire  was 
a  guarantee  of  peace  because  it  eliminated  desires 
to  seek  a  quarrel  with  her. 

The  Chancellor  concluded  by  exhorting  his  coun- 
trymen not  to  permit  themselves  to  be  carried  away 
either  by  despondency  or  by  arrogance,  but  to  keep 
their  sangfroid  and  to  be  united  on  the  great  na- 
tional  questions. 

The  Chancellor's  speech  was  well  received  by  the 
Reichstag  and  was  frequently  interrupted  by  ap- 
plause. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  86. 


No.  86. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  9  Decembre  1911. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  brievement  repondu  a  Plymouth 
au  discours  sur  I'etat  des  relations  entre  rAllema- 
gne  et  I'Angleterre  que  le  chancelier  de  I'Empire  a 
prononce  au  Reichstag.  Les  hommes  d'etat  ont  dit 
chacun  a  son  point  de  vue  tout  ce  qu'il  y  avait  a 
dire  et  la  presse  a  public  ses  commentaires.  On 
semble  maintenant  vouloir  faire  le  silence  sur  cet 
incident  qui  est  clos  et  sur  lequel  il  est  inutile  de 
recriminer.  Esperons  qu'il  ne  sera  pas  rompu.  La 
question  en  est  arrivee  a  un  point  ou  Ton  s'entend 
d'autant  moins  qu'on  s'explique  davantage. 


II  s'en  faut  en  effet  de  fceaucoup  que  les  relations 
se  soient  ameliorees,  malgre  I'expression  obligee  du 
desir  de  les  rendre  plus  cordiales. 

Ce  qui  resulte  de  plus  clair  du  discours  de  Sir  E. 
Grey  c'est  qu'il  veut  continuer  la  politique  de  la  tri- 
ple entente  dans  I'esprit  ou  il  I'a  pratiquee  jusqu'ici, 
c'est-a-dire  hostile  a  I'AUemagne. 

Le  discours  de  M.  de  Bethmann  Hollweg  dit  non 
moins  clairement  qu'il  n'est  nullement  dispose  a  ad- 
mettre  le  droit  de  veto  que  I'Angleterre  s'arroge  sur 
les  entreprises  allemandes  et  que  pour  un  rappro- 
chement il  attend  du  Gouvernement  Britannique 
non  des  paroles,  mais  des  actes. 

II  n'y  a  pas  plus  d'accord  entre  les  peuples  qu'en- 
tre  les  gouvernements.  Les  Anglais  continuent  a 
jalouser  I'expansion  de  I'AUemagne.  Les  Allemands 
qu'il  y  a  six  mois  encore,  n'etaient  nullement  hos- 
tiles  a  I'Angleterre,  le  sont  devenus  maintenant. 

Les  relations  ne  sont  done  pas  remises  au  point 
de  correction  froide  oti  elles  etaient  avant  la  crise. 
Elles  sont  empirees  et,  je  le  crains,  pour  longtemps. 


Agreez,  etc. 
[s.] 


Greindl. 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  December  9,  1911. 

Sir:— 

Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  briefly  at  Plymouth  to 
the  speech  on  the  state  of  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  England  which  the  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor delivered  in  the  Reichstag.  The  statesmen  have 
said  everything  that  there  was  to  be  said  from  the 
point  of  view  of  each,  and  the  press  has  published 
its  comments.  There  now  seems  to  be  a  desire  to 
observe  silence  on  an  incident  which  is  closed  and 
about  which  it  is  useless  to  make  recriminations. 
Let  us  hope  that  that  silence  will  not  be  broken. 
The  question  has  reached  a  point  at  which  the  more 
explanations  are  made  the  less  the  one  understands 
the  other. 

Relations  are  far  from  being  improved,  despite 
the  usual  expression  of  the  desire  to  make  them 
more  cordial. 

What  is  most  apparent  from  the  speech  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  is  that  he  wishes  to  continue  the  pol- 
icy of  the  Triple  Entente  in  the  spirit  in  which  he 
has  practiced  it  until  now, — that  is  to  say — in  a 
spirit  hostile  to  Germany. 

Mr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  speech  states  no 
less  clearly  that  he  is  by  no  means  disposed  to  recog- 
nize the  right  of  veto  which  England  is  claiming 
over  German  enterprise,  and  that  in  regard  to  rap- 
prochement he  expects  not  words  but  actions  from 
Great  Britain. 

There  is  no  more  harmony  between  the  peoples 
than  there  is  between  the  Governments.  The  Eng- 
lish continue  to  be  jealous  of  Germany's  expansion. 
The  Germans,  who  six  months  ago  were  by  no 
means  hostile  to  England,  have  become  so  now. 

The  relations  have  therefore  not  reverted  to  the 
state  of  cold  correctness  which  marked  them  be- 
fore the  crisis.  They  have  grown  worse  and  I  fear 
they  will  remain  so  for  a  long  time. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  87. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  15  Janvier  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Les  revelations  qui  ont  provoque  la  recente  crise 
ministerielle  en  France  ont  ete  desagreables  pour  le 
Gouvernement  Anglais.  Elles  semblent  prouver  que 
le  Premier  Ministre  de  la  Republique  a  essaye  de 
negocier  avec  Berlin,  a  I'insu  du  Ministre  des  Affai- 
res Etrangeres  et  de  ses  autres  collegues,  ce  qui  est 
de  nature  a  inquieter  un  gouvernment  qui  a  lie  ses 
interets  a  ceux  de  la  France  et  qui  est  done  peu  dis- 
pose a  admettre  une  incorrection  de  ce  genre.  Ces 
revelations  ont  souligne  ensuite  I'impression  que  M. 
Caillaux  avait  ete  secretement  favorable  a  une  poli- 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  January  15,   1912. 

Sir:— 

The  revelations  which  provoked  the  recent  cabi- 
net crisis  in  France  have  caused  displeasure  to  the 
British  Government.  They  seem  to  prove  that  the 
Prime  Minister  of  the  Republic,  without  knowledge 
of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  his  other  col- 
leagues, tried  to  negotiate  with  Berlin.  This  is 
naturally  causing  misgivings  to  a  Government  which 
has  linked  its  interests  with  those  of  France  and 
which  is  therefore  little  inclined  to  tolerate  a  wrong 
step  of  such  a  nature.  These  revelations  have,  fur- 
thermore, emphasized  the  impression  that  M.  Cail- 


tique  de  concessions  outrees  envers  TAllemagne,  im- 
pression d'autant  plus  penible  pour  les  cercles  offi- 
ciels  anglais,  que  1  on  venait  a  peine  de  saisir  toute 
la  portee  de  la  tension  entre  Londres  et  Berlin,  qui 
avait  resulte  de  I'attitude  loyale  du  Cabinet  de  St. 
James  a  I'egard  de  celui  de  Paris.  On  ose  4  peine 
s'avouer  aujourd'hui  en  Angleterre  qu'on  semble 
avoir  ete  plus  royaliste  que  le  Roi,  plus  intransi- 
geant  que  I'ami  qu'on  voulait  soutenir.  II  est  desa- 
greable  d'avoir  ete  dupe,  meme  un  instant.  Aussi  la 
presse  est-elle  unanime  a  accueillir  avec  joie  le  de- 
part de  M.  Caillaux  et  a  esperer  un  prompt  retour 
a  des  traditions  plus  saines,  mais  il  ne  manque  pas 
de  journaux  pour  rappeler  ironiquement  que  c'est 
pour  soutenir  un  gouvernement  pareil  que  la 
Grande-Bretagne  a  adopte  une  attitude  qui  aurait 
pu  amener  a  la  guerre  et  pour  en  deduire  que  Sir 
E.  Grey  a  manque  de  perspicacite.  Ces  evenements 
seront  mis  a  profit  par  les  publicistes,  plus  nombreux 
que  jadis,  qui  jettent  des  doutes  sur  la  valeur  de 
I'entente  cordiale  (des  articles  dans  ce  sens  ont  deja 
paru  dans  les  derniers  numeros  de  la  "Fortnightly" 
et  de  la  "Contemporary  Review"),  et  fourniront  des 
arguments  nouveaux  a  la  petite  coterie  d'ecrivains 
qui  s'efforcent  de  prouver  que,  sans  rompre  avec  la 
France,  il  y  aurait  avantage  pour  I'Angleterre  a  en- 
tretenir  avec  Berlin  des  relations  plus  amicales.  D'a- 
pres  eux,  la  conception  premiere  de  I'entente  cor- 
diale a  ete  faussee  par  le  Cabinet  actuel,  qui  voit 
des  engagements  fermes  et  des  obligations  inelucta- 
bles  dans  un  arrangement  qui  n'etait  destine  qu'a 
amortir  la  vieille  politique  de  coups  d'epingles  en- 
tre, Londres  et  Paris,  en  reglant  une  bonne  fois  une 
serie  de  questions  secondaires,  mais  irritantes.  Cette 
entente,  destinee  uniquement  a  ecarter  certains  nua- 
ges  determines,  n'etait  pas  une  alliance. .  Le  tort  du 
Gouvernement  de  M.  Asquith  a  ete  de  I'envisager 
en  fait  comme  telle,  avec  le  resultat  qu'une  serieuse 
inimitie  contre  la  Grande-Bretagne  en  est  nee  a  Ber- 
lin. 


La  composition  du  nouveau  Cabinet  Poincare  est 
bien  accueillie  ici. 
Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


laux  had  been  secretly  in  favor  of  a  policy  of  ex- 
cessive concessions  to  Germany,  an  impression 
which  is  all  the  more  painful  to  English  official 
circles  as  they  had  only  just  realized  the  whole 
importance  of  the  tension  between  London  and  Ber- 
lin, which  had  been  caused  by  the  loyal  attitude  of 
the  Cabinet  of  St.  James's  towards  that  of  Paris. 
People  in  England  hardly  dare  to-day  to  confess  to 
themselves  that  they  seem  to  have  out-Heroded 
Herod  in  showing  themselves  more  irreconcilable 
than  the  friend  whom  they  wished  to  support.  It 
is  unpleasant  to  have  been  duped,  even  if  it  be  only 
for  an  instant.  While  the  press  is  unanimous  in  its 
joyful  reception  of  the  retirement  of  M.  Caillaux  and 
its  hope  for  a  prompt  return  to  saner  traditions, 
there  are  some  papers  which  ironically  recall  that 
in  order  to  support  such  a  Government  Great  Brit- 
ain had  taken  up  an  attitude  that  might  have  led 
to  war,  and  these  papers  conclude  from  this  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  shown  a  lack  of  perspicacity. 
These  events  will  be  utilized  by  those  publicists, 
more  numerous  than  before,  who  throw  doubts  on 
the  value  of  the  entente  cordiale  (articles  of  this 
kind  have  already  appeared  in  the  latest  number 
of  the  Fortnightly  and  the  Contemporary  Review) 
and  will  furnish  fresh  arguments  to  the  small  coterie 
of  writers  who  endeavor  to  prove  that,  without 
breaking  with  France,  it  would. be  profitable  for 
England  to  entertain  more  amicable  relations  with 
Berlin.  According  to  them  the  original  idea  of  the 
entente  cordiale  has  been  perverted  by  the  present 
Cabinet  which  sees  firm  and  immutable  obligations 
in  an  arrangement  which  was  only  intended  to  mod- 
erate the  old  policy  of  pin-pricks  between  London 
and  Paris  by  settling  once  and  for  all  a  number  of 
secondary,  but  nevertheless  irritating  questions. 
This  entente,  solely  intended  to  dissipate  certain 
clearly  defined  clouds,  was  not  an  alliance.  Mr. 
Asquith  made  the  mistake  of  actually  regarding  it 
as  such,  thereby  causing  serious  hostility  against 
Great  Britain  to  arise  at  Berlin. 

The  composition  of  the  new  Poincare  Cabinet  is 
being  well  received  here. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  88. 


No.  88. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  h  Lon- 
dres, a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Londres,  le  9  Fevrier  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  depart  de  Lord  Haldane,  Ministre  de  la  Guerre, 
pour  Berlin  a  eveille  la  curiosite ;  la  presse  trouve  di- 
verses  explications  pour  ce  voyage,  entrepris  au  len- 
demain  d'un  conseil  de  Cabinet  et  presqu'a  la  veille 
de  I'ouverture  des  Chambres.  On  a  suggere  que  le 
Ministre  etait  charge,  ou : 

1.  de  traiter  la  question  d'un  echange  de  rensei- 
gnements  sur  les  armements  anglo-allemands, 

2.  de    demander    la    grace    d'un    espion    anglais, 
Stewart,  recemment  condamne  en  Allemagne, 

3.  de  travailler  a  une  entente  anglo-allemande, 

4.  de  s'occuper  d'une  rectification  de  frontieres  en 
Afrique, 

5.  d'un  partage  des  colonies  portugaises. 


London,  February  9,  1912. 


The  departure  of  Lord  Haldane,  the  Minister 
of  War,  for  Berlin,  has  aroused  curiosity ;  the  press 
finds  various  explanations  for  this  journey  on  the 
day  following  a  Cabinet  meeting  and  almost  on  the 
eve  of  the  opening  of  the  Houses.  It  has  been  sug- 
gested that  the  Minister  had  been  charged  either: 

(1)  to  negotiate  on  the  question  of  an  exchange  of 
information  relative  to  Anglo-German  armaments; 

(2)  to  ask  pardon  for  an  English  spy,  Stewart,  who 
was  recently  condemned  in  Germany;  (3)  to  work 
for  an  Anglo-German  entente ;  (4)  to  discuss  a  recti- 
fication of  frontiers  in  Africa;  (5)  to  discuss  a  par- 
tition of  the  Portuguese  colonies ;  (6)  to  discuss  a 
cession  of  Walfish  Bay  to  Germany;  (7)  to  carry 


-    108 


6.  d'une  cession  de  Walfish  Bay  a  rAllemagne, 

7.  d'une  mission  personnelle  du  Roi  Georges  au 
Kaiser. 

Ce  qui  est  certain  est  que  le  but  que  Ton  a  en 
vue  est  pacifique.  On  voudrait  a  tout  prix  diminuer 
la  tension  existante  entre  les  deux  pays.  C'est  la 
politique  actuelle  du  Cabinet  et  de  tous  les  Minis- 
tres  de  la  Couronne,  celui  de  la  Guerre  est  le  plus 
philo-allemand.  Lord  Haldane  a  ete  en  son  temps 
etudiant  a  Heidelberg,  parle  bien  la  langue  si  peu 
familiere  aux  Anglais  et  a  des  amis  personnels  a 
Berlin.  Le  choix  de  I'envoye  est  sous  ce  rapport 
un  nouvel  indice  de  la  tendance  de  la  mission  offi- 
cieuse.  De  toutes  les  hypotheses,  celle  d'une  con- 
versation amicale,  cherchant  un  terrain  d'entente  et 
deplorant  les  depenses  imposees  aux  deux  nations 
par  les  programmes  de  constructions  navales  semble 
la  plus  probable.  L'Angleterre  est  disposee  a  ne 
plus  contrecarrer  I'Allemagne  dans  les  questions  se- 
condaires,  mais  on  ne  doit  pas  lui  disputer  la  supre- 
matie  sur  mer. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


out  a  personal  mission  of  King  George  to  the  Kaiser. 


What  is  certain  is  that  the  end  in  view  is  a  paci- 
fic one.  It  is  desired  to  diminish  the  tension  ex- 
isting between  the  two  countries  at  any  price.  That 
is  the  present  policy  of  the  Cabinet,  and  of  all  the 
Ministers  of  the  Crown,  the  War  Minister  is  the 
most  pro-German.  Lord  Haldane  in  his  time  was 
a  student  at  Heidelberg,  he  speaks  the  language 
well  with  which  so  few  Englishmen  are  familiar, 
and  he  has  personal  friends  in  Berlin.  In  this  re- 
spect the  choice  of  the  envoy  is  another  symptom 
of  the  spirit  of  this  semi-official  mission.  Of  all  the 
conjectures  made,  the  one  of  a  friendly  conversa- 
tion to  find  a  basis  for  an  understanding  on  the 
deplorable  expenses  imposed  on  the  two  countries 
by  the  naval  programmes,  seems  the  most  probable 
one.  England  is  disposed  to  oppose  Germany  no 
longer  in  secondary  questions,  but  brooks  no  inter- 
ference with  her  supremacy  at  sea. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.    89. 


No.  89. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  k  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  13  Fevrier  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

II  est  interessant  de  noter  combien  Sir  E.  Grey 
est  devenu  impopulaire  aupres  de  la  section  extreme 
de  son  parti.  J'ai  deja  eu  I'occasion  de  vous  signaler 
les  critiques  que  lui  a  adressees  Morel,  dans  le 
"Daily  News,"  journal  radical  socialiste  et  anticon- 
golais.  Cette  meme  feuille  (organe  des  non-confor- 
mistes  et  affiliee  aux  pacifistes)  a  public  avant-hier 
une  diatribe  contre  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres, dont  il  desapprouve  hautement  la  politique. 
Le  "Daily  News"  emet  I'avis  que  Sir  E.  Grey,  par 
sa  faiblesse  vis-a-vis  de  la  Russie,  motivee  par  sa 
crainte  de  mecontenter  le  Gouvernement  de  Peters- 
bourg  et  de  le  pousser  dans  les  bras  de  I'Allema- 
gne, contribue  au  demembrement  prochain  de  la 
Chine  et  de  la  Perse.  Le  journal  rappelle  qu'en 
renouvelant  I'alliance  anglo-japonaise  le  23  juillet 
1911  le  Gouvernement  Britannique  a  declare  son  in- 
tention de  maintenir  I'independance  et  I'integrite  de 
I'Empire  Chinois  et  le  principe  de  la  porte  ouverte. 
Et  qu'en  1907,  le  31  aout,  par  I'accord  anglo-russe 
I'Angleterre  s'est  engagee  a  respecter  I'integrite  et 
I'independance  de  la  Perse.  Le  "Daily  News"  dit 
que  les  evenements  sont  en  train  de  prouver  le  peu 
d'importance  qu'on  peut  attacher  aux  promesses  du 
chef  du  Foreign  Office  et  dit  que  Sir  E.  Grey  s'y  est 
rendu  desormais  impossible. 

Le  meme  journal,  prenant  pour  texte  un  discours 
de  Lord  Rosebery,  a  Glasgow,  dans  lequel  I'ancien 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  critique  la  politi- 
que exterieure  de  la  Grande-Bretagne,  avec  son  en- 
chevetrement  d'ententes  qui  amene  a  sa  suite  de  gra- 
ves responsabilites,  continue  aujourd'hui  ses  atta- 
ques  contre  Sir  E.  Grey.  II  deplore  le  resultat  de 
Taction  du  Ministre,  qui  oppose  une  triple  entente 
a  la  triple  alliance,  entrave  I'expansion  de  I'Allema- 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,   February   13,   1912. 

Sir:— 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  unpopular  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  has  become  with  the  extreme  section 
of  his  party.  I  already  had  occasion  to  draw  your 
attention  to  the  criticisms  which  Morel  made  of 
him  in  the  Daily  News,  the  radical-socialist  and  anti- 
Congolese  paper.  The  same  sheet,  which  is  the  or- 
gan of  the  non-conformists  and  is  affiliated  with 
the  pacifists,  published  a  diatribe  the  day  before 
yesterday  against  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of 
whose  poHcy  it  highly  disapproves.  The  Daily 
News  is  of  the  opinion  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  by  his 
weakness  towards  Russia  caused  by  his  fear  of  dis- 
pleasing the  Government  of  Petersburg  and  of  push- 
ing it  into  the  arms  of  Germany,  is  contributing  to 
the  impending  dismemberment  of  China  and  Persia. 
The  paper  recalls  that  at  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  on  July  23,  1911,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment declared  its  intention  of  maintaining  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
and  the  principle  of  the  open  door;  and  that  on 
August  31,  1907,  by  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  it 
pledged  itself  to  respect  the  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  Persia.  The  Daily  News  says  that  the 
present  events  go  to  prove  what  little  importance 
can  be  attached  to  the  promises  of  the  head  of  the 
Foreign  Office  and  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  hence- 
forth become  impossible  as  such. 

To-day  the  same  paper  continues  its  attacks  on 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  taking  for  a  text  a  speech  of 
Lord  Rosebery  at  Glasgow,  in  which  the  former 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  criticizes  the  foreign 
policy  of  Great  Britain  with  its  entangling  ententes, 
which  lead  to  grave  responsibilities.  The  paper  de- 
plores the  results  of  the  action  of  the  Minister  who 
set  up  a  Triple  Entente  in  opposition  to  the  Triple 
Alliance,  hampered  the  expansion  of  Germany,  and 


109 


gne  et  a  mene  le  pays  a  deux  doigts  de  la  guerre  I'etd 
dernier.  La  politique  de  Sir  E.  Grey  doit  logique- 
ment  amener  la  Grande-Bretagne  non  seulement  a 
augmenter  sa  flotte,  mais  a  adopter  le  service  mili- 
taire  obligatoire.  Aussi  le  "Daily  News"  reclame- 
t-il  la  demission  de  Sir  E.  Grey. 

On  ne  doit  cependant  pas  oublier  que  le  "Daily 
News"  ne  represente  qu'une  fraction,  bruyante  il 
est  vrai,  du  parti  radical.  La  gauche  en  general  est 
fidele  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  qui  a  un 
grand  credit  aupres  de  la  Chambre  des  Communes 
et  beaucoup  d'admirateurs  dans  les  rangs  meme  de 
I'opposition. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


brought  the  country  within  an  ace  of  war  during 
last  summer.  The  policy  of  Sir  E.  Grey  was  logi- 
cally bound  to  lead  Great  Britain  not  only  to  in- 
crease her  fleet,  but  also  to  adopt  compulsory  con- 
scription. The  Daily  News  also  demands  the  re- 
tirement of  Sir  E.  Grey. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  Daily 
News  represents  only  a  fraction,  though  a  noisy  one, 
of  the  Radical  party.  In  general  the  Left  is  faith- 
ful to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  enjoys 
great  repute  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  has 
many  admirers,  even  in  the  ranks  of  the  opposition. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  90. 


No.  90. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  k  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  16  Fevrier  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  Premier  Ministre,  lors  de  la  discussion  de  la 
leponse  au  discours  du  Trone,  a  eu  I'occasion  de 
fournir  quelques  eclaircissements  sur  le  but  de  la 
recente  visite  du  Ministre  de  la  Guerre  a  Berlin. 

Dans  men  rapport  du  9  de  ce  mois  je  vous  disais 
que  de  toutes  les  hypotheses  mises  en  avant  celle 
d'une  conversation  amicale,  en  vue  de  rechercher  un 
terrain  d'entente  et  de  diminuer  la  tension  existante 
etait  la  plus  vraisemblable. 

Le  discours  de  M.  Asquith  confirme  cette  impres- 
sion. 

II  a  admis  que  dans  les  derniers  mois  I'amitie 
traditionnelle  entre  les  deux  nations  avait  subi  des 
atteintes  serieuses,  a  cause  de  la  mefiance  qui  exis- 
tait  de  part  et  d'autre. 

Le  public  ,allemand  a  ete  jusqu'a  croire  que  la 
flatte  britannique  avait  prepare  une  attaque  contre 
les  escadres  germaniques  pendant  I'ete  et  I'automne 
1911.  —  C'est  une  pure  invention.  Les  deux  gou- 
vernements  ont  le  sincere  desir  d'arriver  a  une  en- 
tente meilleure,  et  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  a  fait  com- 
prendre  a  Londres  que  ce  but  commun  serait  peut- 
etre  plus  facilement  atteint  si  un  ministre  anglais  se 
rendait  en  AUemagne. 

C'est  peut-etre  contraire  aux  usages  diplomati- 
ques,  mais  il  en  a  resulte  d'heureuses  et  franches  ex- 
plications de  nature  a  detruire  I'impression  que  les 
gouvernements  en  cause  ont  des  intentions  agressi- 
ves.  M.  Asquith  croit  que  les  conversations  de  son 
collegue  a  Berlin  pourraient  avoir  d'autres  heureux 
resultats  dans  I'avenir,  sur  lesquels  il  ne  s'est  pas 
explique. 

Si  les  deux  nations  desirent  voir  s'etablir  entre 
dies  des  relations  plus  cordiales,  le  Premier  Minis- 
tre a  eu  soin  d'aj outer  qu'il  ne  s'agissait  cependant 
en  aucune  fagon  de  modifier  la  situation  speciale 
dans  laquelle  1' AUemagne  d'une  part,  la  Grande- 
Bretagne  de  I'autre,  se  trouvaient  vis-a-vis  d'autres 
puissances,  mais  les  deux  Etats  examinent  en  ce  mo- 
ment ce  qu'il  serait  possible  de  faire. 

M.  Asquith  n'a  pas  parle  de  la  question  navale, 
mais  vous  aurez  remarque  qu'a  Glasgow,  pendant 
que  le  Ministre  de  la  Guerre  se  trouvait  a  Berlin, 
le  Ministre  de  la  Marine,  M.  Winston  Churchill,  a 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  February  16,  1912. 

Sir:— 

During  the  debate  on  the  reply  to  the  speech  from 
the  Throne,  the  Prime  Minister  had  occasion  to 
throw  some  light  on  the  aim  of  the  recent  visit  of 
the  War-Minister  to  Berlin. 

In  my  report  of  the  9th  inst.  I  observed  that  of 
all  the  conjectures  advanced,  the  one  of  a  friendly 
conversation  with  a  view  to  finding  a  ground  for  an 
understanding  and  to  diminishing  the  existing  ten- 
sion was  the  most  likely  one. 

The  speech  of  Mr.  Asquith  confirms  that  impres- 
sion. 

He  admitted  that  during  the  last  months  the  tra- 
ditional friendship  between  the  two  nations  had 
suiifered  somewhat  severely  on  account  of  the  sus^ 
picion  existing  on  both  sides. 

The  German  public  had  gone  so  far  as  to  be- 
lieve that  the  British  fleet  had  been  preparing  dur- 
ing the  summer  and  autumn  of  1911  for  an  attack 
against  the  German  squadrons.  That  was  a  pure 
invention.  The  two  Governments  had  a  sincere 
desire  to  bring  about  a  better  understanding  and 
the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  had  indicated  at  London  that 
the  attainment  of  that  common  object  would  per- 
haps be  facilitated  by  a  visit  of  a  British  Minister 
to  Germany. 

That  was  perhaps  contrary  to  diplomatic  usage, 
but  it  had  resulted  in  fortunate  and  frank  explana- 
tions, sufficient  to  dispel  the  impression  that  the 
Governments  concerned  were  harboring  aggressive 
intentions.  Mr.  Asquith  believes  that  the  conver- 
sations of  his  colleague  at  Berlin  may  have  fur- 
ther happy  results  in  future,  concerning  which  he 
gave  no  explanation. 

The  Prime  Minister  was  careful  to  add  that 
though  the  two  nations  desired  to  see  more  cordial 
relations  established  between  themselves,  this  did 
not  in  any  way  imply  a  modification  of  the  special 
relationships  in  which  Germany  on  one  side  and 
Great  Britain  on  the  other  stood  to  other  Powers, 
but  the  two  Powers  were  examining  at  present  what 
could  be  done. 

Mr.  Asquith  did  not  touch  upon  the  naval  ques- 
tion, but  you  will  have  noticed  that  at  Glasgow, 
while  the  Minister  of  War  was  at  Berlin,  the  Min- 
ister of  the   Navy,  Mr.  Winston   Churchill,  again 


encore  affirme  la  resolution  de  I'Angleterre  de  main- 
tenir  a  tout  prix  sa  suprematie  sur  mer. 

II  a  meme  employe  un  mot  assez  malheureux,  qui 
a  fait  mauvais  effet  en  Allemagne,  lorsqu'il  a  dit 
qu'une  forte  marine  etait  une  necessite  pour  la 
Grande-Bretagne  et  un  simple  luxe  pour  I'Empire 
germanique. 

Quel  serait  le  terrain  d'entente?  En  procedant 
par  elimination  il  semble  qu'on  doive  le  chercher 
dans  des  delimitations  de  spheres  d'interets  politi- 
ques  et  economiques.  On  doit  esperer  que  ce  ne 
sera  pas  aux  depens  d'Etats  tiers  trop  faibles  pour 
s'y  opposer. 

A  la  Chambre  des  Lords  le  Marquis  de  Crewe  au 
nom  du  Gouvernement  a  parle  dans  le  meme  sens 
que  M.  Asquith. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


affirmed  England's  resolution  to  maintain  her  su- 
premacy at  sea  at  any  price. 

He  even  used  a  rather  unfortunate  phrase,  which 
made  a  bad  impression  in  Germany,  when  he  said 
that,  while  a  strong  navy  was  a  necessity  to  Great 
.Britain,  it  was  simply  a  luxury  to  the  German 
Empire. 

Where,  then,  is  the  ground  for  an  understanding? 
By  process  of  elimination  it  seems  that  it  must  be 
found  in  the  delimitation  of  political  and  economi- 
cal spheres  of  interest.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this 
will  not  take  place  at  the  expense  of  third  States, 
too  feeble  to  offer  resistance. 

In  the  House  of  Lords  the  Marquis  of  Crewe 
spoke  in  the  name  of  the  Government  in  the  same 
sense  as  Mr.  Asquith. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Count  de  Lalaing. 


No.  91. 


Le  Baron  Greindl,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  26  Avril  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Le  Reichstag  a  commence  lundi  dernier  et  ter- 
mine  hier  la  premiere  lecture  des  projets  de  loi  sur 
I'augmentation  de  I'arm'ee  de  terre,  de  la  marine  de 
guerre  et  sur  les  ressources  a  creer  pour  les  nou- 
velles  depenses  militaires,  moyennant  la  suppression 
du  privilege  des  distilleries  agricoles  que  j'ai  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  par  mes  rapports  du  17 
et  du  18  avril. 

Les  trois  projets  avaient  ete  mis  conjointement 
a  I'ordre  du  jour.  Le  Reichstag  les  a  disjoints  en 
adoptant  une  mesure  de  M.  Bassermann  qui  envoie 
a  une  commission  speciale  le  projet  relatif  aux  dis- 
tilleries par  160  voix  contre  158.  C'est  une  majorite 
de  hasard  puisque  79  deputes  etaient  absents.  Les 
gauches  reunies  n'en  ont  pas  moins  remporte  un 
succes  contre  les  conservateurs  allies  au  centre. 

La  defaite  est  d'autant  plus  sensible  pour  les  con- 
servateuts  que  la  discussion  dans  la  commission 
fournira  I'occasion  de  demander  la  suppression  des 
clauses  du  projet  de  loi  destinees  a  rendre  moins  pre- 
judiciables  a  leurs  amis  les  cultivateurs  distillateurs 
la  perte  de  la  reduction  d'impot  dont  ils  jouissent 
actuellement  et  a  mettre  en  question  toute  la  loi  sur 
I'accise  de  I'eau-de-vie  de  1909  qui  a  donne  lieu  a 
de  nombreuses  plaintes. 

Quel  que  soit  le  sort  de  ce  projet,  il  ne  met  pas 
en  peril  celui  des  projets  d'augmentation  de  I'armee 
et  de  la  flotte.  Tous  les  partis  bourgeois  sont  d'ac- 
cord  pour  reconnaitre  qu'ils  sont  necessaires.  Cette 
unanimite  est  la  cause  pour  laquelle  les  debats  du 
Reichstag  ont  ete  assez  ternes.  Dans  son  discours 
initial  le  chancelier  s'est  efforce  de  dernontrer  que 
I'initiative  du  gouvernement  n'etait  pas  inspiree  par 
une  pensee  d'agression  ou  de  provocation  contre  qui 
que  ce  soit.  Tous  les  orateurs  ont  suivi  I'exemple  de 
M.  de  Bethmann  Hollweg.  lis  ont  parle  a  cote  de  la 
question  et  a  peine  effleure  la  vraie  raison  qui  oblige 
I'Allemagne  a  developper  encore  ses  formidables  pre- 
paratifs  militaires;  c'est-a-dire  I'etat  alarmant  des 
relations  entre  les  grandes  puissances,  provenant  des 


Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  April  26,  1912. 

Sir:— 

The  Reichstag  commenced  last  Monday  and  fin- 
ished yesterday  the  first  reading  of  the  bills,  which 
I  sent  you  in  my  reports  of  April  17th  and  18th, 
covering  the  increase  of  the  army  and  the  navy 
and  the  creation  of  sources  of  revenue  to  cover  the 
new  military  expenditure  by  abolishing  the  privil- 
eges of  the  agricultural  distilleries. 

The  three  bills  had  been  conjointly  put  on  the 
order  of  the  day.  The  Reichstag  separated  them, 
carrying,  by  160  against  158  votes,  the  motion  of 
Mr.  Bassermann,  according  to  which  the  draft  con- 
cerning the  distilleries  goes  to  a  special  commission. 
That  majority  was  accidental  since  79  deputies 
were  absent.  The  united  Left,  nevertheless,  scored 
a  success  against  the  combined  Conservatives  and 
Centre. 

The  defeat  is  all  the  more  painful  for  the  Conser- 
vatives, because  the  debate  in  the  commission  will 
furnish  occasion  for  demanding  the  suppression  of 
those  clauses  in  the  proposed  bill  which  were  in- 
tended to  compensate  their  friends  the  distillers  in 
the  country  for  the  loss  of  the  tax  reduction  which 
they  are  now  enjoying,  and  practically  to  invahdate 
the  entire  law  concerning  the  brandy  tax  of  1909 
which  has  given  rise  to  numerous  complaints. 

Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  this  proposed  bill, 
it  does  not  endanger  the  plans  for  the  increase  of 
the  army  and  navy.  All  civil  parties  are  agreed  in 
recognizing  their  necessity.  This  unanimity  is  the 
reason  why  the  debates  in  the  Reichstag  were  rather 
dull.  In  his  introductory  speech  the  Chancellor 
took  pains  to  demonstrate  that  the  step  of  the  Gov- 
ernment was  not  inspired  by  any  ideas  of  aggression 
or  provocation  against  any  one.  All  speakers  fol- 
lowed the  example  of  Mr.  von  Bethmann  Hollweg. 
They  talked  around  the  matter  without  touching 
even  lightly  on  the  true  reason  which  obliged  Ger- 
many to  develop  still  further  her  formidable  mili- 
tary preparations,  that  is  to  say,  the  alarming  state 
of  the  relations  between  the  Great  Powers,  produced 


Ill 


rancunes  entre  les  peuples,  de  la  foUe  6quipee  de 
ritalie  et  de  la  fermentation  dans  les  etats  des  Bal- 
kans. 

Agreez  etc. 

[s.]  Greindl. 


by  the  ill-feeling  among  the  nations,  the  foolish  es- 
capade of  Italy,  and  the  fermentation  in  the  Balkan 
States. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Greindl. 


No.  92. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  28  Juin  1912. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

M.  le  Baron  de  Marschall  reussira-t-il,  au  cours 
de  sa  mission  a  Londres,  a  operer  un  rapproche- 
ment entre  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  le  Gouver- 
nement  Britannique?  Personne  sans  doute  ne  le  de- 
sire plus  que  I'Empereur,  et  c'est  une  justice  a  ren- 
dre  a  Sa  Majeste  que  de  constater  qu'Elle  ne  neglige 
guere  une  occasion  de  prononcer  en  public  quelques 
paroles  aimables  ou  elogieuses  a  I'adresse  des  An- 
glais. Les  recentes  regates  de  Kiel  viennent  de  lui 
fournir  deux  fois  un  pretexte  a  vanter  la  marine  de 
la  Grande-Bretagne.  L'Empereur,  d'ailleurs,  ne  se 
laisse  pas  rebuter  par  les  deceptions  que  lui  causent 
ses  amis  britanniques.  Apres  la  mort  d'Edouard 
VII,  il  etait  persuade,  m'a-t-on  dit  ici,  ainsi  que  le 
Kronprinz,  lorsqu'ils  sont  revenus  d'Angleterre  ou 
ils  avaient  ete  tres  courtoisement  regus,  que  la  froi- 
deur  des  relations  des  annees  precedentes  allait  faire 
place  entre  les  deux  Cours  a  une  cordiale  intimite, 
et  que  les  causes  de  mesintelligence  entre  les  deux 
peuples  allaient  s'evanouir  avec  le  passe.  Aussi  sa 
surprise  a-t-elle  du  etre  cruelle  quand  il  a  yu  le  Ca- 
binet de  Londres  se  ranger  avec  tant  de  resolution, 
I'an  dernier,  du  cote  de  la  France.  Mais  I'Empereur 
est  tenace  et  il  n'a  pas  renonce  a  reconquerir  la  sym- 
pathie  des  Anglais,  comme  il  a  reussi  a  s'emparer 
jusqu'a  un  certain  point  de  la  confiance  du  Czar,  a  la 
gagner  par  le  charme  de  ses  seductions  personnelles. 
Ne  pouvant  agir  lui-meme  a  Londres,  il  a  charge  de 
ce  role  ingrat  le  plus  distingue  des  diplomates  alle- 
mands. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  m'a  paru  assez  scep- 
tique  quant  au  succes  de  cette  mission.  Ce  qui  rend, 
m'a  dit  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  le  retablissement  de 
la  bonne  entente  d'autrefois  si  diiificile,  c'est  qu'il 
n'existe  entre  les  deux  nations  aucun  motif  correct 
d'irritation  ou  d'eloignement.  Nous  n'avons  pas  eu 
a  regler  avec  I'AUemagne  un  incident  penible  comme 
celui  de  Fachoda.  La  mesintelligence  date  de  I'en- 
voi  du  telegramme  de  I'Empereur  au  President  Krii- 
ger.  ^'a  ete  pour  nous  comme  un  trait  de  lumiere 
qui  nous  a  montre  qu'un  abime  s'etait  creuse  silen- 
cieusement,  et  sans  que  nous  nous  en  fussions  aper- 
gus,  entre  nous  et  le  peuple  allemand.  La  question 
de  la  limitation  de  la  flotte  de  guerre  allemande  est 
insoluble.  Nous  n'avons  aucun  droit  de  I'imposer  au 
Gouvernement  Imperial.  Nous  ne  pouvons^  que  le 
suivre  dans  la  voie  ruineuse  oil  il  s'est  engage,  car  le 
salut  de  I'Angleterre  depend  de  sa  superiorite  na- 
vale.  L'Ambassadeur  croit,  comme  M.  Winston 
Churchill,  que  la  flotte  allemande,  creation  person- 
nelle  de  I'Empereur,  est  I'objet  de  ses  predilections, 
qu'il  prend  plaisir  a  I'augmenter  et  qu'il  ne  renon- 
cera  pas  a  la  rendre  plus  redoutable  que  ne  I'exige 
la  protection  du  commerce  allemand. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  June  28,  1912. 

Sir:— 

Will  Baron  von  Marschall  succeed  in  the  course 
of  his  mission  at  London  in  effecting  a  rapproche- 
ment between  the  Imperial  Government  and  the 
British  Government?  Without  doubt,  nobody  de- 
sires it  more  than  the  Emperor  and  in  justice  to 
Ilis  Majesty  it  should  be  said  that  he  hardly  neg- 
lects a  single  occasion  in  order  to  say  in  public 
some  amiable  or  laudatory  words  about  the  Eng- 
lish. The  recent  races  at  Kiel  twice  offered  him  a 
pretext  for  praising  the  British  Navy.  The  Em- 
peror never  allows  himself  to  be  discouraged  by 
the  disappointments  which  his  British  friends  cause 
him.  I  have  been  told  here  that  after  the  death  of 
Edward  VII  the  Emperor  as  well  as  the  Crown 
Prince  were  convinced,  when  returning  from  Eng- 
land, where  they  were  very  courteously  received, 
that  the  coldness  existing  in  the  relations  between 
the  two  Courts  during  the  preceding  years  would 
give  way  to  an  intimate  cordiality  and  that  the 
causes  of  misunderstanding  between  the  two  peo- 
ples would  vanish  with  the  past.  The  Emperor's 
surprise  must  have  been  cruel  when  he  saw  the 
Cabinet  of  London  last  year  range  itself  with  so 
much  resolution  by  the  side  of  France.  But  the 
Emperor  is  tenacious  and  he  has  not  given  up  the 
task  of  reconquering  the  sympathy  of  the  EngHsh, 
just  as  he  has  succeeded  in  winning  the  confidence 
of  the  Czar,  by  the  charm  of  his  seductive  person- 
ality. As  he  cannot  act  himself  at  London,  he  has 
charged  with  this  thankless  task  the  most  distin- 
guished of  the  German  diplomats. 

The  British  Ambassador  seems  to  me  to  be  rather 
sceptical  as  to  the  success  of  the  mission.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Goschen  said  to  me:  "What  renders  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  former  good  understanding  so 
difficult  is  that  there  exists  between  the  two  nations 
no  concrete  reason  for  irritation  or  estrangement. 
We  have  no  painful  incident  like  that  of  Fashoda 
to  settle  with  Germany.  The  misunderstanding 
dates  from  the  sending  of  the  telegram  of  the  Em- 
peror to  President  Kruger.  That  was  like  a  flash 
of  light,  which  showed  us  that  an  abyss  had  silently 
opened  up  between  us  and  the  German  people.  The 
question  of  the  limitation  of  the  German  Navy 
cannot  be  solved.  We  have  no  right  to  impose  it 
on  the  Imperial  Government.  We  can  do  nothing 
but  follow  along  the  ruinous  road  which  it  has 
chosen,  for  the  welfare  of  England  depends  on  her 
naval  superiority.  The  Ambassador  believes,  as 
does  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  that  the  German  fleet, 
the  personal  creation  of  the  Emperor,  is  the  object 
of  his  predilections,  that  he  takes  pleasure  in  in- 
creasing it,  and  that  he  will  not  renounce  his  plan 
of  making  it  more  formidable  than  the  protection 
of  the  German  commerce  demands. 


112 


Sir  Edward  Goschen  a  passe  sous  silence  une 
autre  cause,  plus  profonde  peut-etre,  de  I'aversion  de 
la  nation  anglaise  contre  la  nation  germanique :  c'est 
leur  rivalite  industrielle  et  commerciale.  L'Angle- 
terre  voit  avec  une  jalousie  bien  naturelle  un  peuple 
europeen  gagner  chaque  annee  du  terrain  dans  la 
lutte  economique  mondiale  et,  la  aussi,  menacer  la 
suprematie  qu'elle  s'etait  assuree.  Les  produits  alle- 
mands,  quoique  encore  inferieurs  en  qualite,  tendent 
a  egaler  les  marchandises  anglaises  similaires,  dont 
le  prix  est  reste  plus  eleve;  la  marque  d'origine 
"made  in  Germany,"  imposee  par  le  Cabinet  britan- 
nique,  fait,  parait-il,  preferer  aujourd'hui  les  produits 
allemands  a  ceux  de  la  metropole  dans  les  colonies 
anglaises  seduites  par  leur  bon  marche. 

Le  Baron  de  Marschall  est  un  homme  d'affaires 
tres  avise,  a  ce  qu'assurent  les  diplomates  qui  le  con- 
naissent ;  il  etudie  une  question  diplomatique  comme 
un  avocat  compulse  un  dossier.  Loin  de  se  limiter 
a  frequenter  la  haute  societe  et  le  monde  politique, 
il  ne  neglige  aucune  source  d'information,  il  ques- 
tionne  les  journalistes  en  ayant  I'air  de  se  laisser 
interviewer  par  eux.  C'est  un  brillant  representant 
d'une  nouvelle  ecole.  A  Constantinople,  m'a  raconte 
I'Ambassadeur  de  Turquie,  sa  situation  et  son  credit 
semblerent  perdus  apres  la  revolution  de  1908.  II 
les  a  promptement  retablis  en  profitant  des  fautes  de 
ses  adversaires,  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  et 
d'Angleterre.  A  Londres,  il  etudiera  sans  doute 
avec  calme  les  causes  morales  et  economiques  de  la 
mesintelligence  entre  les  deux  Gouvernements  et  les 
deux  nations.  Trouvera-t-il  les  bases  d'une  entente 
politique?  Cela  semble  plus  que  douteux,  mais  une 
detente  momentanee  n'est  pas  impossible.  L'oeuvre 
en  tons  cas  est  en  de  bonnes  mains  et  I'ouvrier  n'en 
compromettra  pas  le  succes  par  trop  de  precipitation 
et  de  confiance  en  lui-meme. 

Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


Sir  Goschen  passed  over  in  silence  another,  per- 
haps deeper  cause  of  the  aversion  of  the  English 
for  the  German  nation:  their  industrial  and  com- 
mercial rivalry.  England  observes  with  a  very 
natural  jealousy  a  European  people  gaining  ground 
every  year  in  the  economic  struggle  of  the  world, 
threatening,  in  this  respect  too,  the  supremacy  which 
England  has  secured  for  herself.  The  German  prod- 
ucts, though  still  inferior  in  quality,  are  tending  to 
become  equal  to  similar  English  goods  the  price  of 
which  has  remained  higher.  The  mark  of  origin 
"Made  in  Germany"-  imposfed  by  the  British  Cabi- 
net, seems  to  have  had  the  result  that  German 
products,  because  of  their  cheaper  price,  are  to-day 
being  preferred  in  the  British  Colonies  to  those  of 
the  mother  country. 

Baron  von  Marschall  is  a  very  clever  man  of  af- 
fairs, so  I  am  told  by  the  diplomats  who  know  him : 
he  studies  a  diplomatic  question  as  a  lawyer  exam- 
ines his  papers.  Far  from  confining  himself  to 
visiting  high  society  and  the  political  world,  he  neg- 
lects no  source  of  information ;  he  questions  the 
journalists  while  appearing  to  be  interviewed  by 
them.  He  is  a  brilliant  representative  of  a  new 
school.  At  Constantinople,  so  the  Turkish  Ambas- 
sador tells  me,  his  position  and  his  reputation 
seemed  lost  after  the  revolution  of  1908.  He 
promptly  reestablished  them,  profiting  by  the 
mistakes  of  his  adversaries,  the  Ambassadors  of 
France  and  England.  At  London  he  will,  no  doubt, 
calmly  study  the  moral  and  economic  causes  of  the 
misunderstanding  between  the  two  Governments 
and  the  two  nations.  Will  he  find  the  basis  for  a 
political  understanding?  That  seems  more  than 
doubtful,  but  a  momentary  relaxation  is  not  impos- 
sible. In  any  case,  the  work  is  in  good  hands  and 
the  workman  will  not  compromise  its  success  by 
too  much  haste  and  too  much  confidence  in  himself. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


No.  93. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  18  Octobre  1912. 


Berlin,  October  18,  1912. 


Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Les  relations  entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  ne 
s'etaient  pas  ameliorees  durant  I'ete  dernier.  La 
campagne  entreprise  par  une  partie  de  la  presse  ger- 
manique a  propos  de  la  concentration  de  la  flbtte 
frangaise  dans  la  Mediterranee  et  d'autre  part,  cer- 
tains incidents  sur  lesquels  il  avait  fallu  donner  des 
explications  a  la  Wilhelmstrasse,  tels  qu'un  discours 
du  General  d'Amade  et  le  traitement  inflige  par  la 
population  de  Nancy  a  I'automobile  de  la  Princesse 
Colloredo  d'oii  un  drapeau  allemand  avait  ete  arrache 
et  foule  aux  pieds,  avaient  contribue  a  entretenir  et 
meme  a  augmenter  I'aigreur  entre  les  deux  peuples 
voisins.  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter  ne  semblait  y  at- 
tacher  aucune  importance,  mais  M.  Cambon,  charge 
d'aplanir  les  difiicultes  a  mesure  qu'elles  se  pro- 
duisaient,  se  preoccupait  de  leur  frequence  et  de 
I'etat  de  tension  qui  en  resultait. 

Le  premier  effet  de  la  crise  balkanique  a  ete  d'ope- 
rer  un  rapprochement  entre  le  Gouvernement  Im- 


Sir:— 

The  relations  between  France  and  Germany  had 
not  improved  during  last  summer.  The  campaign 
started  by  a  part  of  the  German  press  on  account 
of  the  concentration  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  Med- 
iterranean and,  on  the  other  side,  certain  incidents 
concerning  which  explanations  had  to  be  given  to 
Wilhelmstrasse,  such  as  a  speech  by  General  d'A- 
made and  the  treatment  inflicted  by  the  population 
of  Nancy  on  the  automobile  of  Princess  Colloredo 
from  which  a  German  flag  was  torn  and  trodden 
under  foot,  had  contributed  to  sustain  and  even  to 
augment  the  bitterness  between  the  two  neighbor- 
ing peoples.  Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter  did  not 
seem  to  attach  any  importance  to  this,  but  M.  Cam- 
bon, who  had  been  charged  to  smooth  out  the  diffi- 
culties as  they  arose,  was  perturbed  over  their  fre- 
quency and  the  state  of  tension  which  they  caused. 

The  first  effect  of  the  Balkan  crisis  has  been  to 
bring  about  a  rapprochement  between  the  Imperial 


perial  et  celui  de  la  Republique.  Egalemeiit  desireux 
de  voir  le  conflit  localise  dans  la  peninsule  et  d'eviter 
line  guerre  europeenne,  ils  se  sont  entendus  pour 
agir  dans  le  meme  sens  sur  leurs  allies  respectifs,  la 
Kussie  et  I'Autriche,  et  ils  ont  pris  part  en  meme 
temps  aux  demarches  tentees,  un  peu  tardivement,  a 
Constantinople  et  dans  les  capitales  des  Balkans. 
L'initiative  prise  personnellement  par  M.  Poincare 
en  vue  du  retablissement  de  la  paix  a  regu  I'appro- 
bation  et  meme  les  eloges  de  la  presse  allemande, 
quoiqu'elle  ait  trouve  qu'il  etait  trop  tot  pour  parler 
de  la  reunion  d'une  Conference.  Enfin  le  "Matin"  a 
chante  les  louanges  de  M.  de  Kiderlen,  si  Ton  pent 
qualifier  ainsi  I'article  qu'il  lui  a  consacre. 

II  n'a  pas  tenu  au  Gouvernement  Imperial  que  la 
crise  causee  par  I'annexion  de  la  Bosnie  et  de  I'Her- 
zegovine  n'eut  regu  en  1909  une  meilleure  solution. 
II  avait  fait  offrir  au  Cabinet  de  Paris  d'agir  simul- 
tanement  a  Petersbourg,  pour  amener  la  Russie  a 
changer  d'attitude.  Cette  collaboration  ayant  ete 
declinee  par  M.  Pichon,  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  se  de- 
cida  a  efFectuer  seul  la  demarche  que  Ton  sait.  Je 
crois  utile  de  retablir  la  verite  sur  ce  point  historique. 
Je  I'ai  apprise  recemment  a  I'Ambassade  de  France. 


II  etait,  d'ailleurs,  assez  naturel  que  I'attention  et 
les  preoccupations  du  public  des  deux  cotes  des 
Vosges  se  detournassent  des  sujets  habituels  de  dis- 
cussion et  de  polemique  pour  se  concentrer  sur  les 
evenements  balkaniques.  Sans  vouloir  exagerer  la. 
portee  de  la  detente  que  je  signale,  il  est  permis 
d'esperer  que  la  communaute  de  vues  de  I'Allemagne 
et  de  la  France  dans  les  circonstances  presentes  ser- 
vira  puissamment  au  retablissement  de  la  paix. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


Government  and  that  of  the  Republic.  Equally  de- 
sirous of  seeing  the  conflict  localized  in  the  penin- 
sula and  of  avoiding  a  European  war,  they  agreed 
to  try  to  influence  their  respective  allies,  Russia  and 
Austria  in  this  sense.  At  the  same  time,  though  a 
little  belated,  they  also  shared  in  the  steps  which 
were  being  taken  at  Constantinople  and  in  the  Bal- 
kan capitals.  The  initiative  which  M.  Poincare 
personally  took  with  a  view  to  reestabhshing  peace, 
received  the  approval  and  even  the  praise  of  the 
German  press,  though  it  was  of  the  opinion  that  it 
was  too  early  to  speak  of  calling  a  conference.  The 
Matin  published  a  eulogy  of  Mr.  von  Kiderlen- 
Waechter,  if  the  article  which  it  devoted  to  him  can 
be  called  that. 

It  was  not  the  fault  of  the  Imperial  Government 
that  the  crisis  caused  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  found  no  better  solution  in  1909. 
The  German  Government  caused  the  offer  to  be 
made  to  the  Cabinet  of  Paris  of  a  concerted  action 
at  Petersburg  in  order  to  induce  Russia  to  change 
her  attitude.  This  collaboration  having  been  de- 
clined by  M.  Pichon,  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  decided 
to  make  the  demarch,  which  is  known,  single-hand- 
ed. I  think  it  is  useful  to  reestablish  the  truth  on 
this  historical  point,  which  I  learned  recently  at  the 
French  Embassy. 

For  the  rest,  it  was  only  natural  that  the  atten- 
tion and  the  anxiety  of  the  public  on  both  sides  of 
the  Vosges  should  turn  from  the  habitual  subjects 
of  discussion  and  polemic  in  order  to  concentrate 
on  Balkan  events.  Without  wishing  to  exag- 
gerate the  importance  of  the  relaxation  which  I  re- 
port, one  may  hope  that  the  community  of  views  of 
Germany  and  France  in  the  present  circumstance 
will  be  a  powerful  factor  in  reestablishing  peace. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  24  Octobre  1912. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Depuis  que  les  Souverains  allies  ont  donne  nette- 
mentdansleurs  manifestes  le  caractere d'une  croisade 
a  la  guerre  entreprise  par  eux  en  commun  contre 
I'ennemi  de  leur  foi,  contre  le  conquerant  asiatique 
qui  oppresse  depuis  presde  cinq  sieclesdes  pays  Chre- 
tiens, la  presse  allemande,  animee  en  general  d'idees 
tres  larges  en  fait  de  croyances,  penche  de  plus  en 
plus  du  cote  des  Turcs.  Comme  j'avais  I'honneur  de 
vous  I'ecrire  le  21  de  ce  mois,  les  allusions,  vraiment 
peu  adroites,  faites  par  le  Czar  de  Bulgarie  dans  sa 
proclamation  a  ses  troupes  a  I'intervention  eventu- 
elle  de  la  Russie,  ont  produit  ici  la  plus  mauvaise 
impression. 

On  pense  en  eflfet  avec  raison  que  les  sentiments 
panslavistes  du  peuple  russe  n'ont  pas  besoin  d'etre 
excites;  on  craint  qu'a  un  moment  donne,  si  le  sort 
des  armes  est  defavorable  ou  trop  favorable  aux  al- 
lies, les  manifestations  de  ces  sentiments  ne  rompent 
toutes  les  digues  par  lesquelles  le  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial chercherait  a  les  contenir  et  que  la  politique 
d'entente  avec  les  autres  puissances  pratiquee  par 
M.  Sassonow  ne  disparaisse  avec  lui. 


Berlin,  October  24,  1912. 
Sir:— 

Since  the  allied  Sovereigns  in  their  manifestoes 
clearly  gave  the  character  of  a  crusade  to  the  war 
jointly  undertaken  by  them  against  the  enemy  of 
their  faith,  against  the  Asiatic  conqueror,  who  for 
five  centuries  has  oppressed  Christian  countries,  the 
German  press,  at  all  times  animated  by  very  broad 
ideas  in  matters  of  creed,  is  inclining  more  and 
more  towards  the  side  of  the  Turks.  As  I  had  the 
honor  to  write  to  you  on  the  21st  inst.  the  really 
very  clumsy  allusions  made  by  the  Czar  of  Bulgaria 
in  his  proclamation  to  his  troops,  relative  to  a  pos- 
sible intervention  of  Russia,  have  produced  the 
worst  impression  here. 

It  is  thought,  truly  with  reason,  that  the  Pan- 
Slavist  sentiments  of  the  Russian  people  need  no 
spur;  it  is  to  be  feared  that  at  any  given  moment, 
if  the  fate  of  arms  is  unfavorable  or  too  favorable 
for  the  allies,  the  manifestations  of  those  sentiments 
would  break  down  all  barriers  by  which  the  Im- 
perial Government  would  try  to  restrain  them,  and 
that  the  policy  of  harmony  with  the  other  Powers, 
observed  by  M.  Sassonov  will  disappear  with  him. 


L'Ambassadeur  de  France,  qui  doit  avoir  des 
raisons  particulieres  de  parler  ainsi,  m'a  repete  a 
diverses  reprises  que  le  plus  grand  danger  pour  le 
maintien  de  la  paix  europeenne  consiste  dans  I'indis- 
cipline  et  la  politique  personnelle  des  Agents  russes 
a  I'etranger.  lis  sont  presque  tous  d'ardents  pansla- 
vistes  et  c'est  a  eux  qu'il  faut  en  grande  partie  im- 
puter  la  responsabilite  des  evenements  actuels.  lis 
se  feront,  a  n'en  pas  douter,  les  instigateurs  secrets 
d'une  intervention  de  leur  Pays  dans  le  conflit  bal- 
kanique. 

La  politique  de  M.  Sassannow  est  d'autant  plus 
sage  que  les  evenements  actuels  ont  surpris  la  Rus- 
sie  en  pleine  reorganisation  de  ses  forces  militaires 
et  qu'un  desastre  ou  un  simple  echec  en  Europe  lui 
serait  autrement  funeste  que  ses  defaites  en  Ex- 
treme-Orient. II  serait  le  signal  d'une  revolution  so- 
ciale  qui  s'arme  dans  I'ombre  et  menace  sourdement 
le  Trone  des  Czars.  A  comparer  le  peu  d'avantage 
personnel  que  la  Russie  retirerait  d'une  intervention 
avec  les  risques  qu'elle  encourrait,  on  devrait  avoir 
confiance  dans  le  bon  sens  de  ses  gouvernants  et  en- 
visager  I'avenir  prochain  avec  assez  de  tranquillite, 
n'etaient  les  sentiments  panslavistes  et  ceux  qui  les 
attisent. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Baron  Beyens. 


The  Ambassador  of  France,  who  must  have  spe- 
cial reasons  for  saying  so,  has  repeatedly  told  me 
that  the  greatest  danger  for  the  maintenance  of 
European  peace  consists  in  the  lack  of  discipline 
and  in  the  personal  policy  of  the  Russian  agents 
abroad.  They  are  almost  without  exception  ardent 
Pan-Slavists,  and  to  them  the  responsibility  for  the 
present  events  must  be  attributed  to  a  great  extent. 
They  will,  that  cannot  be  doubted,  secretly  instigate 
their  country  to  intervene  in  the  Balkan  conflict. 

The  policy  of  M.  Sassonov  is  all  the  wiser,  be- 
cause the  present  events  have  surprised  Russia  in 
the  midst  of  the  reorganisation  of  her  military  forces 
and  because  a  disaster  or  simply  a  failure  in  Europe 
would  be  vastly  more  fatal  than  her  defeats  in  the 
Far  East.  It  would  be  the  signal  for  a  social  revo- 
lution, which  is  arming  in  the  dark  and  is  mutely 
menacing  the  throne  of  the  Czars.  If  the  small  ad- 
vantage to  herself  which  Russia  would  derive  from 
an  intervention  be  compared  with  the  risks  which 
she  would  incur,  it  would  seem  that  the  good  sense 
of  her  rulers  might  be  relied  on  and  that  the  near 
future  might  be  viewed  with  tranquilHty,  were  it 
not  for  the  Pan-Slavist  sentiments  and  those  who 
fan  them. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


No.  95. 

Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  de  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Londres,  le  31  Octobre  1912. 


No.  95. 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  October  31,  1912. 


Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Une  des  nombreuses  conferences  instituees  par  la 
societe  de  I'entente  anglo-allemande  s'est  reunie  hier 
au  Guildhall  a  Londres,  sous  la  presidence  de  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles,  ancien  Ambassadeur  a  Berlin.  Le 
President,  le  Lord  Maire  et  Lord  Avebury  ont  tendu 
le  rameau  d'olivier.  Le  Comte  Leyden,  le  Dr.  Schu- 
ster et  le  Professeur  Rathgen  ont  tenu  des  discours 
pacifiques.  On  a  echange  quelques  politesses  sur  la 
race  anglo-saxonne,  les  liens  du  sang,  les  horreurs  de 
la  guerre  que  les  deux  nations  redoutent,  leurs  inte- 
rets  commerciaux  communs  et  le  besoin  reciproque 
d'une  meilleure  entente. 

Malheureusement  la  semaine  derniere,  le  Feld- 
Marechal  Lord  Roberts  avait  prononce  dans  un  mee- 
ting un  discours  belliqueux  qui  avait  attire  beaucoup 
d'attention.  On  sait  que  Lord  Roberts  preconise  le 
service  militaire  personnel,  qu'il  critique  la  situation 
de  I'armee  et  cherche  a  introduire  un  esprit  plus 
guerrier  dans  la  nation.  Ce  veteran  a  son  franc  par- 
ler et  fait  le  desespoir  des  pacifistes.  II  ne  cesse  de 
predire  le  declin  de  I'Angleterre  et  sa  mine  finale,  si 
ses  forces  militaires  ne  sont  pas  reorganisees  et  ne 
craint  pas  de  parler  clairement. 

D'un  ton  solennel  et  prophetique,  il  a  declare  que 
I'Allemagne  n'attend  que  le  moment  ou  ses  arme- 
ments  navals  seront  acheves  pour  attaquer  la  Grande 
Bretagne.  L'Empire  Germanique  ne  yise  rien  moins 
que  la  suprematie  sur  terre  et  sur  mer.  II  a  en- 
suite  critique  I'etat  actuel  de  I'armee  anglaise,  qui 
n'est  pas  prete.  Quant  aux  troupes  territoriales,  il 
les  declare  trop  peu  nombreuses,  indisciplinees,  mal 
equipees  et  sans  energie. 


Sir:— 

One  of  the  numerous  meetings  arranged  by  the 
society  for  an  Anglo-German  understanding  was 
held  yesterday  at  the  Guildhall  at  London  under 
the  presidency  of  Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  the  former 
Ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  president,  the  Lord 
Mayor  and  Lord  Avebury  held  out  the  olive  branch. 
Count  Leyden,  Dr.  Schuster,  and  Professor  Rath- 
gen delivered  pacific  speeches.  Some  courtesies 
were  exchanged  on  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  the  ties 
of  blood,  the  horrors  of  war  which  both  nations 
dread,  their  common  commercial  interests,  and  the 
reciprocal  need  for  a  better  understanding. 

Unfortunately,  at  a  meeting  last  week,  Field-Mar- 
shal Lord  Roberts  made  a  bellicose  speech  which  at- 
tracted much  attention.  It  is  known  that  Lord  Rob- 
erts recommends  universal  conscription,  that  he 
criticizes  conditions  in  the  army,  and  tries  to  instil  a 
more  warlike  spirit  into  the  nation.  This  veteran 
by  his  very  frank  speech  is  the  despair  of  the  paci- 
fists. He  does  not  cease  predicting  the  decline  of 
England  and  her  ultimate  ruin,  if  her  military  forces 
are  not  reorganized,  and  he  is  not  afraid  of  speaking 
clearly. 

In  a  solemn  and  prophetic  tone  he  declared  that 
Germany  was  only  waiting  for  the  moment  when 
her  naval  armaments  were  finished  in  order  to  at- 
tack Great  Britain.  The  German  Empire  was  aim- 
ing at  nothing  less  than  supremacy  on  land  and  at 
sea.  He  then  continued  criticizing  the  present  state 
of  the  English  army,  which  was  not  ready.  As  re- 
gards the  territorial  troops  he  described  them  as 
being  too  few  in  number,  lacking  in  discipline,  badly 
equipped,  and  without  energy. 


115 


Pareil  requisitoire  a  fait  sensation.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment  responsable  de  la  creation  de  I'armee  territo- 
riale  a  ete  vivement  froisse.  Le  Foreign  Office  a 
craint  I'effet  que  ce  discours  pourrait  produire  a  Ber- 
lin. II  y  a  eu  des  interpellations  a  la  Chambre  et  Sir 
E.  Grey  a  dit  qu'il  etait  regrettable  de  voir  dans  les 
deux  pays  des  personnalites  qui  ne  sont  pas  en  me- 
sure  d'influencer  la  politique  de  leurs  Gouvernements 
se  livrer  a  des  attaques  de  ce  genre. 

Mais  le  coup  avait  ete  porte,  et  le  speech  contri- 
buera  a  persuader  aux  timores  que  decidement  I'Alle- 
magne  medite  de  faire  la  guerre  a  sa  rivale  dans  la 
mer  du  Nord,  peut-etre  meme  a  breve  echeance. 

C'est  dans  ces  circonstances,  au  moins  defavora- 
bles,  que  s'est  reunie  la  conference  de  I'entente 
anglo-allemande.  Lord  Roberts  est  un  vieillard  qui 
joue  le  role  d'enfant  terrible,  mais  il  croit  avoir  la 
mission  d'ouvrir  les  yeux  de  la  nation  et  sa  popularite 
lui  tient  lieu  d'arguments  aupres  de  la  masse.  Les 
paroles  mielleuses  que  Ton  a  entendues  hier  au 
Guildhall  ne  sont  pas  de  nature  a  eflfacer  les  sorties 
violentes  du  Feld-Marechal  dans  I'esprit  populaire, 
sorties  qui  maintiennent  une  atmosphere  de  mefiance 
chronique  dans  I'opinion. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


That  plea  caused  a  sensation.  The  Government 
which  is  responsible  for  the  creation  of  the  terri- 
torial army  was  highly  offended.  The  Foreign 
Office  feared  the  efifect  that  this  speech  might  pro- 
duce in  Berlin.  Questions  were  put  in  the  House, 
and  Sir  E.  Grey  said  that  it  was  regrettable  that  in 
both  countries  people  who  were  not  in  a  position  to 
influence  the  policy  of  their  Government  indulged 
in  attacks  of  this  kind. 

But  the  blow  has  been  dealt  and  the  speech  will 
help  to  convince  the  timorous  that  Germany  is  cer- 
tainly meditating  war  on  her  rival  in  the  North 
Sea,  perhaps  even  within  a  short  time. 

Under  these  at  least  unfavorable  circumstances 
the  meeting  for  the  Anglo-German  understanding 
took  place.  Lord  Roberts  is  an  old  man  who  plays 
the  part  of  the  enfant  terrible,  but  he  believes  that 
he  has  the  mission  to  open  the  eyes  of  his  nation 
and  his  popularity  takes  the  place  of  arguments 
with  the  masses.  The  honeyed  words  which  were 
heard  yesterday  at  the  Guildhall  will  not  be  able  to 
efface  the  violent  outbursts  of  the  Field-Marshal  in 
the  popular  mind,  outbursts  which  sustain  an  at- 
mosphere of  chronic  mistrust  in  public  opinion. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


Let  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


No.  96. 

Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  30  Novembre  1912. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Le  voyage  de  I'Archiduc  Heritier  d'Autriche  en 
Allemagne,  bien  qu'il  ait  eu  pour  pretexte  un  de- 
placement  de  chasse  motive  par  une  invitation  de 
I'Empereur,  a  eu  cette  annee-ci  une  importance  par- 
ticuliere,  etant  donnes  la  guerre  balkanique  et  le 
conflit  entre  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  la  Serbie. 
L'Archiduc  a  dit  a  Berlin  que  la  Monarchie  austro- 
hongroise  etait  arrivee  a  la  limite  des  concessions 
qu'elle  pouvait  faire  a  sa  voisine.  L'Empereur  et  ses 
Conseillers  ne  lui  en  ont  pas  moins  prodigue  des  con- 
seils  de  moderation  que  Guillaume  II,  en  recondui- 
sant  son  bote  a  la  gare,  a  resumes  avec  la  familiarite 
de  langage  dont  il  est  coutumier  par  ces  mots  ex- 
pressifs:  "Surtout  pas  de  betises!"  Je  puis,  sur  la 
foi  d'Ambassadeurs  qui  me  I'ont  repete,  vous  ga- 
rantir  I'authenticite  dece  conseil  qui  a  echappe  aux 
indiscretions  des  journaux. 

Peude  jours  apresle  depart  de  FranQois-Ferdinand, 
a  paru  dans  la  "Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung" 
!e  communique  officieux  que  vous  connaissez,  redige 
a  la  Wilhelmstrasse  et  destine  a  rassurer  les  esprits 
que  la  nouvelle  des  preparatifs  militaires  de  I'Au- 
triche  avait  affoles.  II  n'y  a  pas  de  doute  que  I'Em- 
pereur, le  Chancelier  et  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Af- 
faires Etrangeres  ne  soient  passionnement  pacifi- 
ques.  L'article  de  la  "Norddeutsche"  a  cause  un 
certain  mecontentement  a  la  Cour  de  Vienne. 
L'Archiduc  Heritier  ne  s'attendait  pas,  au  lendemain 
de  son  voyage,  a  une  declaration  aussi  nette  de  la 
part  de  I'Allemagne,  et  il  s'en  est  plaint  ici.  Quels 
que  soient  les  projets  que  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter, 
qui  a  de  grandes  idees,  porte  dans  sa  tete  pour  con- 
cilier  a  son  pays  les  sympathies  des  jeunes  Puis- 
sances balk'aniques,  un  fait  absolument  certain,  c'est 
qu'il  veut  fermement  eviter  une  conflagration  euro- 


Berlin,  November  30,  1912. 
Sir:— 

The  journey  of  the  Austrian  Heir  Apparent  to 
Germany,  though  it  took  place  under  the  pretext  of 
a  hunting  trip  made  at  the  invitation  of  the  Em- 
peror, had  especial  importance  this  year  in  view  of 
the  Balkan  War  and  the  conflict  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia.  The  Archduke  said  at  Berlin 
that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  had  reached 
the  limit  of  the  concessions  which  it  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  make  to  its  neighbor.  The  Emperor  and  his 
advisers  have  nevertheless  not  been  sparing  with 
counsels  of  moderation  which  William  II,  when 
speeding  his  guest  at  the  station  summed  up,  with 
the  familiarity  of  speech  which  is  his  custom,  in 
the  words :  "Above  all,  no  follies !"  I  can  on  the 
authority  of  Ambassadors  who  repeated  it  to  me 
vouch  for  the  authenticity  of  this  advice  which  es- 
caped the  indiscretion  of  the  newspapers. 

A  few  days  after  the  departure  of  Francis  Fer- 
dinand, the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  pub- 
lished the  semi-official  communique  with  which  you 
are  acquainted  and  which  was  drawn  up  at  Wilhelm- 
strasse with  the  intention  of  calming  the  minds 
excited  by  the  reports  of  military  preparations  of 
Austria.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor,  the 
Chancellor,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  are  passionately  pacific.  The  article  of  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  has  caused  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  discontent  at  the  Court  of  Vi- 
enna. The  Heir  Apparent  had  not  expected  his 
journey  to  be  followed  by  such  an  unequivocal  dec- 
laration on  the  part  of  Germany  and  he  has  com- 
plained here  about  it.  Whatever  may  be  the  plans 
which  Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter,  who  has  big 
ideas,  carries  in  his  head  in  order  to  win  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  young  Balkan  Powers  for  his  country. 


peenne.  La  politique  allemande  se  rapproche  sur 
ce  point  de  celle  de  I'Angleterre  et  de  la  France, 
toutes  deux  resolument  pacifiques,  et,  si  les  sujets  de 
polemique  continuent  d'etre  journaliers  entre  la 
presse  de  Paris  et  celle  de  Berlin,  celle-ci  a  adopte 
un  ton  beaucoup  plus  conciliant  a  I'egard  de  la 
Grande  Bretagne  et  de  Sir  Edward  Grey  en  particu- 
lier.  Les  relations  entre  les  Gouvernements  alle- 
mand  et  britannique  sont  meilleures  qu'elles  n'avai- 
ent  ete  depuis  longtemps  et  meme,  a  ce  qu'assure 
I'Ambassadeur  de  France,  une  detente  tres  favorable 
au  maintien  de  la  paix  se  produit  aussi  entre  les  Ca- 
binets de  Berlin  et  de  Paris. 

Amener  I'Autriche  a  se  montrer  plus  traitable, 
comme  on  croit  ici  que  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  y 
a  reussi,  cela  ne  suffirait  pas  pour  apaiser  le  conflit. 
II  faut  encore  faire  flechir  la  resistance  opiniatre  de 
la  Serbie  a  une  diminution  de  ses  pretentions.  A  la 
fin  de  la  semaine  derniere,  le  bruit  courait  dans  les 
Chancelleries  europeennes  que  M.  Sassanow  renon- 
gait  a  lutter  contre  le  parti  de  la  Cour  qui  veut 
entrainer  la  Russe  dans  une  guerre,  quoique  le  sol 
de  I'Empire  russe  soit  mine  par  la  revolution  et  sa 
preparation  militaire  encore  insuffisante.  Mais  de- 
puis deux  jours,  depuis  surtout  que  le  Czar  a  regu 
en  audience  particuliere  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie,  une  impression  de  confiance  a  succede  a 
I'enervement  de  la  semaine  passee.  Mr.  Sassonow 
s'est,  parait-il,  ressaisi  et  il  joue  activement  aupres 
de  la  Cour  de  Belgrade  le  meme  role  que  la  diplo- 
matic allemande  aupres  de  la  Cour  de  Vienne.  Sous 
I'influence  des  Conseils  russes  I'intransigeance  Serbe 
va-t-elle  se  lier  a  un  compromis  dans  la  question  du 
port  de  I'Adriatique?  Mes  Collegues  a  qui  j'ai  fait 
cette  demande  m'ont  repondu  affirmativement.  Or 
c'est  la  le  noeud  de  la  question. 

On  est  done  optimiste  dans  le  monde  diplomatique 
de  Berlin;  je  viens  de  le  constater  des  mon  retour. 
Mais  on  s'attend  encore  a  recevoir  de  temps  en 
temps  des  nouvelles  tres  alarmistes,  auxquelles  on 
devra  d'autant  moins  ajouter  foi  qu'elles  seront  pro- 
bablement  I'oeuvre  des  diplomates  turcs  Hilmi 
Pacha  et  Nizamy  Pacha,  qui  s'entendent  admirable- 
ment,  en  vrais  Levantins,  a  lacher  ces  oiseaux  de 
mauvais  augure.  Nizamy  Pacha,  Ambassadeur  a 
Berlin,  disait  hautement  que  la  defaite  de  la  Turquie 
mettrait  TEurope  en  feu.  II  s'applique  de  son  mieux 
a  faire  en  sorte  que  sa  prediction  se  realise.  Son 
passage  a  Vienne  et  a  Bucarest  a  ete  marque  par 
toute  une  volee  de  fausses  novelles,  avidement  re- 
cueillies  par  les  journaux. 

Le  projet  d'une  Conference  d'Ambassadeurs  qui 
aurait  pour  but  de  deblayer  le  terrain  en  amenant 
une  entente  prealable  entre  les  six  grandes  Puis- 
sances pour  la  solution  de  questions  importantes,  tel- 
les  que  celle  des  iles  de  la  Mer  l^gee  et  celle  de 
I'Albanie,  a  laquelle  est  fatalement  liee  la  question 
d'un  port  serbe  sur  I'Adriatique,  a  trouve  un  ac- 
cueil  favorable  a  Berlin.  L'idee  de  Sir  Edward  Grey 
repond  a  une  preoccupation  de  Mr.  de  Kiderlen- 
Waechter  qui  s'est  plaint  a  diverses  reprises  de 
perdre  un  temps  precieux  et  de  n'aboutir  a  aucun 
resultat  par  des  echanges  de  vues  de  Cabinet  a  Cabi- 
net. En  les  concentrant  dans  une  seule  capitale  et  en 
confiant  a  des  diplomates  experimentes,  on  arriverait 
sans  doute  a  un  accord  qui  rendrait  plus  facile  la 
tache  du  Congres  appele  plus  tard  a  regler  les  ques- 
tions soulevees  par  la  guerre  actuelle.  II  semble 
tout  naturel,  la  proposition  emanant  du  Gouverne- 
ment britannique,  que  la  Conference  des  Ambassa- 
deurs  ait  lieu  a  Londres ;  on  parle  cependant  de  la 
faire  tenir  plutot  a  Paris.  Dans  cette  derniere  Ca- 
pitale resident,  comme  Ambassadeurs,  des  hommes 


one  thing  which  is  certain  is  that  he  is  firmly  re- 
solved to  avoid  a  European  conflagration.  On  this 
point  the  German  policy  is  approaching  that  of  Eng- 
land and  France,  both  emphatically  pacific  and, 
though  the  polemics  between  the  press  of  Paris  and 
Berlin  are  continued  daily,  the  latter  has  adopted 
a  much  more  conciliatory  tone  towards  Great  Brit- 
ain and  particularly  towards  Sir  Edward  Grey.  The 
relations  between  the  German  and  the  British  Gov- 
ernments are  better  than  they  have  been  for  a  long 
time  and,  according  to  the  assurance  of  the  French 
Ambassador,  a  relaxation  which  greatly  helps  the 
maintenance  of  peace  is  also  taking  place  between 
the  Cabinets  of  Berlin  and  Paris. 

To  induce  Austria  to  show  herself  more  amenable, 
as  the  Imperial  Qovernment  is  believed  here  to  have 
succeeded  in  doing,  would  not  be  sufficient  to  settle 
the  conflict.  Besides  that,  it  is  necessary  to  break 
Servia's  obstinate  resistance  to  a  diminution  of  her 
pretensions.  At  the  end  of  last  week  a  rumor  was 
current  in  the  European  Chancelleries  that  M. 
Sassonov  has  given  up  struggling  against  the  Court 
party,  which  wants  to  draw  Russia  into  a  war,  al- 
though the  Russian  Empire  is  undermined  by  the 
revolution  and  its  military  preparations  are  still  in- 
sufficient. But  for  two  days,  above  all  after  the 
Czar  received  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
in  special  audience,  a  feeling  of  confidence  has  suc- 
ceeded the  nervousness  of  last  week.  M.  Sassonov 
seems  to  have  recovered  and  he  is  zealously  play- 
ing the  same  part  at  the  Court  of  Belgrade  which 
German  diplomacy  is  acting  at  the  Court  of  Vienna. 
Will  intransigent  Servia  under  the  influence  of 
Russian  counsels  stoop  to  a  compromise  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  port  on  the  Adriatic?  My  colleagues  to 
whom  I  put  this  question  answer  in  the  affirmative. 
That  is  the  nucleus  of  the  whole  matter. 

The  political  world  of  Berlin  is  optimistic;  that 
I  found  at  once  on  my  return.  Alarmist  news  is 
still  expected  from  time  to  time  in  which,  however, 
all  the  less  faith  need  be  placed  as  it  is  likely  to  be 
the  work  of  the  Turkish  diplomats  Hilmi  Pasha 
and  Nizamy  Pasha,  who  understand  admirably,  in 
true  Oriental  fashion,  how  to  release  these  birds  of 
evil  omen.  Nizamy  Pasha,  the  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, has  proclaimed  in  a  loud  voice  that  the  defeat  ot 
Turkey  would  set  Europe  ablaze.  He  is  putting 
forth  his  best  efforts  to  make  his  prophecy  come 
true.  His  stay  at  Vienna  and  at  Bucharest  was 
marked  by  a  veritable  shower  of  false  news  avidlj 
snatched  up  by  the  papers. 

The  project  of  a  Conference  of  Ambassadors  with 
the  function  of  clearing  the  ground,  by  a  previous 
agreement  among  the  six  Great  Powers,  for  the 
solution  of  important  questions  such  as  that  of  the 
Aegean  Islands  and  that  of  Albania,  with  which 
that  of  a  Servian  port  on  the  Adriatic  is  fatally 
connected,  has  been  favorably  received  at  Berlin. 
The  idea  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  relieves  the  anxiety 
of  Mr.  von  Kiderlen-Waechter,  who  more  than  once 
complained  that  precious  time  was  being  lost,  while 
no  results  were  being  reached  by  the  exchange  of 
views  between  the  various  Cabinets.  By  gathering 
at  one  capital  diplomats  whose  experience  could  be 
trusted,  an  agreement  would  doubtless  be  reached 
which  would  facilitate  the  task  of  the  Congress  to 
be  called  later  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  ques- 
tions raised  by  the  present  war.  It  seems  quite  nat- 
ural since  the  proposal  comes  from  the  British  Gov- 
ernment that  the  Conference  of  the  Ambassadors 
should  take  place  at  London ;  but  there  is  talk  of 
holding  it  at  Paris.  In  the  latter  capital  Ambas- 
sadors are  residing  who  have  played  a  militant  part 


117    — 


qui  ont  joue  un  role  militant  dans  la  politique  etran- 
gere  de  leur  pays — tels  que  M.  M.  Tittoni  et  Iswol- 
sky — et  qui  sont  par  la  suspects  d'avoir  une  politi- 
que personnelle.  D'autre  part,  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre,  Sir  Francis  Bertie,  est  un  esprit  trop 
combatif  pour  qu'on  puisse  esperer  qu'il  ne  s'amuse 
pas  a  semer  le  desaccord  entre  ses  Collegues.  Le 
choix  de  Paris  ne  paraitrait  pas  tres  heureux  pour 
cette  reunion  diplomatique. 
Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Baron   Beyens. 


in  the  foreign  policies  of  their  couptries — men  like 
MM.  Tittoni  and  Iswolski— and  who,  therefore,  are 
suspected  of  having  a  personal  policy.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  British  Ambassador,  Sir  Francis  Bertie, 
is  of  too  combative  a  turn  of  mind  to  allow  of  the 
hope  that  he  will  not  amuse  himself  by  sowing  dis- 
cord among  his  colleagues.  The  choice  of  Paris 
for  this  diplomatic  gathering  would  not  seem  a 
very  happy  one. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  14  Fevrier  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Le  nouveau  President  de  la  Republique  jouit  en 
ce  moment  en  France  d'une  popularite  que  n'a  con- 
nue  aucun  de  ses  predecesseurs.  Pour  ne  parler  que 
des  deux  derniers,  I'election  de  M.  Loubet  fut  assez 
mal  accueillie  par  I'opinion  publique,  et  celle  de  M. 
Fallieres  ne  produisit  que  de  I'indifiference. 

M.  Poincare  est  tous  les  jours  I'objet  de  manifesta- 
tions de  sympathie ;  on  lui  ofTre  banquets  sur  ban- 
quets ;  on  chante  ses  louanges  dans  des  complaintes 
au  coin  des  rues  et,  dans  tous  les  cafes  concerts  et 
les  cinemas,  I'apparition  de  son  portrait  et  la  men- 
tion de  son  nom  soulevent  des  applaudissements. 

On  prepare  de  grandes  fetes  pour  le  jour  oil  il 
prendra  possession  des  pouvoirs  presidentiels ;  la 
Ville  de  Paris  lui  ofifrira  une  reception,  et  des  cen- 
taines  de  societes  demandent  la  permission  de  se 
grouper  sur  le  parcours  de  son  cortege  lorsqu'il  se 
rendra  a  I'Hotel  de  Ville. 

Cette  popularite  est  faite  de  divers  elements:  son 
election  avait  ete  habilement  preparee ;  on  lui  sait 
gre  d'avoir,  au  cours  de  son  ministere,  manoeuvre 
assez  adroitement  pour  mettre  la  France  en  evidence 
dans  le  concert  europeen ;  il  a  eu  quelques  mots 
heureux  et  qui  ont  fait  impression.  Mais  il  faut  y 
voir  tout  d'abord  une  manifestation  de  ce  vieux  chau- 
vinisme  frangais,  qui  s'etait  eclipse  durant  de  lon- 
gues  annees,  mais  a  repris  force  depuis  les  incidents 
d'Agadir. 

M.  Poincare  est  Lorrain  et  ne  manque  aucune  oc- 
casion de  le  rappeler ;  il  fut  le  coUaborateur  et  I'ins- 
tigateur  de  la  politique  militariste  de  M.  Millerand ; 
le  premier  mot  enfin  qu'il  ait  prononce  au  moment 
meme  ovi  il  apprit  son  election  a  la  Presidence  de  la 
Republique,  fut  la  promesse  de  veiller  au  maintien 
de  tous  les  elements  de  la  defense  nationale. 

Dans  ces  conditions  et  grace  a  ses  eminentes  qua- 
lites  il  pourra  rendre  de  grands  services  a  son  pays ; 
mais  il  est  trop  avise  pour  ne  pas  savoir  que  les  re- 
actions sont  frequentes  dans  I'opinion  publique  fran- 
qaise,  et  qu'il  n'est  aucun  pays  oti  la  Roche  Tar- 
peienne  soit  aussi  proche  du  Capitole. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  February  14,  1913. 
Sir:— 

The  new  President  of  the  Republic  is  at  present 
enjoying  a  popularity  in  France  such  as  has  been 
unknown  to  his  predecessors.  Only  to  mention  the 
last  two,  the  election  of  M.  Loubet  was  rather  badly 
received  by  the  public  and  that  of  M.  Fallieres 
caused  only  indifference. 

M.  Poincare  is  the  daily  object"  of  manifestations 
of  sympathy ;  he  is  offered  banquets  upon  banquets ; 
his  praise  is  being  sung  in  ditties  at  the  street- 
corners,  and  in  all  the  concert  halls  and  cinemato- 
graphs the  appearance  of  his  portrait  and  the  men- 
tion of  his  name  causes  applause.  Great  festivities 
are  being  prepared  for  the  day  when  he  is  to  assume 
presidential  powers.  The  City  of  Paris  is  going 
to  give  him  a  reception  and  hundreds  of  societies 
are  asking  for  permission  to  range  themselves  along 
the  course  of  his  cortege  on  his  way  to  the  Hotel 
de  Ville. 

This  popularity  is  caused  by  various  elements: 
his  election  has  been  ably  prepared;  it  is  realized 
that  during  his  ministry  he  managed  adroitly  to 
bring  France  to  the  fore  in  the  European  concert; 
he  used  a  few  happy  phrases  which  left  an  impres- 
sion. But  above  all  one  must  see  in  this  a  mani- 
festation of  that  old  French  chauvinism  which  had 
disappeared  for  long  years  but  has  gained  fresh 
force  since  the  incidents  of  Agadir. 

M.  Poincare  is  from  Lorraine  and  misses  no  oc-. 
casion  to  mention  it.  He  was  the  collaborator  and 
originator  of  M.  Millerand's  militarist  policy.  Fi- 
nally, the  first  word  which  he  pronounced  on  hear- 
ing of  his  election  to  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic 
was  the  promise  to  watch  over  the  maintenance  of 
all  means  of  national  defense. 

Under  these  conditions  and  with  his  eminent  qual- 
ities he  will  be  able  to  render  great  services  to  his 
country;  but  he  is  too  well  informed  not  to  know 
that  reactions  are  very  frequent  in  French  public 
opinion  and  that  there  is  no  country  where  the 
Tarpeian  Rock  is  so  close  to  the  Capitol. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


118 


No.  98. 

Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  19  Fevrier  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Je  viens  de  voir  M.  le  Ministre  des  Aflfaires  Etran- 
geres  qui  m'a  dit  que  la  situation  internationale  ne 
s'est  guere  modifiee.  L'armee  bulgare  ne  fait  pas  de 
progres  appreciables,  et  la  Conference  des  Ambas- 
sadeurs  de  Londres  semble  dans  un  certain  marasme. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  est  toujours  intransigeant 
pour  toutes  les  questions  qui  I'interessent,  et  la  Rus- 
sie  defend  energiquement  la  Serbie  et  le  Monte- 
negro. 

Les  six  Grandes  Puissances  ont  formellement  of- 
fert  leur  mediation  pour  le  reglement  du  conflit  bul- 
garo-roumain ;  jusqui'ici,  cette  offre  n'a  pas  reQu  de 
reponse.  M.  jonnart  regrette  que  la  question  inter- 
nationale soit,  dans  les  deux  pays,  conduite  avec  des 
soucis  de  politique  interieure.  Le  Roi  Charles  etait 
tres  sage  et  tres  prudent  au  debut  des  difficultes ;  il 
est  a  craindre  qu'il  ne  se  laisse  deborder  par  les  hom- 
mes  politiques  de  I'opposition.  Les  Bulgares  sont 
generalement  tres  raides  dans  leurs  negociations,  et 
M.  Danef  est  intraitable  dans  toute  circonstance. 

La  presse  allemande  se  montre  etonnee  des  me- 
sures  militaires  que  le  Gouvernement  franqais  va 
prendre  en  reponse  a  I'accroissement  des  forces  de 
I'Empire ;  il  ne  pouvait  en  etre  autrement ;  nous  Sa- 
vons parfaitement  bien,  m'a  dit  le  Ministre,  quel 
avantage  donne  a  notre  voisin  I'augmentation  con- 
tinuelle  de  la  population ;  mais  nous  devons  faire  tout 
ce  qui  nous  est  possible  pour  compenser  cet  avan- 
tage par  une  meilleure  organisation  de  nos  forces. 

Les  journaux — et  notamment  le  "Temps" — en 
rendant  compte  des  projets  du  Gouvernement  de  la 
Republique,  ont  tort  de  les  presenter,  d'ailleurs,  com- 
me  une  reponse  aux  mesures  prises  par  I'Allemagne ; 
beaucoup  ne  sont  que  raboutissement  d'etudes  pour- 
suivies  depuis  longtemps. 

Le  Cabinet  n'a  pas  encore  pris  de  decision  quant 
a  la  duree  du  service.  Retablira-t-on  le  service  de 
trois  ans  pour  certaines  armes  ou  pour  toutes?  M. 
Jonnart  n'en  sait  encore  rien,  mais  il  ne  cache  pas 
ses  preferences  pour  le  service  de  trois  ans  pour 
toutes  les  armes. 

Le  Ministre  ne  considere  pas  les  mesures  prises 
par  I'Allemagne  comme  un  geste  hostile — mais  com- 
me  une  mesure  de  prudence  pour  I'avenir.  L'AUe- 
magne  craint,  un  jour,  d'etre  en  lutte  a  la  fois  avec 
la  Russie  et  la  France,  et  peut-etre  meme  avec  I'An- 
gleterre,  alors  que  le  secours  que  pourrait  lui  preter 
I'Autriche  serait  tres  reduit  par  la  necessite  pour 
I'Empire  Dualiste  de  resister  au  groupe  des  Etats 
Balkaniques.  Les  relations  entre  I'Ambassade  de 
France  a  Berlin  et  la  Wilhelmstrasse  restent  inces- 
santes  et  excellentes. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
No.  98. 


Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  February  19,  1913. 
Sir:— 

I  have  just  seen  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  told  me  that  the  international  situation  had 
hardly  changed.  The  Bulgarian  army  was  making 
no  perceptible  progress  and  the  Conference  of  the 
Ambassadors  seemed  to  be  in  a  state  of  atrophy. 

The  Cabinet  of  Vienna  was  adhering  to  its  un- 
bending attitude  on  all  questions  in  which  it  was 
interested  and  Russia  was  strenuously  defending 
Servia  and  Montenegro. 

The  six  Great  Powers  had  formally  offered  their 
mediation  in  the  Bulgaro-Roumanian  conflict ;  until 
now  that  offer  had  not  received  an  answer.  M. 
Jonnart  regrets  that  the  international  question  is 
being  conducted  in  the  two  countries  with  an  eye 
to  internal  affairs.  King  Charles  had  been  very 
wise  and  prudent  at  the  beginning  of  the  difficul- 
ties, but  it  was  to  be  feared  that  he  might  permit 
himself  to  be  out-manoeuvred  by  the  politicians  of 
the  opposition.  The  Bulgarians  generally  were 
very  stiff-necked  in  their  negotiations  and  M.  Danef. 
was  intractable  under  any  circumstances. 

The  German  press  showed  astonishment  at  the 
military  measures  which  the  French  Government 
was  going  to  take  in  answer  to  the  increase  of  the 
forces  of  the  Empire ;  it  could  not  be  otherwise.  We 
know  very  well,  the  Minister  said,  what  advantage 
our  neighbor  has  in  his  steadily  increasing  popu- 
lation ;  but  we  must  do  everything  possible  in  order 
to  compensate  this  advantage  by  a  better  organiza- 
tion of  our  forces. 

The  papers — above  all  the  Temps — in  speaking 
of  the  projects  of  the  Goverrmient  of  the  Republic 
are  wrong  in  representing  them  as  an  answer  to  the 
measures  taken  by  Germany ;  many  of  them  are  sim- 
ply the  result  of  investigations  which  have  been  go- 
ing on  for  a  long  while. 

The  Cabinet  has  not  yet  come  to  any  decision  as 
to  the  duration  of  the  military  service.  Is  the  three 
years'  service  going  to  be  reintroduced  for  some 
arms  or  for  all?  M.  Jonnart  does  not  know  that 
yet,  but  he  does  not  conceal  his  preference  for  the 
three  years'  service  for  all  arms. 

The  Minister  does  not  consider  the  measures 
taken  by  Germany  as  a  hostile  step,  but  as  a  pre- 
cautionary measure  for  the  future.  Germany  feared 
to  find  herself  in  a  conflict  with  Russia  and  France, 
and  perhaps  also  with  England,  at  a  time  when  the 
help  which  Austria  might  lend  her  would  be  very 
much  restricted  by  the  Dual  Monarchy's  necessi- 
ties in  resisting  the  group  of  the  Balkan  States. 
The  relations  between  the  French  Embassy  at  Ber- 
lin and  Wilhelmstrasse  continue  to  be  excellent. 


I  am,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Guillaume. 


119 


No.  99. 


No.  99. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  21  Fevrier  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

La  nouvelle  de  la  prochaine  nomination  de  M. 
Delcasse  au  poste  d'Ambassadeur  a  Petersbourg  a 
eclate  hier  apres-midi,  comme  une  bombe.  Les  jour- 
naux  en  donnaient  la  mention  en  meme  temps  que  le 
texte  du  message  de  M.  le  President  de  la  Repu- 
blique. 

La  coincidence  etait-elle  voulue?  II  semble  que 
"ui;  dans  tous  les  cas  elle  fut  tres  remarquee  et 
exer^a  une  action  deprimante  sur  la  Bourse. 

La  personnalite  de  M.  Delcasse  est  tres  connue  et 
assez  significative.  II  fut  un  des  artisans  de  I'al- 
liance  russo-fran^aise  et,  plus  encore,  de  I'amitie 
franco-anglaise. 

Les  incidents  de  son  depart  force  du  Quai  d'Orsay 
sont  presents  a  la  memoire  de  tous.  Au  bout  de 
quelques  annees,  lorsque  M.  Delcasse  prit  le  Mi- 
nistere  de  la  Marine,  on  dit  de  toute  part,  que  son 
retour  au  pouvoir  n'etait  pas  mal  vu  a  Berlin,  et 
I'Ambassade  d'Allemagne  le  proclamait  tres  haut. 

.  Le  mois  dernier,  des  amis  de  I'eminent  homme 
d'Etat,  allaient  le  repetant,  pour  I'hypothese  ou,  au 
Congres  de  Versailles,  apres  d'eventuels  scrutins 
inutiles,  on  eut  voulu  faire  elire  M.  Delcasse  comme 
outsider.  II  n'etait  un  secret  pour  personne  qu'il  le 
desirait;  mais  bien  des  hommes  politiques  eussent 
redoute  ce  choix  dans  la  crainte  de  I'apparence  d'une 
manifestation  anti-allemande. 

'Faut-il  donner  cette  interpretation  au  choix  du 
nouvel  Ambassadeur  a  Petersbourg?  Je  ne  le  pense 
pas ;  mais  j'estime,  cependant,  q'il  n'a  pas  deplu  a  M. 
Poincare,  le  Lorrain,  d'affirmer,  des  le  premier  jour 
de  sa  haute  magistrature,  son  souci  de  se  montrer 
ferme  et  de  tenir  haut  le  drapeau  du  pays. 

Dans  les  moments  troubles  oii  se  trouve  I'Europe, 
c'est  la  le  danger  que  presente  la  presence  de  M. 
Poincare  a  I'Elysee.  C'est  sous  son  Ministere  que 
se  sont  reveilles  les  instincts  militaristes — legere- 
ment  chauvins — du  peuple  frangais.  On  a  vu  sa  main 
dans  cette  modification;  il  faut  esperer  que  son 
esprit  politique,  pratique  et  froid,  le  defendra  contre 
toute  exageration  dans  cette  voie.  L'accroissement 
notable  des  armements  de  I'Allemagne,  qui  survient 
au  moment  de  I'entree  a  I'Elysee  de  M.  Poincare,  va 
augmenter  le  danger  d'une  orientation  trop  nationa- 
liste  de  la  politique  de  la  France. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


Paris,  February  21,  1913. 


The  news  of  the  impending  nomination  of  M.  Del- 
casse as  Ambassador  at  Petersburg  burst  here  yes- 
terday afternoon  like  a  bomb.  The  papers  reported 
it  at  the  same  time  with  the  text  of  the  message  of 
the  President  of  the  Republic. 

Was  the  coincidence  intended?  It  seems  so.  In 
any  case  it  attracted  great  attention  and  exercised 
a  depressing  influence  on  the  Exchange. 

The  personality  of  M.  Delcasse  is  well  known  and 
fairly  important.  He  was  one  of  the  builders  of  the 
Russo-French  alliance  and,  what  is  more,  of  the 
Franco-English  friendship. 

The  incidents  of  his  forced  retirement  from  the 
Quai  d'Orsay  are  present  in  everybody's  memory. 
When  some  years  later  M.  Delcasse  took  charge  of 
the  Ministry  of  the  Navy,  it  was  said  everywhere 
that  his  return  to  power  was  not  badly  received  at 
Berlin  and  the  German  Embassy  proclaimed  this 
loudly. 

Last  month  friends  of  the  eminent  statesman 
went  about  repeating  this,  working  on  a  hypothesis 
that,  in  the  event  of  an  unsuccessful  ballot,  the  Con- 
gress of  Versailles  might  wish  to  see  M.  Delcasse 
elected  as  an  outsider.  It  is  no  secret  to  anybody 
that  he  desired  this;  but  many  politicians  would 
have  dreaded  this  choice  from  a  fear  that  it  might 
look  like  an  anti-German  demonstration. 

Is  the  same  interpretation  to  be  placed  on  the 
choice  of  the  new  Ambassador  at  Petersburg?  I 
do  not  think  so ;  but  I  believe  that  M.  Poincare,  the 
Lorrainer,  has  taken  pleasure  in  asserting  from  the 
first  day  of  his  high  office  his  strong  desire  to  take 
a  firm  stand  and  to  upraise  the  flag  of  the  country. 

Here  lies  the  danger  of  M.  Poincare's  presence  at 
the  Elysee  in  the  troubled  times  through  which 
Europe  is  passing  at  present.  It  was  under  his 
ministry  that  the  militarist  and  slightly  chauvin- 
istic instincts  of  the  French  people  awoke.  His 
hand  could  be  seen  in  this  change.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  his  practical  and  cold  political  sense  will  defend 
him  against  all  exaggeration  in  this  direction.  The 
considerable  increase  of  Germany's  armament  at 
the  moment  when  M.  Poincare  enters  the  Elysee 
will  increase  the  danger  of  a  too  nationalistic  trend 
of  the  French  policy. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  100. 


No.  100. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  24  Fevrier  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Les  milieux  politiques  ont  ete  emus  et  I'imagina- 
tion  du  public  fortement  frappee,  par  les  vastes  pro- 
jets  militaires  de  I'Allemagne  et  plus  encore  peut- 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

London.  February  24,  1913. 
Sir:— 

Political  circles  have  been  stirred  and  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  public  has  been  forcibly  struck  by  the 
vast  military  projects  of  Germany  and,  perhaps  even 


etre  par  la  reponse  si  prompte  et  si  ferme  de  la 
France.  Les  deux  gouvernements  sont  prets  a  faire 
des  sacrifices  financiers  considerables  et  paraissent 
soutenus  par  I'opinion  dans  les  deux  pays,  ou  seuls 
les  socialistes  font  entendre  une  voix  discordante. 

La  presse  anglaise  veut  naturellement  endosser  a 
I'Allemagne  la  responsabilite  de  la  nouvelle  tension 
qui  resulte  de  ses  projets  et  qui  peut  apporter  a 
I'Europe  des  sujets  d'inquietude  nouveaux.  Beau- 
coup  de  journaux  estiment  que  le  Gouvernement 
frangais,  en  se  declarant  pret  a  imposer  le  service  de 
trois  ans,  et  en  nommant  M.  Delcasse  a  St.  Peters- 
bourg,  a  adopte  la  seule  attitude  digne  de  la  grande 
Republique  en  presence  d'une  provocation  alle- 
mande. 

Au  Foreign  Office,  j'ai  trouve  une  appreciation 
plus  equitable  et  plus  calme  de  la  position.  On  voit 
dans  le  renforcement  des  armees  allemandes,  moins 
une  provocation  que  I'admission  d'une  situation  mili- 
taire  amoindrie  par  les  evenements  et  qu'il  importe 
de  renforcer.  Le  Gouvernement  de  Berlin  se  voit 
oblige  de  reconnaitre  qu'il  ne  peut  plus  compter 
comme  auparavant,  sur  I'appui  de  toutes  les  forces 
de  son  alliee  autrichienne,  depuis  I'apparition  dans 
le  sud-est  de  I'Europe  d'une  puissance  nouvelle,  celle 
des  allies  balk^niques,  etablie  sur  les  flancs  memes 
de  I'empire  dualiste.  Loin  de  pouvoir  compter  en 
cas  de  besoin  sur  tout  I'appui  du  gouvernement  de 
Vienne,  c'est  a  celui-ci  vraisemblablement  que  I'Al- 
lemagne devra  preter  le  sien.  En  cas  de  guerre  euro- 
peenne,  elle  devrait  tenir  tete  a  ses  ennemis  sur  deux 
frontieres,  la  russe  et  la  frangaise,  et  diminuer  peut- 
etre  ses  propres  forces  pour  aider  I'armee  autrichien- 
ne. Dans  ces  conditions,  on  ne  trouve  rien  d'eton- 
nant  a  ce  que  I'Empire  allemand  eprouve  le  besoin 
d'accroitre  le  nombre  de  ses  corps  d'armee.  On  a 
ajoute  au  Foreign  Office  que  le  Gouvernement  de 
Berlin  avait  tres  franchement  expose  au  Cabinet  de 
Paris  les  motifs  precites  de  son  action. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


more,  by  the  prompt  and  firm  reply  of  France.  The 
two  Governments  are  ready  to  make  considerable 
financial  sacrifices  and  are  sustained  in  this  by 
public  opinion  in  the  two  countries,  where  only  the 
socialists  are  raising  a  dissentient  voice. 

The  English  press  wants,  of  course,  to  saddle  Ger- 
many with  the  responsibility  for  the  new  tension, 
which  is  represented  as  the  consequence  of  her  pro- 
jects and  as  likely  to  give  Europe  fresh  causes  for 
alarm.  Many  papers  take  the  stand  that  the  French 
Government  In  declaring  its  readiness  to  impose  the 
three  years'  conscription  has  adopted  the  only  atti- 
tude worthy  of  the  great  Republic  in  face  of  a  Ger- 
man provocation. 

At  the  Foreign  Office  I  found  a  calmer  and  more 
equitable  appreciation  of  the  situation.  The  rein- 
forcement of  the  German  army  is  looked  upon  less 
as  a  provocation  than  as.  an  admission  that  Ger- 
many's military  position  has  been  weakened  by  the 
events  and  that  it  requires  to  be  reinforced.  The 
Government  of  Berlin  has  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
it  cannot,  as  before,  count  on  the  support  of  all  the 
forces  of  its  Austrian  ally  since  the  appearance  in 
the  southeast  of  Europe  of  a  new  power,  that  of  the 
Balkan  allies,  which  is  threatening  the  very  flank 
of  the  Dual  Empire.  Far  from  being  in  a  position 
to  count  in  case  of  need  on  all  the  full  support  of 
the  Government  of  Vienna,  Germany  will  probably 
have  to  lend  Austria  her  assistance.  In  case  of  a 
European  war  she  would  have  to  face  enemies  on 
two  frontiers,  the  Russian  and  the  French,  and  per- 
haps to  weaken  her  own  forces  in  order  to  help  the 
Austrian  army.  Under  these  conditions  it  is  not 
considered  surprising  that  the  German  Empire  feels 
the  need  of  increasing  the  number  of  its  army  corps. 
It  was  added  at  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Berlin  had  very  frankly  explained  to  tbe 
Cabinet  of  Paris  the  above-mentioned  motives  of  its 
action. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  101. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  3  Mars  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  me  disait  samedi : 
La  situation  politique  s'est  beaucoup  amelioree  de- 
puis quarante-huit  heures;  la  detente  est  generale; 
on  peut  esperer  un  prochain  retour  a  la  paix.  Mais 
ce  qui  ne  s'ameliore  pas  c'est  I'etat  de  I'opinion  pu- 
blique  en  France  et  en  Allemagne  quant  aux  rela- 
tions entre  les  deux  pays. 

On  est  persuade  chez  nous  que  I'esprit  de  chauvi- 
nisme,  s'etant  reveille,  nous  avons  a  craindre  une 
attaque  de  la  Republique ;  en  France,  on  professe  les 
memes  craintes  a  notre  egard.  La  consequence  de 
ces  malentendus  est  de  nous  ruiner  tous  les  deux; 
je  ne  sais  ou  nous  allons  dans  cette  voie  perilleuse. 
Ne  se  trouvera-t-il  done  pas  un  homme  d'assez  de 
bonne  volonte  et  d'assez  de  prestige  pour  rappeler 
tout  le  monde  a  la  raison?  Tout  cela  est  d'autant 
plus  ridicule  que,  durant  toute  la  crise  que  nous  tra- 
versons,  les    deux    Gouvernements  ont    prouve    les 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir: 


Paris,  March  3,  1913. 


The  German  Ambassador  told  me  on  Saturday: 
The  poHtical  situation  has  improved  considerably 
in  the  past  forty-eight  hours ;  the  relaxation  is  gen- 
eral; an  early  peace  can  be  hoped  for.  But  what 
does  not  improve  is  the  state  of  pubHc  opinion  in 
France  and  Germany  as  to  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries. 

People  in  Germany  are  convinced  that  in  view  of 
the  reawakening  of  the  chauvinist  spirit  they  have 
to  fear  an  attack  by  the  Republic;  in  France  the 
same  fears  are  felt  with  regard  to  Germany.  The 
consequence  of  this  is  that  both  ruin  themselves; 
I  do  not  know  where  we  are  going  on  this  dangerous 
path.  Is  there  no  man  to  be  found  who  has  suf- 
ficient good  will  and  prestige  to  recall  everyone  to 
his  senses?  All  this  is  the  more  ludicrous  because, 
during  the  entire  crisis  through  which  we  are  pass- 
ing, the  two  Governments  have  been  manifesting 


sentiments  les  plus  pacifiques,  et  se  sont  continuel- 
lement  appuyes  I'un  sur  I'autre  pour  eviter  les  con- 
flits  de  naitre. 

M.  le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  parfaitement  raison.  Je 
suis  mal  place  pour  scruter  I'opinion  publique  alle- 
mande;  mais  je  constate,  tous  les  jours,  combien  le 
sentiment  public  devient  tous  les  jours  plus  defiant 
et  plus  chauvin  en  France. 

On  ne  rencontre  que  gens  qui  vous  assurent 
qu'une  guerre  prochaine  avec  TAllemagne  est  cer- 
taine,  fatale.  On  le  regrette  mais  on  s'y  resoiit.  On 
demande  le  vote  immediat  et  presque  d'acclamation 
de  toute  mesure  capable  d'accroitre  la  puissance  de- 
fensive de  la  France.  Les  plus  raisonnables  soutien- 
nent  qu'ij  faut  s'armer  jusqu'aux  dents  pour  effra- 
yer  I'adversaire  et  empecher  la  guerre. 

C'est  ce  que  prechait  encore  recemment,  au  sein 
d'une  association,  M.  Pichon,  homme  d'experience, 
qui  fut  longtemps  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 
II  disait: 

"Travaillons  a  I'accroissement  continu  de  nos 
forces,  c'est  la  encore  une  des  garanties  les  plus  ef- 
ficaces  de  la  paix.  Les  efforts  de  notre  diplomatic 
seraient  vains  si  notre  puissance  militaire  n'etait  pas 
crainte  et  respectee. 

"Pas  de  desequilibre  diplomatique  en  Europe.  Pas 
de  desequilibre  militaire  non  plus  au  detriment  de 
I'une  des  nations  qui  representent  au  plus  haut  de- 
gre  I'ideal  pacifique  des  demoncraties  modernes. 
Qu'aucune  charge  reconnue  necessaire  ne  soit  au 
dessus  de  notre  patriotisme.  Ce  n'est  pas  pour  la 
guerre  que  nous  nous  armons;  c'est  pour  I'eviter,  la 
conjurer.  Et  nous  ne  fortifions  I'armee  dont  nous 
sommes  fiers,  et  qui  est  notre  sauvegarde,  que  dans 
la  mesure  ovi  il  le  faut  pour  prevenir  toutes  les  sur- 
prises et  decourager  toute  velleite  de  provocation." 

J'ai  rencontre  hier  soir  M.  Pichon  qui  m'a  repete 
ces  memes  paroles ;  il  faut  armer  de  plus  en  plus  pour 
empecher  la  guerre. 

II  est  convaincu  que  les  Chambres  voteront  avec 
enthousiasme  les  500  millions  demandes  par  le  Gou- 
vernement  pour  perfectionner  I'outillage  militaire  du 
pays.  J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  envoyer  I'expose 
des  motifs  et  le  dispositif  de  ce  projet  de  loi.  M. 
Pichon  ne  doute  pas,  qu'a  quelques  exceptions  pres, 
il  en  sera  de  meme  des  mesures  qui  seront  proposees 
pour  I'augmentation  des  effectifs.  Sur  ce  point,  il 
est  des  opinions  divergentes. 

Toute  la  presse,  sauf  les  organes  socialistes  et  cer- 
tains journaux  radicaux-socialistes,  reclament  le  ser- 
vice de  trois  ans  sans  exceptions.  Le  Gouvernement 
garde  jusqui'  ici  le  secret  sur  les  resolutions qu'il  veut 
prendre.  On  admet,  toutefois  generalement  que,  si 
le  Cabinet,  malgre  les  interets  electoraux  contraires, 
se  rallie  au  dit  service  de  trois  ans,  celui-ci  sera  vote, 
mais  non  sans  opposition.  M.M.  les  Deputes  ont 
peur  de  perdre  leurs  sieges. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


the  most  pacific  sentiments  and  have  continuously 
leaned  on  one  another  in  order  to  prevent  conflicts 
from  arising. 

Baron  von  Schoen  is  perfectly  right.  I  am  not  in 
a  good  position  here  to  fathom  German  public  opin- 
ion :  but  I  observe  every  day  how  public  sentiment 
is  daily  growing  more  distrustful  and  more  chauvin- 
istic in  France. 

Everyone  you  meet  assures  you  that  an  early  war 
with  Germany  is  certain,  inevitable.  It  is  regretted 
but  must  be  accepted.  The  demand  is  that  all 
measures  capable  of  increasing  the  defensive  power 
of  France  be  voted  immediately  and  almost  by  ac- 
clamation. The  most  reasonable  people  mainUin 
that  it  is  necessary  to  arm  up  to  the  teeth  in  order 
to  frighten  the  enemy  and  prevent  war. 

That  was  preached  only  recently  in  a  society  by 
M.  Pichon,  a  man  of  experience,  who  was  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  for  a  long  while.     He  said : 

"Let  us  work  for  the  continued  increase  of  our 
forces.  That  is  yet  one  of  the  most  efficacious  guar- 
antees of  peace.  The  efforts  of  our  diplomacy  would 
be  in  vain  if  our  military  power  were  not  feared  and 
respected. 

"The  political  and  the  military  equilibrium  in 
Europe  must  not  be  disturbed  to  the  detriment  of 
one  of  the  nations  which  represent  the  highest  de- 
gree of  the  pacific  ideal  of  modern  democracies. 
No  burden  recognized  as  necessary  must  be  above 
our  patriotism.  It  is  not  for  war  that  we  are  arm- 
ing ;  it  is  to  avoid  it,  to  ward  it  off.  And  we  rein- 
force our  army,  of  which  we  are  proud  and  which 
is  our  safeguard,  only  in  such  a  measure  as  is  re- 
quired to  forestall  all  surprises  and  to  discourage 
all  ideas  of  provocation." 

Last  night  I  met  M.  Pichon,  who  repeated  to  me 
those  same  words :  it  is  necessary  to  arm  more  and 
more  to  prevent  war. 

He  is  convinced  that  the  Chambers  will  vote  with 
enthusiasm  the  500  millions  demanded  by  the  Gov- 
ernment for  perfecting  the  military  equipment  of 
the  country.  I  had  the  honor  to  send  you  the  ex- 
pose of  the  motives  and  the  terms  of  the  law.  M. 
Pichon  does  not  doubt  that  with  a  few  exceptions 
the  measures  which  will  be  proposed  for  the  increase 
of  effective  strength,  will  be  equally  well  received. 
On  this  point,  however,  opinions  differ. 

The  entire  press,  aside  from  the  socialist  and  cer- 
tain radical-socialist  papers,  without  exception,  de- 
mand the  three  years'  service.  The  Government 
has  so  far  guarded  the  secret  of  the  decisions  which 
it  is  going  to  make.  It  is  generally  admitted  that 
if  the  Cabinet,  despite  contrary  electoral  interests, 
decides  in  favor  of  the  three  years'  service,  it  will 
be  carried,  if  not  without  opposition.  The  deputies 
are  afraid  to  lose  their  seats. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  102. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a      Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  18  Mars  1913.  "  Berlin,  March  18,  1913. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre!  Sir: — 

Les  conditions  inacceptables  posees  par  les  Etats  The   inacceptable  conditions  which   the   Balkan 

balkaniques  pour  la  conclusion  de  la  paix  s'expli-  States  have  made  for  the  conclusion  of  peace  are 


quent  par  la  certitude  qu'ils  ont  de  I'impossibilite  ou 
se  trouvent  les  Grandes  Puissances  de  leur  imposer 
leurs  volontes. 

D'apres  les  informations  que  j'ai  recueillies  dans 
le  monde  diplomatique  de  Berlin,  un  accord  complet 
regnerait  a  Londres  entre  les  Ambassadeurs  qui  ont 
regu  le  mandat  de  preparer  des  solutions  aux  ques- 
tions soulevees  par  la  continuation  des  hostilites. 
Mais  aucun  de  ces  Messieurs  n'est  autorise  a  rediger 
un  protocole,  a  tracer  meme  une  virgule  sur  une 
feuille  de  papier,  sans  I'assentiment  prealable  de  son 
Gouvernement,  et  I'entente  entre  les  differentes  Puis- 
sances, qu'on  jugeait  trop  longue  et  trop  difficile  a 
etablir  par  des  negociations  entre  Cabinets,  ne  pa- 
rait  pas  plus  aisee  aujourd'hui  a  obtenir,  depuis  qu'on 
a  recours  au  moyen  suggere  par  Sir  Edward  Grey 
et  qu'on  a  constitue  la  reunion  des  Ambassadeurs 
accredites  a  Londres  comme  une  sorte  de  Conseil 
deliberatif,  destine  a  concilier  les  divergences  de  vue 
et  a  preparer  le  terrain  pour  une  action  commune  des 
Puissances. 

C'est  precisement  la  que  git  la  difficulte  de  I'en- 
tente. Les  desirs  des  Puissances  ne  peuvent  se  rea- 
liser  qu'a  I'aide  d'une  pression  exercee  sur  les  Etats 
balkaniques.  Jusqu'a  present  I'unanimite  fait  defaut, 
des  quil  s'agit  de  passer  aux  moyens  d'action.  On 
le  sait  a  Sofia,  a  Belgrade  et  a  Athenes  et  cette 
inertie  des  Grands  Etats,  qui  s'est  manifestee  apres 
les  premieres  victoires  des  Allies,  encourage  ceux-ci 
a  se  montrer  arrogants  et  intransigeants. 

lis  y  sent  pousses  aussi  par  I'attitude  ambigue  de 
la  Russie.  Les  representants  des  Etats  balkaniques 
a  :?erlin  ne  font  plus  mystere  aujourd'hui  des  liens 
etroits  qui  n'ont  jamais  cesse  d'exister  entre  leurs 
Gouvernements  et  le  Cabinet  de  St.  Petersbourg. 
Lui  seul  etait  au  courant  de  I'alliance  conclue  entre 
eux,  et  ils  n'ont  marche  de  I'avant  que  nantis  de  son 
approbation.  La  diplomatic  russe  tient  pour  ainsi 
dire  en  laisse  celle  des  allies  qui  regoit  d'elle  ses  ins- 
tructions et  va  prendre  son  mot  d'ordre.  Mais  la 
diplomatic  russe  a  beaucoup  varie  elle-meme  depuis 
le  commencement  des  hostilites.  Dans  ses  moments 
d'expansion,  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  ne 
m'a  pas  cache  combien  il  etait  difficile  de  compter 
sur  I'esprit  brillant  mais  versatile  des  hommes  poli- 
tiques  qui  dirigent  I'Empire  alHe  de  la  France,  car  ils 
jouent  un  double  jeu  meme  avec  elle.  M.  Cambon 
s'est  plaint  en  particulier,  a  maintes  reprises,  de  I'in- 
fluence  conservee  par  M.  Isvolsky,  lequel  poursuit 
une  revanche  personnelle  centre  rAutriche-Hongrie 
et  s'efTorce  de  brouiller  les  cartes,  quand  elle  parait 
gagner  la  partie. 


On  croit  cependant  ici  que  la  guerre  approche  de 
son  terme,  parce  que  les  allies,  malgre  le  bluflf  dont 
ils  abusent,  sont  tres  desireux  de  traiter.  On  croit 
que  la  question  de  Scutari  se  resoudra  conforme- 
ment  a  la  volonte  du  Cabinet  de  Vienne,  appuye  par 
I'Allemagne  et  I'ltalie,  d'annexer  cette  place  a  I'Al- 
banie,  et  en  depit  des  tergiversations  de  la  Russie  qui 
ne  pent  se  decider  a  abandonner  le  Montenegro, 
de  mobiliser  une  escadre  Internationale  afin  d'en 
chasser  les  Grecs  qui  connaissent  la  valeur  de 
I'axiome  Beati  possidentes.  Enfin,  en  presence  de 
I'obstination  de  la  Bulgarie  a  reclamer  une  indem- 
nite  de  guerre,  on  se  demande  si  la  resistance  de  la 
France  et  de  I'Allemagne  ne  flechira  pas  et  si,  dans 
les  pourparlers  qui  seront  engages  a  Paris  sur  ce 
point  special,  on  ne  trouvera  pas  moyen  de  donner 
quelques  satisfactions  au  Cabinet  de  Sofia. 


explained  by  their  certainty  that  the  Great  Powers 
are  not  in  a  position  to  impose  their  will. 

According  to  information  which  I  have  gathered 
in  the  diplomatic  world  of  Berlin,  complete  agree- 
ment reigns  at  London  between  the  Ambassadors 
who  received  the  mandate  to  prepare  solutions  of 
the  questions  which  were  raised  by  the  continua- 
tion of  the  hostilities.  But  not  one  of  these  gentle- 
men is  authorized  to  draw  up  a  protocol,  or  even  to 
put  a  comma  on  a  piece  of  paper,  without  previous 
consent  of  his  Government,  and  the  understanding 
between  the  different  Powers,  which  was  thought 
too  long  and  too  difficult  to  establish  by  negotia- 
tions between  the  Cabinets,  does  not  >seem  any 
easier  to  obtain  to-day  even  although  recourse  was 
taken  to  the  means  suggested  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
to  hold  a  Conference  of  the  Ambassadors  accredited 
at  London  as  a  sort  of  deliberative  council  intended 
to  reconcile  divergent  views  and  to  prepare  the 
ground  for  a  joint  action  of  the  Powers. 

That  is  the  very  point  where  the  difficulty  of  an 
understanding  lies.  The  desires  of  the  Powers  can 
only  be  realized  by  exercising  pressure  on  the  Bal- 
kan States.  Up  to  the  present,  unanimity  has  ceased 
whenever  the  question  of  passing  on  to  acts  arose. 
That  is  known  at  Sofia,  at  Belgrade,  and  at  Athens, 
and  this  inactivity  of  the  Great  Powers  which  be- 
came apparent  after  the  first  victories  of  the  Allies, 
encourages  the  latter  to  show  themselves  arrogant 
and  irreconcilable. 

In  this  they  are  also  encouraged  by  the  ambigu- 
ous attitude  of  Russia.  The  representatives  of  the 
Balkan  States  at  Berlin  are  to-day  no  longer  mak- 
ing any  secret  of  the  close  ties  which  have  never 
ceased  to  exist  between  their  Governments  and  the 
Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg.  The  latter  alone  was  in- 
formed about  the  aUiance  concluded  between  them 
and  they  did  not  march  before  they  had  Russia's 
approval.  Russian  diplomacy  is,  as  it  were,  hold- 
ing that  of  the  allies  in  leash.  From  Russia  they 
receive  their  instructions,  from  Russia  they  will  take 
their  orders.  But  Russian  diplomacy  itself  has 
varied  much  since  the  beginning  of  the  hostilities. 
When  in  a  communicative  mood,  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin  did  not  conceal  from  me  how  lit- 
tle one  could  count  on  the  brilliant  but  changeable 
mind  of  the  politicians  who  conduct  the  Empire 
allied  to  France,  for  they  were  playing  a  double 
game  even  with  the  latter.  M.  Cambon  complained 
in  particular  at  various  times,  of  the  influence  which 
M.  Iswolski  still  retained,  because  he  was  pursuing 
a  policy  of  personal  revenge  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  would  endeavor  to  spoil  the  game  when- 
ever she  would  seem  to  be  on  the  point  of  winning  it. 

It  is  believed  here,  however,  that  the  war  is  ap- 
proaching its  end  because  the  allies,  who  have  gone 
too  far  in  their  bluff,  are  really  anxious  to  negotiate. 
It  is  believed  that  the  Scutari  question  will  be 
solved,  in  conformity  with  the  will  of  the  Cabinet 
of  Vienna  supported  by  Germany  and  Italy,  by 
annexing  this  place  to  Albania  in  spite  of  the  ter- 
giversations of  Russia,  who  cannot  make  up  her 
mind  to  abandon  Montenegro.  As  regards  the 
Aegean  Islands,  it  seems  impossible  to  mobilize  an 
international  squadron  in  order  to  eject  the  Greeks, 
who  know  the  value  of  the  axiom :  beati  possidentes. 
Lastly,  in  face  of  the  obstinacy  of  Bulgaria  in  de- 
manding a  war  indemnity  the  question  is  whether 
the  resistance  of  France  and  Germany  will  not  give 
Way  and  whether  in  the  pourparlers  which  are  to 
be  held  in  Paris  on  this  special  point  a  means  will 
not  be  found  to  give  some  satisfaction  to  the  Cab- 
inet of  Sofia. 


—    123 

On  en  est  venu  ici  a  desirer  la  chute  d'Andrinople 
pour  hater  I'acquiescement  de  la  Turquie  a  des  exi- 
gences, qu'on  juge,  d'ailleurs,  excessives,  et  le  main- 
tien  du  Cabinet  jeune-turc  centre  les  essais  de  soule- 
vement  d'une  partie  des  officiers,  pour  trouver  des 
Ministres  qui  consentent  a  signer  I'acte  de  decheance 
de  la  domination  ottomane  en  Europe. 


Veuillez  etc. 
[s.] 


Baron  Beyens. 


A  point  has  been  reached  where  the  fall  of  Adri- 
anople  is  desired  in  order  to  hasten  Turkey's  acqui- 
escence in  demands  which  are  nevertheless  consid- 
ered excessive.  The  maintenance  of  the  Young- 
Turkish  Cabinet  is  desired  against  the  attacks  of 
a  party  of  officers  in  order  to  find  Ministers  who 
will  be  ready  to  sign  the  document  which  seals  the 
fall  of  Ottoman  domination  in  Europe. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


No.  103. 


No.  103. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  4  Avril  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

L'incident  de  Scutari  est  sans  doute  le  plus  grave 
qui  se  soit  produit  au  point  de  vue  europeen,  depuis 
I'ouverture  des  hostilites  balkaniques.  Que  le  roi  du 
Montenegro  s'entete  dans  sa  resistance  aux  somma- 
tions  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  a  la  pression  des 
Puissances,  cela  se  comprend  du  reste.  II  joue  sa 
couronne  par  suite  de  ses  insucces  militaires,  et  il 
n'a  chance.de  la  conserver  centre  une  revolution  in- 
terieure,  consequence  probable  de  Texasperation  de 
ses  sujets,  qu'en  devenant  a  leurs  yeux  la  victime  de 
la  politique  austro-hongroise.  Mais  il  ne  peut  pour- 
suivre  le  siege  de  Scutari  qu'avec  la  cooperation  des 
Serbes.  Or,  I'arrogance  et  le  mepris,  avec  lesquels 
ces  derniers  regoivent  les  reclamations  du  cabinet  de 
Vienne  ne  s'expliquent  que  par  I'appui  qu'ils  croient 
trouver  a  Saint  Petersbourg.  •  Le  Charge  d' Affaires 
de  Serbie  disait  ici  recemment  que  son  gouvernement 
ne  serait  pas  alle  de  I'avant  depuis  six  mois,  sans  te- 
nir  compte  des  menaces  autrichiennes,  s'il  n'y  avait 
pas  ete  encourage  par  le  Ministre  de  Russie,  M.  de 
Hartwig,  un  diplomate  de  I'ecole  de  M.  Isvolsky.  II 
faut  avouer  que  I'evenement  a  donne  jusqu'a  present 
raison  a  I'audace  aventureuse  du  Cabinet  de  Bel- 
grade. 

La  politique  russe  temoigne  une  hesitation  qui  ag- 
grave  singulierement  la  situation  europeenne.  M. 
Sassonow  est  de  coeur  avec  ses  collegues  qui  diri- 
gent  la  politique  des  Grandes  Puissances,  mais  il 
sent  son  influence  sur  le  Czar  battue  en  breche  par 
le  parti  de  la  Cour  et  par  les  Panslavistes.  De  la 
les  contradictions  de  sa  conduite.  II  adhere  a  Lon- 
dres  par  I'organe  de  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  au 
Concert  europeen  decide  a  mettre  a  la  raison  le  Mon- 
tenegro, et  il  hesite  a  donner  officiellement  a  la 
France  le  mandat  de  representer  son  alliee  russe  dans 
le  blocus  des  cotes  montenegrines. 

Qu'on  soit  las  a  Paris  de  ces  tergiversations,  cela 
ne  fait  pas  de  doute,  mais  on  y  subit  en  maugreant 
les  consequences  de  I'alliance  et  on  se  laisse  entrai- 
ner  dans  une  voie  qui  peut  conduire  a  une  guerre  ge- 
nerale.  A  Berlin  on  n'est  pas,  au  fond,  plus  satisfait 
de  la  direction  imprimee  a  la  Triple  Alliance  dans  la 
question  balkanique  par  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne,  mais 
on  fait  meilleure  figure  et  on  envisage  avec  sang  froid 
les  complications  qui  peuvent  en  resulter.  Dans  les 
declarations  pleines  de  reserve  faites  hier  par  le 
Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  la  Com- 
mission du  budget  du  Reichstag,  le  seul  point  sur 
lequel  Mr.  de  Jagow  se  soit  exprime  avec  une  nettete 
qui  ne  laisse  aucun  doute  quant  aux  intentions  de 


Sir:- 


Berlin,  April  4,  1913. 


The  incident  of  Scutari  is,  no  doubt,  the  gravest 
from  the  European  point  of  view  that  has  happened 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  hostilities.  It  can 
be  easily  understood  that  the  King  of  Montenegro 
persists  in  his  resistance  to  the  demands  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  pressure  of  the  Powers.  He  is 
running  the  risk  of  losing  his  crown  through  his 
military  failures,  and  has  no  chance  to  keep  it  in  the 
face  of  an  internal  revolution  which  will  be  the  prob- 
able consequence  of  the  despair  of  his  subjects,  un- 
less they  come  to  regard  him  as  a  victim  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  policy.  But  he  cannot  continue  the 
siege  of  Scutari  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
Serbs.  The  arrogance  and  contempt  with  which 
the  latter  are  receiving  the  complaints  of  the  Cab- 
inet of  Vienna  can  only  be  explained  by  the  support 
which  they  expect  to  find  in  St.  Petersburg.  The 
Servian  Charge  d'Affaires  here  said  recently  that  his 
Government  would  not  have  proceeded  as  it  did  for 
six  months,  regardless  of  the  Austrian  threats,  if  it 
had  not  been  encouraged  by  the  Russian  Minister, 
M.  de  Hartwig,  a  diplomat  of  M.  Iswolski's  school. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  events  have,  so  far, 
justified  the  adventurous  audacity  of  the  Cabinet 
of  Belgrade. 

The  Russian  policy  is  showing  a  hesitation  which 
seriously  compromises  the  European  situation.  M. 
Sassonov  is  one  with  his  colleagues  who  are  direct- 
ing the  policy  of  the  Great  Powers,  but  he  feels  that 
his  influence  over  the  Czar  is  being  battered  down 
by  the  Court  party  and  the  Panslavists.  Hence  the 
inconsistency  of  his  conduct.  While  at  London  he 
is  adhering  in  the  organ  of  the  Russian  Ambassador, 
to  the  European  Concert  which  is  determined  to 
bring  Montenegro  to  reason,  he  hesitates  to  give  to 
France  the  official  mandate  of  representing  her  Rus- 
sian Ally  in  the  blockade  of  the  Montenegrin  coasts. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Paris  is  tired  of  these 
tergiversations,  but  France  submits,  though  cursing 
them,  to  the  consequences  of  the  alliance  and  allows 
herself  to  be  drawn  along  a  path  which  may  lead 
to  a  general  war.  At  Berlin,  satisfaction  is  just  as 
lacking  in  the  direction  which  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna  has  given  to  the  Balkan  question,  but  it  is 
regarded  with  better  grace  and  the  complications 
which  it  may  entail  are  faced  with  composure.  In 
the  very  reserved  stateinents  which  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  made  yesterday  in  the 
budget  commission  of  the  Reichstag,  the  only  point 
on  which  Mr.  von  Jagow  expressed  himself  with 
sufficient  clearness  to  leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  in- 


rAllemagne,  c'est  I'appui  qu'elle  est  resolue  de  pre- 
ter  jusqu'au  bout  a  son  alliee,  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

On  ne  pense  pas  dans  le  monde  diplomatique  de 
Berlin,  ou  plutot  on  n'espere  plus  que  la  demonstra- 
tion navale  devant  Antivari  empechera  la  continua- 
tion du  siege  de  Scutari  et  I'assaut  final  auquel  les 
Montenegrins  et  les  Serbes  se  preparent  activement. 
Si  la  place  tombe  entre  leurs  mains,  il  faudra  autre 
chose  qu'un  simple  blocus  et  des  sommations  inutile- 
ment  repetees  pour  les  en  deloger.  L'entree  des 
troupes  autrichiennes  sur  un  territoire  balkanique, 
plutot  serbe  que  montenegrin,  parce  qu'en  Serbie  des 
operations  militaires  seraient  plus  faciles  qu'au  Mon- 
tenegro, motiverait  une  intervention  de  la  Russie  et 
dechainerait  peut-etre  une  guerre  generale.  C'est 
une  eventualite  tellement  grave  qu'elle  ferait  recu- 
ler — on  I'espere  du  moins  ici — les  deux  Puissances,  de 
la  decision  desquelles  depend  aujourd'hui  la  paix 
europeenne.  En  d'autres  termes,  on  croit  que  la 
gravite  du  peril  auquel  toute  decision  inconsideree 
exposerait  I'Europe  entiere  est  la  meilleure  garantie 
que  Ton  ait  qu'il  sera  evite. 

II  faudrait  necessairement  offrir  une  compensation 
au  Montenegro,  I'Autriche-Hongrie  ne  pouvant  pas, 
sans  se  deconsiderer,  laisser  en  sa  possession  Scu- 
tari, la  future  capitale  du  futur  etat  d'Albanie.  On 
parle  ici  de  I'offre  d'une  certaine  etendue  de  cote 
avec  une  bande  de  territoire  au  sud  de  Dulcigno,  qui 
comprendrait  le  port  de  St.  Jean  de  Medua,  entoure 
de  rochers  et  qui  n'est  pas  susceptible  d'un  develop- 
pement  economique  ou  militaire. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


tentions  of  Germany  was  the  support  which  she  is 
resolved  to  give  to  the  end  to  her  Ally,  Austria- 
Hungary. 

It  is  not  believed  in  the  diplomatic  world  of  Ber- 
lin or,,  rather  it  is  no  longer  hoped,  that  the  naval 
demonstration  off  Antivari  will  prevent  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  siege  of  Scutari  and  the  final  on- 
slaught for  which  the  Montenegrins  and  Serbs  are 
actively  preparing.  If  the  place  falls  into  their 
hands  it  will  require  more  than  a  simple  blockade 
or  a  useless  repetition  of  demands  to  dislodge  them. 
The  entry  of  Austrian  troops  on  Balkan  territory, 
rather  Servian  than  Montenegrin  because  in  Servia 
military  operations  would  be  easier  than  in  Monte- 
negro, would  give  the  motive  for  a  Russian  inter- 
vention and  would  probably  unchain  a  general  war. 
That  is  a  contingency  of  such  gravity — that,  at 
least,  is  the  hope  here — as  to  cause  the  two  Powers, 
on  whose  decision  the  peace  of  Europe  is  depending 
to-day,  to  shrink  from  it.  In  other  words,  it  is  be- 
lieved that  the  gravity  of  the  danger  to  which  the 
whole  of  Europe  would  be  exposed  by  any  ill-con- 
sidered decisions  is  the  best  possible  guarantee  that 
it  will  be  avoided. 

It  would,  of  course,  be  necessary  to  offer  a  com- 
pensation to  Montenegro,  as  Austria-Hungary  can- 
not without  discrediting  herself  leave  in  Monte- 
negro's hands  Scutari,  the  capital  of  a  future  State 
of  Albania.  There  is  talk  here  of  the  offer  of  a  cer- 
tain stretch  of  coast  with  a  strip  of  territory  to  the 
south  of  Dulcigno,  comprising  the  port  of  San  Gio- 
vanni di  Medua  surrounded  by  rocks  and  incapable 
of  economic  or  military  development. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


No.  104. 


No.  104. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  16  Avril  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Je  viens  de  voir  M.  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres  avec  lequel  j'ai  cause  assez  longuement  de  I'in- 
cident  de  Nancy,  que  les  journaux  vous  ont  rapporte. 

M.  Pichon  se  montre  tres  desole  de  I'esprit  de  sus- 
ceptibilite  chauvine,  dont  la  presse  allemande  donne 
le  spectacle. 

Les  organes  officieux  du  Gouvernement  Imperial 
sont  prudents  mais  les  pangermanistes  jettent  feu  et 
flamme,  et  il  est  regrettable  que  I'agence  Wolff  s'em- 
presse  de  repandre  dans  toute  I'Allemagne  de  si  de- 
plorables  articles. 

On  n'a  pas  encore  de  details  precis  sur  ce  qui  s'est 
passe  a  Nancy,  surtout  au  Casino — un  etablissement 
de  troisieme  ordre — oil  la  querelle  a  commence,  et  ou 
Ton  jouait  une  piece  intitulee  "le  Uhlan."  On  ne 
devrait  pas  laisser  jouer  des  pieces  de  ce  genre. 

Le  rapport  des  autorites  locales  etait  insuffisant ; 
un  haut  fonctionnaire  a  ete  envoye  pour  faire  une  en- 
quete  serieuse. 

II  n'est  pas  douteux  que  I'affaire,  qui  n'a  pas  d'im- 
portance  veritable  se  liquidera  facilement ;  mais,  m'a 
dit  le  Ministre,  elle  est  grave  en  ce  qu'elle  prouve 
combien  les  esprits  sont  montes  de  part  et  d'autre. 

Chez  nous  aussi,  a  continue  Monsieur  Pichon,  il  y 


Sir: 


Paris,  April  16,  1913. 


I  have  just  seen  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  spoken  at  some  length  with  him  of  the  incident 
of  Nancy,  of  which  the  papers  have  advised  you. 

M.  Pichon  was  very  much  grieved  over  the  spirit 
of  chauvinistic  susceptibility  which  the  German 
press  is  displaying. 

The  semi-official  organs  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment are  cautious,  but  the  Pan-Germanists  are  fret- 
ting and  fuming  and  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the 
Wolff  Agency  hastens  to  spread  such  deplorable 
articles  all  over  Germany. 

There  are  not  yet  any  exact  details  to  hand  on 
what  happened  at  Nancy,  above  all  at  the  Casino — 
an  establishment  of  the  third  class — where  the  quar- 
rel began  and  where  a  piece  entitled  "The  Uhlan" 
was  played.  Pieces  of  that  kind  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  be  played. 

The  report  from  the  local  authorities  is  insuffi- 
cient ;  a  high  official  has  been  despatched  to  make 
a  serious  investigation. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  affair,  which  is  of  no 
real  importance,  will  easily  be  straightened  out  but, 
said  the  Minister,  it  is  grave  in  so  far  as  it  shows 
how  high  feelings  are  running  on  both  sides. 

With  us  also,  the  Minister  continued,  a  spirit  of 


125 


a  un  esprit  de  chauvinisme  qui  se  developpe,  que  je 
deplore  et  centre  lequel  il  faudra  reagir.  La  moitie 
des  theatres  de  Paris  jouent  maintenant  des  pieces 
nationalistes  et  chauvines;  je  m'abstiens  d'y  aller; 
mais  ce  n'est  pas  assez,  il  faudrait  avoir  les  moyens 
d'empecher  de  les  representer.  II  importe  de  ra- 
mener  plus  de  calme  dans  les  esprits. 
Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


chauvinism  is  developing  which  I  deplore  and  which 
must  be  fought.  Half  of  the  theatres  of  Paris  are 
now  playing  nationalistic  and  chauvinistic  pieces. 
I  abstain  from  going  to  them,  but  that  is  not  suf- 
ficient. Means  are  needed  to  prevent  them  from 
being  presented.  It  is  imperative  to  bring  about 
calmer  sentiments. 
Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  105. 


No.  105. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
g^res. 

Paris,  le  17  Avril  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

On  ne  connait  pas  encore  les  resultats  definitifs  de 
I'enquete  que  le  Gouvernement  a  charge  un  haut 
fonctionnaire,  M.  Ogier,  de  faire  a  Nancy  sur  les  in- 
cidents franco-allemands. 

Les  nombreuses  correspondances  que  publient  les 
journaux  donnent  cependant  I'impression  que  j'avais 
deja  I'honneur  de  vous  communiquer  hier,  que  les 
faits  n'ont  pas  eu  une  importance  suffisante  pour  le- 
gitimer  la  levee  de  boucliers  d'une  partie  de  la  presse 
allemande  et  les  paroles  prononcees  au  Parlement 
de  Berlin  par  le  Sous-Secretaire  d'Etat  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Mais  ces  faits  demontreront  sans  doute  aussi  que 
— comme  j'ai  deja  eu  maintes  fois  I'honneur  de  vous 
le  dire — I'esprit  public  en  France  devient  de  plus 
en  plus  chauvin  et  imprudent.  On  devrait  prendre 
des  mesures  pour  arreter  ce  courant  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment a  veritablement  encourage  depuis  les  incidents 
d'Agadir  et  la  constitution  du  Ministere  Poincare- 
Millerand-Delcasse. 

Le  "Journal"  de  ce  matin  public,  a  cet  egard,  un 
article  de  Victor  Margueritte,  intitule:  "A  la  fron- 
tiere,"  que  je  me  permets  de  vous  signaler. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,   Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Je  suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Sir: 


Paris,  April  17,  1913. 


Guillaume. 


The  definite  results  of  the  investigation  which  the 
Government  charged  a  high  official,  M.  Ogier,  to 
make  at  Nancy  in  connection  with  the  Franco-Ger- 
man incidents  are  not  yet  known. 

The  numerous  news  despatches  published  in  the 
papers  give,  however,  the  impression  which  I  al- 
ready had  the  honor  to  report  to  you  yesterday, 
that  the  facts  are  not  of  such  importance  as  to  jus- 
tify a  part  of  the  German  press  in  taking  up  arms, 
or  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to 
speak,  as  he  did,  in  the  Reichstag  at  Berlin. 

But  these  facts  will  doubtless  show  also — as  I 
have  repeatedly  had  the  honor  of  reporting  to  you 
— that  the  public  mind  in  France  is  becoming  more 
and  more  chauvinistic  and  imprudent.  Measures 
should  be  taken  to  stop  this  current  which  the  Gov- 
ernment has  actually  been  encouraging  since  the  in- 
cidents of  Agadir  and  the  accession  of  the  Poincare- 
Millerand-Delcasse  Cabinet. 

The  Journal  of  this  morning  publishes  in  this 
connection  an  article  by  Victor  Margueritte,  en- 
titled :  "To  the  frontier,"  to  which  I  take  the  lib- 
erty of  drawing  your  attention. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  106. 


No.  106. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  26  Mai  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Un  mariage  princier  fut  rarement  aussi  populaire 
que  celui  de  la  Princesse  Victoria  Louise  avec  le 
Prince  Ernest  Auguste,  Due  de  Brunswick  et  Lune- 
bourg.  Les  habitants  de  Berlin  ont  temoigne  leur 
satisfaction  par  des  ovations  a  la  Famille  Imperiale, 
qui  se  sont  etendues  aux  botes  royaux  qu'elle  re- 
cevait  a  cette  occasion.  II  est  aise  de  constater  par 
la  lecture  des  journaux  que  le  meme  sentiment,  fait 
d'approbation  et  de  contentement  a  ete  eprouve  dans 
toute  I'Allemagne.  On  etait  content  de  voir  terminer 
d'une  maniere  aussi  heureuse  la  vieille  querelle  des 
Guelfes  et  des  Hohenzollern  qui  pesait,  comme  un 


Berlin,  May  26,  1913. 
Sir:- 

Rarely  has  a  princely  marriage  been  so  popular 
as  that  of  Princess  Victoria  Louise  with  Prince 
Ernest  August,  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Luneburg. 
The  inhabitants  of  Berlin  showed  their  satisfaction 
by  ovations  to  the  Imperial  Family,  extending  to 
the  Royal  guests  who  were  received  at  this  occa- 
sion. It  is  easy  to  ascertain  by  reading  the  papers 
that  the  same  sentiment  of  approval  and  satisfac- 
tion is  prevailing  all  over  Germany.  One  is  glad 
to  see  terminated  in  such  a  happy  manner  the  old 
quarrel  of  the  Guelfs  and  the  Hohenzollerns  which 
weighed  like  a  painful  legacy  of  the  past  on  the 


legs  penible  du  passe,  sur  les  brillantes  destinees  du 
nouvel  Empire  allemand.  On  approuvait  I'Empe- 
reur,  non  pas  seulement  d'avoir  donne  sa  fille  unique 
au  fils  de  son  ancien  ennemi,  mais  aussi  d'avoir  traite 
ce  dernier,  pendant  toute  la  duree  des  fiangailles  de 
leurs  enfants,  avec  une  courtoisie  qui  ne  s'est  pas 
dementie  un  seul  instant,  en  evitant  soigneusement 
tout  ce  qui  pouvait  froisser  I'amour  propre  de  I'he- 
ritier  du  vaincu  de  Langensalza.  Dans  le  toast  plain 
de  tact  et  d'elevation  que  Guillaume  II  a  porte  au 
jeune  couple  pendant  le  banquet  nuptial,  il  s'est  plu 
a  mettre  sur  le  meme^pied  les  Maisons  des  Guelfes 
et  des  Hohenzollern  "qui  ont  joue  des  roles  si  mar- 
quants  dans  le  developpement  historique  de  la  patrie 
allemande"  (Die  so  markante  Rollen  in  der  ge- 
schichtlichen  Entwicklung  des  deutschen  Vaterlan- 
des  gespielt  haben).  On  ne  saurait  plus  aimable- 
ment  travestir  I'histoire. 

Le  Due  de  Cumberland,  oncle  du  Roi  d'Angle- 
terre  et  de  I'Empereur  de  Russie,  a  toujours  ete  I'ob- 
jet  de  la  part  de  ces  deux  Princes  d'une  sympathie 
des  plus  marquees.  La  Cour  britannique  n'a  jamais 
oublie  que  la  maison  de  Hanovre  est  une  branche  de- 
tachee  du  tronc  royal  de  la  maison  d'Angleterre. 
Aussi  la  solution  chevaleresque  apportee  a  la  ques- 
tion guelfe  par  Guillaume  II  a-t-elle  ete  accueillie 
avec  une  joie  sincere  tant  a  Londres  qu'a  St.  Peters- 
bourg.  Quoi  d'etonnant  que  les  Souverains  Anglais 
et  le  Czar  aient  tenu  a  montrer  leur  satisfaction  en 
assistant  au  mariage  qui  a  scelle  la  reconciliation  des 
Guelfes  et  des  Hohenzollern?  Ce  sentiment,  plus 
encore  que  les  liens  de  famille,  suffirait  a  justifier 
leur  presence  ici  pendant  les  fetes  qui  viennent  de 
se  terminer.  On  a  cherche  d'autre  part  a  attribuer 
a  la  reunion  des  trois  principaux  Monarques  de  I'Eu- 
rope  une  certaine  importance  politique.  De  politi- 
que proprement  dite  il  n'a  pas  dCi  etre  beaucoup 
question  dans  les  entretiens  de  Guillaume  II  et  de 
Georges  V.  Avec  le  Czar,  I'Empereur  allemand  n'a 
sans  doute  pas  laisse  echapper  I'occasion  d'engager 
<les  conversations  interessantes. 


On  peut  dire,  tout  au  moins,  sans  risquer  de  se 
tromper  que  la  visite  du  couple  royal  d'Angleterre 
a  Berlin  apparait  comme  la  confirmation  et  comme? 
la  consecration  aux  yeux  de  I'Europe  du  rapproche- 
ment qui  s'est  incontestablement  opere  entre  I'Alle- 
magne  et  la  Grande-Bretagne  pendant  la  guerre  bal- 
kanique,  oii  les  deux  Etats  ont  agi  de  concert  pour 
la  preservation  de  la  paix  europeenne.  C'est  un 
avertissement  que  la  France  ferait  bien  de  mediter, 
au  moment  ou  elle  se  consume  en  efforts  peut-etre 
inutiles  et  destines  en  tout  cas  a  reveler  a  I'etranger 
I'etat  de  decomposition  interne  de  son  armee,  en  vue 
-de  retablir  I'equilibre  des  forces  entre  elle  et  I'Alle- 
magne. 

Quant  au  voyage  du  Czar,  il  est  une  nouvelle 
preuve  des  bonnes  relations,  inaugurees  lors  de  I'en- 
trevue  de  Potsdam  et  cimentees  par  celle  de  Port 
Baltique,  qui  existent  entre  les  Maisons  regnantes 
•des  deux  Empires  voisins  et  aussi  entre  leurs  Gou- 
vernements.  La  guerre  balkanique  n'y  a  pas  porte 
atteinte.  Des  diplomates  frangais  clairvoyants  ac- 
•cusent  la  Russie  de  jouer  un  double  jeu  vis-a-vis  de 
son  alliee  au  profit  de  I'Allemagne.  Cela  n'est  pas 
invraisemblable  et  ce  serait  une  raison  de  plus  pour 
la  France  de  renoncer  a  vouloir  contre-balancer  la 
suprematie  militaire  allemande  et  de  repudier  la  chi- 
mere  d'une  revanche. 

Faut-il  conclure  de  la  visite  des  Souverains  anglais 
a  Berlin  qu'un  rapprochement  anglo-allemand  est  en 
preparation,  qui  poursuivrait  un  but  concret,  tel  que 
celui  de  I'absorption    du  Congo    beige    par  I'Alle- 


brilliant  destiny  of  the  new  German  Empire.  The 
Emperor  was  praised  not  only  for  having  given  his 
only  daughter  to  the  son  of  his  former  enemy  but 
also  because  he  has  been  treating  the  latter  through- 
out the  year  of  the  engagement  of  their  children 
with  a  never  failing  courtesy,  carefully  avoiding 
everything  that  might  have  hurt  the  amour-propre 
of  the  heir  of  the  vanquished  of  Langensalza.  In 
the  tactful  and  noble-minded  toast  which  William 
II  gave  to  the  young  couple  at  the  marriage  ban- 
quet, he  was  pleased  to  place  on  the  same  level  the 
Houses  of  the  Guelfs  and  the  HohenzoUerns  "which 
have  played  such  conspicuous  parts  in  the  historic 
development  of  the  German  Fatherland"  (Die  so 
markante  Rollen  in  der  geschichtlichen  Entwick- 
lung des  deutschen  Vaterlandes  gespielt  haben). 
History  could  not  be  more  amiably  disguised. 

The  Duke  of  Cumberland,  the  uncle  of  the  King 
of  England  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  was  always 
the  object  of  most  marked  sympathy  on  the  part 
of  these  two  Princes.  The  British  Court  has  never 
forgotten  that  the  house  of  Hanover  is  a  detached 
branch  of  the  royal  tree  of  the  house  of  England. 
The  chivalrous  solution  given  to  the  Guelf  ques- 
tion by  William  II  has  also  been  received  with  sin- 
cere joy  both  at  London  and  at  St.  Petersburg.  Is 
it  therefore  surprising  that  the  English  Sovereigns 
and  the  Czar  should  have  had  it  at  heart  to  show 
their  satisfaction  by  attending  the  marriage  which 
sealed  the  reconciliation  of  the  Guelfs  and  the  Ho- 
henzoUerns? This  sentiment,  even  more  than  fam- 
ily ties,  would  be  sufficient  to  justify  their  presence 
here  during  the  festivities  which  have  just  come  to 
a  close.  It  has  been  tried,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
invest  the  meeting  of  the  three  principal  Monarchs 
of  Europe  with  political  importance.  Of  politics  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word  there  should  not  have 
been  much  question  in  the  conversations  between 
William  II  and  George  V ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  German  Emperor  will  not  have  let  the  op- 
portunity pass  to  hold  interesting  conversations 
with  the  Czar. 

In  any  case  it  may  be  said,  without  risk  of  being 
mistaken,  that  the  visit  of  the  Royal  English  couple 
at  Berlin  appears  to  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  the  con- 
firmation and  consecration  of  the  rapprochement 
which  indisputably  took  place  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  during  the  Balkan  war  when  the 
two  States  acted  in  common  for  the  preservation  of 
European  peace.  That  is  a  warning  on  which 
France  would  do  well  to  reflect  at  a  time  when  she 
is  exhausting  herself  in  efforts  to  reestablish  the' 
balance  of  forces  between  herself  and  Germany, 
efforts  which,  while  they  may  be  useless,  are  sure 
to  reveal  to  the  other  countries  the  internal  rotten- 
ness of  her  army. 

As  regards  the  journey  of  the  Czar  it  is  a  fresh 
proof  of  the  good  relations,  inaugurated  at  the  time 
of  the  meeting  of  Potsdam  and  cemented  by  that 
of  Baltic  Port,  which  exist  between  the  reigning 
Houses  of  the  two  neighboring  Empires  and  also 
between  their  Governments.  They  have  not  suf- 
fered by  the  Balkan  war.  Clear-sighted  French 
diplomats  accuse  Russia  of  playing  a  double  game 
with  her  ally  to  the  b'enefit  of  Germany.  That  is 
not  improbable  and  it  would  be  another  reason  for 
France  to  renounce  the  wish  to  counter-balance 
the  German  military  supremacy  and  to  repudiate 
the  chimera  of  a  revenge. 

Is  it  to  be  assumed  from  the  visit  of  the  English 
Sovereigns  at  Berlin  that  an  Anglo-German  rap- 
prochement is  in  preparation  with  a  concrete  aim, 
such  as  the  absorption  of  the  Belgian  Congo  by  Ger- 


127 


magne,  un  rapprochement  de  ce  genre  ne  pouvant 
etre  realise,  comme  le  pretend  la  "Post"  de  Berlin, 
que  sous  la  forme  d'une  entente  coloniale?  Nous 
sommes  avertis  par  I'experience  de  1909  qu'un  ar- 
rangement secret,  conclu  aux  depens  du  Congo  par 
les  Cabinets  de  Londres  et  de  Berlin,  n'aurait  rien 
d'impossible.  Mais  en  1909  il  ne  s'agissait  que  d'une 
faible  portion  du  territoire  de  la  colonic  beige,  dont 
la  possession  nous  etait,  d'ailleurs,  contestee  par 
I'Angleterre.  Aujourd'hui  la  "Post"  parle,  comme 
d'une  chose  toute  naturelle,  de  la  cession  volontaire 
ou  forcee  de  notre  empire  africain.  II  n'est  pas  ad- 
missible, quelles  que  soient  les  convoitises  des  co- 
loniaux  et  des  pangermanistes  allemands,  que  I'An- 
gleterre consente  a  introduire  au  coeur  de  I'Afrique 
une  rivale  dont  la  puissance  expansive  et  economi- 
que  menacerait  les  colonies  britanniques  elles- 
memes,  et  a  lui  ceder  le  magnifique  bassin  du  Con- 
go, sans  que  I'Allemagne  soit  en  mesure  de  lui  offrir 
une  compensation  equivalente.  S'il  etait  question 
d'un  partage  de  notre  colonic,  nous  pourrions  com- 
mencer  a  concevoir  de  legitimes  inquietudes.  Mais 
dans  ce  cas  encore,  il  serait  impossible  d'exclure 
completement  la  France  d'un  pareil  marche.  Le 
danger  paraitrait  reel  et  pressant,  si  le  partage  du 
Congo  fasait,  sous  les  auspices  de  I'Angle- 
terre, I'objet  de  pourparlers  secrets  entre  les  trois 
grandes  Puissances  qui  sont  nos  voisines  en  Europe 
et  si  nos  depouilles  africaines  devenaient  entre  elles 
I'instrument  d'un  rapprochement  pacifique.  Mais 
les  choses  n'en  sont  pas  la.  Nous  n'en  devons  pas 
moins,  a  mon  avis,  tenir  I'oeil  ouvert  sur  toutes  les 
consequences  possibles  d'une  entente  anglo-alle- 
mande. 
Veuillez  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


many,  since  the  Post  of  Berlin  contends  that  such 
a  rapprochement  can  only  be  realized  in  the  form 
of  a  colonial  understanding?  We  have  been  warned 
by  the  experiences  of  1909  that  a  secret  agreement 
concluded  by  the  Cabinets  of  London  and  Berlin 
at  the  expense  of  the  Congo  would  not  be  at  all 
impossible.  But  in  1909  there  was  question  of  only 
a  small  part  of  the  territory  of  the  Belgian  colony, 
our  possession  of  which  was,  moreover,  being  con- 
tested by  England.  To-day  the  Post  speaks,  as  of 
something  quite  natural,  of  the  voluntary  or  en- 
forced cession  of  our  African  empire.  It  cannot  be 
imagined,  whatever  the  desires  of  the  German  colo- 
nials and  Pan-Germanists  may  be,  that  England 
would  consent  to  admit  to  the  heart  of  Africa  a 
rival  whose  expansive  and  commercial  power  would 
threaten  the  very  British  colonies  and  that  England 
would  cede  to  her  the  magnificent  Congo  basin, 
whereas  Germany  would  have  no  equivalent  to  offer 
as  compensation.  If  a  partition  of  our  colony  were 
in  question  we  would  have  just  reason  to  feel  con- 
cerned. But  it  would  be  impossible  to  exclude 
France  from  such  a  deal.  The  danger  would  seem 
real  and  imminent  if  the  partition  of  the  Congo 
were  being  secretly  discussed,  under  the  auspices 
of  England,  by  the  three  Great  Powers  which  are 
our  neighbors  in  Europe  and  if  our  African  spoils 
were  to  become  the  means  of  a  pacific  rapproche- 
ment among  them.  But  that  is  not  how  matters 
stand.  Nevertheless,  I  think  we  should  keep  a 
watchful  eye  on  all  the  possible  consequences  of  an 
Anglo-German  understanding. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Baron  Beyens. 


No.  107. 


No.  107. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
k  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  12  Juin  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

Les  journaux  ont  annonce  que  le  Conseil  des  Mi- 
nistres  avait  decide  d'inviter  la  Chambre  des  Depu- 
tes a  consacrer  prochainement  des  seances  supple- 
mentaires  a  la  discussion  de  la  loi  militaire,  dont  il 
est  resolu  a  assurer  le  vote  avant  les  vacances  par- 
lementaires. 

Le  fait  est  vrai ;  il  m'a  ete  confirme  par  M.  le  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  Le  Gouvernement 
entend  que  la  loi  etablissant  le  service  de  trois  ans 
soit  adoptee  avant  que  la  Chambre  ne  se  separe,  dut- 
elle  sieger  au  dela  du  14  Juillet. 

Monsieur  Pichon  est  certain  du  succes  de  ladite 
loi.  "Nous  aurons,  m'a-t-il  dit,  une  belle  majorite 
pour  voter  le  principe ;  les  articles  suivants  reuniront 
des  chiffres  de  voix  divers  et  puis,  pour  I'ensemble 
du  projet,  nous  compterons  un  chiffre  d'adherents 
encore  plus  important  que  pour  le  vote  du  principe." 

On  est  done  des  a  present  certain  de  I'introduction 
dans  la  legislation  fran?aise  de  dispositions  que  le 
pays  ne  pourra  vraisemblablement  supporter  long- 
temps.  Les  charges  de  la  nouvelle  loi  seront  telle- 
ment  lourdes  pour  la  population,  des  depenses  qu'elle 
cntrainera  seront  tellement  exorbitantes,  que  le  pays 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir: 


Paris,  June  12,  1913. 


The  papers  announce  that  the  Ministerial  Council 
has  decided  to  ask  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  shortly 
to  devote  extraordinary  meetings  to  the  discussion 
of  the  military  law  which  it  is  resolved  to  see  passed 
before  the  parliamentary  vacations. 

The  report  is  correct ;  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  confirmed  it  to  me.  The  Government  is  of 
the  opinion  that  the  law  introducing  the  three  years' 
service  should  be  adopted  before  the  Chamber  ad- 
journs, even  if  it  should  have  to  extend  the  session 
beyond  the  14th  of  July. 

M.  Pichon  is  certain  of  the  success  of  the  said 
law.  He  told  me:  "We  shall  have  a  strong  ma- 
jority to  vote  for  the  principle;  the  subsequent  arti- 
cles will  secure  different  numbers  of  votes  and  then, 
for  the  project  in  its  entirety  we  count  on  a  figure 
of  pros  still  bigger  than  that  of  the  vote  on  the 
principle." 

Thus  it  is  certain  to-day  that  provisions  are  going 
to  be  introduced  in  the  French  legislature  which 
the  country  will  probably  not  be  able  to  bear  for  a 
great  length  of  time.  The  burdens  of  the  new  law 
will  be  so  heavy  for  the  population,  the  expendi- 
ture which  it  involves  so  exorbitant,  that  the  coun- 


protestera  bientot,  et  la  France  se  trcuvera  devant 
ce  dilemme:  une  abdication  qu'elle  ne  pourra  souf- 
frir  ou  la  guerre  a  breve  echeance.  La  responsabi- 
lite  de  ceux  qui  ont  entraine  la  nation  dans  cette 
situation,  sera  lourde.  On  les  suit  dans  une  sorte 
d'affolement,  de  frenesie  interessante,  mais  lamenta- 
ble. II  est  aujourd'hui  defendu,  sous  peine  de  passer 
pour  un  traitre,  d'emettre  un  simple  doute  sur  la 
necessite  d'adopter  le  service  de  trois  ans.  Chacun 
se  rend  compte  que  I'ensemble  de  la  nation  est  loin 
d'etre  favorable  a  la  reforme  que  Ton  prepare  et  com- 
prend  le  danger  qui  menace  I'avenir;  mais  on  ferme 
les  yeux  et  Ton  marche  en  avant. 


La  propagande  en  faveur  de  la  loi  de  trois  ans, 
destinee  a  amener  un  reveil  du  chauvinisme,  a  ete 
admirablement  bier  preparee  et  menee;  elle  a  com- 
mence par  servir  a  I'election  de  M.  Poincare  a  la 
Presidence  de  la  Republique,  elle  poursuit  aujour- 
d'hui son  oeuvre  sans  souci  des  dangers  qu'elle  fait 
naitre ;  le  malaise  est  grand  dans  le  pays. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


try  will  soon  protest,  and  France  will  be  confronted 
with  this  alternative:  renunciation  which  will  be 
insufferable  to  her,  or  war  within  a  short  time. 

The  responsibility  of  those  who  have  brought  the 
country  to  this  pass  will  be  heavy.  The  people  are 
following  them  in  a  sort  of  madness,  in  a  frenzy 
which  is  interesting  but  lamentable.  It  is  forbid- 
den to-day,  on  pain  of  being  considered  a  traitor, 
to  utter  the  slightest  doubt  of  the  necessity  for  the 
adoption  of  the  three  years'  service.  Everybody 
realizes  that  the  nation  as  such  is  far  from  being 
in  favor  of  the  reform  which  is  in  preparation; 
everybody  comprehends  the  danger  which  threat- 
ens the  future;  but  one  closes  one's  eyes  and  goes 
on. 

The  propaganda  in  favor  of  the  three  years'  law 
by  which  chauvinism  was  to  be  reawakened  was 
admirably  prepared  and  conducted ;  at  the  outset  it 
helped  the  election  of  M.  Poincare  to  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Republic ;  it  is  still  pursuing  its  work, 
heedless  of  the  dangers  which  it  entails;  great  un- 
easiness prevails  in  the  country. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  108. 


No.  108. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  7  Novembre  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

SirEdward  Grey  a  prononce  a  Newcastle  un  speech 
sur  les  devoirs  d'un  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. II  s'est  renferme  dans  les  generalites  en  fai- 
sant  prevoir  que  le  Premier  Ministre,  au  banquet  du 
Guildhall  le  10  de  ce  mois,  ferait  une  allusion  plus 
precise  au  programme  gouvernemental  en  ce  qui 
concerne  les  relations  exterieures. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  a  commence  par  constater  que 
I'Angleterre,  de  concert  avec  les  autres  Grandes 
Puissances,  avait  essaye,  pendant  les  hostilites  bal- 
kaniques,  d'empecher  que  ce  conflit  ne  degenerat  en 
guerre  generale.  Le  succes  avait  couronne  ces  ef- 
forts. L'opposition  au  Parlement  britannique,  avait 
loyalement  soutenu  le  Gouvernement  dans  les  mo- 
ments difficiles  et  s'etait  montree  patriotique. 

Ensuite,  le  Ministre  a  defini  la  tache  de  son  De- 
partement,  qui  devait  avoir  quatre  grands  buts  en 
vue: 

1.  empecher  les  changements  ou  combinaisons 
politiques  qui,  du  dehors,  menaceraient  la  se- 
curite  de  I'Empire; 

2.  ne  pas  augmenter  les  responsabilites  terri- 
toriales  de  I'Empire,  assez  grandes  deja  et  se 
borner  a  garder  et  a  developper  ce  que  I'An- 
gleterre possede ; 

3.  encourager  le  commerce  Britannique,  surtout 
en  evitant  la  guerre ; 

4.  employer  I'influence  de  la  nation  en  faveur 
des  buts  humanitaires  dans  le  monde. 

On  pent  resumer  pratiquement  ces  desiderata  com- 
me  suit: 

1.  le  Ministre  est  en  faveur  du  maintien  de  la 
triple  entente; 

2.  il  est  hostile  a  toute  politique  de  conquete,  qui 
exciterait  I'animosite  des  grands  rivaux; 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


London,  November  7,  1913. 
Sir:— 

Sir  Edward  Grey  made  a  speech  at  Newcastle 
concerning  the  duties  of  a  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. He  confined  himself  to  generalities,  indi- 
cating that  the  Prime  Minister  at  the  banquet  in 
the  Guildhall  on  the  10th  of  this  month  would  dis- 
cuss more  in  detail  the  programme  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  regard  to  foreign  relations. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  began  by  stating  that  England, 
together  with  the  other  Great  Powers,  had  en- 
deavored during  the  Balkan  war  to  prevent  this 
conflict  from  developing  into  a  general  war.  Suc- 
cess had  crowned  these  efforts.  The  opposition  in 
the  British  Parliament  had  loyally  supported  the 
Government  in  these  difficult  moments  and  demon- 
strated its  patriotism. 

Then  the  Minister  defined  the  task  of  his  depart- 
ment, which  had  to  have  four  great  ends  in  view : 

(1)  to  prevent  political  changes  or  combinations, 

which  would  menace  the  security  of  the  Em- 
pire from  the  outside; 

(2)  not  to  increase  the  territorial  responsibilities  of 

the  Empire,  which  were  already  great  enougli, 
and  to  confine  activities  to  protecting  and  de- 
veloping England's  present  possessions ; 

(3)  to  encourage  British  commerce,  above  all  by 

avoiding  war; 

(4)  to  use  the  influence  of  the  nation  in  favor  of 

the  humanitarian  endeavors  of  the  world. 
These  ambitions  may  be  summed  up  practically 
as  follows : 

( 1 )  The  Minister  is  in  favor  of  the  maintenance  of 

the  Triple  Entente ; 

(2)  he  is  opposed  to  any  policy  of  conquest  which 

would  arouse  the  animosity  of  England's 
great  rivals; 


3.  il  veut  favoriser  I'expansion  economique  du 
pays,  au  dehors,  en  eliminant  I'anxiete  que 
produit  la  crainte  de  complications  interna- 
tionales  c'est  a  dire  en  maintenant  avec  I'Al- 
lemagne  les  meilleures  relations  possibles ; 

4.  il  ne  renonce  pas  a  user  vis-a-vis  d'autres  na- 
tions (surtout  vraisemblablement  vis-a-vis 
des  Etats  faibles)  du  prestige  et  de  I'influence 
de  I'Angleterre,  pour  appuyer  les  campagnes 
humanitaires. 

Cette  formule,  dangereusement  elastique,  est  des- 
tinee  a  plaire  au  parti  philanthropique,  si  puissant 
dans  ce  pays  et  permet  des  interventions  souvent  in- 
justiHees  et  irritantes. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


(3)  he  wishes  to  favor  the  economic  expansion  of 

the  country  abroad  by  eliminating  the  anx- 
iety, which  the  fear  of  international  compli- 
cations produces,  that  is  to  say,  by  maintain- 
ing the  best  possible  relations  with  Germany ; 

(4)  he  wants  to  put  England's  prestige  and  influ- 

ence to  use  against  the  other  nations  (proba- 
bly the  weak  States  above  all)  in  order  to 
further  humanitarian  campaigns. 

This  dangerously  elastic  formula  is  intended  to 
please  the  philanthropic  party  which  is  so  strong 
in  this  country  and  it  admits  of  interventions,  which 
are  often  unjustified  and  provoking. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  109. 


No.  109. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  k  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  13  Decembre  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

On  avait  acceuilli  ici  avec  regret  la  nouvelle  de  la 
chute  du  Cabinet  Barthou.  Elle  a  ete  consideree 
comme  une  attaque,  couronnee  du  succes,  centre  le 
credit  du  President  Poincare,  qui  est  "persona  grata" 
aupres  du  Cabinet  de  Londres,  comme  une  preuve 
de  la  puissance  de  ses  adversaires,  et  un  signe  nou- 
veau  de  I'instabilite  constante  des  ministeres  fran- 
gaises.  On  a  constate,  avec  une  certaine  amertume, 
I'impopularite  plus  reelle  qu'on  ne  se  I'imaginait,  du 
service  de  trois  ans  et  on  a  ete  frappe  des  difficultes 
dans  lesquelles  se  trouve  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Re- 
publique  au  sujet  de  I'emprunt. 

M.  Doumergue,  qui  cumule  les  fonctions  de  Presi- 
dent du  Conseil  avec  celles  de  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres,  passe  pour  avoir  ete  jadis  peu  favorable 
a  I'entente  cordiale  avec  I'Angleterre  et  sceptique 
quant  aux  bons  resultats  de  I'alliance  franco-russe. 

C'est  peut-etre  pour  detruire  cette  impression  a 
Londres  et  a  St.  Petersbourg  que  M.  Doumergue  a 
telegraphic  a  Sir  E.  Grey  que  ses  efforts  tendraient 
a  developper  la  confiance  et  I'amitie  existantes  entre 
les  deux  nations,  et  a  M.  Sassonow  que  son  vif  desir 
etait  d'entretenir  les  relations  les  plus  cordiales  avec 
Son  Excellence  dans  I'interet  de  I'alliance  qui  unit  s? 
heureusement  les  deux  pays. 

Le  Ministre  Britannique  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
en  remerciant,  a  dit  que  M.  Doumergue  pouvait 
compter  sur  sa  cooperation  pour  developper  I'en- 
tente cordiale,  et  le  Ministre  russe  a  repondu  qu'il 
collaborerait  au  maintien  et  au  renforcement  de  I'al- 
liance franco-russe. 

Une  mise  au  point  aussi  categorique,  a  I'occasion 
d'un  changement  de  portefeuilles,  est  assez  inusitee 
et  a  ete  probablement  consideree  comme  utile,  dans 
les  circonstances,  pour  contredire  des  rumeurs  qui 
avaient  cours. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir:- 


London,  December  13,  1913. 


The  news  of  the  fall  of  the  Barthou  Cabinet  was 
received  here  with  regret.  It  was  regarded  as  a 
successful  attack  on  the  position  of  M.  Poincare, 
who  is  "persona  grata"  with  the  Cabinet  of  London, 
as  a  proof  of  the  power  of  his  adversaries,  and  a 
sign  of  the  invariable  instability  of  the  French  Min- 
istries. It  is  realized  with  a  certain  degree  of  dis- 
appointment that  the  three  years'  service  was  much 
more  unpopular  than  had  been  supposed  and  every- 
one was  struck. with  the  difficulties  in  which  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  found  itself  in  regard 
to  the  loan. 

M.  Doumergue,  who  combines  the  functions  of 
the  Prime  Minister  and  those  of  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  is  said  to  have  been  formerly  rather 
unfavorable  to  the  entente  cordiale  with  England 
and  to  be  sceptical  of  the  good  results  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  alliance. 

It  is,  perhaps,  in  order  to  destroy  this  impression 
at  London  and  at  St.  Petersburg  that  M.  Dou- 
mergue telegraphed  to  Sir  E.  Grey  that  his  efforts 
would  be  aimed  at  developing  the  confidence  and 
the  friendship  existing  between  the  two  nations, 
and  to  M.  Sassonov  that  it  was  his  earnest  desire 
to  maintain  the  most  cordial  relations  with  His  Ex- 
cellency in  the  interests  of  the  alliance  which  so 
happily  united  the  two  countries. 

In  thanking  him,  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  said  that  M.  Doumergue  could  count  on  his 
cooperation  to  develop  the  entente  cordiale,  and 
the  Russian  Minister  replied  that  he  would  collabo- 
rate in  the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of  the 
Franco-Russian  alliance. 

To  put  matters  clear  in  such  a  categorical  fashion 
on  the  occasion  of  a  Cabinet  change  is  rather  un- 
usual and  has  probably  been  considered  useful  un- 
der the  circumstances  in  order  to  contradict  rumors 
which  were  current. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


No.  110. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  16  Janvier  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

A  plusieurs  reprises  deja,  j'ai  eu  Thonneur  de  vous 
rendre  compte  des  premieres  manifestations  du  nou- 
veau  groupement  politique  dont  Mr.  Briand,  avec  le 
concours  de  M.  M.  Barthou,  Pichon  et  consorts,  a 
pris  I'initiative.  Cette  action  se  precise;  M.  Briand 
vient  d'etre  proclame  le  President  de  I'association  et 
la  propagande  se  poursuit. 

Ce  mouvement  aura  certes  une  influence  sur  les 
prochaines  elections;  mais  on  pent  se  demander  s'il 
sera  aussi  important  que  le  desirent  ses  auteurs, 
lorsque  I'on  considere  que  de  hautes  personnalites 
du  monde  politique  modere  et  relativement  conser- 
vateur,  tels  que  M.  M.  Ribot,  Develle,  Meline  et 
beaucoup  d'autres  s'en  sont  tenus  jusqu'ici  eloignes. 

Quoiqu'il  en  soit,  cette  action  est  interessante ; 
elk  peut  avoir  pour  effet  de  moderer  I'ardeur  sectaire 
des  hommes  politiques  et  elle  a  pour  but  certain  de 
soutenir  et  perpetuer  les  efTets  de  la  loi  de  trois  ans. 
Si  j'etais  Frangais,  je  crois  bien  que  mes  sympathies 
iraient  au  groupement  imagine  par  M.  Briand  qui 
constituerait  une  amelioration  sur  I'etat  de  choses 
actuelles;  mais  je  suis  beige  et  je  suis  ainsi  tenu 
d'envisager  sous  un  autre  angle,  les  faits  qui  se 
deroulent  devant  moi 

II  me  semble  certain  que  nous  aurions  plus  d'inte- 
ret  a  voir  le  succes  de  la  politique  de  M.  Caillaux — 
des  radicaux  et  radicaux-socialistes.  J'ai  deja  eu 
I'honneur  de  vous  dire  que  ce  sont  M.M.  Poincare, 
Delcasse,  Millerand  et  leurs  amis  qui  ont  invente  et 
poursuivi  la  politique  nationaliste,  cocardiere  et 
chauvine  dont  nous  avons  constate  la  renaissance. 
C'est  un  danger  pour  I'Europe — et  pour  la  Belgique. 
J'y  vois  le  plus  grand  peril  qui  menace  aujourd'hui 
la  paix  de  I'Europe,  non  pas  que  j'aie  le  droit  de 
supposer  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  dispose 
a  la  troubler  de  propos  delibere — je  crois  plutot  le 
contraire — mais  parce  que  I'attitude  qu'a  prise  la 
Cabinet  Barthou  est  selon  moi,  la  cause  determi- 
nante  d'un  surcroit  de  tendances  militaristes  en  AUe- 
magne. 

Les  folies  belliqueuses  de  la  Turquie  et  la  loi  de 
trois  ans  me  paraissent  constituer  les  seuls  dangers  a 
redouter  pour  la  paix  de  I'Europe.  Je  crois  pouvoir 
relever  le  peril  que  fait  naitre  la  legislation  militaire 
actuelle  de  la  Republique. 

La  France  amoindrie  par  les  deficits  de  sa  natalite 
ne  peut  supporter  longtemps  le  regime  de  la  loi  de 
trois  ans.  L'eflfort  est  trop  considerable,  tant  au 
point  de  vue  financier  que  relativement  aux  charges 
personnelles.  Elle  ne  pourra  soutenir  un  pareil  ef- 
fort et  que  fera-t-elle  pour  sortii;  de  la  position  dif- 
ficile dans  laquelle  elle  se  sera  placee?  Tout  le  monde 
est  d'accord  pour  reconnaitre  que  les  50  000  hommes 
qui  ont  ete  ajoutes  au  contingent  par  I'amendement 
Vincent  sont  superflus  et  inutiles.  On  cherche  un 
moyen  de  s'en  debarrasser  de  faqon  convenable  et 
elegante,  mais  apres? 

II  n'est  pas  a  esperer  qu'au  moins  pour  le  moment 
les  partis  et  les  hommes  qui  ont  produit  un  effort 
considerable  pour  faire  voter  la  loi  de  trois  ans,  puis- 


Paris,  January  16,  1914. 

Sir:— 

On  several  previous  occasions  I  have  had  the 
honor  to  give  you  an  account  of  the  first  manifesta- 
tions of  the  new  political  grouping  in  which  M. 
Briand,  with  the  concurrence  of  MM.  Barthou,  Pi- 
chon, and  their  associates,  took  the  initiative.  This 
action  is  taking  more  definite  shape;  M.  Briand  has 
just  been  proclaimed  president  of  the  association 
and  the  propaganda  is  being  continued. 

This  movement  will  certainly  have  an  influence 
on  the  next  elections;  but  one  may  doubt  whether 
it  will  be  as  important  as  its  originators  desire, 
when  one  considers  that  such  high  personalities  in 
moderate  and  more  conservative  political  circles,  as 
MM.  Ribot,  Develle,  Meline,  and  many  others,  have 
so  far  held  themselves  aloof  from  it. 

However  that  may  be,  the  movement  is  interest- 
ing; it  may  have  the  effect  of  moderating  the  cliqu- 
ism  of  the  politicians  and  its  clear  aim  is  to  support 
and  perpetuate  the  effects  of  the  law  of  the  three 
years'  service.  If  I  were  a  Frenchman,  I  believe 
that  my  sympathies  would  go  to  the  group  planned 
by  M.  Briand,  which  would  be  an  improvement  on 
the  present  state  of  affairs ;  but  I  am  a  Belgian  and 
I  am,  therefore,  constrained  to  regard  the  events 
which  are  taking  place  before  me,  from  another 
angle. 

It  seems  certain  to  me  that  we  would  have  a 
greater  interest  in  seeing  the  policy  of  M.  Caillaux 
— of  the  Radicals  and  the  Radical  Socialists — suc- 
ceed. I  have  already  had  the  honor  to  tell  you  that 
it  was  MM.  Poincare,  Delcasse,  Millerand,  and  their 
friends  who  invented  and  followed  the  nationalistic, 
militaristic  and  chauvinistic  policy,  the  revival  of 
which  we  are  witnessing.  It  is  a  danger  for  Europe 
— and  for  Belgivmi.  I  see  in  it  the  greatest  peril 
which  is  menacing  the  peace  of  Europe  to-day;  not 
that  I  have  the  right  to  suppose  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  intends  to  disturb  it  deliber- 
ately— I  am  rather  inclined  to  believe  the  contrary — 
but  because  the  attitude  which  the  Barthou  Cabinet 
has  assumed  is  in  my  opinion  the  principal  cause  of 
the  growth  of  militaristic  tendencies  in  Germany. 

The  bellicose  follies  of  Turkey  and  the  law  of  the 
three  years'  service  seem  to  me  to  be  the  only  dan- 
gers to  be  feared  for  the  peace  of  Europe.  I  be- 
lieve that  I  can  describe  the  peril  which  the  present 
military  legislation  of  the  Republic  is  calling  forth. 
France,  weakened  by  her  decreasing  birth-rate, 
cannot  endure  for  very  long  the  r&ginie  of  the  law 
of  the  three  years'  service.  The  effort  is  too  great, 
from  a  financial  point  of  view  as  well  as  in  regard 
to  personal  burdens.  She  will  not  be  able  to  bear 
such  an  effort  and  what  will  she  do  in  order  to  es- 
cape from  the  difficult  position  in  which  she  will  be 
placed  ?  Everyone  agrees  that  the  50,000  men  which 
have  been  added  to  the  contingent  by  the  Vincent 
amendment,  are  superfluous  and  useless.  A  way 
is  being  sought  for  getting  rid  of  this  in  a  suitable 
and  elegant  manner,  but  what  is  going  to  happen 
afterwards? 

It  is  not  to  be  hoped  that  at  least  for  the  present 
the  parties  and  the  men  who  made  a  great  effort 
in  order  to  have  the  law  of  the  three  years'  service 


sent  se  montrer  favorables — voire  meme  indulgents 
— a  un  retour  en  arriere  de  leur  politique  militariste. 
11  y  a  en  plus  le  Maroc  ou  le  General  Liautey  de- 
mande  des  renforts  considerables  pour  faire  mooter 
jusqu'a  cent  ou  cent  cinquante  mille  hommes  les  con- 
tingents qui  lui  sont  affectes;  il  veut  etablir  defini- 
tivement  I'union  entre  I'Algerie  et  le  Maroc.  On  use 
aujourd'hui  de  moyens  indirects;  on  achete  a  prix 
d'or  les  chameaux  de  tribus  que  Ton  veut  gagner  et 
Ton  supprime  ainsi  leurs  moyens  d'action.  Mais  le 
moyen  coute  trop  cher  et  son  application  est  trop 
lente.  II  y  a  entre  le  Maroc  et  I'Algerie  des  poptila- 
tions  redoutables,  contre  lesquelles  des  forces  im- 
portantes  sont  necessaires.  II  faut  done  un  accrois- 
sement  de  60  a  80000  hommes,  et  ceux  qui  preconi- 
sent  I'application  immediate  de  cette  politique  ne 
seront  pas  partisans  de  I'allegement  de  I'effort  mili- 
taire  inaugure  en  France. 

M.  Caillaux  a  vote  contre  la  loi  de  trois  ans ;  nom- 
breux  sont  les  hommes  politiques  qui  le  soutiennent 
et  partagent  son  avis  a  cet  egard.  Le  President  du 
Conseil  pousse  par  les  hauts  personnages  de  la  Re- 
publique  a  promis  le  respect  loyal  de  la  loi  de  trois 
ans ;  mais  il  n'est  pas  exagere  de  supposer  que  dans 
sa  pensee  et  dans  celle  de  ses  amis,  on  conserve  le 
dessein  d'adoucir  considerablement  les  rigueurs  du 
regime  actuel. 

M.  Caillaux,  qui  est  le  veritable  President  du  Con- 
seil est  connu  pour  ses  sentiments  en  faveur  d'un 
rapprochement  avec  l'Allemagne;il  connait  admirab- 
lement  son  pays  et  sait,  qu'en  dehors  des  etats- 
majors  politiques,  de  poignees  de  chauvins  et  de 
gens  qui  n'osent  pas  avouer  leurs  idees  et  leurs 
preferences,  le  plus  grand  nombre  des  Frangais,  des 
paysans,  des  commergants  et  des  industriels  subis- 
sent  avec  impatience  le  surcroit  de  depenses  et  de 
charges  personnelles  qui  leur  est  impose. 

La  veritable  campagne  electorale  va  commencer; 
je  ne  doute  pas  que  le  resultat  de  ces  dispositions  ne 
vienne  contrebalancer  les  eflfets  du  groupement  inau- 
gure par  M.  Briand.  On  cherche  par  tous  les  mo- 
yens a  user  la  politique  de  M.  Caillaux ;  ou  veut  em- 
pecher  qu'il  fasse  les  prochaines  elections ;  personne, 
en  ce  moment,  ne  pourrait  escompter  les  resultats  de 
cette  lutte ;  mais  je  tenais  a  vous  faire  remarquer  que 
nous  n'avons  certes  pas  a  desirer,  comme  beiges,  la 
chute  de  M.  Caillaux.  Cet  homme  d'Etat  peut  etre 
dangereux  pour  les  finances  du  pays ;  il  peut  amener 
des  divisions  malsaines  et  regrettables  pour  la  po- 
litique interieure  de  la  France  mais  j'estime  que  sa 
presence  au  pouvoir  diminuera  I'acuite  des  rivalites 
internationales  et  constituera  une  meilleure  base 
pour  les  relations  entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne. 


Je  suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Guillaume. 


passed,  would  show  themselves  favorable,  or  even 
indulgent,  to  a  reversal  of  their  militaristic  policy. 
Besides,  there  is  Morocco,  where  General  Lyautey 
is  demanding  considerable  reinforcements  in  order 
to  increase  the  contingent  allotted  to  him  to  100,000 
or  150,000  men ;  he  wishes  to  establish  definitely  the 
union  between  Algiers  and  Morocco.  To-day  in- 
direct methods  are  being  used.  The  camels  of  the 
tribes  whose  friendship  is  sought  are  purchased  at 
a  high  price  and  thus  these  tribes  are  robbed  of 
their  means  of  action.  But  this  means  is  too  expen- 
sive and  its  application  is  too  slow.  Between  Mo- 
rocco and  Algiers  there  are  dangerous  tribes  against 
whom  large  forces  are  needed.  An  increase  of  from 
60,000  to  80,000  men  is  therefore  necessary,  and 
those  who  favor  the  immediate  execution  of  this 
policy  will  not  be  partial  to  decreasing  the  military 
efforts  which  have  been  inaugurated  in  France. 

M.  Caillaux  voted  against  the  law  for  three  years' 
service;  the  politicians  who  support  him  and  share 
his  opinion  in  this  respect  are  numerous.  The 
Prime  Minister,  influenced  by  high  personages  in 
the  Republic,  promised  to  carry  out  the  law  faith- 
fully ;  but  it  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  suppose  that 
in  his  mind  and  in  that  of  his  friends  there  still 
exists  the  plan  to  temper  to  some  extent  the  rigors 
of  the  present  regime. 

M.  Caillaux,  who  is  the  real  Prime  Minister,  is 
known  for  his  sentiments  in  favor  of  a  rapproche- 
ment with  Germany;  he  knows  his  country  thor- 
oughly and  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  aside  from  the 
political  leaders,  a  handful  of  chauvinists  and  people 
who  do  not  dare  to  declare  their  thoughts  and  their 
preferences,  the  majority  of  the  French,  of  the  peas- 
ants, merchants,  and  manufacturers,  are  bearing 
only  with  impatience  the  excessive  expenses  and 
personal  burdens  which  have  been  imposed  on  them. 

The  actual  election  campaign  is  about  to  begin ; 
I  have  no  doubt  that  the  result  of  these  sentiments 
will  counterbalance  the  effects  of  the  grouping 
formed  by  M.  Briand.  By  all  possible  means  the 
effort  is  being  made  to  defeat  the  policy  of  M.  Cail- 
laux; to  prevent  him  from  influencing  the  next 
elections  is  the  end  sought.  No  one  can  at  present 
estimate  the  results  of  this  struggle;  but  I  want 
to  point  out  to  you  that  we  Belgians  certainly  have 
no  cause  for  desiring  the  fall  of  M.  Caillaux.  This 
statesman  may  be  dangerous  for  the  finances  of  the 
country;  he  may  cause  divisions,  which  are  un- 
healthy and  regrettable  for  the  internal  policy  of 
France,  but  I  consider  that  his  stay  in  power  will 
diminish  the  acuteness  of  international  rivalries  and 
will  furnish  a  better  basis  for  the  relations  between 
France  and  Germany. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  111. 


No.  in. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  k 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  20  Fevrier  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

L'accord  franco-allemand  relatif  a  I'Asie-Mineure 
conclu  tout  dernierement  a  Berlin  apres  de  difficiles 
negociations  et  grace  a  I'intervention  personnelle  du 
Chancelier,  assure  a  la  France  une  sphere  d'action  et 


Berlin,  February  20,  1914. 

Sir:— 

The  Franco-German  agreement  concerning  Asia 
Minor,  concluded  very  recently  at  Berlin  after  diffi- 
cult negotiations  and  thanks  to  the  personal  inter- 
vention of  the  Chancellor,  assures  to  France  a  large 


d'influence  considerable  en  Syrie.  Elle  pourra  faire 
remonter  une  ligne  de  chemin  de  fer  partie  de  Bey- 
routh le  long  de  la  vallee  de  I'Oronte,  derriere  I'Anti- 
Liban  jusqu.'a  Alep,  point  de  jonction  avec  les  lignes 
allemandes.  Une  autre  ligne  frangaise,  venant  egale- 
ment  de  Beyrouth,  passant  par  Homs,  ira  atteindre 
I'Euphrate  dans  la  direction  du  35  parallele.  M. 
Cambon  m'a  montre  sur  la  carte  ces  traces  qui  ne 
sont  pas  encore  connus  du  public.  La  cote  de  la 
Mediterranee  entre  Alexandrette  et  Beyrouth  sera 
neutralisee;  aucun  chemin  de  fer  ne  pourra  y  etre 
construit  par  TAllemagne  ou  par  la  France,  soit  pour 
longer  la  cote,  soit  pour  traverser  I'Anti-Liban.  La 
necessite  d'une  voie  de  ce  genre  n'a  pas  ete  recon- 
nue.  Elle  se  heurterait  a  I'hostilite  des  tribus  fana- 
tiques  de  I'Anti-Liban  qui  ferment  leur  pays  aux 
Europeens  et  apportent  elles-memes  au  port  de  Lata- 
quie  les  produits  du  sol,  dont  le  principal  est  le  tabac. 
La  difflculte  des  negociations  a  reside  principalement 
dans  la  delimitation  precise  des  zones  d'influences 
franqaises  et  allemandes  (60  kilometres  de  chaque 
cote  de  la  voie  ferree),  de  faqon  a  eviter  qu'elles  ne 
se  penetrent  reciproquement.  La  France  conserve 
en  outre  les  concessions  de  chemin  de  fer  qu'elle  a 
obtenues  de  la  Turquie  dans  la  riche  region  miniere 
de  I'ancienne  Cappadoce,  le  long  de  la  Mer  Noire,  et 
le  railwray  tres  productif  de  Smyrne  a  Kassaba. 

Sans  doute  elle  est  eliminee  a  tout  jamais  de  la 
grande  entreprise  du  Bagdadbahn,  de  cette  ligne 
principale  qui  traversera  de  part  en  part  I'Asie 
Mineure  et  drainera  ses  produits.  Mais  la  faute  en 
est,  comme  vous  le  savez,  a  la  diplomatic  a  courte 
vue  du  Quai  d'Orsay  qui  a  rendu  impossible  la  par- 
ticipation de  la  Banque  Ottomane  a  I'eiifort  gigantes- 
que  que  la  finance  allemande  hesitait  a  accomplir 
avec  ses  seuls  moyens.  Au  lieu  de  s'incliner  devant 
I'irreparable  et  de  se  montrer  satisfaite  de  la  mois- 
son  encore  importante  que  la  finance  frangaise,  bien 
secondee  par  son  Ambassadeur,  a  reussi  a  glaner, 
une  partie  de  la  presse  parisienne  recrimine  aujour- 
d'hui  contre  le  nouvel  accord  et  contre  ses  negocia- 
teurs.  A  la  tete  des  mecontents,  on  retrouve  le  re- 
dacteur  politique  du  "Temps,"  M.  Tardieu,  qui  ne 
neglige  aucune  occasion  d'attaquer  la  politique  de 
I'Allemagne  et  ceux  qui  essayent  d'amener  sur  le 
terrain  des  interets  economiques  un  rapprochement 
entre  les  deux  nations  voisines.  M.  Cambon  ne  m'a 
paru  emu  de  cette  polemique.  Cependant  il  se  ren- 
dra  a  Paris  la  semaine  prochaine,  dans  le  but  de  de- 
fendre  I'accord  qu'il  a  tant  contribue  a  faire  aboutir 
et  d'en  expliquer  les  avantages  a  M.  Doumergue,  en- 
core un  peu  novice  dans  I'etude  de  ces  questions. 


Jai  demande  a  I'Ambassadeur  si  I'entente  en  Asie 
Mineure,  tres  desiree  par  I'Empereur,  comme  j'ai 
eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire,  contribuerait,  d'apres 
lui,  a  ameliorer  les  relations  franco-allemandes.  "Les 
relations  officielles  peut-etre  dans  une  certaine  me- 
sure,  m'a  repondu  M.  Cambon,  mais  je  ne  pense  pas 
que  cet  accord  ait  de  I'influence  sur  les  sentiments 
du  gros  public  de  chaque  cote  des  Vosges.  Le  Ian- 
gage  de  la  presse  franqaise  a  I'egard  des  Allemands 
n'en  sera  malheureusement  pas  change.  Nous  avons 
aussi  en  France,  depuis  I'affaire  Dreyfus,  un  parti 
militaire  et  nationaliste  qui  ne  veut  a  aucun  prix  d'un 
rapprochement  avec  I'Allemagne  et  qui  excite  le  ton 
agressif  d'un  grand  nombre  de  journaux.  Le  Gou- 
vernement  devrait  compter  avec  eux  et  avec  le  parti 
dont  ils  sont  les  porte-paroles,  dans  le  cas  ou  un 
grave  incident  eclaterait  de  nouveau  entre  les  deux 
nations.  La  majorite  des  Allemands  et  des  Frangais 
desire  incontestablement  vivre  en  paix.  Mais  une 
minorite  puissante  dans  les  deux  pays  ne  reve  que 


sphere  of  action  and  influence  in  Syria.  She  will 
be  able  to  build  a  railway  line  starting  from  Beiroot 
along  the  valley  of  the  Orontes,  back  of  the  Antile- 
banon  as  far  as  Aleppo,  the  point  of  junction  with 
the  German  lines.  Another  French  line,  also  start- 
ing from  Beiroot,  passing  through  Homs,  will  reach 
the  Euphrates  in  the  direction  of  the  35th  parallel. 
M.  Cambon  showed  me  on  the  map  these  lines 
which  are  not  yet  known  to  the  public.  The  coast 
of  the  Mediterranean  between  Alexandretta  and 
Beiroot  will  be  neutralized ;  no  railway  can  be  built 
there  either  by  Germany  or  by  France,  be  it  along 
the  coast  or  across  the  Antilebanon.  A  line  of  this 
sort  was  not  considered  necessary.  It  would  arouse 
the  hostility  of  the  fanatic  tribes  of  the  Antilebanon 
who  close  their  country  to  Europeans  and  carry  the 
products  of  the  soil,  the  chief  one  of  which  is  tobac- 
co, to  the  harbor  of  Latakia  themselves.  The  diffi- 
culty of  the  negotiations  consisted  principally  in 
the  exact  delimitation  of  the  French  and  German 
zones  of  influence  (60  kilometers  on  each  side  of 
the  railway),  so  as  to  prevent  them  from  overlap- 
ping. In  addition  to  this,  France  retains  the  railway 
concessions  which  she  obtained  from  Turkey  in 
the  rich  mineral  district  of  ancient  Capadocia,  along 
the  Black  Sea,  and  the  very  profitable  railway  of 
Smyrna  and  Cassaba. 

Doubtless  she  has  been  excluded  for  all  time  from 
the  great  enterprise  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the 
principal  line  which  will  traverse  Asia  Minor  from 
one  side  to  the  other,  draining  it  of  its  products. 
But  as  you  know,  the  fault  is  due  to  the  short- 
sighted diplomacy  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay  which  pre- 
vented the  participation  of  the  Banque  Ottomane  in 
the  gigantic  undertaking  which  German  finance 
hestitated  to  carry  out  with  its  own  means  alone. 
Instead  of  yielding  to  the  inevitable  and  of  showing 
itself  satisfied  with  the  still  considerable  harvest 
which  French  finance,  well  supported  by  its  Ambas- 
sador, succeeded  in  reaping,  a  part  of  the  Parisian 
press  is  criticizing  to-day  the  new  agreement  and 
its  negotiators.  At  the  head  of  the  discontented, 
is  again  found  the  political  editor  of  the  Temps,  M. 
Tardieu,  who  never  lets  an  opportunity  pass  of  at- 
tacking Germany's  policy  and  those  who  are  en- 
deavoring to  bring  about  a  rapprochement  between  ■ 
the  two  neighboring  countries  in  the  sphere  of  eco- 
nomic interests.  M.  Cambon  did  not  seem  to  me 
to  be  moved  by  this  polemic.  Nevertheless  he  is 
going  to  Paris  next  week  for  the  purpose  of  defend- 
ing the  agreement  which  he  helped  to  such  a  great 
extent  to  bring  about,  and  of  explaining  its  advan- 
tages to  M.  Doumergue,  who  is  still  somewhat  of 
a  novice  in  the  study  of  these  questions. 

I  asked  the  Ambassador  if  the  understanding  on 
Asia  Minor  so  very  much  desired  by  the  Emperor, 
as  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you,  would,  in  his 
opinion,  help  to  improve  the  Franco-German  rela- 
tions. "The  official  relations,  perhaps,  to  a  certain 
extent,"  M.  Cambon  replied,  "but  I  do  not  think 
that  this  agreement  will  have  any  influence  on  the  senti- 
ments of  the  masses  on  either  side  of  the  Vosges. 
It  will,  unfortunately,  not  change  the  language  of  the 
French  press  in  regard  to  the  Germans.  Since  the 
Dreyfus  affair  we  have  in  France  also  a  military  and 
nationalist  party  which  does  not  want  a  rapproche- 
ment with  Germany  at  any  price  and  which  encour- 
ages the  aggressive  tone  of  a  large  number  of  news- 
papers. The  Government  would  have  to  reckon 
with  them  and  the  party  of  which  they  are  the 
mouth-piece,  in  case  a  serious  incident  should  again 
take  place  between  the  two  nations.  The  majority 
of  the  Germans  and  the  French  undoubtedly  wish 
to  live  in  peace.     But  a  powerful  minority  in  the 


Latailles,  luttes  de  conquete  ou  de  revanche.  C'est 
la  le  danger  a  cote  duquel  il  faut  vivre,  comme  a 
cote  d'un  baril  de  poudre  dont  une  imprudence  pour- 
rait  provoquer  I'explosion." 

Au  cours  de  I'entretien,  I'Ambassadeur  s'est  mon- 
tre  tres  preoccupe  du  changement  ministeriel  qui 
vient  de  s'accomplir  si  soudainement  en  Russie  et 
de  la  retraite  de  M.  Sassonow  qui  suivra  probable- 
ment  M.  Kokovtzow.  II  parait  que  M.  Delcasse  n'a 
pas  eu,  avant  son  depart,  le  moindre  pressentiment 
de  la  chute  prochaine  du  Premier  Ministre  Russe. 
Cette  ignorance  oil  le  representant  de  la  France  a 
ete  tenu  a  dessein  presage-t-elle  une  nouvelle  orien- 
tation politique  de  la  Russie?  C'est  la  ce  que  se  de- 
mandait  TAmbassadeur. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Baron  Beyens. 


two  countries  only  dreams  o£  battles,  wars  of  con- 
quest, or  of  revanche.  That  is  the  danger,  next  to 
which  one  must  live  as  next  to  a  powder  barrel 
which  might  be  exploded  through  sotne  impru- 
dence." 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation,  the  Ambassador 
showed  himself  very  much  concerned  about  the 
change  in  the  Ministry  which  has  just  taken  place 
so  suddenly  in  Russia,  and  about  the  retirement  of 
M.  Sassonov,  who  will  probably  follow  M.  Kokov- 
tzow. It  seems  that  M.  Delcasse  did  not  have  the 
slightest  knowledge  before  his  departure  of  the  ap- 
proaching fall  of  the  Russian  Prime  Minister.  Does 
this  ignorance  in  which  the  representative  of  France 
was  purposely  left,  presage  a  new  departure  in  the 
policy  of  Russia  ?  That  was  what  the  Ambassador 
was  asking  himself. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


No..  112. 


No.  112. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  10  Mars  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Des  le  retour  de  la  bonne  saison,  M.  le  President 
de  la  Republique  va  reprendre  le  chemin  des  divers 
departements  de  la  France  oti  Ton  reclame  sa  visite. 
Dans  toutes  les  regions  du  pays,  on  I'invite  et  il  se 
rend  presque  toujours  a  ces  appels  qui  le  flattent  et 
servent  sa  politique.  II  connait  le  charme  qu'il  re- 
pand  autour  de  lui ;  il  a  conscience  du  succes  continu 
de  ses  discours.  Sa  parole  est  toujours  habile  et 
brillante;  il  prepare  consciencieusement  ses  allocu- 
tions qui  evitent  la  banalite,  disent  ce  qu'elles  doi- 
vent  dire,  rappellent  eloquemment  le  passe  des  re- 
gions visitees,  prouvent  une  connaissance  profonde 
de  leurs  besoins  et  de  leurs  aspirations  et  melent 
a  ces  considerations  une  note  plus  ou  moins  chauvine 
et  encourageante  qui  flatte  les  populations.  M.  Poin- 
care  est  un  maitre  inconteste  de  la  parole  et  se  sert 
habilement  de  cette  facilite — tant  dans  les  departe- 
ments qu'a  Paris  meme — oil  il  se  depense  avec  une 
continuite  et  une  perseverance  que  rien  ne  lasse.  On 
connait  les  dispositions  de  son  esprit  a  cet  egard,  et 
ii  n'est  pas  d'association,  quelque  modeste  qu'elle 
soit,  qui  n'invite  le  President  a  presider  ses  banquets, 
a  assister  a  ses  reunions.  II  accepte  toujours  de  se 
rendre  a  ces  appels  et  charme  chacun  par  sa  bonne 
grace  et  son  eloquence. 


Mais  on  commence  a  trouver  qu'il  se  prodigue 
trop.  Et  ils  sont  nombreux  ccux  qui  ne  partagent 
pas  ses  opinions  politiques  et  ses  aspirations,  ils  cri- 
tiquent  ces  appels  continuels  a  une  popularite  qui  les 
eflfraie  et  les  indispose.  L'habitude  qu'il  a  prise  d'as- 
socier  Madame  Poincare  a  la  plupart  de  ses  de- 
marches est  aussi  critiquee.  On  pretend  que  ce  sont 
la  des  habitudes  qui  detournent  les  moeurs  politi- 
ques du  pays  des  usages  republicains  qui  devraient 
rester  intangibles. 

Les  populations  au  milieu  desquelles  le  President 
de  la  Republique  se  prodigue,  soit  dans  les  Departe- 
ments, soit  a  Paris  meme,  sont  generalement  flattes 
de  sa  visite  et,  dans  bien  des  coins  de  la  France,  sa 


Baron  Guillaimie,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  March  10,  1914. 
Sir:— 

Since  the  good  weather  has  returned,  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  will  again  take  up  his  travels 
to  the  various  provinces  of  France  in  which  his 
visit  is  requested.  He  is  being  invited  to  all  parts 
of  the  country  and  he  almost  always  accepts  these 
invitations,  which  flatter  him  and  are  useful  to  his 
policy.  He  is  well  aware  of  the  charm  which  he 
exercises  on  those  around  him ;  he  is  conscious  of 
the  continued  success  of  his  speeches.  His  speech 
is  always  clever  and  brilliant;  he  conscientiously 
prepares  his  addresses,  which  are  free  from  plati- 
tudes, says  what  is  to  be  said,  eloquently  recalls  the 
past  of  the  regions  visited,  evidencing  a  profound 
knowledge  of  their  needs  and  of  their  aspirations, 
and  includes  a  more  or  less  chauvinistic  and  encour- 
aging note  which  flatters  the  people.  M.  Poincare 
is  indisputably  a  master  in  the  art  of  speech  and 
skillfully  makes  use  of  this  talent — in  the  provinces 
as  well  as  in  Paris  itself,  where  he  exercises  it  with 
a  persistency  and  perseverance  which  nothing 
seems  to  tire.  His  inclination  in  this  respect  is 
known  and  there  is  not  a  society,  no  matter  how 
modest  it  be,  which  does  not  invite  the  President 
to  preside  over  its  banquets,  to  be  present  at  its 
reunions.  He  always  accepts  these  invitations  and 
charms  everyone  with  his  amiability  and  his  elo- 
quence. 

But  people  are  beginning  to  find  that  he  is  too 
lavish.  And  those  who  do  not  share  his  political 
opinions  and  aspirations  are  numerous;  they  criti- 
cize these  continuous  appeals  to  a  popularity  which 
frightens  and  disquiets  them.  The  habit  which  he 
has  acquired  of  including  Mme.  Poincare  in  most 
of  his  undertakings  is  also  criticized.  It  is  asserted 
that  such  habits  divert  the  political  customs  of  the 
country  from  the  Republican  usages  which  ought 
to  remain  untouched. 

The  people  in  whose  midst  the  President  of  the 
Republic  lavishes  his  speeches,  be  it  in  the  provinces 
or  in  Paris  itself,  are  generally  flattered  by  his  visit, 
and  in  many  corners  of  France,  his  coming  is  the 


134 


venue  est  le  signal  de  I'octroi  de  distinctions  honori- 
fiques,  de  quelques  cadeaux  agreables  a  recevoir, 
d'avantages  commerciaux  et  economiques ;  mais  il 
est  souvent  dangereux  de  trop  speculer  sur  la  recon- 
naissance humaine. 

Les  groupes  qui  ont  lutte  contre  Televation  de 
M.  Poincare  a  la  Presidence  ne  desarment  pas;  ils 
sent  au  contraire  impatients  de  succes  personnels 
qui  pourraient  influencer  I'opinion  publique;  ils  lut- 
tent  sur  d'autres  terrains  oti  ils  remportent  eux  aus- 
si,  des  avantages. 

II  n'est  un  secret  pour  personne  que  la  chute  du 
Cabinet  Barthou  a  ete  tres  sensible  au  President  de 
la  Republique  qui  ne  s'est  pas  mepris  sur  sa  signifi- 
cation, ayant  parfaitement  compris  que  c'etait  sa 
propre  personnalite  qui  etait  en  jeu.  L'obligation 
ou  il  s'est  trouve,  grace  a  la  defection  de  quelques 
personnalites  politiques  sur  lesquelles  il  croyait  pou- 
voir  compter,  de  confier  le  pouvoir  a  M.  Caillaux  tout 
en  I'attribuant  nominalement  a  M.  Doumergue,  I'a 
profondement  indispose.  La  personnalite  du  Mi- 
nistre  des  Finances  dont  il  connait  le  merite.mais  aus- 
si  toutes  les  faiblesses,  lui  est  profondement  anti- 
pathique.  II  y  a  vu  un  echec  pour  la  politique  mili- 
taire  et  nationaliste  qu'il  poursuit  systematiquement 
depuis  le  jour  deja  ou  il  avait  ete  place  a  la  tete  du 
Gouvernement  comma  President  du  Conseil. 

Avec  M.  M.  Delcasse,  Millerand  et  quelques  au- 
tres,  il  preconisa  inlassablement  I'oeuvre  du  releve- 
ment  politique  et  militaire  de  la  France,  combinee 
avec  des  relations  plus  etroites  et  plus  confiantes 
avec  la  Russie.  II  est  alle  a  Petersbourg  comme 
President  du  Conseil ;  il  y  retournera,  dans  quelques 
mois,  comme  President  de  la  Republique. 

II  y  a  envoye  recemment  M.  Delcasse,  auquel  il 
avait  confie  la  mission  de  chercher,  par  tous  les  mo- 
yens,  a  exalter  les  bienfaits  de  I'alliance  franco-russe, 
et  a  amener  le  grand  Empire  a  accentuer  ses  pre- 
paratifs  militaires. 

On  pretend  aujourd'hui  que  M.  Delcasse  aurait 
quelque  peu  force  la  note,  que  sa  mission  n'a  guere 
reussi,  qu'il  a  indispose  par  ces  instances  les  hautes 
spheres  moscovites,  et  que  son  retour,  un  peu  pre- 
mature, quoique  Ton  en  disc,  serait  en  partie  motive 
par  le  peu  de  succes  de  sa  personne  a  Petersbourg. 

D'autres  ajoutent  d'autres  motifs :  comme  chacun 
sait,  M.  Delcasse  est  superieurement  ambitieux,  il 
veut  arriver  au  sommet  de  la  hierarchie  franqaise,  et 
reve  d'etre  demain  President  du  Conseil  pour  arriver 
bientot  a  I'Elysee. 

II  sait  mieux  que  personne  que  les  adversaires  de 
M.  Poincare  sent  nombreux  et  ne  desarment  pas, 
qu'ils  emploieront  tous  les  moyens  pour  lui  rendre 
impossible  I'existence  presidentielle  et  I'amener  a  la 
retraite.  Leur  tache  sera  laborieuse,  car  M.  Poin- 
care, tres  actif  et  tres  intelligent,  connait  les  em- 
bCiches  dont  il  est  entoure  et  fera  tous  ses  efforts 
pour  les  eviter.  II  tient  d'ailleurs  par  dessus  tout  a 
la  haute  situation  qu'il  a  conquise,  et  il  est  peu  d'es- 
poir  de  le  voir  se  resigner  a  une  retraite  volontaire 
comme  le  fit  naguere  M.  Casimir  Perier.  Mais  tout 
est  possible  en  France ;  les  adversaires  du  President 
actuel  peuvent  trouver  des  moyens  encore  insoup- 
gonnes  pour  lui  nuire — on  pretend  que  M.  Del- 
casse tient  a  etre  a  Paris  pour  qu'aucune  occasion  ne 
lui  echappe  de  satisfaire  son  ambition.  Depuis  son 
retour  de  Petersbourg,  il  se  tient  dans  une  ombre 
voulue ;  cela  ne  durera  evidemment  pas. 


M.  Poincare,  qui  avait  ete  a  Versailles  I'elu  d'une 
partie  du  parti  republicain,  mais  aussi  du  centre  et 
de  la  droite  du  Parlement,  fut  pendant  les  premiers 
mois  de  sa  haute  magistrature,  une  sorte  d'idole  pour 


signal  for  the  conferring  of  honors,  for  agreeable 
gifts,  and  for  commercial  and  economic  advantages ; 
but  it  is  often  dangerous  to  speculate  too  much  on 
human  gratitude. 

The  groups  who  fought  against  the  election  of 
M.  Poincare  to  the  Presidency  are  not  disarming; 
they  are,  on  the  contrary,  impatient  of  personal  suc- 
cesses which  may  influence  public  opinion ;  they  are 
fighting  along  other  lines  where  they  also  are  reap- 
ing advantages. 

It  is  not  a  secret  to  anyone  that  the  fall  of  the 
Barthou  cabinet  was  very  painful  to  the  President 
of  the  Republic  who  did  not  mistake  its  meaning, 
understanding  perfectly  that  his  own  person  was 
involved.  The  necessity  under  which  he  found  him- 
self, owing  to  the  defection  of  several  politicians  on 
whom  he  had  believed  he  could  count,  to  entrust 
the  power  to  M.  Caillaux  while  nominally  investing 
M.  Doumergue  with  it,  put  him  very  much  out  of 
humor.  He  had  a  strong  dislike  for  the  personality 
of  the  Minister  of  Finance  whose  worth,  but  also 
all  of  whose  weaknesses,  he  knows.  He  saw  in  that 
necessity  a  check  for  the  military  and  nationalistic 
policy  which  he  has  systematically  followed  from 
the  day  when  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
Government  as  Prime  Minister. 

Together  with  MM.  Delcasse,  Millerand,  and 
several  others,  he  preached  incessantly  the  political 
and  military  rehabilitation  of  France,  in  conjunction 
with  the  closest  and  most  intimate  relations  with 
Russia.  He  went  to  St.  Petersburg  as  Prime  Min- 
ister; he  will  go  there  again  in  a  few  months  as 
President  of  the  Republic. 

He  recently  sent  M.  Delcasse  to  whom  he  en- 
trusted the  mission  of  endeavoring  by  all  possible 
means  to  exalt  the  benefits  of  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance,  and  to  influence  the  great  Empire  to  in- 
crease its  military  preparations. 

It  is  asserted  to-day  that  M.  Delcasse  overdid 
it  somewhat,  that  his  mission  was  not  successful, 
that  by  his  insistence  he  displeased  the  high  Mus- 
covite circles,  and  that  his  somewhat  premature  re- 
turn, whatever  is  said  of  it,  was  due  in  part  to  his 
lack  of  success  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Others  add  other  reasons:  as  everyone  knows, 
M.  Delcasse  is  exceedingly  ambitious,  he  wishes  to 
reach  the  summit  of  the  French  hierarchy,  and 
dreams  of  being  Prime  Minister  to-morrow  in  order 
soon  to  enter  the  Elysee. 

He.  knows  better  than  anyone  that  M.  Poincare's 
adversaries  are  numerous  and  are  not  laying  down 
their  arms,  that  they  will  use  all  the  means  they 
can  in  order  to  make  his  stay  in  power  as  President 
impossible  and  to  force  him  to  retire.  Their  task 
will  be  difficult,  for  M.  Poincare  is  very  active  and 
very  intelligent  and  knows  the  traps  which  surround 
him  and  will  make  the  greatest  efforts  to  avoid  them. 
Moreover,  he  is  strongly  attached  to  the  high  posi- 
tion which  he  has  gained  and  there  is  little  hope 
that  he  will  resign  himself  to  a  voluntary  retire- 
ment, as  M.  Casimir  Perier  recently  did.  But  every- 
thing is  possible  in  France;  the  adversaries  of  the 
present  President  may  find  means  still  unthought 
of  for  harming  him — it  is  asserted  that  M.  Delcasse 
is  anxious  to  be  in  Paris  so  that  no  opportunity  of 
satisfying  his  ambition  will  escape  him.  Since  his 
return  from  St.  Petersburg,  he  has  purposely  kept 
himself  in  the  back-ground ;  that  will  evidently  not 
last. 

M.  Poincare,  who  was  elected  not  only  by  a  part 
of  the  Republican  party  but  also  by  the  Centre  and 
by  the  Right  of  Parliament,  was  during  the  first 
months  of  his  administration  a  sort  of  idol  for  the 


les  elements  conservateurs  de  la  Chambre.  On  ne 
jurait  que  par  lui,  on  mettait  dans  ses  dispositions 
conservatrices  la  plus  absolue  confiance.  Mais  les 
temps  sont  deja  quelque  peu  changes.  On  lui  re- 
proche  les  honneurs  qu'il  a  contribue  a  rendre  au 
general  Picquart  recemment  decede,  on  lui  reproche 
d'avoir  accepte  le  Cabinet  actuel,  on  lui  reproche  de 
permettre  une  recrudescence  de  laicite  dans  les  re- 
gions gouvernementales,  de  nouvelles  persecutions 
contre  certains  etablissements  religieux.  II  n'a  pas 
donne  ce  qu'on  attendait  de  lui;  la  confiance  dis- 
parait. 

Lors  de  son  election  a  Versailles,  bien  des  gens 
parmi  ceux  qui  avaient  la  pretention  de  le  connaitre, 
soutenaient,  que,  s'il  avait  les  meilleures  intentions 
et  un  talent  inconteste,  il  etait  incapable  d'efforts 
prolonges  et  de  resistance  soutenue.  Ceux-la,  au- 
jourd'hui  rappellent  ces  appreciations  du  premier 
jour,  et  la  popularite  de  M.  Poincare  dans  certains 
milieux,  s'en  trouve  assez  amoindrie. 

Des  son  arrivee  a  I'Elysee,  le  President  a  cherche 
un  rapprochement  avec  son  plus  dangereux  adver- 
saire,  M.  Clemenceau;  mais  chacun  salt  que  cette 
tentative  n'a  point  reussi.  Le  redacteur  en  chef  de 
"I'Homme  Libre"  ne  manque  pas  un  jour  de  pour- 
suivre  sa  campagne  violente  et  perfide  contre  M. 
Poincare.  II  a  deja  demoli  durant  sa  longue  car- 
riei'e  un  grand  nombre  de  ministeres ;  aujourd'hui  il 
vise  plus  haut. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


conservative  elements  of  the  Chamber.  They  swore 
by  him  alone  and  placed  absolute  confidence  in  his 
conservative  leanings.  But  the  times  have  already 
changed  a  little.  He  is  reproached  for  the  part  he 
took  in  the  honors  bestowed  on  the  recently  de- 
ceased General  Piquart ;  he  is  reproached  for  having 
accepted  the  present  Cabinet;  he  is  reproached  for 
permitting  a  recrudescence  of  the  anti-clerical  senti- 
ments in  Government  circles,  and  for  fresh  perse- 
cutions against  certain  religious  institutions.  He 
did  not  do  what  was  expected  of  him ;  confidence  is 
disappearing. 

At  the  time  of  his  election  at  Versailles  many 
people  among  those  who  claimed  to  know  him  as- 
serted that,  though  he  had  the  best  of  intentions 
and  indisputable  talent,  he  was  incapable  of  pro- 
longed efforts  and  of  a  sustained  resistance.  These 
people  recall  to-day  their  judgment  of  the  first  day, 
and  the  popularity  of  M.  Poincare  in  certain  circles 
has  diminished  considerably. 

Since  his  arrival  at  the  Elysee  the  President  has 
sought  a  rapprochement  with  his  most  dangerous 
adversary,  M.  Clemenceau;  but  everybody  knows 
that  he  did  not  succeed  in  this  attempt.  The  editor- 
in-chief  of  L'Homme  Libre  does  not  let  a  day  pass 
without  continuing  his  violent  and  perfidious  cam- 
paign against  M.  Poincare.  In  his  long  career  he 
has  already  caused  the  fall  of  a  great  number  of 
Ministries;  to-day  he  has  higher  aims. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  113. 


No.  113. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  24,  Avril  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

La  presse,  comme  le  monde  politique  de  Berlin, 
s'est  occupee  necessairement  de  la  visite  des  Sou- 
verains  Anglais  a  Paris  et  il  n'a  fallu  rien  moins  que 
les  derniers  evenements  du  Mexique  pour  distraire 
leur  attention  de  ce  spectacle.  On  s'est  accorde  ici 
a  trouver  tres  maladroits  les  efforts  de  certains  pu- 
blicistes  franqais  en  vue  d'amener  le  Gouvernement 
britannique  a  transformer  I'entente  cordiale  en  al- 
liance effective,  les  journalistes  berlinois,  tant  libe- 
raux  que  conservateurs,  ont  constate  avec  un  verita- 
ble plaisir  leur  insucces.  M.  Ernest  Lavisse  avait 
ouvert  le  feu  par  sa  lettre  au  "Times,"  ou  il  nous  a 
prouve  qu'un  bon  historien  peut  fort  bien  n'etre 
qu'un  pietre  ecrivain  politique.  Rien  ne  devait  aga- 
cer  davantage  les  Allemands  et  rendre  plus  defiants 
les  Anglais  que  revocation  faite  par  M.  Lavisse,  a 
la  fin  de  sa  lettre,  de  la  question  d'Alsace-Lorraine, 
qu'il  appelle  une  question  europeenne  et  mondiale. 
Pour  les  Allemands  il  n'existe  pas  de  question  d'Al- 
sace-Lorraine, du  moins  telle  que  I'entendent  les 
Frangais,  depuis  que  le  sort  des  armes  a  rattache  de- 
finitivement  ces  anciennes  provinces  germaniques  a 
I'Empire  d'Allemagne.  II  n'y  a  de  divergences  en- 
tre  eux  que  sur  la  faqon  d'administrer  I'Alsace-Lor- 
raine  qui  n'est  pas  facile  a  gouverner.  Les  uns  tien- 
rent  pour  la  maniere  forte,  les  autres  pour  la  dou- 
ceur. Les  Allemands  sont  persuades  que  I'Angle- 
terre  ne  prendra  jamais  les  armes,  afin  d'aider  la 
France  a  reconquerir  les  provinces  perdues. 

M.  Cambon  voit  encore  la  main  de  M.  Isvolsky 


Berlin,  April  24,  1914. 
Sir:— 

The  press  as  well  as  the  political  world  of  Berlin 
has  naturally  occupied  itself  with  the  visit  of 
the  English  Sovereigns  at  Paris  and  nothing  less 
than  the  recent  events  in  Mexico  could  have  dis- 
tracted their  attention  from  that  spectacle.  The 
efforts  of  certain  French  writers  to  induce  the  Brit- 
ish Government  to  transform  the  entente  cordiale 
into  an  effective  alliance  have  been  considered  by 
everyone  here  as  clumsy  and  the  Berlin  journalists, 
liberals  as  well  as  conservatives,  have  noted  the  fail- 
ure of  those  efforts  with  genuine  pleasure.  M. 
Ernest  Lavisse  opened  the  ball  with  his  letter  to 
the  Times  in  which  he  proved  to  us  that  a  good  his- 
torian may  very  well  be  a  wretched  political  writer. 
Nothing  could  have  provoked  the  Germans  more 
or  made  the  English  more  suspicious  than  raising 
at  the  end  of  his  letter  the  question  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, which  he  calls  a  question  which  concerns 
Europe  and  the  world.  For  the  Germans  such  a 
thing  as  a  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  does  not 
exist  since  the  fate  of  arms  definitely  re-united  these 
old  German  provinces  with  the  German  Empire. 
The  only  difference  of  opinion  existing  among  them 
refers  to  the  manner  of  administration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  is  not  easy  to  govern.  Some  are 
in  favor  of  strong  measures,  others  prefer  mild  ones. 
The  Germans  are  convinced  that  England  will  never 
take  up  arms  in  order  to  help  France  reconquer 
the  lost  provinces. 

M.  Cambon  again  sees  the  hand  of  M.  Iswolski 


dans  cette  campagne  inutile  des  journaux  russes  et 
frangais.  M.  Isvolsky  est  de  nouveau  en  grande  fa- 
\  eur  a  St.  Petersbourg,  comme  en  temoigne  la  haute 
distinction,  le  cordon  de  Saint  Alexandre  Newski, 
qu'il  vient  de  recevoir,  mais  a  Paris  il  n'a  pas  I'oreille 
du  Cabinet  radical.  Aussi  I'Ambassadeur  de  France 
a  Berlin  espere-t-il  que  I'intrigant  diplomate  ira  bien- 
tot  representer  le  Czar  a  Londres.  II  pourra  s'y  con- 
vaincre  que  I'opinion  publique  n'est  pas  disposee  a 
\oir  I'Angleterre  perdre  sa  liberte  d'action  par  un 
traite  formel  qui  lierait  son  sort  a  celui  de  la  Russie 
et  de  la  France. 

II  est  curieux  de  constater  que  c'est  le  parti  radi- 
cal anglais  qui  eprouve  le  plus  de  repugnance  a  s'al- 
lier  a  la  Republique.  Ses  tendances  intransigeantes 
et  son  programme  de  reformes  sociales  devraient  au 
contraire  le  rapprocher  des  radicaux  frangais  qui 
poursuivent,  de  I'autre  cote  de  la  Manche,  le  meme 
but  politique.  Ses  sympathies  vont  pourtant  de  pre- 
ference a  I'Allemagne,  malgre  son  gouvernement 
conservateur  et  plutot  reactionnaire.  Comment  ex- 
pliquer  cette  anomalie?  Est-ce  crainte  de  se  laisser 
entrainer  par  la  France  dans  une  guerre  qui  im- 
poserait  de  lourdes  charges  financieres  a  I'Angle- 
terre et  y  empecherait  pour  longtemps  I'accomplisse- 
ment  des  reformes?  Est-ce  aversion  contre  le  ser- 
vice militaire  obligatoire  ou  simplement  contre  I'aug- 
mentation  de  I'armee  britannique  que  ne  cessent  de 
conseiller  des  ecrivains  franqais  avec  une  insistance 
inteippestive?  N'est-ce  pas  aussi  un  reste  du  vieil 
esprit  presbyterien  qui  survit  dans  les  classes  infe- 
rieures  de  la  societe  anglaise,  composees  surtout  de 
non-conformistes?  Cet  esprit  a  ete  de  tout  temps 
hostile  aux  idees  et  a  la  civilisation  frangaises.  L'an- 
tipathie  des  radicaux  anglais  pour  la  Republique  voi- 
sine  est  sans  doute  un  effet  de  ces  diverses  causes  et 
un  produit  de  ces  diiTerents  elements. 

Pour  nous,  la  question  la- plus  interessante  qui  se 
pose  a  I'occasion  de  la  visite  des  Souverains  de  la 
Grande  Bretagne  est  celle  de  savoir  si  le  Gouverne- 
ment britannique  serait  aujourd'hui  aussi  enclin  qu'il 
y  a  trois  ans  a  se  ranger  du  cote  de  la  France,  dans 
le  cas  d'un  conflit  de  cette  derniere  avec  I'Allemagne. 
Nous  avons  eu  la  preuve  qu'une  cooperation  de  I'ar- 
mee  anglaise  et  Tenvoi  d'un  corps  expeditionnaire 
sur  le  continent  avaient  ete  envisages  par  les  auto- 
rites  militaires  des  deux  pays.  En  serait-il  encore  de 
meme  aujourd'hui  et  aurions  nous  toujours  a  re- 
douter  I'entree  en  Belgique  de  soldats  anglais  pour 
nous  aider  a  defendre  notre  neutralite,  en  commen- 
Sant  par  la  compromettre?  Si  la  question  n'est  exa- 
minee que  du  point  de  vue  allemand,  le  seul  ou  je 
puisse  me  placer,  une  reponse  negative  n'est  pas 
douteuse.  II  semble  a  un  observateur  vivant  a  Ber- 
lin que  les  liens  de  I'Entente  cordiale  se  sont  quelque 
peu  detendus,  que  la  pointe  de  cette  arme  defensive 
n'est  plus  tournee  exclusivement  contre  I'Allemagne, 
comme  elle  le  fut  du  temps  du  Roi  Edouard,  et  que 
la  Triple  Entente  est  devenue  plutot  un  concert 
qu'une  Union  de  Puissances,  agissant  ensemble  dans 
certaines  questions  determinees  pour  la  poursuite 
d'interets  communs.  Mais  cette  fagon  de  voir  pent 
etre  fausse  ou  influencee  par  la  lecture  d'ecrits  po- 
litiques  diis  a  des  plumes  allemandes.  II  serait  fort 
interessant  pour  moi  de  savoir  ce  que  pensent  du 
caractere  qu'a  pris  I'Entente  cordiale  mes  CoUegues 
de  Londres  et  de  Paris. 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


in  this  futile  campaign  of  the  Russian  and  French 
papers.  M.  Iswolski  is  in  great  favor  again  at  St. 
Petersburg,  as  proven  by  the  high  distinction  of 
the  cordon  of  St.  Alexander  Nevski  which  has  just 
been  conferred  on  him ;  but  at  Paris  he  has  not  the 
ear  of  the  Radical  Cabinet.  The  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin  also  hopes  that  that  intriguing  diplo- 
mat will  soon  go  to  represent  the  Czar  at  London. 
There  he  will  be  in  a  position  to  convince  himseli 
that  public  opinion  is  not  disposed  to  see  England 
lose  her  liberty  of  action  by  a  formal  treaty  which 
would  link  her  fate  with  that  of  Russia  and  France. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  that  it  is  the  English  Rad- 
ical party  that  is  most  opposed  to  an  alliance  with 
the  Republic  Their  uncompromising  tendencies 
and  their  programme  of  social  reform  ought,  on  the 
contrary,  tg  draw  them  closer  to  the  French  Radi- 
cals who  pursue  the  same  political  aim  on  the  other 
side  of  .the  Channel.  But  their  sympathies  go 
rather  to  Germany  despite  her  conservative  and 
somewhat  reactionary  Government.  How  is  this 
anomaly  to  be  explained?  Are  they  afraid  to  be 
drawn  by  France  into  a  war  which  would  impose 
heavy  financial  burdens  on  England  and  which 
would  for  a  long  time  prevent  the  execution  of  re- 
forms? Is  it  aversion  to  compulsory  conscription 
or  even  only  to  the  increase  of  the  British  army 
which  French  writers  do  not  cease  counseling  with 
such  unreasonable  insistence?  Is  it  not  also  a  re- 
vival of  the  old  Presbyterian  spirit  surviving  in 
the  lower  classes  of  society  which  are  chiefly  com- 
posed of  Non-conformists?  This  spirit  has  at  all 
times  been  hostile  to  French  ideas  and  French  civil- 
ization. The  antipathy  of  the  English  Radicals  to 
the  neighboring  Republic  is  doubtless  the  effect  of 
these  diverse  causes  and  the  product  of  these  va- 
rious factors. 

For  us,  the  most  interesting  point  in  connection 
with  the  visit  of  the  Sovereigns  of  Great  Britain 
is  to  know  whether  the  British  Government  would 
be  as  inclined  to-day,  as  three  years  ago,  to  range 
itself  by  the  side  of  France  in  the  case  of  a  conflict 
of  the  latter  with  Germany ;  we  have  had  the  proof 
that  a  cooperation  of  the  British  army  and  the  des- 
patching of  an  expeditionary  corps  to  the  Continent 
have  been  considered  by  the  military  authorities 
of  the  two  countries.  Would  it  be  the  same  to-day 
and  would  we  still  have  to  fear  the  entry  of  British 
soldiers  in  Belgium  in  order  to  help  us  defend  our 
neutrality  by  first  compromising  it?  If  the  ques- 
tion is  examined  from  the  German  point  of  view 
alone— the  only  one  which  I  can  consider — a  nega- 
tive answer  is  not  doubtful.  To  an  observer  living 
at  Berlin  it  seems  that  the  ties  of  the  entente  cord- 
iale have  loosened  somewhat,  that  the  point  of  that 
weapon  of  defense  is  no  longer  exclusively  directed 
at  Germany,  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  King  Edward, 
and  that  the  Triple  Entente  has  rather  become  a 
concert  than  a  union  of  Powers  acting  together  in 
certain  questions  which  are  determined  by  consider- 
ations of  common  interest.  But  this  manner  of 
looking  at  things  may  be  wrong  or  influenced  by 
the  reading  of  political  writings  emanating  from 
German  pens.  It  would  be  of  great  interest  for  me 
to  know  what  my  colleagues  of  Paris  and  London 
think  of  the  character  which  the  entente  cordiale 
has  assumed. 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Baron  Beyens. 


137 


No.  114. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  k  Paris, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
gferes. 

Paris,  le  25  Avril  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

La  Ville  de  Paris  et  les  plus  hauts  personnages  qui 
gouvernent  la  Republique,  viennent  de  faire  au  Roi 
et  a  la  Reine  d'Angleterre  une  reception  brillante  et 
chaleureuse,  qui  depasse  celle  qui  est  reservee  d'or- 
dinaire  aux  botes  de  la  France,  sans  egaler  cependant 
celle  qui  fut  faite,  il  y  a  quelques  annees,  a  I'Em- 
pereur  de  Russie. 

Un  deuil  cruel  m'a  empeche  d'assister  aux  festivi- 
tes  et  reunions  qui  marquerent  la  visite  royale ;  mais 
les  echos  en  sont  venus  jusqu'a  moi,  et  j'ai  acquis 
ainsi  la  certitude  que  les  trois  journees  qui  ont  mar- 
que le  sejour  de  leurs  Majestes  a  Paris,  gratifiees 
d'un  temps  superbe,  ont  pleinement  reussi  et  souleve 
des  manifestations  de  sympathie  tres  accentuees. 
Elles  s'adressaient  sourtout  au  principe  de  "I'En- 
tente  cordiale,"  et  trouvaient  un  aliment  particuliere- 
ment  actif  dans  la  poussee  de  nationalisme — pour  ne 
pas  dire  de  chauvinisme — que  les  dirigeants  de  la  na- 
tion ont  fait  naitre  pour  faire  accepter  le  principe  si 
lourd  de  la  loi  de  3  ans,  et  de  toutes  ses  consequences 
personnelles,  economiques  et  financieres. 

Les  discours  prononces  par  les  deux  chefs  d'Etat 
au  banquet  de  I'Elysee  ont  ete  tons  deux  remarqua- 
bles  et  tres  approuves — celui  de  M.  Poincare  insis- 
tant  plus  que  son  bote  sur  le  desir  de  voir  les  rela- 
tions amicales  etablies  entre  la  France  et  I'Angleterre 
prendre  de  jour  en  jour  un  caractere  plus  etroit  et 
plus  cordial. 

II  n'y  fut  naturellement  pas  question  de  la  pos- 
sibilite  de  donner  a  ces  rapports  une  portee  plus  for- 
melle,  sous  la  forme  d'un  traite  ou  d'une  convention. 
Certains  journaux  avaient  reve  de  cette  combinai- 
son;  mais  il  n'en  fut  jamais  question,  et  des  com-, 
munications  quasi-ofificielles  faites  a  Londres  et  a 
Paris,  comme  echo  des  conversations  echangees  en- 
tre M.  Doumergue,  et  Sir  Edward  Grey,  I'etablissent 
sans  detours.  La  Grande-Bretagne  n'aime  pas  les 
conventions  formelles  et  les  arrangements  conclus 
entre  les  deux  Gouvernements,  tels  qu'ils  sont  au- 
jourd'hui  etablis,  suffisent  a  la  realisation  du  but  a 
atteindre,  tout  en  respectant  certaines  libertes  pour 
les  contractants. 

L'heure  choisie  par  I'Empereur  Nicolas  pour  ac- 
corder  a  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  Paris  une  haute 
distinction  honorifique,  accompagnee  de  commen- 
taires  significatifs  complete  le  caractere  interna- 
tional des  manifestations  de  Paris  en  I'honneur  du 
Roi  Georges. 

La  visite  en  France  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  etait  pre- 
vue,  necessaire  et  opportune.  II  n'etait  pas  venu  a 
Paris  depuis  son  accession  au  trone,  et  if  devait  re- 
pondre  a  une  demarche  de  courtoisie  faite  I'annee 
derniere  par  M.  Poincare. 

Mais  il  est  permis  de  se  demander  si  elle  est  de 
nature  a  modifier  sensiblement  les  relations  relative- 
ment  confiantes  qui  existent  deja  entre  les  deux 
pays.  Elles  ont  d'ailleurs  donne,  durant  ces  der- 
niers  mois,  des  preuves  d'efficacite  indiscutables  et 
furent  favorables  au  maintien  de  la  paix  generale, 
tout  en  permettant  d'ailleurs  d'autres  tentatives  de 
rapprochement  egalement  profitables  au  respect  de 
I'equilibre  europeen. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  April  25,  1914. 
Sir:— 

The  City  of  Paris  and  the  persons  highest  in  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  have  given  to  the 
King  and  Queen  of  England  a  brilliant  and  warm 
reception  which  surpassed  what  is  ordinarily  offered 
to  the  guests  of  France,  without,  however,  equalling 
the  reception  which  was  extended  some  years  ago 
to  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

Mourning  prevented  me  from  being  present  at 
the  festivities  and  receptions  which  marked  the 
royal  visit ;  but  the  echoes  have  reached  me  and  I 
am  assured  that  the  three  days  of  their  Majesties' 
sojourn  at  Paris,  favored  by  superb  weather,  were 
a  complete  success  and  caused  very  pronounced 
demonstrations  of  sympathy.  These  addressed 
themselves  chiefly  to  the  principle  of  the  entente 
cordiale  and  found  particularly  strong  nourishment 
in  the  nationalistic — not  to  say  chauvinistic — move- 
ment which  the  leaders  of  the  nation  have  aroused 
in  order  to  secure  the  acceptance  of  the  heavy  bur- 
den of  the  three  years'  law  with  all  its  personal, 
economic,  and  financial  consequences. 

The  speeches  delivered  by  the  two  heads  of  State 
at  the  banquet  at  the  Elysee  were  both  remarkable, 
and  were  very  well  received — that  of  M.  Poincare 
laying  more  emphasis  than  that  of  his  guest  on  the 
desire  to  see  the  amicable  relations  existing  between 
France  and  England  assume  a  closer  and  more  cor- 
dial character  from  day  to  day. 

There  was  of  course  no  mention  of  the  possibility 
of  giving  these  relations  a  more  formal  import  in 
the  shape  of  a  treaty  or  a  convention.  Certain 
papers  had  cherished  dreams  of  such  a  combination ; 
but  there  has  never  been  any  question  of  it  and 
quasi-official  communications  made  at  London  and 
Paris  as  echoes  of  the  conversations  exchanged  be- 
tween M.  Doumergue  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  declare 
this  without  equivocation.  Great  Britain  dislikes 
formal  conventions,  and  the  agreements  made  be- 
tween the  two  Governments  such  as  they  are  to-day 
suffice  for  the  realization  of  the  aspired  aims,  while 
allowing  the  contracting  parties  certain  freedom. 

The  time  chosen  by  Emperor  Nicholas  to  confer 
the  honor  of  a  high  distinction  on  the  Russian  Am- 
bassador at  Paris,  accompanied  by  significant  com- 
ments, completes  the  international  character  of  the 
demonstrations  at  Paris  in  honor  of  King  George. 

The  visit  of  the  King  of  England  to  France  was 
expected,  necessary,  and  opportune.  He  had  not 
been  in  Paris  since  his  accession  to  the  throne  and 
has  to  return  a  move  of  courtesy  made  last  year  by 
M.   Poincare. 

But  it  may  be  asked  whether  the  journey  is  likely 
to  modify  to  any  degree  the  relations  of  comparative 
trust  which  already  exist  between  the  two  countries. 
These  have,  moreover,  during  the  last  months  given 
undisputable  proofs  of  their  efficacy  and  they  were 
favorable  for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  while 
at  the  same  time  they  were  not  in  the  way  of  other 
attempts  at  rapprochement  which  equally  furthered 
the  European  equilibrium. 

I  am,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


No.  115. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Paris,  le  8  Mai,  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

J'ai  eu  roccasion  de  causer  hier  avec  un  des  hom- 
mes  de  Paris  qui  connait  le  mieux  la  situation  inter- 
nationale;  il  me  disait:  "La  visite  du  Roi  et  de  la 
Reine  d'Angleterre  a  parfaitement  reussi;  le  Soleil 
etait  de  la  fete  et  les  Frangais  adorent  de  manifester 
et  de  crier  "Vive  le  Roi."  lis  ont  done  fait  a  leurs 
botes  une  reception  vraiment  chaleureuse;  mais  je 
doute  que  ces  manifestations  entrainent  le  moindre 
changement  dans  la  politique  des  deux  etats.  Le 
toast  du  Roi  George  etait  d'ailleurs  manifestement 
moins  chaleureux  que  celui  de  M.  Poincare. 

Quelle  est  la  nature  des  engagements  qui  lient 
entre  eux  les  deux  Etats,  ont-ils  conclu  une  Conven- 
tion militaire?  Je  I'ignore,  mais  je  n'oublie  pas  que 
des  esprits  reflechis  et  serieux  doutent  quelque  peu 
de  I'assistance  que  la  France  trouverait  chez  les  An- 
glais au  jour  d'une  conflagration  europeenne.  II  se 
trouve  meme  des  gens  qui  ne  croient  pas  a  un  con- 
cours  britannique  bien  serieux  sur  mer. 

Je  sais  que  I'on  park  couramment  de  I'intention 
qu'auraient  les  Anglais  de  debarquer  des  troupes 
dans  le  Nord  des  Cotes  frangaises  et  de  les  envoyer 
de  la  sans  retard  dans  les  regions  du  Sud-Est,  pour 
couper  la  route  aux  troupes  italiennes.  C'est  pos- 
sible, mais  je  crois  savoir  que  les  autorites  frangaises 
font  bon  marche  de  Taction  de  Tarmee  italienne,  car 
celle-ci  aurait  besoin  d'un  temps  considerable  pour 
se  mobiliser. 

Enfin,  I'Angleterre  ne  cesse  de  faire  des  coquet- 
teries  a  I'Allemagne.  Je  n'ai  pu  savoir,  ces  derniers 
temps,  ce  qu'etaient  devenues  les  negociations  ger- 
mano-anglaises  relativement  a  I'Angola  et  au  Mo- 
zambique ;  c'est  un  point  sur  lequel  il  serait  interes- 
sant  cependant  d'avoir  des  precisions. 

II  est  incontestable  que  la  nation  frangaise,  durant 
ces  derniers  mois,  est  devenue  plus  chauvine  et  plus 
confiante  en  elle-meme.  Les  memes  hommes,  auto- 
rises  et  competents,  qui — il  y  a  deux  ans — temoi- 
gnaient  des  craintes  tres  vives  a  la  mention  seule  de 
difficultes  possibles  entre  la  France  et  TAllemagne, 
ont  change  aujourd'hui  de  ton ;  ils  se  disent  certains 
de  la  victoire ;  font  grand  etat  des  progres,  d'ailleurs 
tres  reels,  accomplis  par  I'armee  de  la  Republique  et 
se  disent  assures  de  pouvoir  tout  au  moins,  tenir 
I'armee  allemande  en  echec  pendant  une  duree  de 
temps  assez  longue  pour  permettre  a  la  Russie  de 
mobiliser,  de  concentrer  des  troupes  et  de  se  jeter 
sur  son  voisin  de  I'Occident. 

Je  ne  crois  pas  au  desir  ni  de  I'un  ni  de  I'autre 
des  deux  pays  de  jouer  I'efifroyable  coup  de  des  que 
serait  une  guerre;  mais  il  est  toujours  a  craindre, 
avec  le  caractere  frangais,  qu'un  incident  mal  pre- 
sente  n'amene  sa  population  ou  pour  mieux  dire,  1»^ 
elements  les  plus  nerveux  voire  meme  les  moins  res- 
pectables de  la  population,  a  creer  une  situation  qui 
rendrait  la  guerre  inevitable. 

Un  diplomate  d'experience  et  de  haute  position  di- 
sait recemment :  "S'il  eclate  un  de  ces  jours  un  inci- 
dent grave  entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne,  les  hom- 
mes d'Etat  des  deux  pays  devront  s'appliquer  a  lui 
donner  une  solution  pacifique  dans  les  trois  jours  ou 
bien  ce  sera  la  guerre." 

Un  des  elements  les  plus  dangereux  de  la  situation 
actuelle,  est  le  retour  de  la  France  a  la  loi  de  trois 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  May  8,  1914. 
Sir:— 

Yesterday  I  had  occasion  to  speak  with  a  Paris- 
ian who  is  thoroughly  informed  about  the  interna- 
tional situation.    He  told  me  the  following: 

"The  visit  of  the  King  and  Queen  of  England 
was  a  great  success ;  the  sun  shared  in  the  fete  and 
the  French  adore  making  demonstrations  and  shout- 
ing "Vive  le  Roi."  They  have  therefore  given  a 
really  warm  reception  to  their  guests ;  but  I  doubt 
whether  these  demonstrations  will  effect  the  slight- 
est change  in  the  policy  of  the  two  States.  Besides, 
the  toast  of  King  George  was  manifestly  less  warm 
than  that  of  M.  Poincare. 

Of  what  nature  are  the  obligations  which  bind 
the  two  States  to  each  other;  have  they  concluded 
a  military  convention  ?  I  do  not  know,  but  I  remem- 
ber that  thoughtful  and  serious  people  have  some 
little  doubts  as  to  the  help  which  France  would  re- 
ceive from  the  English  in  a  European  conflagra- 
tion. There  are  even  people  who  do  not  believe 
in  any  serious  British  assistance  at  sea. 

I  know  that  talk  is  current  of  an  intention  of 
the  British  to  land  troops  on  the  north  coast  of 
France  and  to  send  them  without  delay  to  the  south- 
eastern regions  to  head  off  the  Italian  troops.  That 
is  possible,  but  I  am  quite  sure  that  the  French  au- 
thorities do  not  place  a  very  high  estimate  on  the 
Italian  army  which  would  need  considerable  time  to 
mobilize. 

Lastly,  England  has  not  ceased  flirting  with 
Germany.  I  have  not  been  able  to  learn  lately  what 
has  become  of  the  Anglo-German  negotiations  rela- 
tive to  Angola  and  Mozambique;  but  that  is  a 
point  on  which  it  would  be  interesting  to  have  some 
exact  information. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  French  nation  has 
become  more  chauvinistic  and  more  self-confident 
during  the  last  few  months.  The  same  well-in- 
formed and  competent  people  who,  two  years  ago, 
showed  lively  apprehension  at  the  mere  mention  of 
possible  difficulties  between  France  and  Germany, 
have  changed  their  tone  to-day.  They  say  they  are 
certain  of  victory ;  they  make  much  of  the  progress, 
which  is  undeniable,  made  by  the  army  of  the  Re- 
public, and  they  say  they  are  sure  that  at  least  they 
will  be  able  to  hold  the  German  army  in  check  long 
enough  for  Russia  to  mobilize  her  army,  to  concen- 
trate her  troops,  and  to  throw  herself  on  her  west- 
ern neighbor. 

I  do  not  believe  that  either  country  desires  to 
play  that  awful  game  of  dice  which  a  war  would  be, 
but  it  is  always  to  be  feared — considering  the 
French  character — that  an  incident  which  is  badly 
represented  to  them  will  lead  the  population,  or  bet- 
ter the  more  nervous  or  even  only  the  less  respect- 
able parts  of  the  population,  to  create  a  situation 
which  would  make  war  inevitable. 

An  experienced  and  high  diplomat  said  recently: 
"If  a  grave  incident  were  to  occur  one  of  these  days 
between  France  and  Germany,  the  statesmen  of  the 
two  countries  would  have  to  exert  themselves  to 
have  it  peaceably  settled  within  three  days  or  there 
will  be  war." 

One  of  the  most  dangerous  factors  in  the  pres- 
ent situation  is  the  return  of  France  to  the  three 


139 


ans;  elle  a  ete  imposee  a  la  legere  par  le  parti  mili- 
taire,  et  le  pays  ne  peut  pas  le  supporter.  Avant 
deux  ans  d'ici,  il  faudra  y  renoncer  ou  faire  la  guerre ; 
de  bons  esprits  cherchent  a  remedier  a  la  situation 
par  une  modification  de  la  loi  qui  en  enleverait  les 
cotes  excessifs  sans  constituer  une  blessure  pour 
I'amour  propre  du  pays.  On  pense  a  une  combinai- 
son  basee  sur  le  rappel  annuel  des  reserves. 

La  presse  est  mauvaise  dans  les  deux  pays.  La 
campagne  qui  se  poursuit  en  Allemagne  au  sujet  de 
la  Legion  etrangere  est  excessivement  maladroite,  et 
le  ton  des  journaux  frangais  ne  cesse  d'etre  acerbe 
et  agressif.  Personne  n'a  assez  d'autorite  et  d'inde- 
pendance  pour  essayer  de  modifier  cette  situation  qui 
est  cependant  blamee  par  beaucoup  de  bons  esprits 

II  n'y  a  rien  a  attendre  du  Parlement ;  le  premier 
tour  de  scrutin  des  elections  nous  a  deja  montre 
comme  nous  nous  y  attendions,  que  la  prochaine 
Chambre  des  Deputes  sera  a  peu  de  chose  pres,  la 
meme  que  sa  devanciere.  Les  Socialistes  pourront 
gagner  quelques  voix,  mais  dans  I'ensemble,  la  su- 
prematie  restera  au  parti  radical-socialiste,  malgre 
ses  fautes  et  ses  erreurs.  Quoique  Ton  puisse  pen- 
ser  des  evenements  recents,  M.  Caillaux,  le  seul 
financier  que  compte  aujourd'hui  la  Chambre,  sem 
ble  devoir  rester  I'instigateur  de  la  politique  fran- 
?aise  avec  un  peu  de  fiel  et  de  mauvaise  humeur  en 
plus. 

Je  suis  etc. 

[s.]  Guillaume. 


years'  law ;  it  was  thoughtlessly  imposed  by  the 
military  party  and  the  country  cannot  bear  it.  It 
will  have  to  be  given  up,  or  war  will  have  to  be 
made  before  two  years  have  elapsed  from  to-day; 

sensible  people  are  trying  to  remedy  the  situation 
by  a  modification  of  the  law  which  would  remove 
its  excessive  severities  without  hurting  the  self- 
respect  of  the  country.  A  solution  based  on  the 
yearly  calling  in  of  the  reserves  has  been  considered. 

The  press  is  bad  in  both  countries.  The  cam- 
paign which  is  going  on  in  Germany  in  the  matter 
of  the  Foreign  Legion  is  exceedingly  stupid,  and 
the  tone  of  the  French  papers  continues  to  be  bitter 
and  aggressive.  Nobody  has  enough  authority  and 
independence  to  try  to  alter  the  situation  although 
it  is  condemned  by  many  sensible  people. 

Nothing  can  be  expected  from  Parliament;  the 
first  ballot  has  already  shown  us  that,  as  we  ex- 
pected, the  next  Chamber  of  Deputies  will  be  more 
or  less  the  same  as  its  predecessor.  The  Socialists 
may  gain  a  few  votes,  but  on  the  whole  the  major- 
ity will  remain  with  the  radical  socialist  party  de- 
spite its  faults  and  mistakes.  Whatever  one  may 
think  of  the  recent  events  it  seems  that  M.  Caillaux, 
the  only  financier  whom  the  Chamber  possesses  to- 
day, is  going  to  continue  to  be  the  moving  spirit 
of  French  policy  with  an  additional  dose  of  hatred 
and  ill-humor. 


I  am,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Guillaume. 


No.  116. 


Le  Baron  Guillaume,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Paris,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Paris,  le  9  Juin  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre ! 

A  I'heure  ou  j'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  adresser  le 
present  rapport— dix  heures  du  matin — on  espere 
que  la  crise  ministerielle  sera  bientot  terminee.  M. 
Ribot  a  fait  connaitre  hier  soir  a  I'Elysee  qu'il  ac- 
ceptait  la  mission  de  former  le  nouveau  Cabinet  et 
on  dit  qu'il  est  assure  du  concours  de  M.  M.  Bour- 
geois, Delcasse,  Jean  Dupuy,  Clementel  et  Noulens. 
Des  incidents  de  la  derniere  heure  peuvent  encore 
surgir;  mais  on  dit  generalement  que  les  premieres 
ouvertures  faites  par  M.  Ribot  ont  ete  tres  favorable- 
ment  accueillies. 

M.  Poincare,  qui  ne  s'etait  decide  qu'a  contre- 
coeur  a  faire  appel  au  groupe  de  la  rue  de  Valois,  e- 
offrant  le  pouvoir  a  M.  Viviani,  sera  evidemmer' 
particulierement  satisfait  de  pouvoir  s'appuyer  sur 
une  combinaison  composee  d'hommes  dont  il  appre- 
cie  le  talent  et  le  patriotisms  II  ne  peut  ignorer 
d'ailleurs  que  la  duree  de  la  crise  ministerielle  avait, 
en  grande  partie,  pour  motif,  de  lui  faire  personnelle- 
ment  echec.  II  est  tous  les  jours  plus  deteste  des 
radicaux-socialistes  et  des  socialistes  unifies;  il  est 
en  butte  a  I'hostilite  personnelle  et  vindicative  de 
plusieurs  chefs  de  partis,  tels  que  M.M.  Clemenceau 
et  Caillaux:  on  fera  tout  ce  qui  sera  humainement 
possible  pour  lui  rendre  la  vie  intenable  a  I'Elysee. 

Quel  est  le  devouement  personnel  sur  lequel  il 
peut  compter  parmi  les  hommes  qu'il  cherche  a 
grouper  autour  de  lui?  Le  probleme  est  d'une  solu- 
tion difficile  et  on  ne  peut  oublier  que  M.  Deschanel 
auquel  il  a  fait  des  oflFres,  fut  son  concurrent  pour  la 


Paris,  June  9,   1914. 
Sir:— 

At  the  hour  of  writing  this  report — 10  o'clock  in 
the  morning — everyone  is  hoping  that  the  Minister- 
ial crisis  will  soon  be  passed.  M.  Ribot  let  it  be 
known  last  night  at  the  Elysee  that  he  had  accepted 
the  mission  of  forming  the  new  Cabinet,  and  it  is 
said  that  he  is  assured  of  the  co-operation  of  MM. 
Bourgeois,  Delcasse,  Jean  Dupuy,  Clementel  and 
Noulens.  Incidents  may  arise  at  the  eleventh  hour, 
but  it  is  generally  said  that  the  first  overtures  made 
by  M.  Ribot  were  very  favorably  received. 

M.  Poincare,  who  had  only  unwillingly  decided  to 
appeal  to  the  group  of  Rue  de  Valois  by  offering 
the  power  to  M.  Viviani,  will  evidently  be  particu- 
larly satisfied  to  be  able  to  lean  on  a  combination 
of  men  whose  talents  and  patriotism  he  holds  in 
esteem.  He  must,  moreover,  be  aware  of  the  fact 
that  the  long  duration  of  the  Ministerial  crisis  was, 
to  a  great  extent,  intended  as  a  personal  blow  di- 
rected at  him.  He  is  daily  more  detested  by  the 
Radical  Socialists  and  the  United  Socialists ;  he  is 
exposed  to  the  personal  hostility  and  vindictiveness 
of  several  party  leaders  including  MM.  Clemenceau 
and  Caillaux ;  they  will  do  everything  humanly  pos- 
sible in  order  to  make  life  at  the  Elysee  unbearable 
for  him. 

Where  among  the  men  whom  he  seeks  to  group 
around  himself  can  he  count  on  personal  devotion? 
The  problem  is  a  difficult  one  to  solve,  and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  M.  Deschanel,  to  whom  he  has 
made  oflfers.  was  his  rival  for  the  Presidency  as 


Presidence  comme  le  fut  aussi  M.  Ribot  et  comme 
M.  Delcasse  reve  de  le  devenir. 

La  campagne  de  presse  fut,  ces  derniers  jours, 
d'une  violence  extreme  en  faveur  du  principe  de  la 
loi  de  trois  ans.  On  a  recherche  tous  les  moyens 
d'influencer  I'opinion  publique,  voulant  meme  y  com- 
promettre  la  personnalite  du  general  Joffre.  On  vit 
aussi  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Petersbourg,  pren- 
dre— contrairement  a  tous  les  usages — une  initiative 
assez  dangereuse  pour  I'avenir  de  la  France. 

Est-il  vrai  que  le  Cabinet  de  Petersbourg  ait  im- 
pose au  pays  I'adoption  de  la  loi  de  trois  ans  et  pe- 
serait  aujourd'hui  de  tout  son  poids  pour  en  obtenir 
le  maintien? 

Je  n'ai  pu  parvenir  a  obtenir  des  lumieres  sur  ce 
point  delicat,  mais  il  serait  d'autant  plus  grave  que 
les  hommes  tjui  dirigent  les  destinees  de  I'Empire 
des  Czars  ne  peuvent  ignorer  que  I'effort  demande 
ainsi  a  la  nation  frangaise  est  excessif  et  ne  pourra 
se  soutenir  longtemps.  L'attitude  du  Cabinet  de  Pe- 
tersbourg est-elle  done  basee  sur  la  conviction  que 
les  evenements  sent  assez  prochains  pour  qu'on 
puisse  se  servir  de  I'outil  qu'elle  entend  mettre  danS 
la  main  de  son  allie? 

La  constitution  d'un  Cabinet  Ribot  soulevera  cer- 
tes  une  opposition  violente  de  la  part  des  partis  ex- 
tremes qui  chercheront  a  avoir  I'explication  de  toutes 
les  insinuations  qu'on  a  repandues  ces  jours  derniers 
sur  l'attitude  de  la  Russie,  ses  desirs  et  ses  menaces. 


Je  suis  etc. 
[s.] 


Guillaume. 


No.  117. 


was  also  M.  Ribot  and  as  M.  Delcasse  dreams  of 
becoming. 

The  press  campaign  in  favor  of  the  three  years' 
law  was  extremely  violent  during  these  last  days. 
All  means  were  tried  to  influence  public  opinion  and 
it  was  even  wanted  to  compromise  the  person  of 
.General  Joflfre.  The  French  Ambassador  at  Peters- 
burg has  also,  contrary  to  all  custom,  taken  an  ini- 
tiative which  is  rather  dangerous  for  France's  fu- 
ture. 

Is  it  true  that  the  Cabinet  of  Petersburg  imposed 
on  France  the  adoption  of  the  three  years'  law,  and 
that  it  is  to-day  using  all  its  weight  in  order  to  se- 
cure its  maintenance? 

I  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  any  light  on  this 
delicate  point,  but  it  would  be  all  the  graver  because 
the  men  who  guide  the  destinies  of  the  Empire  of 
the  Czar  must  know  that  the  effort  which  is  thus 
being  demanded  of  the  French  nation  is  excessive 
and  cannot  be  sustained  for  any  length  of  time. 
Should  the  attitude  of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg 
be  based  on  the  conviction  that  the  events  are  suffi- 
ciently near  at  hand  to  use  the  tool  which  it  intends 
to  put  into  the  hand  of  its  ally? 

The  formation  of  a  Ribot  Cabinet  will  certainly 
cause  violent  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  extreme 
parties  who  will  ask  for  an  explanation  of  all  the 
insinuations  which  have  lately  been  circulated  con- 
cerning the  attitude  of  Russia,  her  desires,  and 
threats. 

Lam,  etc. 

[Signed]  Guillaume. 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Lon- 
dres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  11  Juin  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

J'ai  eu  I'honneur,  le  8  de  ce  mois,  de  vous  si- 
gnaler les  inquietudes  causees  ici  par  la  recente  crise 
ministerielle  en  France.  Aussi  la  formation  du  Cabi- 
net Ribot  est-elle  accueillie  avec  une  tres  vive  satis- 
faction, car  on  estime  que  I'appUcation  de  la  loi  de 
trois  ans  peut  seule  permettre  a  la  Republique  de 
faire  honneur  aux  engagements  qui  la  lient  a  son  al- 
liee,  la  Russie,  ou  a  son  amie,  I'Angleterre.  La  pa- 
role est  au  patriotisme  des  Frangais,  dont  on  ne 
veut  pas  douter;  les  querelles  de  parti  doivent  ceder 
le  pas  aux  interets  superieurs  d'une  nation,  et  M. 
Ribot,  le  veteran,  a  donne  un  bel  exemple  de  desin- 
teressement  et  d'energie  civique  en  acceptant  la 
tache  ardue  qui  s'est  offerte  a  lui.  La  presence  dans 
le  Cabinet  de  M.  Bourgeois,  franc  et  loyal,  radical 
eprouve  est  de  bonne  augure.  Si  sa  place  est  toute 
indiquee  au  quai  d'Orsay,  la  nomination  de  M.  Del- 
casse au  Departement  de  la  Guerre  semble  egalement 
heureuse  et  tout  fait  esperer  une  majorite  gouverne- 
mentale  pour  I'application  loyale  de  la  loi  militaire. 
Mais  on  estime  dans  les  cercles  politiques  anglais 
que  le  maintien  du  Ministere  Ribot  dependra  en 
grande  partie  de  l'attitude  qu'adoptera  M.  Clemen- 
ceau.  (Dn  le  sait  favorable  au  principe  de  la  loi  dont 
il  s'agit.  On  ignore  encore  s'il  fera  taire  ses  ran- 
cunes  personnelles  centre  le  President,  ou  s'il  sou- 
tiendra  plus  ou  moins  ouvertement  les  groupes  dont 
le  but  est  de  deconsiderer  le  Gouvernement  et  ren- 


Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to 
M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Sir: 


London,  June  11,  1914. 


On  the  8th  inst,  I  had  the  honor  to  report  to  you 
the  uneasiness  which  was  caused  here  by  the  recent 
Cabinet  crisis  in  France.  The  formation  of  the 
Ribot  Cabinet  has,  consequently,  been  received 
with  lively  satisfaction,  for  it  is  thought  that  only 
the  application  of  the  three  years'  law  can  put  the 
Republic  in  a  position  to  fulfill  the  agreements 
which  tie  her  to  her  ally,  Russia,  and  her  friend, 
England.  The  patriotism  of  the  French,  which 
there  is  no  desire  to  doubt,  has  the  word  now ;  party 
quarrels  must  give  way  to  the  superior  interests  of 
the  nation,  and  M.  Ribot,  the  veteran,  has  given  a 
good  example  of  disinterestedness  and  of  civic  en- 
ergy in  accepting  the  arduous  task  which  presented 
itself  to  him.  The  presence  in  the  Cabinet  of  the 
frank  and  loyal  M.  Bourgeois,  that  well-tried  Radi- 
cal, is  a  good  omen.  If  he  is  in  his  right  place  at 
the  Quai  d'Orsay,  the  nomination  of  M.  Delcasse 
for  the  War  Department  seems  equally  fortunate 
and  everything  justifies  the  hope  for  a  Government 
majority  in  favor  of  the  application  of  the  military 
law.  But  in  English  political  circles  it  is  thought 
that  the  fate  of  the  Ribot  Cabinet  will  greatly  de- 
pend on  the  attitude  which  M.  Clemenceau  is  going 
to  take.  He  is  known  to  be  in  favor  of  the  principle 
of  the  law  in  question.  But  it  is  not  yet  known 
whether  he  will  silence  his  personal  spite  against 
the  President  or  whether  he  will  support  more  or 


141 


dia  sa  tache  impossible.  De  la  les  apprehensions  qui 
persistent  encore,  malgre  le  succes  initial  de  M. 
Ribot. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
ts.J 


Cte.  de  Lalaing. 


less  those  groups  whose  aim  it  is  to  discredit  the 
Government,  and   whether   he   will   make  its   task 
impossible.     Hence  the  fears  that  still  prevail  de- 
spite M.  Ribot's  initial  success. 
Accei)t,  etc. 

[Signed]  Ct.  de  Lalaing. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  12  Juin  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

Les  journaux  allemands  consacrent  depuis  dix 
jours  en  premiere  page  des  articles  quotidiens  a  la 
crise  ministerielle  frangaise.  Elle  accapare  leur  at- 
tention et  celle  de  leurs  lecteurs.  La  question  al- 
banaise,  I'imbroglio  mexicain,  sent  relegues  au  se- 
cond plan.  Les  elections  legislatives  en  France, 
comme  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  vous  I'ecrire  le  14  Mai 
dernier,  avaient  cause  ici  une  grande  satisfaction  qui 
s'etait  faite  jour  dans  le  langage  de  la  presse,  avec 
cette  restriction  cependant  qu'il  ne  fallait  pas  espe- 
rer  de  la  majorite  de  la  nouvelle  Chambre  I'abro- 
gation  immediate  de  la  loi  sur  le  service  militaire  de 
trois  ans.  Cette  loi  a  acquis  en  eflfet  une  importance 
extraordinaire,  et  suivant  moi  quelque  peu  exageree, 
aux  yeux  des  Allemands.  C'est  le  leitmotif,  le  re- 
frain oblige  de  leurs  appreciations  sur  la  politique 
frangaise  a  I'egard  de  I'Allemagne.  C'est  pour  eux 
la  preuve  manifeste  des  desseins  agressifs  qu'ils  pre- 
tent  a  ses  dirigeants. 

La  demission  du  Cabinet  Doumergue,  I'echec  de 
la  combinaison  Viviani,  le  refus  de  MM.  Deschanel, 
Delcasse  et  Jean  Dupuy  d'assumer  la  responsabilite 
de  constituer  un  Ministere,  avaient  rendu  confiance  a 
la  presse  allemande  dans  la  realisation  de  son  desir: 
I'abolition  du  service  militaire  de  trois  ans  par  une 
majorite  de  radicaux  socialistes.  Mais  si  la  pensee 
etait  la  meme  chez  tous  les  organes  de  I'opinion  pu- 
blique  allemande,  I'expression  en  etait  bien  diffe- 
rente,  suivant  la  couleur  politique  du  journal.  La  ou 
la  presse  liberale  applaudissait  sans'mesure  au  triom- 
phe  du  radicalisme  frangais,  les  pangermanistes  ne 
trouvaient  que  matiere  a  raillerie  et  a  denigrement  ; 
on  peut  meme  dire  que  la  plupart  des  journaux  con- 
servateurs  n'ont  observe  aucune  mesure  dans  leurs 
jugements.  Tous  cependant  sont  d'accord  pour  voir 
dans  I'obstination  des  radicaux-socialistes  a  ne  pas 
faire  partie  d'un  Ministere  qui  ne  promettrait  pas  de 
resoudre  immediatement  la  question  militaire,  un 
plan  de  campagne  ourdi  contre  I'Elysee,  la  crise  mi- 
nisterielle en  se  prolongeant  devant  se  transformer 
en  crise  presidentielle. 

La  constitution  d'un  Cabinet  sous  la  presidence  de 
M.  Ribot  a  degu  les  esperances  des  journaux  alle- 
mands. lis  n'admettent  pas  que  I'honorable  acade- 
micien  n'ait  accepte  que  par  patriotisme,  malgre  son 
age  avance  et  son  mauvais  etat  de  sante,  la  tache  in- 
grate  de  former  un  Ministere  d'union  republicaine. 
lis  ne  voient  la  de  sa  part  qu'un  acte  de  complaisance 
envers  M.  Poincare.  Quant  a  ses  chances  de  duree, 
ils  s'en  referent  aveuglement  a  I'avis  de  Jaures  et  des 
radicaux  frangais,  quoique  la  "Gazette  de  Voss"-— 
qui  connait  mieux  I'histoire  parlementaire  de  la  Re- 
publique— ait  pris  soin  de  rappeler.  par  I'exemple  de 


Berlin,  June  12,   1914. 
Sir: — 

For  ten  days  the  Geriiian  papers  have  been  de- 
voting daily  articles  on  their  front  pages  to  the 
Cabinet  crisis  in  France.  It  monopolizes  their  and 
their  readers'  attention.  The  Albanian  question  and 
the  Mexican  imbroglio  were  relegated  to  the  back- 
ground. As  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  on 
May  14th,  the  parliamentary  elections  in  France 
cause  great  satisfaction  here  which  found  expres- 
sion in  the  language  of  the  press,  with  the  restric- 
tion, however,  that  it  could  not  be  hoped  that  the 
majority  of  the  new  Chamber  would  immediately 
repeal  the  law  concerning  the  three  years'  military 
service.  That  law  has  really  assumed  an  extra- 
ordinary, and,  in  my  opinoin,  somewhat  exagger- 
ated, importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  Germans.  It 
is  the  leitmotif,  the  ever  recurring  refrain  of  their 
writings  on  French  policy  towards  Germany.  They 
consider  it  the  palpable  proof  of  the  aggressive  de- 
signs which  they  attribute  to  the  directors  of 
France's  policy. 

The  fall  of  the  Doumergue  Cabinet,  the  miscar- 
riage of  the  Viviani  combination,  the  refusal  of 
MM.  Deschanel,  Delcasse,  and  Jean  Dupuy  to  as- 
sume the  responsibility  of  forming  a  Cabinet,  all  had 
given  the  German  press  confidence  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  its  desire — the  abolition  of  the  three  years' 
military  service  by  a  majority  of  Radical-Socialists. 
But  if  the  idea  was  the  same  with  all  the  organs  of 
public  opinion  in  Germany,  its  expression  differed 
widely  according  to  the  political  color  of  the  paper. 
While  the  liberal  press  greeted  the  triumph  of 
French  radicalism  with  extravagant  applause,  the 
Pan-Germanists  found  only  cause  for  raillery  and 
vilification.  Of  the  greater  part  of  the  conservative 
papers  it  may  even  be  said  that  they  were  without 
bound  and  measure  in  their  judgment.  All,  how- 
ever, agree  in  seeing  in  the  obstinate  refusal  of  the 
Radical-Socialists  not  to  take  part  in  a  Cabinet 
which  would  not  promise  to  solve  the  military  ques- 
tion at  once,  a  plan  of  campaign  concocted  against 
the  Elysee,  since  a  prolonged  Cabinet  crisis  must 
finally  resolve  itself  into  a  Presidential  crisis. 

The  formation  of  a  Cabinet  under  the  presidency 
of  M.  Ribot  has  been  a  disappointment  to  the  hopes 
of  the  German  papers.  They  do  not  believe  that  the 
honorable  academician  accepted  the  thankless  task 
of  forming  a  Republican  Coalition  Ministry  out  of 
sheer  patriotism,  in  spite  of  his  advanced  age  and 
his  bad  state  of  health.  They  see  in  it  only  an  act 
of  complacency  towards  M.  Poincare.  As  to  the 
chances  for  the  duration  of  the  Cabinet,  they  follow 
iilindly  the  opinion  of  M.  Jaures  and  the  Radical- 
Socialists,  though  the  Vossische  Zeitung — which  is 
better  acquainted  with  the  parliamentary  history  of 


AIM.  Meline  et  Barthou,  que  certains  Ministeres  con- 
damnes  a  mourir  des  le  premier  jour  avaient  eu  la 
vie  plus  dure  qu'on  ne  le  supposait.  En  realite,  sur- 
tout  apres  une  crise  difficile  a  denbuer,  le  Parlement 
frangais  a  generalement  accorde  quelques  mois  de 
repit  aux  combinaisons  ministerielles  les  mgins 
viables. 

II  semble  aujourd'hui,  d'apres  le  spectacle  que 
nous  offre  la  France,  que  le  Cabinet  Barthou  ait  trop 
■presume  des  forces  et  des  sentiments  du  Pays,  en  lui 
demandant  le  retablissement  du  service  militaire  de 
trois  ans,  et  que  les  Allemands  aient  raison  de  le 
penser.  Le  peuple  frangais  n'a  pas  montre  a  cette 
occasion  I'abnegation  patriotique  dont  il  avait  donne 
des  preuves  dans  d'autres  circonstances.  Cela  tient 
sans  doute  a  la  propagation  des  idees  socialistes  dans 
les  classes  inferieures  de  la  nation.  Quel  qu'il  en 
soit,  on  doit  se  demander  si  le  Cabinet  Barthou  et 
le  President  de  la  Republique  n'ont  pas  agi  avec  trop 
de  precipitation ;  si,  mal  eclaires  sur  les  veritables  in- 
tentions du  Gouvernement  Imperial  lorsqu'il  a  de- 
pose I'an  dernier  son  projet  de  loi  pour  le  renforce- 
ment  de  I'armee,  ils  ont  eu  raison  de  riposter  du  tac 
au  tac  par  la  loi  sur  le  service  de  trois  ans,  au  lieu 
de  s'assurer  que  I'augmentation  des  effectifs  alle- 
mands etait  reellement  une  arme  tournee  contre  la 
France.  Je  crois  en  definitive,  comme  I'a  dit  M.  de 
Bethmann  HoUweg  a  la  tribune  du  Reichstag,  que 
le  danger  d'une  confederation  balkanique,  qui  paraly- 
serait  plus  tard  une  grande  partie  des  forces  autri- 
chiennes,  a  ete  la  raison  dominante  de  la  loi  alle- 
mande  de  1913.  Quelques  semaines  apres  le  depot 
de  cette  loi,  la  confederation  balkanique  avait  cesse 
d'exister.  .Mais  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  se  trou- 
vait  en  presence  d'un  autre  danger  qu'il  n'avait  pas 
prevu :  le  depot  d'une  loi  augmentant  les  effectifs  de 
combat  de  I'armee  frangaise,  suivi  d'une  campagne 
violente  de  discours  et  d'articles  de  journaux  dirigee 
contre  I'AUemagne.  II  est  resulte  de  cette  agitation 
montree  par  les  Frangais  une  plus  grande  tension 
dans  leurs  rapports  avec  I'Empire  voisin  et  I'idee, 
faussement  repandue  ou  acceptee  sans  controle  par 
les  meilleurs  esprits  de  ce  pays-ci,  que  la  guerre  est 
inevitable  dans  un  avenir  rapproche,  parce  que  la 
France  la  desire  violemment  et  s'arme  febrilement 
pour  s'y  preparer.  A  Paris  les  memes  intentions 
sont  pretees  au  Gouvernement  Imperial  dont  plu- 
sieurs  membres  ont  eu  parfois,  il  faut  en  convenir, 
des  paroles  malheureuses;  tel  le  Ministre  de  la 
Guerre  parlant  d'une  "offensive  foudroyante"  et 
d'une  "attaque  brusquee"  pour  donner  la  victoire  a 
I'armee  allemande.  II  n'y  a  peut-etre  encore  au- 
jourd'hui qu'une  effroyable  meprise  chez  I'un  comme 
chez  I'autre  des  deux  peuples.  La  majorite  de  la  na- 
tion frangaise  ne  veut  certainement  pas  d'une  guerre 
et  cette  guerre  ne  serait  pas  necessaire  a  I'AUe- 
magne. Dans  peu  d'annees  I'equilibre  des  forces  ne 
sera  plus  possible  entre  elle  et  sa  voisine.  L'Alle- 
magne  n'a  qu'a  prendre  patience,  qu'a  poursuivre  en 
paix  le  developpement  incessant  de  sa  puissance  eco- 
nomique  et  financiere,  qu'a  attendre  les  effets  de  sa 
natalitepreponderante,pour  dominer  sans  conteste  et 
sans  lutte  toute  I'Europe  centrale.  M.  Barthou  et  M. 
Poincare  auraient  done  mieux  fait  peut-etre  d'exami- 
ner  avec  plus  de  sang-froid  s'il  n'existait  pas  de  meil- 
leur  moyen  d'assurer  la  paix  entre  la  France  et  I'Al- 
lemagne  que  cette  concurrence  dans  les  armements 
et  I'augmentation  des  effectifs,  dont  la  premiere  n'est 
pas  capable  de  supporter  le  poids  aussi  longtemps 
que  la  seconde. 

Un  autre  reproche  qu'on  pent  aaresser  aux  parti- 
sans en  France  du  service  de  trois  ans,  c'est  de  faire 
intervenir  sans  cesse  dans  la  discussion  de  cette  ques- 


the  Republic — takes  care  to  recall,  by  the  example 
of  MM.  Meline  and  Barthou,  that  certain  Cabi- 
nets condemned  to  die  from  the  first  day  proved  to 
have  more  vitality  than  was  expected  of  them.  The 
fact  is  that,  especially  after  a  crisis  which  was  diffi- 
cult to  solve,  the  French  Parliament  has  generally 
given  some  months  of  respite  even  to  ministerial 
combinations  the  least  likely  to  live. 

It  seems  to-day  from  the  spectacle  which  France 
is  presenting  to  us  that  the  Cabinet  Barthou  pre- 
sumed too  much  on  the  strength  and  the  sentiments 
of  the  country  in  demanding  from  it  the  reintroduc- 
tion  of  the  three  years'  military  service,  and  that  the 
Germans  are  right  in  thinking  so.  The  French  peo- 
ple have  not  on  this  occasion  shown  the  patriotic 
abnegation  of  which  they  have  given  proof  under 
other  circumstances.  This  is  doubtless  due  to  the 
propagation  of  socialistic  ideas  in  the  lower  classes 
of  the  nation.  However  that  may  be,  it  is  a  ques- 
tion whether  the  Cabinet  Barthou  did  not  act  with 
too  much  precipitation;  whether  badly  informed  on 
the  real  intentions  of  the  Imperial  Government 
when  it  put  the  project  of  the  law  concerning  the 
army  increase  on  the  table  last  year,  they  were 
right  in  replying  at  once  by  the  law  concerning  the 
three  years'  service,  instead  of  assuring  themselves 
first  that  the  increase  of  the  effective  strength  of  the 
German  army  was  really  an  arm  directed  against 
France.  In  short,  I  believe,  as  Mr.  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg  said  from  the  rostrum  of  the  Reichstag, 
that  the  danger  of  a  Balkan  Confederacy  which 
would  later  on  paralyze  a  large  part  of  the  Austrian 
forces  was  the  dominant  reason  for  the  German  law 
of  1913.  Some  weeks  after  this  law  was  introduced, 
the  Balkan  Confederacy  ceased  to  exist,  but  the 
Imperial  Grovernment  saw  itself  face  to  face  with 
another  danger  which  it  had  not  forseen :  the  intro- 
duction of  a  law  augmenting  the  effective  strength 
of  the  French  army,  followed  by  a  violent  campaign 
of  speeches  and  newspaper  articles  directed  against 
Germany.  The  result  of  the  agitation  shown  by  the 
French  has  been  an  increased  tension  in  their  rela- 
tions with  the  neighboring  Empire,  and  the  idea 
which  is  falsely  spread  or  accepted  without  verifi- 
cation by  the  best  heads  in  this  country  that  war 
is  inevitable  in  the  near  future  because  France  de- 
sires it  ardently  and  is  arming  feverishly  to  prepare 
for  it.  At  Paris  the  same  intentions  are  being  im- 
puted to  the  Imperial  Government,  some  of  whose 
members  have,  it  must  be  admitted,  occasionally 
used  unfortunate  words,  as  the  Minister  of  War 
in  speaking  of  a  "lightning  offensive"  and  of  an  "un- 
expected attack"  which  were  to  secure  victory  for 
the  German  army.  Perhaps  even  to-day  there  is 
nothing  but  a  terrible  misunderstanding  on  the  part 
of  either  of  the  two  countries.  The  majority  of  the 
French  nation  certainly  does  not  want  war  and 
Germany  has  no  need  of  it.  In  a  few  years  no  bal- 
ance of  forces  will  any  longer  be  possible  between  . 
her  and  her  neighbor.  Germany  has  only  to  be 
patient,  to  pursue  in  peace  the  incessant  develop- 
ment of  her  economic  and  financial  power,  and  to 
wait  for  the  effect  of  her  preponderant  birth-rate, 
in  order  to  dominate  without  dispute  and  fight  in 
all  of  central  Europe.  M.  Barthou  and  M.  Poincare 
would,  thus,  perhaps  have  done  better  if  they  had 
examined  with  more  coolness  whether  there  was 
no  better  means  of  ensuring  peace  between  France 
and  Germany  than  competition  in  armaments  and 
increasing  effective  strength,  the  burden  of  which 
the  former  is  not  capable  of  bearing  as  long  as  the 
latter. 

Another  reproach  which  might  be  made  against 
the  French  supporters  of  the  three  years'  service 
is  that  they  constantly  draw  Russia  into  the  discus- 


143 


tion  interieure  la  Russie,  dont  les  desseins  politiques 
restent  inpenetrables,  la  Russie  qui  dirige  la  Duplice 
a  son  profit  exclusif,  la  Russie,  qui  accroit,  elle  aussi, 
dans  une  proportion  effrayante  ses  armements,  sans 
qu'elle  soit  menacee  par  TAUemagne ! 

En  ce  qui  nous  concerne,  nous  n'avons  pas  a  pren- 
dre parti,  comme  le  fait  malheureusement  notre  pres- 
se  de  langue  frangaise.  pour  ou  contre  le  maintien  du 
service  de  trois  ans  chez  nos  voisins.  Mais  nous  pou- 
vons  nous  poser  a  nous-meme  cette  question:  le 
triomphe  du  parti  radical  sur  les  republicains  mo- 
deres  groupes  autour  du  President  de  la  Republique 
et  I'abandon  de  la  loi  militaire  du  Cabinet  Barthou 
qui  en  serait  la  consequence  ne  seraient-ils  pas  pour 
nous  des  evenements  tres  favorables,  car  ils  contri- 
bueraient  plus  que  tous  autres  a  eloigner  de  nos  fron- 
tieres  le  danger  d'une  guerre  dont  nous  avons  a  re- 
douter  les  consequences,  qelle  qu'en  soit  Tissue,  et  a 
retablir  dans  I'Occident  Europeen  une  situation  plus 
durable? 

Veuillez  agreer  etc. 

[s.]  Baron  Beyens. 


sioii  of  tills  internal  affair:  Russia,  whose  political 
aims  remain  impenetrable,  Russia  who  is  directing 
the  Dual  Alliance  to  her  exclusive  profit,  Russia 
who  is  likewise  and  at  an  appaling  rate  increasing 
her  armament  without  being  threatened  by  Ger- 
many! 

As  regards  ourselves,  there  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  take  sides — as  is  unfortunately  being  done 
by  our  French  press — for  or  against  the  maintenance 
of  the  three  years'  service  by  our  neighbors.  But 
we  may  put  this  question  to  ourselves.  Would  not 
the  victory  of  the  Radical  party  over  the  moderate 
Republicans  grouped  about  the  President  of  the 
Republic  and  the  consequent  abolition  of  the  mili- 
tary law  of  the  Cabinet  Barthou  be  very  favorable 
events  for  us,  since  they  would  more  than  anything 
else  contribute  to  remove  from  our  borders  the 
dangers  of  a  war  the  consequences  of  which  we  have 
to  dread,  whatever  its  issue,  and  to  reestablish  in 
Western  Europe  a  situation  of  greater  security? 


Accept,  etc. 
[Signed] 


Baron  Beyens. 


No.  119. 


Le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin,  i 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 


Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Berlin,  le  2  Juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre! 

La  nouvelle  que  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a 
Belgrade  avait  ete  charge  de  demander  au  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  d'ouvrir  une  instruction  contre  les  me- 
nees  anarchistes  dont  I'Archiduc  Frangois-Ferdinand 
et  la  Duchesse  de  Hohenberg  ont  ete  les  victimes  et 
de  laisser  des  agents  de  la  police  austro-hongroise 
prendre  part  aux  recherches  a  excite  un  certain  emoi 
dans  les  cercles  diplomatiques  de  Berlin.  Le  fait  que 
la  resolution  d'adresser  cette  demande  au  Cabinet  de 
Belgrade  a  ete  prise  a  la  suite  d'unje  conference  en- 
tre  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Comte 
Berchtold,  le  Chef  de  I'Etat  major  general  Conrad 
von  HotzendorfT,  et  le  Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  Kro- 
batin,  grossit  les  commentaires  que  la  nouvelle  pro- 
voque. 

Certes  il  faut  tenir  compte  de  I'exasperation  causee 
a  Vienne  par  le  forfait,  par  les  aveux  des  assassins  au 
sujet  de  la  provenance  de  leurs  bombes  envoyees  de 
Belgrade  et  par  le  langage  inconsidere  de  quelques 
feuilles  de  cette  capitale  qui  ont  cherche  a  justifier  le 
..-rime,  en  le  depeignant  comme  le  chatiment  merite 
de  I'oppression  dont  les  elements  serbes  et  le  senti- 
ment national  serbe  ont  a  souffrir  en  Bosnie.  Le 
Cabinet  Pachitch  qui  a  ferme  les  yeux  pour  ne  pas 
voir  le  foyer  de  propagande  anarchiste  existant  a  Bel- 
grade ne  doit  pas  etre  surpris  qu'on  le  requiere  d'agir 
energiquement  contre  les  coupables  au  lieu  de  con- 
tinuer  a  les  traiter  avec  une  aussi  aveugle  tolerance. 

Mais  tout  de  meme  la  demande  sort  des  regies 
ordinaires  du  droit.  Quand  un  Etat  accepte,  a  la 
suggestion  d'un  Gouvernement  etranger,  de  poursui- 
vre  sur  son  territoire  des  criminels,  il  confie  les  re- 
cherches a  ses  propres  agents.  La  Serbie  consentira- 
t-elle  a  subir  le  concours  de  policiers  austro- 
hongrois?    Si  elle  le  refuse,  comme  "ne  atteinte  por- 


Berlin,  July  2,  1914. 

Sir:— 

The  news  that  the  Minister  of  Austria-Hungary 
at  Belgrade  had  been  instructed  to  demand  of  the 
Servian  Government  an  examination  into  the  an- 
archist plot  of  which  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand 
and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg  fell  victims  and 
to  let  Austro-Hungarian  police  agents  participate 
in  the  researches  has  caused  anxiety  in  diplomatic 
circles  in  Berlin.  The  fact  that  the  decision  to 
address  this  demand  to  the  Cabinet  of  Belgrade 
was  taken  after  a  conference  between  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  Berchtold,  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  Conrad  von  Hotzendorff,  and 
the  Minister  of  War,  Krobatin,  magnifies  the  com- 
ments which  this  news  provokes. 

What  must  be  taken  into  account  is  the  ex- 
asperation caused  at  Vienna  by  the  crime,  by 
the  confession  of  the  assassins  as  to  the  origin  of 
the  bombs  which  had  been  sent  from  Belgride,  and 
by  the  incautious  language  of  some  papers  of  that 
capital  which  tried  to  justify  the  crime  in  describing 
it  as  the  well-deserved  punishment  for  the  oppres-. 
sion  which  Servian  elements  and  Servian  na- 
tional feelings  had  had  to  suffer  in  Bosnia.  The 
Pachitch  Cabinet,  which  closed  its  eyes  in  order 
not  to  see  the  hot-bed  of  the  anarchist  propaganda 
in  Belgrade,  must  not  be  surprised  that  it  is  re- 
quested to  act  with  energy  against  the  guilty  instead 
of  continuing  to  treat  them  with  such  blind  toler- 
ance. 

But  all  the  same,  the  demand  goes  beyond  the 
ordinary  rules  of  law.  When  a  State  agrees  at  the 
suggestion  of  a  foreign  Government  to  pursue  crim- 
inals on  its  territory,  it  charges  its  own  agents  with 
the  researches.  Will  Servia  consent  to  submit  to 
the  collaboration  of  Austro-Hungarian  police  offi- 


tee  a  ses  droits  de  souverainete,  un  conflit  s'en  sui- 
vra-t-il  qui  etant  donnee  la  colere  legitime  des  Gou- 
vernements  de  Vienne  et  de  Budapest  et  les  manifes- 
tations anti-serbes  dont  des  villes  de  la  monarchie 
sont  le  theatre,  pourrait  degenerer  en  hostilites. 

La  Serbia  n'en  viendrait  la,  se  dit-on  a  Berlin,  que 
si  elle  se  sentait  appuyee  par  la  Russie  et  le  Gou- 
vernement  du  Czar  ne  la  soutiendrait  pas,  car  il  doit 
lui-meme  partager  I'horreur  et  les  craintes  causees 
par  le  crime  des  regicides  de  Sarajewo. 


Veuillez  agreer  etc. 
[s.] 


Baron  Beyens. 


cers?  If  she  refuses  the  demand  as  an  attack  on 
her  sovereign  rights,  will  a  conflict  ensue  which,  in 
the  face  of  the  justified  anger  of  the  Governments 
of  Vienna  and  Budapest  and  the  anti-Servian  dem- 
onstrations taking  place  in  various  towns  of  the 
Monarchy,  might  develop  into  hostilities? 

Berlin  thinks  that  Servia  would  only  let  matters 
go  so  far  if  she  feels  that  she  was  being  backed  by 
Russia,  and  it  is  assumed  that  the  Government  of 
the  Czar  would  not  support  her  because  it  must 
itself  share  the  horror  and  the  fears  caused  by  the 
crime  of  the  regicides  of  Serajevo. 

Accept,  etc. 

[Signed]  Baron  Beyens. 


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